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ABSTRACT 
 
“’So that they are not killed and robbed every day’”: The construction and use of popular  
 
  discourse in Florentine Tuscany, c. 1250-1350 
            by 
   Joseph Knox Figliulo-Rosswurm 
 
My project is a social history of the emergence and use of popular identity and 
popular discourse in late medieval Florence and its territory. Its central theme is the role 
that the Florentine popolo’s discursive identity-a set of norms and associational models 
based on the core values of social peace and the rule of law-played in the commune’s 
consolidation of its institutional power in city and countryside. My main sources are the 
voluminous records of medieval Florence’s foreign-staffed courts: the Executor of the 
Ordinances of Justice, the Capitano del Popolo, and the Podestà, in addition to the 
Notarile Antecosimiano, tax records (estimi), and the commune’s legislative corpus. The 
Italian Renaissance state is a venerable topic in medieval and early modern 
historiography, yet rarely has the question been asked: how did rural non-elites, the 
majority of the population, use, in Michel de Certeau’s sense, the discourse of popular 
identity and solidarity that successive popular regimes elaborated over the period 1250-
1350? Recent scholarship on the topic has incorporated mountaineers and rural elites into 
the narrative, without moving beyond a conceptual binary of acceptance-resistance: later 
medieval states either deployed enough coercion and enticements to achieve their ends, 
or non-elites responded to these states in the most dramatic way possible, open rebellion. 
This schema does not reflect the complexity of mundane reality: case studies of urban 
non-elites’ and rural peoples’ interactions with Florentine popular institutions and their 
discursive imaginary reveal their provisional and tactical quality. Florentine public courts 
	 xiv	
played an important role in legitimizing public power in city and countryside, and 
residents of Florence’s countryside used these courts in large numbers, deploying the 
language of the commune’s popular regime to initiate legal action and impugn their 
enemies. Non-elites’ assent to public power did not exclude a calculating, instrumentalist 
view of the Florentine courts as an ambiguous source of authority, able to improve or 
damage one’s standing in the community. The density and variety of the Florentine 
archives allows me to study the contradictions and evasions at the heart of the Florentine 
state’s relationship with rural society in some detail. I thus move beyond a binary in 
which premodern non-elites are either docile victims of hegemony, or are always already 
resisting their landlords and public officials. The project bridges Florentine 
historiography with wider questions surrounding the emergence of the Italian communes, 
rural life, and the intersection between society and the law in the late Middle Ages. More 
broadly, the project offers a socio-cultural approach to understanding premodern state 
formation, non-elite self-organization, and rural life and society in an exceptionally well-
documented corner of Mediterranean Europe. 
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A Note on Names, Dates, Measurements, and Money 
 
Names:1 
 
Following standard practice, I use modern Italian equivalents of the Latin that appears in 
the documents. Thus, “Anthonius/Antonius” is given as “Antonio”, “Franciscus” as 
“Francesco.”  Popes and emperors are an exception, as are historical figures well-known 
in English, such as Matilda of Canossa or Gregory VII. Elite Florentine lineages such as 
the Bardi or Frescobaldi went by their surnames during the fourteenth century, but their 
patronymic within the lineage is often denoted in the documents. If a person’s father was 
deceased, this was also noted: “Andrea olim Filipozzo de Bardis,” for example, was 
Andrea, son of the deceased Filipozzo, of the Bardi lineage. I render this as “Andrea di 
Filipozzo dei Bardi” or “Andrea dei Bardi” in text to avoid such an awkward 
construction, quoting the full Latin or Tuscan name in footnotes. 
 
 Non-elite Florentines’ names usually denoted their father and geographical origin: for 
example, “Smeralda di Guido da Latera” was Smeralda, daughter of Guido, from the 
parish of Latera. As with elite names, if a person’s father was deceased, this was noted, in 
Latin or Tuscan: for example, “Giovanna che fu/fu di Giovanni da Rabiacaninna” was 
Giovanna, daughter of the deceased Giovanni, from Rabiacanina. 
 
Dates: 
 
The Florentines began their new year on March 25, the Feast of the Assumption. In-text 
dates are given in the new or common style, with the new year beginning January 1; 
archival citations are given in the Florentine style. 
 
Measurements: 
 
Dry measurement for grain in Florentine Tuscany was the staio/staia. Each staia was 
24.7 liters, seven-tenths of a bushel. A moggio (pl. moggia) was equivalent to 24 staia. 
Sicilian grain was measured in salmae; one salma equaled 2.75 or 3.3 hectoliters. A 
libbra of weight was equivalent to twelve once, equal to 339.5 grams or seven-tenths of a 
pound.  
Land measurements: A staioro was equivalent to twelve panora, or 512 sq. meters (5655 
sq. feet, or one-eighth of an acre).  
Liquid measurements: The basic unit was the cogno, each of which consisted of 407 
liters.  
A braccio was 58.36 centimeters or roughly two feet. A piede was 55 centimeters.2  
 																																																								
1 On Tuscan naming practices, see Olaf Brattö, Nuovi studi di antroponimia 
fiorentina. Il libro di Montaperti (an. MCCLX) (Florence, 1953) and David Herlihy, 
“Tuscan Names, 1200-1530,” Renaissance Quarterly 41:4 (Winter, 1988): 561-582. 
2See C.M. De La Roncière, Prix et salaires à Florence au XIVe siècle (1280-
1380) (Rome, 1982), 30-32. 
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Money:3 
Florence’s gold coin, the florin, appeared in 1252 and quickly became a crucial element 
in international trade. For local transactions, Florentines used petty silver and copper 
coins, monete di piccioli. The denaro (denari) was the basic unit of daily transactions. 
The standard money of account was the lira di piccioli (lire di piccioli). This was 
subdivided into twenty soldi and 240 denari each; one soldo was the equivalent of twelve 
denari.   
 
 
																																																								
3 On Florence’s medieval monetary system, see: Richard A. Goldthwaite, The 
economy of renaissance Florence. Baltimore, 2009), with appendix on the florin’s 
fluctuating value (at 609), and Goldthwaite, Building of Renaissance Florence 
(Baltimore, 1980), at 301-02 and 429-30. On Florence’s premodern money supply, see 
W.R. Day, Jr., “Fiorentini e altri italiani appaltatori di zecche straniere (1200-1600): un 
progetto di ricerca,” ASF V (2010): 9-29. This entry also draws on Dameron, Florence 
and its church, 249-50. 
	 1	
 
“Yes, structure is human, it is the monumentalisation of congealed sweat, sweat squeezed 
from old exploitation and represented as nature, the world we inhabit, the objective 
ground. We do not, in our insect-like comings and goings, make the immediate world in 
which we live, we do not make a contribution, on the contrary we are set in motion by it; 
a generation will pass before what we have done, as an exploited class, will seep through 
as an effect of objectivity.”-[Monsieur Dupont], “This is the definition of class hatred,” 
Nihilist Communism 
 
 
Introduction 
         Scope of the study 
The role of non-elite people in late medieval state formation provides the broad 
topic of this dissertation, which analyzes the creation and transformation of a 
heterogeneous sociopolitical and discursive community, the Florentine people (il popolo 
Fiorentino; populus Florentie), across the period 1250-1350. This study arises from a 
preoccupation with three problems facing scholars of premodern Italy: the composition of 
the thirteenth-century popular communes and their struggle against an older elite, the 
magnates; the city/countryside relationship, and the emergence of territorial or regional 
states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.1 Far from an exhaustive treatment of such 
vast subjects, this work addresses three questions: What role did non-elites play in the 
mundane operations and consolidation of the later medieval Florentine commune, 
especially under popular regimes (governo al popolo)? How did the popular commune’s 
discourses and practices, or popular identity, impact rural people? And what role did rural 
																																																								
1 The best single-volume, English-language introduction to the medieval Italian 
city-states remains Daniel Waley, The Italian city-republic, recently updated by Trevor 
Dean (London, 2010 [1968]). Philip Jones, The Italian city-state: from commune to 
signoria (Oxford, 1997) is an exhaustive history of the medieval city-states. John M. 
Najemy, A history of Florence (1200-1575) (Oxford, 2006), is the best recent synthetic 
study of Florence, emphasizing the post-1350 period. 
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people play in Florence’s rise from a second-rate town in the middle of nowhere to one of 
western Eurasia’s greatest economic and cultural hubs by 1300?2 
This study argues that the non-elite population of Florence and its subject rural 
territory (contado) played an important role in the development and consolidation of 
public power via their struggle to pacify urban space and tame a destructive elite, along 
with their active, ongoing use of the popular courts devised by the thirteenth-century 
popolo. During the early fourteenth century, the discursive categories of popular identity 
seeped into mundane forms of communication between state and society, shaping rural 
non-elites’ interactions with the magnates and their rural cousins. My analysis of rural 
society and the Florentine commune emphasizes quotidian interaction rather than singular 
and extraordinary events, such as revolts (in particular the Ciompi, 1378), which have 
usually preoccupied scholars of premodern Florence’s popular politics.3 
I argue that Florence’s military elite (milites4) and working population (popolani) 
cannot be discussed separately and therefore examine the two groups as mutually 
																																																								
2 Richard A. Goldthwaite, The economy of renaissance Florence (Baltimore, 
2009), reconstructs the Florentine economy in toto, 1200-1600; for the city’s earliest 
economic development, see W.R. Day, Jr., “The early development of the Florentine 
economy, c. 1100-1275,” PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2000. 
3 Out of the large literature on the Ciompi, the best recent work is: Ernesto 
Screpanti, L’angelo della liberazione nel tumulto dei Ciompi: Firenze, giugno-agosto 
1378 (Siena, 2008); Patrick Lantschner, “The ‘Ciompi Revolution’ constructed: Modern 
historians and the nineteenth-century paradigm of revolution.” Annali di Storia di Firenze 
4 (2009): 277-97; Alessandro Stella, La Révolte des Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le 
travail. Paris, 1993); the conference volume Il tumulto dei Ciompi. Un momento di storia 
fiorentina ed europea (Florence,1981); and Samuel Cohn, Jr., The laboring classes of 
renaissance Florence. (New York, 1980) at 129-77. 
4 This group consisted of families who furnished the urban militia’s cavalry 
(milites pro comuni). On the composition and function of the urban milites, see Jean-
Claude Maire Vigueur in Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur and Enrico Faini, Il sistema politico 
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antagonistic yet inseparable competitors for political power, discursive space in public 
ideology, and public resources, among them the commune’s institutions. Empirical 
evidence suggests analyzing the magnates and popolo as a conflictual community. The 
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century public documents informing this study demonstrate 
that the antagonism between magnates and their enemies arose from proximity: living in 
the same streets, the same parishes, the same rural communities. Yet this elbow-rubbing 
familiarity did not in and of itself determine the character of this relationship. Here, I 
expand on recent scholarship characterizing pre-modern cities as operating around 
systems of conflict.5 Rejecting an order-disorder binary, this approach sees urban politics 
as inherently conflictual, this conflict itself a feature of pre-modern urban life.6 One of 
the major benefits of such an approach to my subject is that it avoids a moralizing 
assessment of the communes. Much previous scholarship has seen the communes’ failure 
to tame factionalism and internal conflict as proof of their inferiority to the Italian 
peninsula’s early-modern lordships (signorie). Viewed another way, the endurance of 
internal struggles over political, judicial, and fiscal resources is in fact evidence for the 
city-states’ vitality. The incessant factional and class struggles over communal 
institutions and resources are evidence, in this approach, for the communes’ success in 
																																																																																																																																																																					
dei comuni italiani (secoli XII-XIV) (Milan, 2010) [hereafter “Maire Vigueur in Il 
sistema”], 20-22. 
5 See Patrick Lantschner,“Revolts and the political order of cities in the late 
Middle Ages.” Past and Present 225 (Nov. 2014): 4-46, and The logic of political 
conflict: Cities in Italy and the southern Low Countries, c. 1370-1440 (Oxford, 2015) 
[hereafter “Lantschner, Logic”], at 1-15. The classic on medieval communities of conflict 
is David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence (Princeton, 1993). 
6 Lantschner, “Fragmented cities in the later Middle Ages: Italy and the Near East 
compared,” EHR 130: 544 (2015): 547-582, expands this argument to near eastern cities, 
using Damascus as a case study. 
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supplanting other power centers-such as elite patronage networks, or the bishop’s 
entourage-as they established themselves as the hegemonic power in the Italian cities.7  
The popolo was a diverse coalition of urban Italians organized by neighborhood, 
profession and parish that arose during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to 
challenge an older, military elite for access to political power; to contain elite violence in 
the cities, and to develop public power extensively and intensively.8 Whether or not this 
coalition explicitly included rural non-elites, these people certainly considered 
themselves members of the popolo, representing themselves as such in the complaints 
(denuncie) and accusations they submitted to the Florentine courts. This study therefore 
also argues for characterization of rural non-elites as part of the popolo.  
More broadly, I try to understand how social groups and the discourses of 
identityt through which they define and legitimize themselves transform in content and 
meaning over time, from collective agency to a structural element in social reality. I do so 
through the lens of non-elite legal maneuvering. The institutional and discursive results 
of the magnate-popolo struggle, initially the response by collective human imagination 																																																								
7 I paraphrase here Alma Poloni, Potere al popolo. Conflitti sociali e lotte 
politiche nell’Italia comunale del Duecento. Milan, 2010) [hereafter “Poloni, Potere al 
popolo”], at 125: “Questa perenne fibrillazione è stata letta da molti storici come un 
segno della crisi del Comune come forma politica, della sua incapacità di pacificare la 
società e di garantire stabilità. Essa può però essere interpretata anche come una prova 
della vitalità dei regimi popolari, della grandi passioni che la politica continuava a 
suscitare, della vivacità di una dialettica politica che le ambizioni di potere di un piccolo 
gruppo di famiglie non riuscivano davvero a impoverire.” 
8 Poloni, Potere al popolo, is a superb and succinct guide to the popular regimes. 
See also the historiography reviews by Giuliano Milani, “Contro il comune dei milites: 
Trent’anni di dibatti sui regimi di Popolo” in I comuni di Jean-Claude Maire Vigueuer, 
eds. S. Diacciati & L. Tanzini (Rome, 2014), 235-58; and Massimo Giansante, “Ancora 
magnati e popolani: Riflessioni in margine a Politics and Justice di Sarah R. Blanshei,” 
ASI 637: III (2013): 543-70; and Alma Poloni, “Il comune di popolo e le sue istituzioni 
tra Due e Trecento. Alcune riflessioni a partire dalla storiografia dell’ultimo 
quindicennio,” Reti Medievali Rivista 13, 1 (2012): 3-25. 
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and struggle to a felt need for collective security and collective identity around which to 
rally, accrued to become structuring factors in later peoples’ lived social experience, for 
better and worse.9 
Recent scholarship has decentered the history of medieval urban Italy: Florence 
no longer stands as an archetype or model for developments elsewhere, as it once did.10 
This expanded scholarly gaze allows comparison between Florence and its rivals, allies, 
and business partners: cities such as Siena, Pisa, Lucca and Bologna. The present study 
focuses on Florentine Tuscany, but draws on work for other cities wherever possible in 
order to frame its conclusions comparatively. I hope to avoid the single-city myopia that 
is medieval Italian history’s traditional stumbling block: the professional, often 
unintentional version of that venerable Italian pastime, campanilismo,11 or parochialism.  
Within Florentine historiography, a reconsideration of the relationship between 
state and society is also due. The last fifteen years have seen a real watershed in the study 
of medieval Florence.12 Recent digs in the city’s historical center have increased the 
archeological evidence, shedding new light on the medieval city’s built environment.13 
This study contends that the period 1250-1350, usually segmented in Florentine 																																																								
9 My approach is broadly influenced by the arguments set forth in [Monsieur 
Dupont], Nihilist Communism: A critique of optimism in the far left ([np]: Ardent, 2009). 
10 See the conference volume Beyond Florence, ed. Paula A. Findlen, et. al. 
(Stanford, 2003), in particular the contributions of Gene Brucker (5-12); Paula A. Findlen 
(13-28); and Randolph Starn (233-42). 
11 See the remarks of Richard A. Goldthwaite in Economy, xii-xiv. 
12 See G. Pinto, P. Cammarosano and A. Zorzi, “I primi secoli della storia di 
Firenze,” Annali di Storia di Firenze VI (2011): 221-42, and Silvia Diacciati, “A 
proposto di A History of Florence di John Najemy,” Annali di Storia di Firenze V (2010): 
http://www.dssg.unifi.it/SDF/annali/annali2010.htm. 
13 See Jacopo Bruttini, “Enclavi urbane a Firenze: Il caso della famiglia Uberti,” 
Annali di Storia di Firenze VI (2011): 5-35, which discusses recent archeological work 
and provides wonderful maps and hypothetical sketches of the twelfth-century urban 
core.  
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historiography, should be treated as a continuum during which Florence’s popolo 
crystallized as an entity capable of shaping and manipulating the commune’s discursive 
and institutional practices.  
The relationship between the peninsula’s medieval city-states and their subject 
rural hinterland (contado) is an important theme throughout Italian history.14 Cities and 
countryside were more interconnected in medieval Italy than elsewhere in the medieval 
West; Italian cities can scarcely be discussed without reference to the contado.15 This 
study argues that the city-country relationship cannot be characterized as uniformly 
exploitative or beneficial. Rather, it asks how the practices and demands of Florence fit 
into the local concerns and power structures of rural communities. Understanding how 
rural people used, avoided, and tried to game Florence’s institutions demonstrates the 
tacit negotiation at the heart of state officials’ interactions with rural people. Rural 
compliance in any degree with the state’s demands did not mean that the commune did as 
it wished in the countryside, nor that it controlled or even understood rural conditions. 
I approach the relationship between rural people and urban public power through 
the prism of Florentine public justice. The execution of justice was a basic activity for 
premodern European states, especially the Italian urban communes, and reliable public 
courts of arbitration and decision were an essential element in their public life from the 
beginning.16 The appeal of public justice to rural Tuscans is evident as soon as 
																																																								
14 The best survey of the subject’s origins is Pierre Toubert, “‘Città’ e ‘contado’ 
dans l’Italie médiévale: L’emergence d’un thème historiographique entre Renaissance et 
Romantisme,” La Cultura 22 (1984): 219-48. 
15 On the city & countryside, see the article collections of Giovanni Cherubini, 
Signori, contadini, borghesi (Florence, 1974), and Scritti Toscani (Florence, 1994). 
16 Maire Vigueur in Il sistema, 13: “…la giustizia [publica] è sicuramente il 
terreno sul quale i cittadini hanno dato prova di maggiore ingegnosità e creatività 
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continuous public documentation begins (1343).17 Tuscans used the Florentine courts 
eagerly, cannily and often, producing thousands of complaints in the form of written, 
anonymous denunciations (It. tamburagione, Lat. cedula) to communal officials. The 
allegations embraced crimes ranging from petty theft to high treason, with furious 
denunciation of perpetrators from every social stratum, be they impoverished 
sharecroppers or members of the region’s old feudal elite, the Counts Guidi and Alberti.  
While public justice clearly was a commodity in high demand among Florence’s 
rural subjects, the motivations behind this demand are less evident. Thus, the study 
incorporates an array of other archival material to reconstruct how residents of Florence’s 
contado perceived and interacted with the Florentine commune as the late-medieval crisis 
descended upon Tuscany. Reconstructing rural peoples’ stories, plots, claims and 
counter-claims in the commune’s courts demonstrates the widespread appeal of public 
judicial institutions while illuminating the complex motivations behind this appeal. 
Like its subjects, this study views the state not as a single, monolithic entity but 
rather as a tangle of institutions and resources, possibilities and perils, that non-elites 
could manipulate deftly or not, depending on their knowledge of institutions, the 
categories and rhetoric of popular discourse, and their own social standing in their 
																																																																																																																																																																					
istituzionale nel periodo di formazione del comune.” On medieval justice, see the 
conference volumes La giustizia nell’alto medioevo (secoli IX-XI), 179-250. Spoleto, 
1997) and Crime, society and the law in renaissance Italy, eds. Trevor Dean and K.J.P. 
Lowe (Cambridge, 1995); Sarah Rubin Blanshei, Politics and justice in late medieval 
Bologna. Leiden, 2010); and, for Marseilles, Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of 
Justice (Ithaca, 2003). 
17 On documentary losses and Florence’s high-medieval legal history, see 
Lorenzo Tanzini’s editorial introduction, “Il più antico ordinamento della Camera del 
Comune di Firenze: le ‘Provvisioni Canonizzate’ del 1289,” Annali di Storia di Firenze I 
(2006): 139-179, at 139-55. 
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communities.18 I also argue for greater nuance in examining the conflicts and 
compromises surrounding premodern public life and state formation. The stark contrasts 
of hegemony/contestation or domination/resistance do not necessarily account for the 
complexity of this process.19 These paradigms are a legacy of the international 
revolutionary tradition birthed by the French Revolution, of which Marxism is only the 
most famous strand. Analysis of the dialectic between historical elites and subalterns in 
these terms thus implicitly or explicitly takes this event and its cognates or would-be 
cognates (Paris 1871, Petrograd 1917) as a template for understanding premodern social 
conflict.20 Such conceptual schematism hinders a deeper understanding of the factors 
conditioning medieval non-elites’ compliance with, accomodation to, or evasion of state 
power, its institutions and discoursive identities, as well as the power of magnates and 
other elite landowners and merchants. Resistance, hidden or otherwise, was only one 
option for non-elites, and not the one most commonly taken. My focus on this jumble of 
																																																								
18 My approach to the state as a cluster of tactical possibilities is broadly 
influenced by Byzantinist John Haldon’s arguments on state institutions’ relative 
autonomy and sociologist Bob Jessop “strategical-relational approach” (SRA) to the 
sociology of the state. See Haldon, The state and the tributary mode of production 
(London, 1993), 188-94, and Jessop, State power (London, 2008), at 1-18 and 225-46. I 
thank Kristoffer Smemo for the Jessop reference. 
19 The classic studies of subaltern resistance to state and landlord power are James 
C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven, 1987); Domination and the arts of 
resistance (New Haven, 1992); and (New Haven, 2010). On medieval state formation and 
its historiography, see in particular Chris Wickham, Framing the early Middle Ages 
(Oxford, 2005), 56-153, with definitions at 56-58, and Rees Davies, “The medieval state: 
the tyranny of a concept?” Journal of historical sociology 16 (2003): 280-300.  
20 The most interesting recent assay in this field is James C. Scott’s The art of not 
being governed An Anarchist history of upland southeast Asia (New Haven, 2010). For a 
nuanced defense of Marxist categories’ utility for medievalists, see the conference 
volume Marxist history-writing for the twenty-first century, ed. Chris Wickham (Oxford, 
2007). See also S.H. Rigby, Marxism and history: A critical introduction (Manchester, 
1987); English society in the later Middle Ages (New York, 1995); and Engels and the 
formation of Marxism (New York, 1992). 
	 9	
possible non-elite maneuvering is appropriate for a social reality in which non-elites in 
Florence and its rural territories were enmeshed in overlapping and conflicting structures 
and relations of oppression-which could also, at times, benefit them.21  
 Rural peoples’ frequent appeals to one sector of the Florentine state did not imply 
a similar investment in other state structures. Nor did it signify assent to the entirety of 
the commune’s exactions or self-image: for example, resentment against fiscal exactions 
did not necessarily imply a similar opposition to Florentine public justice, still less open 
rebellion. The rural reception of and response to state institutions and officials depended 
on local conditions: rural lords, the Florentine commune, parishes, rural communes, and 
above all family laid claim to the overlapping and intersecting allegiances of rural 
people.22 Just as different sectors of the city contained different aggregations of elite and 
non-elite residents and thus different factional or social allegiances, Florentine Tuscany’s 
communities differed in the frequency and intensity of their contacts with state 
institutions and in their compliance with state demands. 
Central to this study is the argument that social identities such as magnate or 
popular status should be viewed in terms of use: how did non-elites adopt and redeploy to 																																																								
21 On medieval peasant action in the face of rapacious elites, see Paul Freedman, 
The origins of servitude in medieval Catalonia (Cambridge, 1991); R.H. Hilton, Bond 
Men Made Free (London, 1975); Wickham, “Peasant society and its problems” in 
Framing, especially section 4, “The return of feudal dominance in the West,” at 570-588; 
Wickham, “Gossip and resistance among the medieval peasantry,” Past & Present 160 
(1998): 3-24. On peasants and the state in later medieval Egypt, see Yossef Rapoport, 
“Invisibile peasants, marauding nomads: Taxation, tribalism, and rebellion in Mamluk 
Egypt,” Mamluk Studies Review VIII (2): 2004, 1-22. On how some societies have 
avoided state power, see Pierre Clastres, Society against the state, trans. Robert Hurly 
and Abe Stein (New York, 1989), and Scott, Art of not being governed.  
22 Luis M. Pozo, “The mechanisms of class accommodation in precapitalist 
Europe: A study in hegemony,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 29:3 (2006): 227-269, 
explores how intersecting and overlapping loyalties blunted and channeled class struggle 
in preindustrial Europe. 
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their own ends the rhetoric and discursive identities of the Florentine state? My focus on 
tactical use, and the refraction of public power through mundane social relations, explains 
the absence in this study of stand-alone chapters dedicated to the magnates or popolo as 
such. The social relationship between the two – or, rather, the surviving textual 
representations of this relationship – forms the subject of this study more than the 
individual groups or (still less) than individual elite or popolare families.23  
This approach to non-elite action derives from empirical and theoretical concerns: 
close reading of denunciations paired with notarial evidence reveals the fascinating 
complexity behind apparently inconsequential rural crime. Eschewing quantitative scope 
and the search for a monocausal explanation of the magnate-popolo conflict or the appeal 
of state institutions, I hope this study instead gains through depth of attention to the 
communities and themes analyzed. Theoretically, my attention to use and daily practice 
draws on the work of Michel de Certeau and Pierre Bourdieu. Their attention to the 
everyday construction and reconstruction of power provides a productive framework for 
studying medieval subalterns’ tactical reception of and responses to elite actions and the 
commune’s discourse of good government.24  
In denunciation after denunciation to Florence’s foreign-staffed courts, rural 
people appealed to Florentine justice based on their popular identity. This consisted of 
																																																								
23 On medieval Italian family structure, resources and strategy, see the important 
new studies by Giuliano Milani’s research team on the Alighieri family, above all the 
following pieces: “Ruolo sociale e memoria degli Alighieri prima di Dante”, 1-40, and 
Silvia Diacciati, “Dante: relazioni sociali e vita pubblica”, 243-270, both in Dante 
attraverso i documenti. I. Famiglia e patrimonio (secolo XII-1300 circa), eds. Giuliano 
Milani, Antonio Montefusco, Reti medievali 15, 2 (2014). 
24 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a theory of practice, trans. Richard Nice 
(Cambridge, 1977), particularly 72-95 and 159-97; Michel de Certeau, The practice of 
everyday life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, 1984), 29-42. 
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their membership-- genuine, feigned or imagined -- in the multifacted community of the 
populus civitatis Florentie et sue comitatis et districti, “the people of the city of Florence 
and its contado and distretto,” as denunciations usually described it. This community of 
the popolo was a discursive as well as social entity, that shaped the language through 
which non-elites situated themselves in their tactical appeals to Florentine public power. 
The residents of Florence’s rural parishes, communes and mountains were nobody’s 
fools. They understood how the mechanisms of Florentine public power operated, and 
were perfectly capable of manipulating them to serve family or factional strategies, just 
as their betters among the Florentine oligarchy manipulated the city’s constitutional 
system.25  
Sources and methodologies 
Arguing for continuity in Florentine popular identity across 1250-1350 is possible 
because the thirteenth-century popular regimes thoroughly documented their activities, 
and much of this documentation survives.26 The record is significant in itself, being an 
important part of the historical process it records. Recent scholarship has emphasized the 
importance of documentary practices, especially the compilation of normative statutes 
and lists, for the later thirteenth-century communes.27 This is unsurprising, given the 
central, long-acknowledged role of professionals and merchants in communal affairs, 
																																																								
25 For the post-1382 oligarchy’s use of constitutional mechanisms as a channel for 
containing and controlling political conflict, see Lantschner, Logic, 139-145. 
26 See Maire-Vigueur, Il sistema, 19-20, for a comparison of consular- and 
popular-era documentary production and survival. 
27 See Enrico Faini’s recent and exhaustive study of early statutory practices: “Le 
tradizioni normative delle città toscane. Le origini (secoli XII-metà XIII),” ASI (2013): 
419-81.  
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especially during the thirteenth century.28 Their writings, and the sense of civic identity 
they developed, will be discussed below. Bologna, the so-called “republic of notaries,” 
epitomizes the dense connections among legal professionals, documentary practices, and 
forms of social and political exclusion under a popular regime.29  
Florence possesses an incredible, perhaps unrivaled, collection of sources for the 
pre-modern period: documentary, narrative, private and public.30 Scholars of all kinds, 
from art historians to political economists, have been mining Florence’s archival wealth 
since the nineteenth century. This circumstance, together with the city’s immense cultural 
patrimony, has undeservedly made Florence the “model and myth” of a popular 
commune and, more broadly, the Florentine experience representative of those elsewhere 
in the peninsula.31 Although broadly comparable to other urban communes, especially its 
neighbors Bologna and Siena, Florence was exceptional if not unique in many ways, 
including its relatively late institutional development as a commune; the degree to which 
the twelfth-century city was economically and socially distinct from its contado; the 
artificially late beginning of continuous communal documentation; its large population; 
																																																								
28 Edward Coleman, “The Italian communes: recent work and current trends.” 
Journal of Medieval History 254 (1999), 373-397, at 381-82. 
29 For a lucid and thorough analysis of recent scholarship on Bologna in relation 
to other cities, see Massimo Giansante, “Ancora magnati e popolani: Riflessioni in 
margine a Politics and Justice di Sarah R. Blanshei,” ASI 637: III (2013): 543-70. 
30 The best discussions of the Florentine archives’ judicial material is Andrea 
Zorzi, “Pluralismo giudiziario e documentazione: il caso di Firenze in età comunale,” in 
Pratiques sociales et politiques judiciares dans les villes de l’Occident à la fin du Moyen 
Âge, ed. Jacques Chiffoleau, Claude Gauvard, Andrea Zorzi (Rome, 2007), 174-81, and 
“The judicial system in Florence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, ”in Crime, 
society and the law in renaissance Italy, eds. Trevor Dean & K.J.P. Lowe (Cambridge, 
1994) [hereafter “Zorzi, “Judicial system”], 40-58. 
31 On the Florence-centric tradition, see Maire Vigueur, “Il problema 
storiografica”. 
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and Florence’s economic importance in Italy and far beyond as a hub of the 
Mediterranean and European economy.32 
This Florence-centric bias has largely been corrected in the past twenty years as 
other cities -- especially Bologna and Rome -- have decentered Florence as an archetype 
for developments elsewhere. Yet the city’s medieval and Renaissance documentary 
patrimony is far from exhausted. In addition to the State Archive and that of the 
Archbishop, numerous private and religious orders’ archives remain understudied or  
generally off limits to scholars. As this dissertation was nearing completion, a new 
documentary trove was revealed when Florence’s oldest confraternity, the Misericordia 
(f. 1244) announced that its archives would soon be inventoried and open to the public.33  
The vicissitudes of documentary preservation and destruction have created a 
paradoxical situation in discussing the Florentine popolo. Consistent if damaged public 
documentation does not begin until 1343, late in the commune’s history. Yet the 
ordinance- and statute-based judicial and executive offices, so characteristic of the popolo 
here as elsewhere in Italy, had been functioning for decades -- in the Podestà’s case, 
functioning in some form since 1207.34 Florentines would have been quite familiar with 
																																																								
32 The scope of the Florentine merchants’ network by the early fourteenth century 
is highlighted in Yves Renouard, “Una spedizione di cereali dalla Puglia in Armenia 
sequita dai Bardi per conto di Benedetto XII.” Studi Salentini 18 (Dec., 1964): 242-78. 
33Maria Cristina Carratù, “Misericordia di Firenze, la vera scoperta è 
quell’archivio sconosciuto,” La Repubblica, 18 January 2016 (online version: 
http://firenze.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/01/18/news/misericordia_di_firenze_la_vera_sc
operta_e_quell_archivio_sconosciuto-131546193/). 
34 The authoritative study of the Florentine Podestà and other popular offices is 
Andrea Zorzi, “I rettori di Firenze: Reclutamento, flussi, scambi (1193-1313),” in I 
podestà dell’Italia comunale, ed. Jean Claude Maire-Vigueuer. Rome, 2000) [hereafter 
“Zorzi, I rettori”], 453-594. 
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the operation and structure of the foreign-staffed courts by the time documentation 
begins, as I discuss in Chapter 3. 
My main archival sources are the acts of the Executor of the Ordinances of 
Justice; the Podestà; the Capitano del Popolo; notarial registers (Notarile Antecosimiano); 
and the commune’s fragmentary fiscal records, from the treasury (Camera del Comune) 
and its fragmentary tax records (Estimi).35 The sections on rural society and its 
discontents draw mainly on the records of the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice, an 
office unique to Florence. Established in 1306 and abolished by the Medici in 1435, it 
was the last court created by a Florentine popular regime and was a direct response to 
civil war between magnate factions, the Black and White Guelfs. The Executor was 
entrusted with upholding the Ordinances, although enforcement of these depended on 
political regime. The registers consist of criminal and civil procedures against female and 
male magnates, as well as communal officials accused of incompetence, corruption or 
treason.  
The Executor’s records are remarkable for many reasons. Most of the Executor’s 
criminal procedures originated from anonymous, written denunciations (cedulae; 
tamburagioni). These were lodged in dropboxes (tamburi) placed outside the Palazzo del 
Podestà, today’s Bargello. Very few of these denunciations survive in the original; the 
commune’s scribes copied them out and probably then discarded them as procedural 
ephemera. Yet they preserved the original denunciations’ structure, language, and 
																																																								
35 These sources are entitled: Atti dell’Esecutore degli Ordinamenti di Giustizia 
[EOG];Atti del Podestà [AdP]; Atti del Capitano del Popolo [AdC]; Camera del Comune 
[CdC]; Estimo [Est.]; Notarile antecosimiano [NA]. The Archivio di Stato’s Sistema 
Informatico (http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/siasfi/index2.html) is an excellent 
guide to the archive’s medieval and early modern series. 
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content. Denunciations were written in a mixture of Latin and Tuscan volgare, although 
their anonymity usually hampers definitive discussion of authorship and motivations-but 
not always, as chapter 4 demonstrates. They are a fascinating and idiosyncratic, if not 
unique, source for mundane textual practices in a premodern society.36 
Several scholars have preceded me in examining the Executor’s registers. Gene 
Brucker drew on the court’s denunciations anecdotally in his history of Florence between 
1343-1378.37 Andrea Zorzi and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber reconstructed the origins of 
the Executor’s court and the latter systematically quantified samplings of the court’s 
records in relation to the magnates. Samuel Cohn, Jr., drew on samples from the 
Executor’s acts for his Laboring classes of Florence. Claudia Caduff and Carol Lansing 
reconstructed the normative operations of the court in the 1340s, identifying some 
patterns in complaints to the court.38 Most previous scholarship based on the Executor’s 
records used them for evidence regarding administrative history, or to reconstruct 
patterns of magnate criminality and family identity across the later Trecento.39 I expand 
																																																								
36 On the historical practice of petition and denunciation, see Luke Roberts, “The 
petition box in eighteenth-century Tosa,” Journal of Japanese Studies 20:2 (1994): 423-
458 and the special issue on denunciation of The Journal of Modern History, 68:4, 
Practices of denunciation in modern European history, 1789-1989 (1996), especially 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Signals from below: Soviet letters of denunciation of the 1930s,” at 
831-66. 
37 Gene A. Brucker, Florentine politics and society, 1343-1378 (Princeton, NJ., 
1962). 
38 See Andrea Zorzi, “I rettori” and “the judicial system”; Christiane Klapisch-
Zuber, “Vrais et faux magnats: L’application des Ordonnances de Justice au XIV siècle,” 
in Magnati e popolani nell’italia communale, 273-91; “Nobles or pariahs? The exclusion 
of Florentine magnates from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 39:2 (1997): 215-30; and, above all, her Retour à la cité: 
Les magnates de Florence, 1340-1440 (Paris, 2006); Cohn, The laboring classes, ch. 3 
and statistical appendices (179-204, 211-80); Caduff, “Magnati,”; Lansing, “Magnate 
violence revisited”. 
39 See Zorzi, “I rettori”, and Cohn, Laboring classes. 
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on this scholarship in my focus on rural communities’ reception of the court, approaching 
the denunciation system as a state technology open to a variety of uses and as an 
important product of the popular movement and popular identity, which subsequently 
structured both. 
This study’s approach to archival material has been shaped by recent work on 
medieval public justice.40 Scholars such as Sarah Rubin Blanshei, Sarah Menzinger, 
Massimo Vallerani and Giuliano Milani have pioneered the systematic study of medieval 
judicial material, primarily for Bologna and Perugia, which preserve thirteenth-century 
documentation lost for Florence.41 For the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Thomas 
Kuehn and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber have drawn productively on anthropology and 
ethnography in their reconstruction of the manifold and overlapping solidarities and 
interstices of Florence’s pre-modern families and their interactions with the state.42 
Recent work on medieval law and society has often used the processual model of legal 
anthropology, and has supplanted an evolutionary, statist view of medieval justice that 
																																																								
40 The best general introduction to medieval Italian law is Mario Ascheri, The 
laws of late medieval Italy (1000-1500), trans. Anabel Thomas and Sara Elin Roberts 
(Leiden, 2013). 
41 S. Blanshei, Perugia, 1260-1340 (Philadelphia, 1980) and Politics; S. 
Menzinger, Giuristi e politica nei comuni di popolo (Rome, 2006); G. Milani, 
L’esclusione dal comune (Rome, 2003); M. Vallerani, Il sistema giudiziario del comune 
di Perugia (Perugia, 1991); “Pace et processo nel sistema giudiziario del comune di 
Perugia,” Quaderni Storici 101 (1999): 315-53; Medieval public justice, trans. Sarah 
Rubin Blanshei. Washington, D.C., 2012). 
42 Thomas Kuehn, Law, family, and women: toward a legal anthropology of 
renaissance Italy (Chicago, 1991); Illegitimacy in Renaissance Florence (Ann Arbor, 
2002); and Heirs, kin, and creditors in renaissance Florence (Cambridge, 2004), which 
collects previous articles; out of Klapisch-Zuber’s massive corpus, see the studies 
collected in Women, family and ritual in renaissance Italy, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane 
(Chicago, 1985), with David Herlihy’s valuable historiographical introduction.  
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prevailed during much of the twentieth century.43 This school approaches disputes and 
legal proceedings as individual elements in relationships and histories preceding and 
following a trial.44 Medieval states’ judicial apparatuses are now seen as deeply 
enmeshed in the societies they presided over, and a variety of dispute settlement practices 
were recognized as legitimate by medieval states. I expand on this in my attention to rural 
non-elites as well as the criminal courts: previous scholars have generally focused on 
urban populations’ use of public justice, usually based on records of civil proceedings. 
The unusual richness of Florence’s archives provides judicial records that, 
considered in combination with notarial material, allow reconstruction of the social 
context of events and rural communities appearing in the Executor’s material. Notaries 
were required to deposit copies of their transactions with the commune, ensuring the 
legitimacy of the actions recorded. These registers provide invaluable information on 
every facet of public life, from peace-making to dowries and agricultural contracts. 
Because registers are limited to a single notary’s transactions, however, they are useful 
primarily for reconstructing that notary’s clientele, and by extension social network-not, 
necessarily, the entire family or community of that notary’s clients. This organization 
also makes it difficult to be sure that one is reading all the relevant material for a given 
urban neighborhood or rural community. Paolo Pirillo’s remarkable encyclopedia of the 
Florentine and Fiesolano dioceses does, however, allow construction of limited case 
																																																								
43 On processual legal anthropology, see Simon Roberts, Order and conflict: An 
introduction to legal anthropology (New York, 1979); Max Gluckman, “Limitations of 
the case-method in the study of tribal law,” Law and Society Review 7 (1973): 611-14;.  
44 See Sarah Rubin Blanshei’s foreward to Vallerani, Medieval public justice. 
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studies of rural communities covered by surviving notarial registers, especially for the 
first half of the fourteenth century.45  
I address the complex and problematic authorship, structure, and content of 
anonymous denunciations at length in Chapter 3. One important point concerns types of 
crime denounced to the Executor. Assaults, usually non-lethal, are by far the most 
common magnate crimes appearing in the Executor’s atti. This does not mean that 
assaults were the crimes elites most often committed against popolani, only that assaults 
were the type of crime denouncers considered most likely to elicit court action. Thus, the 
criminal records of the Executor and the commune’s other foreign-staffed courts cannot 
and should not be read as indices of rising, falling or static crime rates.46  
Scholarship on the medieval communes, rural society, and the state 
a. The Italian urban communes: Origins and early developments 
The Italian communes have long fascinated European historians.47 Ludovico 
Muratori laid the groundwork for serious study of the Italian Middle Ages with his 27-
volume series Rerum Italicarum Scriptores (1723-1738).48 Two Swiss scholars, J.C.L. de 
Sismondi and Jacob Burckhardt, pioneered the study of Italian communes’ history in the 																																																								
45 Paolo Pirillo, Forme e strutture del popolamento nel contado fiorentino. I*/II* 
Gli insediamenti nell’organizzazione dei populi (prima metà del XIV secolo) (Florence, 
2005); Forme e strutture del popolamento nel contado fiorentino II: Gli insediamenti 
fortificati (1280-1380) (Florence, 2005). See also Pirillo, Construzione di un contado 
(Florence, 2001) and “La Romagna fiorentina” in Castelli medievali e neomedievali in 
Emilia-Romagna, eds. M. Muzzarelli and A. Campanini (Bologna, 2006), 191-96. 
46 See Andrea Zorzi’s discussion in “The judicial system.” 
47 The best recent surveys of the medieval urban communes as an Italian 
phenomenon: Chris Wickham, Sleepwalking into a new world: The emergence of Italian 
city communes in the twelfth century (Princeton, NJ, 2015); Vigueur and Faini, Il sistema; 
François Menant, L’Italie des communes (1100-1350) (Paris & Berlin, 2005); and Elisa 
Occhipinti, L’Italia dei comuni. Secoli XI-XIII (Rome, 2000).  
48 Rerum italicarum scriptores[….], ed. Ludovico Muratori; new, corrected 
edition ed. Giosue Carducci (Città di Castello, 1900). 
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early nineteenth century. Sismondi lauded the Italian communes as cradles of democracy, 
while Burckhardt famously praised the Renaissance state as a work of art and 
Renaissance Italy as the birthplace of individualism.49 Study of the communes’ origins 
and popular period flourished in the later nineteenth century as Risorgimento-era 
historians searched their cities’ past for analogues and antecedents to the political 
earthquake of unification and its aftermath.50 This was accompanied by German scholars’ 
ongoing interest in medieval Italian history; between 1896 and 1927, Danziger Robert 
Davidsohn published what still remains the definitive synthetic history of medieval 
Florence to 1338.51 
Scholarship on the communes in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
mainly concerned itself with legal and political documentary history.52 Many studies 
from this period, such as those of Robert Davidsohn for Florence and Gioacchino Volpe 
for Pisa, were the definitive studies of the institutional and political evolution of these 
																																																								
49 J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi, Histoire des Republiques italiennes du Moyen 
Âge, 8 vols. (Brussels,1838-1839). 
50 Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, in Maire Vigueur & Enrico Faini, Il sistema 
politico dei comuni italiani (secoli XII-XIV) (Milan, 2010), 2. Among Risorgimento-era 
historians, see above all Carlo Cattaneo, “La città considerata come principio ideale delle 
istorie italiane [1858]’, in Cattaneo, Scritti storici e geografici, ed. Gaetano Salvemini & 
Ernesto Sestan, vol. 1, 383-437 (Florence, 1957). 
51 Robert Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz (Berlin, 1896-1927); Italian ed.:  
Storia di Firenze, 8 vols., trans. (Florence, 1956-1968). Davidsohn’s house and work are 
commemorated in a plaque on his former residence in Via della Robbia, 68. 
52 See, for example, the early works of Robert Davidsohn and Piero Santini on 
Florence: Davidsohn, “Origine del Consolato, con speciale riguardo al contado di 
Firenze-Fiesole,” ASI V: IX (1892), 225-49, and Santini, Documenti sull’antica 
costituzione del comune di Firenze (Florence, 1895); ed., “Nuovi documenti sull’antica 
costituzione del comune di Firenze” in ASI V:XIX (1897), 276-325; and Studi sull’antica 
costituzione del comune di Firenze: Ricerche di storiografia fiorentina (Rome, 1972 
[1908]. 
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cities until recently, and remain important references.53 Volpe’s 1904 study 
“Fundamental questions on the origins and early development of the Italian communes” 
would in particular have an impact entirely out of proportion to its brevity, as it 
introduced socioeconomic factors into the discussion of communal origins.54 
 These fin-de-siècle studies were firmly grounded in the constitutional and formal 
political preoccupations of most nineteenth-century history.55 This partially explains their 
long-term value: Gaetano Salvemini’s edition of the 1295 Ordinances of Justice remained 
a standard reference until quite recently.56 Yet their conception of the commune, urban 
and rural, now looks schematic and overly concerned with formal political structures as 
the sole indicators of sociopolitical development. For example, the first mention of the 
consulate, the most important office of the early communes, was usually taken as 
synonymous with the existence of the commune as a self-governing entity autonomous 
from bishop, emperor, and feudal lord.57 This formalistic and constitutional approach to 
the communes’ history was not superseded until the late twentieth century.58  
																																																								
53 Robert Davidsohn, [German ed.:]); G. Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a 
Pisa, 2nd ed. (Florence, 1970). On Volpe’s work, see Ovidio Capitani, “Gioacchino 
Volpe, storico del medioevo” in Capitani, Medioevo passato prossimo. Appunti 
storiografici tra due guerre e molte crise (Bologna, 1979), 191-210. 
54 Gioacchino Volpe, “Questioni fondamentali sull’origini e primo svolgimento 
dei comuni Italiani” in Volpe, Medio evo Italiano (Bari, 1961), 85-118. 
55 See Chris Wickham’s useful discussion of the issue in regard to the 
historiography on rural communes, in Community and clientele in twelfth-century 
TuscanyOxford, 1994), 1-6. 
56 Salvemini reproduced the 1295 Ordinances as an appendix to his 1899 work 
Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295. This was not included in the 1966 
reprint (Ernesto Sestan, ed. (Milano, 1966 [1899]). The standard edition is now that of 
Silvia Diacciati and Andrea Zorzi: La legislazione antimagnatizia a Firenze (Rome, 
2013). All references in this study are to this edition unless otherwise noted. 
57 Maire Vigueur, Il sistema, 8-9. 
58 Maire Vigueur, Il sistema, 8.  
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The last twenty years have seen a remarkable revival of historiography on the 
Italian communes’ political history.59 Recent scholarship emphasizes the communes’ 
slow, fitful, and above all unconscious emergence over the later eleventh and twelfth 
centuries.60 Communes are now seen as the product of compromise, rather than heroic 
revolts against episcopal power.61 Different sectors of urban society’s ruling group, such 
as the bishops and the military men and professionals who comprised the urban elite, 
typically were unable to fully dominate cities and thus were forced to compromise among 
themselves and, to a certain extent, with non-elite citizens.62 This elite, which would 
become more heterogeneous in the thirteenth century, had to improvise measures of basic 
urban government, from hearing justice to maintaining the walls and gates and, in a river 
town such as Florence, building and repairing bridges.63 Urban elites took over running 
the cities because there was no one else to do so.  
During the early twelfth century, political power gradually slid, if it did not quite 
fall, into the streets of the Italian cities.64 This resulted in large part from the damage 
done by the Investiture Controversy, from 1076 onward.65 This, the most famous episode 
in the Roman Church’s eleventh-century reform movement, progressively undermined 
																																																								
59 Edward Coleman, “The Italian communes: recent work and current trends.” 
Journal of Medieval History 254 (1999), 373-397, is a survey of scholarship to 1999.  
60 Wickham, Sleep walking, 66. 
61 Cremona was an exception; the Cremonesi had been fighting their bishop off 
and on since the mid-eleventh century: Wickham, Sleep walking, 175-76. 
62 See Maire Vigueur, Il sistema, 20-24, for the bounds of political participation in 
the consular period. 
63 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 9. 
64 Chris Wickham, “The ‘feudal revolution’ and the origins of Italian city 
communes,” Transactions of the RHS 24 (2014): 29-55, compares the Italian situation to 
an earlier but analogous situation in early Capetian France. 
65 See Wickham’s usefully schematic discussion of the collapse of the kingdom, 
Sleep walking, 198-202. 
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traditional sources of authority in the cities and eroded the ability of central powers north 
of Rome to control local developments. The controversy was deeply divisive. The civil 
war of the 1080s-1090s, the most famous episode of which is the 1084 sack of Rome, 
fractured the Italian Kingdom (Regnum Italicum; Regnum Italiae). The kingdom’s titled 
elites usurped public offices, sometimes carving private lordships (signorie) out of royal 
or ecclesiastical land. Some cities hosted rival bishops, appointees of pope and emperor. 
This undermined the authority of the bishop’s office, although as usual in Italy, no single 
experience is entirely representative of developments elsewhere. Lucca, Florence, and 
Arezzo are close geographically, yet developed in different directions during the early 
communal period, in part because the bishops of these towns held different positions vis-
à-vis their flock and local elites. Arezzo’s count-bishops already had power in the 
contado, and Lucca’s bishops had ample holdings in the Lucchese.66 In contrast, the 
Florentine bishops possessed no public powers, and consequently had to build up a rural 
patrimony in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They did so slowly and with great 
effort, as George W. Dameron has shown,67 working as allies -- initially senior, 
progressively more junior -- of the Florentine commune, in the most famous of the 
																																																								
66 Chris Wickham in Maria Elena Cortese, Signori, castelli, città. L’aristocrazia 
del territorio fiorentino tra X e XII secolo. Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editors, 2007) 
[hereafter “Cortese, Signori”], x.  
67 See George W. Dameron, Episcopal Power and Florentine Society, 1000-1320 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1991) [hereafter Dameron, Episcopal power], 68-92, for 
the twelfth-century situation and “Episcopal lordship in the diocese of Florence and the 
origins of the commune of San Casciano Val di Pesa, 1230-1247,” Journal of Medieval 
History 12 (1986): 135-54, for thirteenth-century developments in the Val di Pesa. 
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conquests of the contado that appear in older textbooks on the twelfth- and thirteenth-
century communes.68 
Recent scholarship now recognizes the improvised, often intermittent, nature of 
early urban communes.69 The communes had to establish themselves as the hegemonic 
power within the cities; this was not a given, especially in the early twelfth century. 
Communal office-holding in the formal sense of consuls and their personnel, usually 
including legal experts (iudices; iurisperiti), were only one among many avenues of 
action for ambitious men and their families.70 Usurpation and privatization of old comital 
titles and their privileges, membership in the bishop’s entourage, landholding, and castle-
holding were other means of building up socioeconomic capital and access to political 
resources.71 Until the mid-twelfth century, some consulates were evanescent, ad hoc 
offices used for specific purposes, such as the famous Genoese trading and maritime 
Compagna.72 
The communes were local elites’ piecemeal, emergency response to a 
deteriorating situation. This ruling elite was, however, usually one level below the 																																																								
68 On the break between city and countryside lying behind this, see Cortese, 
Signori, 209-48.  
69 On “evanescent” or “latent” communes in the Romagna and Veneto, see 
Wickham, Sleep walking, 177-84. Enrico Faini, Firenze nell’età romanica (1000-1211) 
(Florence, 2010), at 223-48, analyzes the early Florentine commune and its relationship 
with the city’s bishops, stressing the twelfth-century commune’s informal and “latent” 
nature. 
70 On the variety of activities within Florence’s consular-era elite, see Enrico 
Faini, “Il gruppo dirigente fiorentino dell’età consolare,” in ASI CLXII (2004), 199-231. 
71 See Maire-Vigueur, Il sistema politico, 5-8, for a lucid discussion of urban 
powers within the late eleventh century, and Faini, Firenze, 230-48, reconstructs the 
vicissitudes of the Florentine elite and the episcopate between eleventh and twelfth 
centuries.  
72 On the emergence of the Genoese commune and its early maritime activities, 
see Steven A. Epstein, Genoa & the Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill & London, 1996), 
33-53.  
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greatest noble families of the late Regnum Italicum and adjoining areas.73 The kingdom’s 
old first-level elite, such as the Counts Guidi and Alberti (Tuscany) or the Obertenghi 
(Piedmont, Liguria), had a more ambiguous relationship to the communes. Northeast 
Tuscany’s first-tier families abandoned Florence in the early twelfth century, and 
subsequently became one of the commune’s many local nemeses.74 In the Lombard cities, 
the feudal nobility played a much more important role in the early commune; Milan is the 
historiographical archetype of an “aristocratic commune.”75  
Recent scholarship on the communes has broadened the ambit of  “communal 
Italy” to include regions and experiences previously ignored, or treated as atypical. Little-
studied regions such as Le Marche or small centers such as Asti have supplemented a 
traditional focus on the Tuscan cities.76 Paralleling the Mezzogiorno’s tormented place 
within the modern Italian nation-state, the South (traditionally understood as the islands 
and mainland south of Rome) traditionally has been excluded from discussion of the 
																																																								
73 A good study of early medieval territorial organization is Tiziana Lazzari, 
“Campagne senza città, territori senza centro. Per un riesame dellà organizzazione del 
territorio della penisola italiana fra tardo-antico e alto medioevo (secoli VI-X)” in Città e 
campagna nei secoli altomedievali (Spoleto, 2009), 621-58. 
74 On the early Florentine commune’s relationship with its territory, see Faini, 
Firenze, 320-32. 
75 Abandonment of the city: Cortese, Signori, 231-36; on Milan, see most recently 
Wickham, Sleep walking,137-42; on the exceptionality of the Lombard cities, Maire 
Vigueur, Il sistema, 22. 
76 On the east-central regions, see Maire-Vigueuer, Comuni e signorie in Umbria, 
Marche, e Lazio. Turin, 1987); see also Magnati e popolani nell’italia communale 
(Pistoia, 1997), with articles on Liguria, Asti, and Piacenza. Tiziana Lazzari, “Milites a 
Imola: La lista dei cavalli (1319) e la struttura sociale urbana” in Studi sul Medioevo per 
Andrea Castagnetti, eds. M. Bassetti, A. Ciaralli, M. Montanari, G. M. Varanini 
(Bologna, 2011. 219-40, is a fine study of the milites in a small, perhaps typical 
Romagnole city. 
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communes.77 Recent work argues, however, that some cities in the high-medieval 
Mezzogiorno, such as Gaeta and Amalfi, were developing in the eleventh century toward 
“proto-communes,” a process usually seen as stifled by the Normans.78 This effort to 
normalize the southern experience in traditional terms is, perhaps, less interesting than 
efforts to understand the points of real divergence and contrast between the South and the 
northern city-states.79 David Abulafia’s work has shown how the northern communes of 
the later Middle Ages, especially Florence, exploited southern agricultural surpluses and 
royal privileges to enrich themselves and ensure grain supplies.80 Recent work by Sandro 
Carocci on rural southern lordships between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and Eleni 
Sakellariou on Angevin-era justice demonstrates how compelling the medieval 
Mezzogiorno is in its own right, and how much remains to be done on southern topics, 
across the full medieval period.81 
																																																								
77 The traditional view of the South is discussed in Patricia Skinner, “Politics and 
piracy: the duchy of Gaeta in the twelfth century,” Journal of Medieval History 21 
(1995): 307-319. Other important work on the South includes: Barbara M. Kreutz, Before 
the Normans. Southern Italy in the ninth and tenth centuries (College Park, PA, 1996); 
Joanna Drell, Kinship and conquest. Family strategies in the principality of Salerno, 
1077-1194 (Ithaca, 2002); and Valerie Ramseyer, The Transformation of a religious 
landscape. Medieval southern Italy, 800-1100. Ithaca, 2006). 
78 The best work on political developments under the Normans is Paul Oldfield, 
City and community in Norman Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011). See also the 
same author’s “Rural settlement and economic development in southern Italy: Troia and 
its contado, c. 1020-c. 1230,” Journal of Medieval History 31 (2005): 327-345. 
79 See David Abulafia, The two Italies. Economic relations between the Norman 
kingdom of Sicily and the northern communes. Cambridge, 2005) and, for a much later 
period, Eleni Sakellariou, Southern Italy in the late Middle Ages (Leiden, 2012). 
80 See David Abulafia, “Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370,” 
Economic History Review 33 (1981): 377-88 and “Grain Traffic out of the Apulian Ports 
on Behalf of Lorenzo de Medici, 1486-7,” in Mediterranean Encounters, Economic, 
Religious, Political, 1100-1550 (Aldershot, 2000), and the monograph The two Italies. 
81 See Sandro Carocci, Signorie dei Mezzogiorno. Società rurali, poteri 
aristocratici e monarchia (XII-XIII secolo) (Rome, 2014), the authoritative study of the 
subject, especially, for the problem of southern historiography, 17-32; and the same 
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Study of the later thirteenth-century popular communes has focused on two major 
themes, oligarchy and the magnate-popolo struggle, as well as civic identity. “Civic 
identity” refers here to the urban communes’ collective sense of membership in a 
bounded community, constructed around religious practice; a sense of a shared past 
(albeit often mythologized or fictitious), and cultural production, above all in the form of 
the communes’ crowning glories -- public palaces and religious monuments. Communal 
society relied as much on exclusion as inclusion, and a large body of scholarship exists 
on the most famous of the excluded, political exiles and prescribed magnates. Yet the 
communes excluded many other groups; most obviously, women typically were barred 
from public life.82  
Other categories of the excluded varied with period and regime, but partial or total 
exclusion from political life, not to mention confiscation of goods and exile, were the fate 
of those whom a commune deemed damaging to the public good. Massimo Vallerani has 
demonstrated how political exigencies combined with developments in juridical practice 
and theory to create an identifiable “ideology of the penalty” applicable to those whose 
negative public reputation (mala fama) denoted their inability to live according to the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
author’s study of Lazio’s elite, Baroni di Roma. Dominazioni signorili e lignaggi 
aristocratici nel Duecento e nel primo Trecento (Rome, 1993). Among Eleni 
Sakellariou’s many works, see in particular “Il principato di Taranto e l’oriente latino nel 
tardo Medioevo,” in Il principato di Taranto (secc. XII-XV): atti del Convegno 
Internazionale di Studi, Napoli, 1-3 Dec. 2011 (Rome, 2013) [forthcoming]; “I centri 
minori del Regno di Napoli nel tardo medioevo. Problemi e prospettive,” Incontri 
Mediterranei 5.1 (9) (2004): 194-207; and “Royal justice in the Aragonese kingdom of 
Naples: Theory and the realities of power,” Mediterranean Historical Review 26:01 
(2011), 31-50. 
82 The early Milanese general assembly (concio) appears to have included some 
element of the city’s female population in 1117: Wickham, Sleep walking, 62-63. 
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popolo’s “legalistic orthodoxy.”83 The frequency with which communal courts 
temporized, through amnesties and the use of peace settlements, should not conceal the 
deeply conflictual character of the communes; rather, this temporizing should be seen as 
a strategy to defuse potentially destructive disputes.  
Until the late twentieth century, studies of the commune emphasized the 
supposedly secular aspects of the urban communes’ culture and self-perception. This was 
attributable to the anti-clerical bent of much Risorgimento- and Liberal-era Italian-
language scholarship, which ignored the role of the church in the communes’ history 
when not regarding it as an active impediment to the city-states’ development.84 In the 
past two decades this has changed, as a series of studies demonstrated the centrality of the 
church to every aspect of communal life, from ritual processions to urban landowning.85 
The continuing importance of bishops in public life after the eleventh century is now 
clear.86 Augustine Thompson’s revisionist Cities of God (2005) reconstructed every 
aspect of the cities’ orthodox Catholic religious life, from baptism in the Duomo to death 
and burial. Thompson demonstrated the communes’ concern for religious orthodoxy in 
every facet of life, although he possibly overstated the zealousness with which Italians 
assented to external interference in urban life, such as the mendicant-staffed inquisitions 
of the late thirteenth century. Recent scholars have also focused on the contested politics 																																																								
83 Medieval public justice, trans. Sara Rubin Blanshei (Washington, D.C., 2012) 
[hereafter Vallerani, public justice], 67. See Vallerani, public justice, 65-72, for the 
thirteenth-century communes’ punitive language and system of amnesties and exceptions. 
84 See George W. Dameron’s discussion in Episcopal power, 3-8, with the 
scholarship cited in footnotes.  
85 See Mary Doyno, “Urban religious life in the Italian communes: the state of the 
field,” History Compass 9:9 (September 2011), 720-30, for a clear discussion of recent 
historiography on the subject. 
86 See Maureen C. Miller, The formation of a medieval church (Ithaca, NY, 1993) 
and The bishop’s palace (Ithaca, NY, 2000). 
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of sainthood: the civic role holy patrons such as the Virgin Mary and purported holy 
people, living or dead, played in family strategies and public affairs.87 
The question of oligarchy is deeply intertwined with historiography on the 
struggle between the Italian cities’ popolani e magnati.88 Italian medieval history here 
parallels a major preoccupation of twentieth- and early twenty-first-century political 
philosophy and sociology: oligarchy, its historical forms, and its supposed inevitability.89 
Twentieth-century theorists of oligarchy, such as Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto and 
the American James Burnham, held that government, whatever its nominal form, was 
oligarchical in essence.90 This fixation on the gap between political form and content was 
also a theme of Anglophone pre-modern historians, especially Roman historian Ronald 
Syme and medievalist Philip Jones.91 Skepticism or cynicism towards the century’s 
various quasi-religious ideologies explains some of these academics’ oligarchic 
essentialism.  In some cases, this cynicism arose in reaction to previous faith in these 
ideologies.92 Theories of oligarchic closure played the role of a theodicy for some 
embittered ex-Communists, following the erosion of faith in the millenarian prospects 																																																								
87 See in particular: Carol Lansing, Power and purity: Cathar heresy in medieval 
Italy (Oxford, 1996); F.T. Luongo, The saintly politics of Catherine of Siena (Ithaca, 
2006); Brad Franco, The legend of Montaperti (Siena, 2012); and, for fourteenth-century 
Rome, Bianca Lopez, “Between court and cloister: the life and lives of Margherita 
Colonna,” Church History 82: 3 (2013), 554-75. 
88 Silvia Diacciati, Popolani e magnati. Società e politica nella Firenze del 
Duecento (Spoleto, 2011).  
89 A good study of oligarchy, with useful case studies of specific regimes, is 
Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge, 2011).  
90 Vilfredo Pareto, Borghesia, élites, fascismo, ed. Marcalio Veneziani (Rome, 
1981); James Burnham, The managerial revolution (New York, 1941).  91	See	Ronald	Syme,	The	Roman	Revolution	(Oxford,	2002	[1939]),	especially	149-161,	and,	by	Jones,	“Communes and despots. The city-state in late-medieval Italy.”  
Reprinted in Communes and despots in medieval and renaissance Italy, eds. John E. Law and 
Bernadette Paton, 3-26. London: Ashgate, 2010 [1965]. 
92 See Hannah Arendt’s 1953 piece, “The ex-Communists,” in Essays in 
understanding, 1930-1954 (New York, 1994), 391-400. 
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that the Bolshevik Revolution and the early years of Soviet power had aroused 
worldwide.93 
The European civil war of 1914-194594 and its opposing ideologies deeply 
influenced scholarship on the Italian cities. Historians of pre-modern Europe, no less than 
anyone else, were profoundly affected by the collapse of nineteenth-century liberal values 
in the face of total war, economic crisis, and social revolution.95 The globalized 
ideological polarization of the Cold War era also profoundly shaped historians’ 
interpretations of the nature and ideological stakes of economic development and social 
conflict in the pre-modern past. American scholars in particular have as a rule avoided 
serious engagement with historical materialism in any form.96  
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that since its inception, the study of Italian 
history has been shot through with the language, expectations and preconceptions of the 
																																																								
93 This seems to have been the case with Burnham. See Orwell, “James Burnham 
and the managerial revolution” [1946] and “Burnham’s view of the contemporary world 
struggle” [1947], both in Essays (New York, 2002), at 1052-72 and 1215-18, 
respectively. The classic account of the initial enthusiasm October aroused is John Reed, 
Ten days that shook the world (New York, 1977 [1919]; see also E.J. Hobsbawm, The 
age of extremes (New York, 1994), 54-84. 
94 Enzo Traverso fully articulates this idea in Fire and blood: The European civil 
war, 1914-1945, trans. David Fernbach (New York, 2016). Eric Hobsbawm, Age of 
extremes, 144, succinctly argued for the period as one of civil war: “Indeed, the politics 
of the West [in the 1930s]…can best be understood, not through the context of states, but 
as an international ideological civil war….” 
95 On the interwar intellectual climate at Cambridge University and among 
interwar Communists, see Hobsbawm, Interesting times (New York, 2002), 100-51. On 
“the fall of liberalism,” see Hobsbawm, Age of extremes, 109-41. 
96 The best example of this is Frederick C. Lane’s classic “At the roots of 
republicanism,” AHR 71 (1966): 403-274, a eulogy to the communes’ nominal 
“republicanism”. The piece is as valuable for the study of Cold War ideology as it is for 
medievalist historiography.  
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European long nineteenth century.97 Popular legislation and popular movements, such as 
the Florentine Ciompi rebels of 1378, have often been evaluated according to ideological 
or moral preference, rather than the sources. How “bourgeois” were the popolo grasso, 
and how “proletarian” were the popolo minuto? How “revolutionary” was a revolt? Was 
it a social or “merely” political revolution? Radical, liberal, or (proto-) Communist? Even 
after the Cold War, social scientist Robert Putnam appropriated the communes -- or 
perhaps the version of the communes as they exist in the Anglophone imagination -- to 
explain the comparative strength of postwar northern Italian “civil society.”98 Northern 
economic prosperity had medieval roots, as did southern “backwardness” and Edward 
Banfield’s “amoral familism”, a concept that at least wore its moralizing, 
developmentalist colors on its sleeve.99  
I reject this lexicon of the long nineteenth century as inadequate for explaining the 
polycentric nature of medieval social conflict.100 In a series of recent studies, Patrick 
Lantschner has demonstrated this conflictual aspect of urban politics. I expand upon his 
work, to argue that-in some cases, at least-rural communities also featured polycentric 																																																								
97 The best discussion of this problem, regarding Florentine history, is Patrick 
Lantschner, “The ‘Ciompi Revolution’ constructed: Modern historians and the 
nineteenth-century paradigm of revolution.” Annali di Storia di Firenze 4 (2009): 277-97. 
 98 Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making 
democracy work (Princeton, 1993). The book provoked a flurry of criticism and 
condemnation from all quarters. See Paul Ginsborg, Italy and its discontents (London, 
2003), 106-07, the special issue of Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29 (1999), in 
Edward Muir, “The sources of civil society in Italy,” at 370-406, and the conference 
volume Sociability and its discontents, eds. Nicholas A. Eckstein and Nicholas Terpstra 
(Turnhout, 2009).  
99 Edward C. Banfield with Laura Fasano Banfield, The moral basis of a 
backward society (New York, 1958). On the issue of “backwardness” see Sandro 
Carocci’s justifiably exasperated “L’ossessione dell’arretratezza” in Signorie di 
Mezzogiorno, 26-28, and more broadly, Carlo Tullio-Altan, La nostra Italia: Arretratezza 
socioculturale, clientelismo, trasformismo e ribellismo dall’Unità ad oggi (Turin, 1986). 
100 See Patrick Lantschner, “Revolts,” and Logic. 
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conflict as an element in their normative social life. I furthermore follow Alma Poloni in 
arguing that the real question is not what the popolo means to modern scholars or 
ideologists (or scholar-ideologists), but rather what it meant to those who constituted it, 
in the medieval past.101 In this spirit, I focus on the logic of non-elite behavior within the 
institutions and discursive identities created by Florence’s popular regimes, while 
emphasizing the popular coalition’s fissiparous nature even at its height, and of the 
society that produced it. I try to avoid interpreting certain events or texts as emblematic 
of future developments, whether these are Renaissance civic humanism, the rise of the 
early modern principalities (signorie), or the communes’ supposed modernity.102 
b. Class and social conflict in the medieval communes 
The debate over the communes’ ruling class (ceto dirigente) originates with 
Gaetano Salvemini’s 1899 classic, Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295.103 
The young socialist historian argued that the exclusion of some sectors of Florence’s elite 
(the magnates) from political office and their exclusion from some political and legal 
rights represented a medieval antecedent to the Marxist narrative of 1789. A rising 																																																								
101 Poloni, Potere al popolo, 6-7: “Ciò che dobbiamo domandarci, forse, non è 
che cosa significa il popolo per noi, che cosa ci ha lasciato, ma che cosa ha significato per 
quelle persone, per coloro che hanno fondato quel movimento politico, sociale e culturale 
e vi hanno investito risorse ed energie.” 
102 On civic humanism see above all Hans Baron, The crisis of the early Italian 
renaissance (Princeton, NJ, 1966 [1955]), and James Hankins, “The ‘Baron Thesis’ after 
forty years and some recent studies of Leonardo Bruni,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
56 (1995): 309-38; Ronald G. Witt, ‘In the footsteps of the ancients.” The origins of 
humanism from Lovato to Bruni (Boston, Cologne, Leiden, 2000). On “republicanism” 
and the Renaissance, see: Frederick C. Lane, “At the roots of republicanism,” AHR 71 
(1966): 403-274; Anthony Molho, “The Italian renaissance, made in the U.S.A.,” in 
Imagined histories, eds. A. Molho & G. Wood (Princeton, NJ, 1998), 263-94; “Edward 
Muir, “Was there republicanism in the renaissance republics? Venice after Agnadello,” in 
Venice reconsidered, eds. J. Martin & D. Romano (Baltimore, 2000), 137-67. 
103 Gaetano Salvemini, Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295 (Florence, 
1899). The 1966 reprint did not reproduce the extremely valuable documentary 
appendices. 
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bourgeois, confident in its cultural no less than economic supremacy, overcame and 
excluded from power an older “feudal” nobility through the popular leadership’s 
effective mobilization of the popolo against the nobility. Salvemini’s work retained much 
of value even after his main argument -- that the late medieval city’s social conflicts were 
in fact a class struggle in the classic Marxist sense -- had been disproven.104  
Nicola Ottokar passionately assailed Salvemini in his Il Comune di Firenze alla 
fine del Dugento (1926).105 Ottokar, a Baltic German aristocrat and intellectual of the old 
regime, became an exile in Fascist Italy after the Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil 
War (1917-1921).106 Although this was never explicit, it is hard not to see his view of 
these traumatic events behind his interpretation of Florentine history as one of oligarchy 
and oligarchic factionalism, in all periods. Ottokar rejected Salvemini’s class struggle 
thesis, based on a prosopographical study of the communes’ public records for 1280-
1294. Rejecting economic factors, Ottokar portrayed the social conflicts of the late 
Duecento as simple power struggles between effectively identical segments of Florence’s 
ruling class. In Ottokar’s view, the leaders of the second popular regime of 1293 reacted 
to their lack of political power by mobilizing the popolo minuto to break the magnates 
and increase their share of power in the commune’s institutions.107  
Ottokar evaluated this period in starkly constitutional terms: because the “factual 
dictatorship of the popular masses” of the 1290s did not restructure the Commune’s 
																																																								
104 See Sarah Rubin Blanshei’s discussion of the Salvemini and Ottokar “schools” 
in Politics, 1-6. 
105 Nicola Ottokar, Il Comune di Firenze alla fine del Dugento (Turin: Einaudi, 
1962 [1926]) [hereafter Ottokar, Il comune]. 
106 See Ernesto Sestan’s critical introduction to Ottokar, Il comune, x-xii, for a 
sketch of his life. 
107 Ottokar, Il comune, 199-200. 
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constitution, no revolution or social change of any significance took place in medieval 
Florence.108 The popolo minuto is reduced here to a singularly mindless entity, incapable 
of acting for itself, let alone contributing anything to elite political culture. The 
“dictatorship of the popular masses” does not, and is not intended to, raise them above 
their current condition; rather, they were mobilized only to supply the “force and energy” 
for the popular elite’s machinations.109 Reading this in conjunction with Ottokar’s cryptic 
allusions to contemporary events, it is hard not to conclude that the exiled White 
medievalist was using the events of 1917 as a thinking device in his analysis of the 
1290s.110 
Ottokar did not provide a new explanatory model to replace Salvemini’s historical 
materialism, but his work was of fundamental importance in Italian medieval studies.111 
Ottokar’s assessment became the standard explanation for political change in the 
thirteenth-century commune: the magnates and popolo were simply competing factions of 
an oligarchy.112 The struggle between magnates and popolo was for political power, in 
																																																								
108 Ottokar, Il comune, 199: “Da un altro, la dittatura di fatto delle masse popolari, 
non segnò nessun mutamento nella struttura costituzionale del Comune.” 
109 Ottokar, Il comune, 200: “È naturale che un movimento, rivolto contro lo 
spadroneggiare di una ristretta oligarchia dirigente, dovesse appoggiarsi su larghi strati 
popolari e da essi attingere la sua energia e la sua forza. Da qui l’importanza delle masse 
del popolo minuto (direi quasi della piazza) nella situazione politica degli anni 1293-94. » 
Compare this with George Orwell’s summary of “realism,” in ‘’James Burnham,” 1053 : 
“In each great revolutionary struggle [according to Burnham.] the masses are led on by 
vague dreams of human brotherhood and then, when the new ruling class is well 
established in power, they are thrust back into servitude. This is practically the whole of 
political history, as Burnham sees it.” 
110 See in particular Ernesto Sestan’s discussion in Il comune, xiv-xv, at xv. 
111 See Sestan in Il comune, xvii-xviii.  
112 Desiderio Cavalca, “Il ceto magnatizio a Firenze dopo gli ordinamenti di 
giustizia,” Rivista di storia del diritto italiano 40-41 (1967-68): 85-132, and Andrea 
Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia a Firenze al tempo degli ordinamenti antimagnatizi” in 
Ordinamenti di giustizia fiorentini, ed. Vanna Arrighi (Florence, 1995), 105-47. 
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which the popolo’s leading group of legal professionals and elite merchants supplanted 
older, more established families from office. They mobilized the popolo minuto against 
the most violent and atavistic elements of the elite by labeling them magnates and 
subjecting them to various political and financial penalties. For Ottokar, communal 
history was the history of oligarchy, just as Roman Republican history was such for the 
Baltic German’s contemporary, British Roman historian Ronald Syme.113 Ottokar’s 
paradigm would not be challenged until 1978, when a team of four scholars demolished it 
through meticulous prosopographical studies of four Florentine regimes.114 This study did 
not, however, offer an explanation of the turnover in the ruling group that the four 
historians had identified. 
In Philip Jones’ work, a negative assessment of the significance and capabilities 
of the popolo reached “a kind of historiographical apotheosis,” in Sarah Rubin Blanshei’s 
apposite words.115 Jones argued that the popular regimes failed to create a stable political 
order in part because of their narrow political base.  While he acknowledged the 
significance of the popolo in his exhaustive The Italian city-states (1997), he maintained 
a negative evaluation of the popular communes. This paradigm of elite tenacity and 
popular failure remained dominant until the 1990s.116 
																																																								
113 Sestan in Ottokar, Il comune, xvi; Ronald Syme, The roman revolution, 7. 
114 S. Raveggi, M. Tarassi, D. Medici, and P. Parenti, Ghibellini, Guelfi e popolo 
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115 Blanshei, Public justice, 3. 
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Change in family structure during a period of headlong urbanization and 
economic growth is an important cognate question to that of the conflict between 
magnates and popolo.117 Jacob Burckhardt’s contention that urbanization contributed to 
the breakup of the medieval extended kin group and the emergence of the “nuclear” 
family lies behind much of this scholarship, as a claim to expand upon or refute.118 
Richard Goldthwaite, in an important 1968 study, argued on economic grounds that 
during the early Renaissance, elite extended kinship groups fragmented into more 
individuated families.119 The evolution, strategies, and fate of the prescribed elite lineages 
forms the subject of two of the best recent studies of the Florentine magnates, Christiane 
Klapisch-Zuber’s Retour à la cité (2006) and Carol Lansing’s The Florentine Magnates 
(1991). The latter’s Florentine Magnates focused on the twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
evolution of forms of family solidarity, such as the property-owning consorteria, and 
non-family forms of association, such as tower societies.120 She identified the 
																																																								
117 The best single-volume introduction to medieval family history is the article 
anthology Medieval families: perspectives on marriage, household & children, ed. Carol 
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development of patrilineages among the urban elite as a major consequence of 
urbanization, as families attempted to protect and expand family holdings in their urban 
neighborhoods and in the contado. Lansing linked magnate culture, its ethos of 
knighthood and personal honor, to the popolo’s attempts at reining in elite violence and 
pacifying the city.121 
Numerous scholars have studied the Florentine commune’s governing machinery 
and constitution.122 I concentrate instead on the magnate-popolo conflict from the angle 
of its impact on official discourse -- composed of the Ordinances of Justice, statutes, and 
denunciations to the commune -- and the strategies and rhetoric of rural people in their 
interactions with the commune’s popular courts. These come into focus in the second part 
of the study. I follow recent scholarship in rejecting Ottokar’s paradigm of oligarchical 
stasis within a narrow and relatively static ruling class, if not the popular regimes’ 
oligarchical tendencies as such.  
I expand in particular upon two scholars of the thirteenth century, Silvia Diacciati 
and Sarah Rubin Blanshei. In a series of articles and her landmark Popolani e magnati 
(2011), Diacciati has produced an exhaustive group portrait of the Florentine magnates, 
their origins, and their thirteenth-century struggle with the popolo.123 Diacciati developed 
a much larger prosopographical database than previous scholars such as Ottokar, 
																																																								
121 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 145-63. 
122 The classic on Florentine electoral procedures is John M. Najemy, 
Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, 
1982). On Florentine government and administration as sites of conflict and 
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culture, building on Lansing’s work. 
	 37	
encompassing “all the categories [of Florence’s population] that participated in the city’s 
government” during the thirteenth century.124 Diacciati’s study demonstrated that the 
magnates cannot be understood apart from the popolo, understood properly as a social 
grouping with vague borders, a social movement, and a series of political regimes. This 
required reconstructing the pre-1250 development of popular forms of association, 
especially the guilds. These have long been recognized as the basis of Florentine popular 
regimes and, because of Florence’s unique status as “model (and myth)” of a popular 
regime, those of other cities.125  This marked a shift away from the previous 
preoccupation on the magnates as such toward a view of them as part of a wider historical 
process: late medieval elite turnover in the Italian cities in an economic boom period.126 
Diacciati, furthermore, valorized the culture, achievements, and even goals of Florence’s 
second popular regime, above all the legal professionals who drafted the initial 
Ordinances of Justice and were central in deposing Giano Della Bella, leader and symbol 
of the popolo’s radical wing, during the early 1290s. 
I draw extensively on Diacciati’s work, which demonstrates the enduring utility of 
prosopography for medieval social historians. Her reconstruction of the Florentine ruling 
group across the thirteenth century’s political vicissitudes is unmatched, and promises to 
be the definitive study for quite some time. I differ in my interpretation of events in the 
																																																								
124 Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur in Diacciati, Popolani, xii, discussing the 
reasoning behind Diacciati’s scope of study: “…la sua intuizione iniziale non lasciava 
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1-16; Diacciati, Popolani, xxiv. 
126 See Chris Wickham’s arguments for the early twelfth-century Roman 
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1290s, the position and motives of popular leadership, and my emphasis on rural people 
as constituent members of the popolo. The centrality of legal experts to the popular 
regimes is unquestionable; more problematic is their motivations. Reading the 
Ordinances of Justice and contemporary chronicles in conjunction with Remigio dei 
Girolami’s sermons to the priorate, I highlight the complex intertwinement among 
different elements of the Florentine elite in the struggles of the 1290s. My assessment of 
Giano Della Bella and his party is more sympathetic than those of most scholars. I argue 
that his 1294 attempt at definitively eliminating the magnates from political life was a 
logical strategy to increase his followers’ political weight in the commune. They were not 
simply a result of his personal vendettas or vindictive excesses, as has usually been 
assumed. Despite these differences, I see my contribution as expanding upon Diacciati’s 
neo-Salveminian perspective, incorporating rural people. 
Sarah Rubin Blanshei’s Politics and Justice in Late Medieval Bologna (2010) is 
another major reference point for the present work. It is an exhaustive study of Duecento 
Bologna’s popular commune and the shifting grounds of eligibility for and exclusion 
from formal political power. Diacciati and Blanshei’s studies paralleled one another, 
appearing within a year’s time and reconfiguring scholarship on the magnates by refusing 
to study them in isolation from their popular nemeses. Both scholars likewise utilized 
large troves of understudied sources to answer the same question: What did the popolo do 
in power, and how did this differ from previous elites? Above all, how did the popolo 
reconfigure the channels and institutions of power, and with what consequences for the 
early fourteenth century commune?  
	 39	
In Massimo Giansante’s words, ragioni di fondi above all explain the originality 
of Blanshei’s study.127 Blanshei read all relevant material produced by the Bolognese 
commune’s constituent parts, such as the arms societies. This allowed her to move 
beyond the top level of the official commune -- the various executive officials and 
legislative councils -- to trace political power, through capillary prosopography, down to 
the point at which the commune merged with the popolo’s other bases: in Bologna, the 
arms societies and guilds; in Florence, primarily the guilds. (Elsewhere, neighborhood 
associations or the popular militia were alternative bases of popular aggregation.)128  
I expand upon Blanshei’s move to broaden analysis of popular politics in two 
ways. I trace the legal and institutional manifestations of tensions within the popolo, 
between grassi and minuti, through a close reading of one body of Florentine legislation, 
the Ordinances of Justice. I differ also by directly addressing what Blanshei avoided, “the 
rather unreliable ground of ideological confrontation.”129 The Ordinances warrant special 
attention because of their status as the central textual product of Florence’s second 
popular regime: they laid down the criteria for popular and magnate identity. The 
Ordinances became, in the course of the fourteenth century, an important structuring 
mechanism in Florentine public discourse and institutional activity. Especially in the 
second and third chapters, I focus on the ideological aspects of Florence’s Ordinances of 
Justice and the records of the court eventually established specifically to safeguard these, 
the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice.  
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This study builds upon Blanshei and Diacciati’s conceptual scope by treating 
specific Florentine documents and practices, as well as Florentine regime changes, within 
a broader Tuscan and Italian context: the long-term aftermath of the disappearance of 
central power from the Regnum Italicum, and the competition among city-states within 
and across old political and ecclesiastical boundaries for resources, labor, and access to 
communications networks.130 Chapter 2 emphasizes divisions within the Florentine 
popolo as a factor in the events surrounding the various redactions of the Ordinances of 
Justice (1293-95). In the second part of this study, I expand on Blanshei’s focus on 
closure (a ruling group’s move up and down the social ladder to exclude outsiders from 
political resources and power) by considering the manifold contradictions and 
vicissitudes of popular inclusion. Rural people were explicitly included, as if by 
afterthought, in the rubric of people protected by the Florentine Ordinances of Justice; 
surviving fourteenth-century archival material shows that they eagerly took the 
opportunity to appeal to the commune’s jurisdiction.  
c. Rural society and the urban communes 
The theme of rural society links the popular regimes to another important topic in 
Italian historiography: the relationship between the peninsula’s cities and subject 
countryside (contado/i).131 In the postwar period, a large body of work appeared on every 
aspect of the medieval Italian countryside, from shifts in settlement concentration to 
agricultural contracts to rural religion.132 A guiding framework of much scholarship on 																																																								
130 See below, ch. 1.  
131 See Coleman, “the Italian communes,” 384-90, and the extensive scholarship 
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rural history,” in The rural history of medieval European societies. Trends and 
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city-contado relations has interpreted these in terms of exploitation/accommodation: 
cities subjugated and exploited their rural territories and subjects, or the latter benefited 
from access to urban markets, institutions, and protection.133 The work of Enrico Fiumi 
on San Gimignano and David Herlihy on Pistoia emphasized the weight of urban taxation 
and the catastrophic effects of migration and depopulation in the fourteenth century as 
major reasons for the decline of these once-prosperous Tuscan towns.134  
Philip Jones provoked a major reevaluation of the contado’s role in urban 
developments in his 1978 article for Einaudi’s Storia d’Italia. Provocatively subtitled 
“the myth of the bourgeois,” the piece had a major impact on medievalist scholarship.135 
Arguing directly against the traditional paradigm, Jones contended not only that rural 
history should be studied on its own terms, but also that the countryside’s impact on the 
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settlement is Pierre Toubert’s landmark, Les structures du Latium médiéval. Le Latium 
méridional et la Sabine du IX e siècle à la fin du XIIe siècle (Rome, 1973). On Tuscan 
rural religion, see C.M. De La Roncière, “L’influence des franciscains dans la campagne 
de Florence au XIVe siècle (1280-1360),” MEFR T.87.1 (1975), 27-103, and Religion 
paysanne et religion urbaine en Toscane (c. 1250-1450) (London, 1994); and Duane J. 
Osheim, An Italian lordship (Berkeley, 1977); “Countrymen and the Law in Late-
Medieval Tuscany.” Speculum 64:2 (1989): 317-337; anhd A Tuscany monastery and its 
social world (Rome, 1989). 
133 William Caferro, “City and countryside in Siena in the second half of the 
fourteenth century,” The Journal of Economic History 54:1 (1994): 85-103, at 85. See 
also Samuel Cohn, Jr.’s discussion of the scholarship, with footnotes, in Creating, 26-28. 
134 David Herlihy, “Population, plague, and social change in rural Pistoia, 1201-
1430,” Economic History Review New Series 18(2): 225-244; Enrico Fiumi, “Sui rapporti 
economici tra città e contado nell’età comunale,” ASI 14: 18-68; Storia economica e 
sociale di San Gimignano (Florence, 1993 [1961]); see also Enrico Fiumi’s Fioritura e 
decadenza dell’economia fiorentina. Florence, 1977), and Jones’ general discussion in 
Italian city-state, 237-39. 
135 See Paolo Cammarosano, “L’economia italiana nell’età dei comuni e il ‘modo 
feudale di produzione’: una discussione,” Società e storia 10 (1980), 891-907, for 
contemporary discussion and critique of Jones. 
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city should be a guiding theme of future work.136 Yet it is still possible to write a city’s 
history with almost no reference to the countryside. The most recent survey of late 
medieval and early modern Renaissance Florentine history ignores the original contado 
except in passing references to its population and administrative organization; the later 
Florentine territorial state is discussed only in terms of Florentine conquest. Likewise, the 
thematic chapters on the Florentine economy largely ignore regional exchange and 
production in favor of attention to long-distance exchange and Florence’s market-
oriented industries.137 Examining the importance of the countryside and its population to 
Florence’s development as an expansionist urban center is thus necessary and timely. 
Rural immigration was essential to sustained urban growth under preindustrial 
demographic conditions. Even at their pre-plague height, cities like Florence and Milan 
needed immigrants to replace natural loss.138 Many families that would form the 
thirteenth-century communes’ ruling class were descended from rural clans, but all 
classes migrated to the cities.139 In the boom period of the late thirteenth and early 
																																																								
136 Philip Jones, “Economia e società nell’Italia medievale: le leggenda della 
borghesia,” in Einaudi Storia d’Italia, Annali 1, Feudalesimo al capitalismo (Turin, 
1978), 185-372. 
137 John M. Najemy, A History of Florence, 1200-1575 (Oxford, 2006).  
138 On rural conditions and immigration to cities, see: Johann Plesner, 
L’emigrazione dalla campagna alla città libera di Firenze nel XIII secolo (Florence, 
1979 [Copenhagen, 1938]); La formazione della struttura agraria moderna nel contado 
fiorentino, 3 vols. Rome, 1965); and W.R. Day, “Population growth and productivity: 
rural-urban migration and the expansion of the manufacturing sector in thirteenth-century 
Florence,” in Labour and labour markets between town and countryside (Middle Agesl-
19th century), ed. B. Blondé, M. Galand (Turnhout, 2001), 82-110; “The population of 
Florence before the Black Death: Survey and synthesis,” Journal of Medieval History 28 
(2002): 93-129; and “The early development of the Florentine economy, c. 1100-1275.” 
PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2000). 
139 Jones, City-state, 154. On early immigration see Enrico Faini, “L’emigrazione 
dal Valdarno Superiore a Firenze nel XII secolo: una storia mancata,” Storie di una pieve 
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fourteenth centuries, entire tenement blocks in Florence were occupied by residents from 
the same rural villages, in a medieval antecedent of southern Italian migrant chains 
between the Mezzogiorno and the industrialized North in the postwar period.140  
This study incorporates rural society and rural people into the debate over the 
magnates and popular regimes more than previou studies.141 Rural people were far more 
exposed to elite depredations than their urban fellow popolani. This was not simply a 
result of the long-standing hatred of magnates and popolani: magnate violence must be 
understood not only in local but broader historical processes. In Chapter 5, I read cases of 
magnate violence against rural communities in light of the particular crisis period of the 
1340s and the broader crisis of the first world system. 
The transition from late-medieval city-state to Renaissance regional or territorial 
state is a large one in Italianist historiography.142 The subject originated with Jacob 
																																																																																																																																																																					
del Valdarno. San Romolo a Gaville in età medievale. Eds. Paolo Pirillo, Mauro Ronzani 
(Rome, 2008), 105-21. 
140 Immigrant tenements in Florence: Jones, City-state, 154-55; for postwar 
immigration patterns and networks, see Paul Ginsborg, A history of contemporary Italy, 
1943-1980 (New York & London: Penguin, 1990), 217-25, at 223. 
141 The most important studies of the magnate-popolo struggle in the countryside 
are: Dameron, Episcopal power, 145-53; Andrea Giorgi, “Il conflitto magnati/popolani 
nelle campagne: il caso senese” in Magnati e popolani nell’Italia comunale. Pistoia: 
Centro italiano studi di storia e d’arte, 1997), 137-411; “Magnati e popolani nel contado 
fiorentino: dinamiche sociali e rapporti di potere nel Trecento,” Rivista di storia 
dell’agricoltura 33:2 (December, 1993): 15-63; and Carol Lansing, “Magnate violence 
revisited,” in Communes and despots in medieval and renaissance Italy, eds. John E. Law 
and Bernadette Paton (Farnham, UK, 2010), 35-45. 
142 See above all the three conference volumes Origini dello stato: processi di  
formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna, eds. G. Chittolini, A. Molho, 
and P. Schiera (Bologna,1994); Lo stato territoriale fiorentino (secoli XIV-XV), eds. 
William Connell and Andrea Zorzi (San Miniato, 2002); Florence et la Toscane. XIVe-
XIXe siècles. Les dynamiques d’un Ètat italien, eds. Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier 
Rouchon. Rennes, 2004).Giorgio Chittolini, La formazione dello Stato regionale e le 
istituzioni del contado (Turin, 2005 [1979]). 
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Burckhardt himself, who famously called the Renaissance state a work of art.143 Since the 
1970s, scholars have explored the many discontents and aporias of Burckhardt’s “work of 
art.”144 Yet even scholarship valorizing rural peoples’ active role in state formation often 
implicitly assumes an all-or-nothing, resistance-opposition binary around which past 
subaltern action supposedly hinges. In this view, doughty rebels heroically refuse the 
exactions of the city and its rulers, who must respond to this rural defiance by refining the 
tools of government.145  
Since Marvin Becker’s pioneering work on Florence, Italianists have identified a 
shift in the nature and scope of public power originating in fourteenth-century social 
conflicts and economic crises, which the medieval communes proved unable to deal 
with.146 Becker epitomized the Florentine fourteenth century as the age of the commune’s 
decline and the territorial state’s rise. He characterized this territorial state as more 
expansive, exploitative, and centralized than the medieval city-state. Becker saw ongoing 
fiscal crises, and the cost of funding the public debt (the Monte, founded 1343-45), as a 
crucial factor structuring transformations in the state and political regimes’ social base.147  
																																																								
143 Jacob Burckhardt, The civilization of the renaissance in Italy, trans. S.G.C. 
Middlemore (New York, 1990 [1878]) [hereafter “Burckhardt, Civilization”]. 
144 See the conference volume Origini dello Stato (Bologna, 1994). The most 
influential historian of European state formation is Charles Tilly. See “War making and 
state making as organized crime,” in Bringing the state back in, eds. P. B. Evans, D. 
Rueschmeyer, T. Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985), 169-91, and Coercion, 
capital, and European states, A.D. 990-1992, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA, 1992). 
145 See Samuel Cohn, Jr., Creating the Florentine state, for this revisionist view.  
146 See Marvin Becker, “Economic change and the emerging Florentine territorial 
state,” in Florentine essays (Ann Arbor, 2005), 160-94, and, in general, Florence in 
transition, vol. II. 
147 Becker, Florence in transition, 151-200, for the Monte and the public debt; 
figures for ever-escalating Florentine debt and falling rate of return on indirect taxes (the 
gabelle) are given on 151.  
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The history of the territorial state usually is the history of administrative changes, 
the physical expansion of state power, or exchanges between urban elites and their 
provincial or sub-regional peers.148 When ordinary people are discussed, it is usually 
within a framework that focuses on instances of resistance and revolt, and evaluating 
these in terms of their social, economic, or political content, and the results these 
instances had on matters of state. One tradition of scholarship has emphasized the 
quiescient nature of the early modern Italian peasantry, especially Tuscans, often 
attributed to the stability and relative prosperity of the region’s sharecropping system (the 
mezzadria).149 Samuel Cohn, Jr., however, has argued that revolts on Florence’s 
mountainous perimeter played an important role in changing Florentine fiscal policy 
during the early fifteenth century, before the Medici rose to power.150 
Both of these views regarding non-elite action or inaction rely on a problematic 
paradigm: non-elites either fail to revolt and therefore can be written out of the history of 
the state, or they do revolt and thereby play a major role in changes in state practice and 
policy. This binary paradigm cannot account, in the case of Florence, for the relatively 
complex nature of the state’s institutions, or for how non-elites dealt with them when not 
directly attacking them. To avoid such pitfalls, this study draws from anti-statist 
anthropological work on peasant society, particularly the work of Pierre Clastre, James C. 
																																																								
148 See, for example, the numerous articles on Florentine and sub-regional elites in 
Lo stato territoriale fiorentino (secoli XIV-XV), (San Miniato, 2001) and Laura De 
Angelis, La repubblica di Firenze fra XIV e XV secolo. Istituzioni e lotte politiche nel 
nascente stato territoriale fiorentino (Florence, 2009); and Giorgio Chittolini, La 
formazione dello Stato regionale e le istituzioni del contado (Turin, 2005 [1979]). 
149 See Cohn, Creating, 114, and the scholarship cited in ftnts. 5, 6, 7. On the 
mezzadria system, see Mario Ascheri & Alessandro Dani, La mezzadria nelle terre di 
Siena e Grossetto dal medioevo all’età contemporanea (Siena, 2011). 
150 Cohn, Creating. 
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Scott and David Graeber.151 Anthropologically inflected work on the Latin American 
peasantry also reveals some of the parameters shaping subaltern action in a society 
founded on patriarchy and landholding.152 In Chapter 5, I explore how rural people 
behaved when cited as witnesses in cases of magnate crime: this reveals the 
contradictions at the heart of Tuscans’ relationship with the Florentine state. Exploring 
elite violence against rural people highlights the flip side of popular political discourse. 
The Florentine commune could formally and institutionally offer protection against the 
magnates, but on a mundane level this meant little, given its institutional limitations and 
phantasmal rural presence.153  
Rejecting a hegemony-resistance paradigm does not mean ignoring the realities of 
elite oppression, institutional indifference, and rural resentment of both that rural people 
had. Their cooperation with the state was often reluctant and partial, and Chapters 4 and 5 
also explore a judicial version of James C. Scott’s weapons of the weak: mass 
noncompliance by witnesses in cases involving elite violence. Nor did rural people direct 
their maneuvering exclusively against landowners: when their own quarrels threatened 
social peace, rural people were perfectly capable of turning on neighbors and fellow 
popolani, using such state mechanisms as anonymous denunciation and the inquisitorial 
procedure. Furthermore, elite clientele networks offered rural people an alternative form 
of protection and advancement to the commune and its ethos of popular solidarity. These 																																																								
151 James C. Scott, The art of not being governed (New Haven, 2009) and 
Weapons of the weak (New Haven, 1985); David Graeber, “Provisional autonomous 
zone” and “Oppression,” in Possibilities (Oakland, 2007). 
152 Steve J. Stern, The secret history of gender (Chapel Hill & London, 1995), in 
particular 124-150 and 189-216; and Karen Spalding, Huarochirí (Stanford, 1988). 
153 See chapter 5, below, which draws on David Graeber’s “Provisional 
Autonomous Zone: Or, the ghost-state in Madagascar” in Possibilities (Oakland, 2007), 
157-180.  
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entourages included the bands of armed followers (fanti) that often appear in anti-
magnate denunciations. The fissures within rural society are an important sub-theme of 
this study: the rural popolo was just as divided within itself as was its urban counterpart.  
Structure of the study 
This study’s structure reflects the tormented, intertwined town-country 
relationship. The first two chapters examine Florentine Tuscany during its twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century boom, with Chapter 1 providing context for the region’s sociopolitical 
and economic developments between about 1115 and 1260 — a long period, of which my 
analysis is far from comprehensive. I refer the reader to several recent and exhaustive 
monographs for a detailed account of this period.154 What forces produced the medieval 
urban commune, and how did competing social groups struggle to access political and 
institutional resources? Florence’s expansion and consolidation cannot be understood in a 
vacuum, or as the product of a purely internal process. External factors structured 
Tuscany’s horizons, prospects, potential and limitations.155 Because the first popular 
regime (the Primo Popolo, 1250-1260) is a traditional watershed in Florentine and urban 
communal history, I pay particular attention to how this regime developed the city-state 
physically, territorially, and ideologically. 
Chapter 2 discusses Florentine social conflict and its textual products in the age of 
Dante. The core of the chapter analyzes the struggles surrounding the Ordinances of 
Justice (1293-95), a period of particularly intense conflict between the Florentine popolo 
and the magnates. This is an old topic in the historiography, but scholars have 																																																								
154 Cortese, Signori; Diacciati, Popolani e magnati; Faini, Firenze.  
155 See Mario Ascheri’s discussion of Sienese history: “Nel cuore del Dugento: 
Siena capitale ‘Europea’?” In Montaperti, eds. M.A. C. Ridolfi & P. Turrini (Siena, 
2013), 7-11. 
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traditionally focused on the clash between the two parties, not the tensions within the 
popular party. I scrutinize the three redactions of the Ordinances, reading them as a 
product of inter-class tensions between the popolo grasso and the minuti over the place of 
the old elite in civic life -- yet this question was less important than the role of the popolo 
minuto, the minor guildsmen and non-guild laborers, in politics. The conflict with the 
magnates had unified the popolo, yet the second popular regime faltered along these 
divisions. This would become apparent during 1293-95 and the promulgation of the 
Ordinances of Justice, a landmark in Florence’s political and legal history. Analyzing the 
three successive redactions of the Ordinances, I argue that Giano Della Bella’s two years 
in leadership of the popolo were crucial to Florentine political history, as the radicals 
attempted to completely exclude the city’s old ruling class from office. This was the case 
even though Giano’s family was itself part of this class, in a development found 
elsewhere in the peninsula, especially north of the Po: popular regimes sometimes took 
the form of popular lordships (signorie del popolo).156 I argue that Della Bella’s wing of 
the popolo aimed to pacify the city and countryside with a broad attack on the magnates, 
targeting their urban compounds and clientele networks. The lawyers and jurists in the 
city’s popular leadership foiled this attempt, out of resentment of Della Bella and anger at 
his disregard for the rule of law. 
The popolo minuto’s organized support for the popular commune’s leadership 
was crucial against the magnates, yet it was unable to withstand the deposition and exile 
of Della Bella. The magnates, under the banners the Black and White Guelfs, soon tore 																																																								
156 On popular coalitions led by members of the military elite, see Poloni’s limpid 
and succinct discussion in Potere al popolo, 52-59, and Riccardo Rao’s important recent 
study, Signori di Popolo. Signoria cittadina e società comunale nell’Italia nord-
occidentale, 1275-1350. Milan, 2011). 
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the city apart in renewed factional conflict (1301-04). I trace this process textually 
through the Ordinances and the occasional sermons of the Dominican reader (lector) of 
the church of S. Maria Novella, Remigio dei Girolami. Remigio, a scion of an elite 
Florentine popular family, was a guiding light of the early fourteenth-century 
commune.157 I read his 1295 sermons before the priorate as tactical interventions 
supporting the priorate in its struggle against della Bella’s faction, and defending the 
magnates in the wake of their July 1295 rebellion, calling for their reincorporation into 
the body politic despite their revolt. 
The third chapter begins the archival portion of the study, pivoting between town 
and country through the Executor’s records. Analyzing denunciations to the Executor as a 
means of communication between state officials and rural people, I reconstruct the 
dissemination of legal knowledge in the contado and the report of crime to the Executor 
and his court. These denunciations demonstrate the diffusion of the Florentine popolo’s 
rhetoric among rural Tuscans, the use of this rhetoric as a framing device for legal action, 
and the attempts of Tuscans to shape the actions of the judiciary. The chapter draws 
primarily on statutory law and denunciations against magnates and Florentine officials 
from the period 1343-1365. The period was chosen because it provides the longest and 
most detailed denunciations in the Executor’s acts.  
																																																								
157 On Remigio, see the conference volume Remigio dei Girolami. Dal bene 
comune al bene del comune. I tratti politici (Florence, 2013); T.P. Rupp, “’If you want 
peace, work for justice’: Dino Compagni’s Cronica and the ordinances of justice.” In 
Florence and beyond, eds. David S. Peterson with Daniel E. Bornstein (Toronto, 2008), 
323-28; and Charles T. Davis, “An early political theorist: Fra Remigio de’Girolami,” in 
Dante’s Italy and other essays (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984) 
[1960], 199-220. 
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The last two chapters analyze rural people and rural communities, combining 
material from the foreign-staffed courts with notarial evidence to reconstruct the 
socioeconomic context of (and logic for) crimes denounced to the Executor. Chapter 4 
addresses three questions: How did judicial procedure shape the strategies of those using 
the commune’s courts and our record of these strategies? How did disputants prove their 
version of a dispute when summoned before the Executor? And how did extra-judicial 
social networks affect parties in court? A detailed case study of a rural dispute from the 
1340s, on the eve of the Black Death, provides this chapter’s core. I follow an analysis of 
the in-court part of the dispute with a reconstruction of its socio-economic context, 
drawing on surviving notarial evidence. The intention is to understand how disputes were 
shaped by judicial procedure, the strategies of disputants in court, and the forms of proof 
most commonly used in Florentine public courts. 
Chapter 5 analyzes testimony in cases of magnate violence against rural 
communities. Reconstructing the behavior of witness communities in the Executor’s 
court demonstrates two patterns: a general tendency to deny all knowledge, and appealing 
to common knowledge (publica fama) when people did admit knowing of a crime. I 
argue that this was a response to elite power and the commune’s limitations outside the 
courtroom. Silence was a tactical response to the structural and conjunctural limitations 
of Florentine public justice in the countryside. Rural disinclination to cooperate with the 
Florentine courts resulted neither from communal institutions’ decadence, as some 
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scholars have claimed, nor from rural communities’ refusal to carry out judicial 
responsibilities.158 
Rural people did appear regularly to testify in cases before the Executor, but local 
power relations and communal solidarity-or, just as frequently, its absence-conditioned 
their responses. I demonstrate this through analysis of cases of magnate violence, 
particularly by the illustrious Bardi lineage, against rural people during the second half of 
the 1340s, straddling the Black Death (May-August 1348). How did magnate families 
respond to the economic difficulties of the fourteenth century, and how did their family 
strategies affect rural people and their interactions with the commune’s courts? Exploring 
the relationship between elite violence and non-elites’ responses in court reveals the 
structural and conjunctural limits on a late medieval state’s ability to protect its subjects, 
even when it possessed the will, institutionally and ideologically. It also explores how the 
popolo’s discursive unity, and the Florentine popolo’s attempts at imposing social peace 
on the countryside, ran into the morass of the late-medieval crisis -- a period of 
demographic catastrophe, sociopolitical breakdown, and economic recession. The goal 
here is to outline the connections between apparently micro- or sub-regional conditions 
and concerns, and broader historical developments. Doing so, the chapter complements 
chapter 1’s attention to how macro-level developments like the collapse of the Italian 
Kingdom influenced local political and social transformations in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. 
																																																								
158 Halina Manikowska, “ ‘Accorr’uomo”: il “popolo” nell’amministrazine della 
giustizia a Firenze durante il XIV secolo,” Ricerche storiche 18 (1988): 523-49, seems to 
attribute the decline of the commune’s judicial system to Tuscans’ refusal to cooperate 
with it. 
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The conclusion explains the study’s endpoint and places Florentine developments 
in a wider context. The later fourteenth century was a period of crisis not only in Europe 
but much of western Eurasia, as Janet Abu Lughod’s thirteenth-century world system 
went into crisis and began restructuring, post-plague and following the Pax Mongolica’s 
gradual fragmentation.159  I conclude by suggesting prospects for future research at a 
regional and inter-regional level, on the Italian city-states and the themes discussed in the 
study. 
																																																								
159 See Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European hegemony: The world system, A.D. 
1250-1350 (New York, 1989), particularly 352-69, for the structure and crisis of the late 
medieval world system. 
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1: A world turned upside down: The collapse of the March of Tuscany and the emergence of 
communal identity in Florentine Tuscany, c. 1115-1260 
 
Abstract: This chapter discusses socio-economic and political developments in Florentine 
Tuscany and the city. The chapter is symbolically bookended by two events in Tuscan history: the 
death of Matilda, last Marquess of Tuscany (1115), and the Sienese triumph over Florence at 
Montaperti (1260). Whereas later chapters focus on the actions and behavior of rural Tuscans in 
their interactions with Florentine institutions, the focus here is on macrolevel developments in 
Tuscany and Florence, comparing these where relevant with other Italian cities. The chapter’s 
main theme is the profound changes affecting Florentine Tuscany during the later Middle Ages: 
the social problems created by rapid economic growth, the search for political stability and social 
peace, and the institutional mechanisms devised for these purposes. I begin with the landscape 
and settlement of Florentine Tuscany, before addressing the origins of the Florentine economy 
and commune. An important aspect of this early development was the emergence of a civic 
identity, and the forms of organization preceding and accompanying the emergence of the semi-
institutionalized commune of the early thirteenth century. The chapter concludes with an account 
of the first popular regime at Florence, the Primo Popolo (1250-60), focusing on the regime’s 
institutional innovations and expansion in Tuscany. 
 
    Introduction 
This chapter reviews socio-economic and political developments in Florentine 
Tuscany from the mid-twelfth century to the mid-thirteenth century. It is not intended as 
a narrative of Tuscan history during the period, nor is it a comprehensive account of this 
period; several excellent accounts have done this in recent years.1 It is intended to 
provide the necessary background for the thematic chapters that follow, in particular the 
crucial events of the 1290s: although the common reference for the struggles between 
Florence’s magnati e popolani is the city, the contado was just as involved, on a political 
economic level, with changes of regime and factional strife as urban people were. Exiles 
in Florence’s interminable civil wars and factional spats frequently took refuge in the 
Fiorentino, and often could find refuge in towns antipathetic to Florence. There was no 																																																								
1 See above all Maria Elena Cortese, Signori, castelli, città. L’aristocrazia del 
territorio fiorentino tra X e XII secolo (Florence, 2007) [hereafter “Cortese, Signori”]; 
Enrico Faini, Firenze nell’età romanica (1000-1211) (Florence, 2010) [hereafter “Faini, 
Firenze”]; and Silvia Diacciati, Popolani e magnati: società e politica a Firenze nel 
Duecento (Spoleto, 2011) [hereafter “Diacciati, Popolani”]. W.R. Day, “The early 
development of the Florentine economy, c. 1100-1275.” PhD dissertation (London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2000) is easily the best study of Florence’s 
medieval economy, and the relationship between the city and sub-regional centers. 
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shortage of these in the Middle Ages as today: Florence’s medieval nemeses included 
Pisa, Siena, Arezzo, and smaller centers such as Prato, Pistoia, and S. Miniato al Tedesco. 
The Black and White Guelfs, similarly, waged their civil war of 1302-1308 in the 
Florentine contado as well as the city. The dense interconnections between town and 
country should feature in any account of Florentine history. Insisting on urban and rural 
interconnectivity may seem a commonplace, yet the urbancentric tradition of Anglophone 
Renaissance history endures.2 And so this chapter begins by describing the Florentine 
contado and the challenges facing Florence as the commune emerged in the twelfth 
century. These included powerful rural lords and regional rivals. The Florentines were 
aided in their expansion, however, by the bishop’s extensive rural holdings, which came 
to serve as proxies for Florentine control, and the internecine squabbling of the rival rural 
lords such as the Guidi and Alberti. From here, I shift focus to the Florentine economy in 
the high Middle Ages, underlining connections between Florence’s need for primary 
agricultural products, its regional political economy, and its international trade.  
The second part of the chapter is devoted to the development of a communal 
identity at Florence. This had to be created in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: the 
Florentines of the early communal age had to craft a shared sense of identity to tie 
																																																								
2 The most recent survey of late medieval and early modern Renaissance 
Florentine history, John M. Najemy’s A History of Florence, 1200-1575 (Oxford, 2006), 
does not discuss the contado except in passing references to its population and 
administrative organization. The later Florentine territorial state is mainly discussed in 
terms of Florentine conquest, and provincial elites’ connections to elite Florentine 
families. Likewise, the thematic chapters on the Florentine economy largely ignore 
regional exchange and productivity in favor of long-distance exchange and Florence’s 
industries. Economic historians have generally done better on this: see the programmatic 
conference volume Town and country in Europe, 1300-1800, ed. S.R. Epstein 
(Cambridge, 2001), and Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of renaissance Florence 
(Baltimore, 2009) [hereafter “Goldthwaite, Economy”], 114-19. 
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together a community largely consisting of new immigrants. In part this happened 
through constructing a useable past: that is, a narrative or series of vignettes of semi-
mythologized past events that served a purpose for the present. Examples include the 
chronicler Sanzanome’s invention of a Roman-era origin for the city’s rivalry with 
Fiesole, and the myth that Totila, the scourge of God (flagellum Dei), destroyed the city 
during the Gothic Wars, with Charlemagne refounding it.3 Florentine civic pride had fully 
crystallized by the time of the first popular regime (1250-1260), and this was a major 
factor in Florence’s expansion. The chapter closes with a summary of Florence’s 
prospects in the later thirteenth century.  
The physical setting Florentine Tuscany in the high Middle Ages 
 Florence’s medieval contado (the Fiorentino4) consisted of the twin dioceses of 
Florence and Fiesole, together constituting the Carolingian-era county, which may have 
been united in 854.5 The Fiesolan diocese was an administrative fossil by the high Middle 
Ages, and may never have been functionally independently from Florence’s bishops.6 
																																																								
3 On the Totila and Charlemagne myths, see Amedeo De Vincentiis, “Origini, 
memoria, identità a Firenze nel XIV: La rifondazione di Carlomagno,” in La mémoire des 
origines dans les institutions médiévales, in Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, 
Moyen Âge 115 (2003): 385-443. 
4 I use the term “Fiorentino” throughout the dissertation, but particularly in the 
first chapter, to denote the Florentine diocese (comitatus) that became the urban 
commune’s contado during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  
5R. Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze I, 129. 
6 Andrea Zorzi, “L’organizzazione del contado e del distretto,” in La 
trasformazione di un quadro politico (Florence, 2008) [hereafter ‘Zorzi, La 
Trasformazione’] 209-56, at 211: “Questi nuovi centri [such as Florence and Siena] erano 
ormai più popolosi di quelli diocesani decaduti o comunque molto piccoli, di quelle 
‘diocesi fossili, à vale a dire, Fiesole, Chiusi, Luni, Sovana o Grossetto.” Tiziana Lazzari, 
“Campagne senza città territori senza centro. Per un riesame dell’organizzazione del 
territorio della penisola italiana fra tardo-antico e alto medioevo (secoli VI-X),” in Città e 
campagna nei secoli altomedievali (Spoleto, 2009), 621-58, is a good discussion of early 
medieval Italian territorial organization, arguing for “territori senza centro” in the 
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After the 1125 Florentine conquest, the bishops of Fiesole temporarily moved the 
bishop’s seat downriver to Figline Valdarno.7 During the later fourteenth century, the 
Florentines would expand well beyond this episcopal boundary, but in the thirteenth 
century, Florence still struggled to dominate its diocese-contado. The division between 
the contado and distretto/districtus was never clearly defined, reflecting the ad hoc nature 
of early communal territorial organization and the piecemeal nature of the communes’ 
expansion within their territory.8 
Florentine expansion was initially conditioned and constrained by two factors: the 
landscape and local rivals.9  The Fiorentino’s broken landscape and the close proximity 
of significant local rivals distinguished it from its maritime neighbors Lucca and Pisa, 
which had little trouble establishing control over their own contadi in the lower Arno 
valley by the mid twelfth century; this included castle-building and limiting signorial 
power.10 Florence’s milieu and size of its contado (ca. 3500 square kilometers in the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Romagna, which, as part of the Papal States, lacked the Carolingian comital organization 
of Tuscany and other parts of the Regnum Italicum. 
7 Day, “Early economic development,” 64-67, provides a good summary account 
of Fiesole’s vicissitudes, and the attempt at changing the episcopal seat. On Figline 
Valdarno, see Lontano dalle città. Il Valdarno di Sopra nei secoli XII-XIII, eds. G. Pinto 
& P. Pirillo (Rome, 2005). 
8 Giampaolo Francesconi, “Scrivere il contado: I linguaggi della costruzione 
territoriale cittadina nell’Italia centrale,” Istituto Storico per il Medioevo 123/2 (2011), 
499-529, is an excellent survey of the development of the central Italian contado, and its 
confused (and confusing) origins. See especially pp. 501-07 for difficulties in medieval 
terminology used to describe the contado and distretto. 
9 I.P. Martini, G. Sarti, P. Pallecchi, A. Costantini, “Landscape influences on the 
development of the medieval and early Renaissance city-states of Pisa, Florence, and 
Siena, Italy,” in Landscape and societies: Selected cases, eds. I.P. Martini and W. 
Chesworth (Berlin, 2013), 203-23, is a useful statement of the geological and topological 
characteristics of Tuscany, with topographical and hydrographical maps. 
10 See Wickham, Community and clientele in twelfth-century Tuscany 
(Oxford:1998), 15-17, for Lucca’s ban on castles within its Sei Miglia, the land within a 
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twelfth century) distinguished it even more sharply from Rome. The Eternal City 
possessed by far the largest contado in all medieval Italy, varying between the minimum 
of 6000 square kilometers under the city’s control in the eleventh century and the 14,000 
square kilometers controlled in the tenth century and later reclaimed by the thirteenth-
century papacy.11  
Florence’s original contado includes only one large river basin, the flood plains 
flanking the Arno. Lesser streams such as the Bisenzio, Pesa, and Elsa fragment even this 
river basin into a series of smaller agrarian foci.12 Most of the rest of the area consists of 
forested hills and small rivulets like the Ema and Era. Examples of these low ranges 
include the Chianti hills to the south, the Monte Albano dividing the Fiorentino from the 
Val di Pesa and lower Valdarno to the southwest, and the Monte Fiorentine, which 
separates Florence’s immediate hinterland from the Valdisieve and Mugello to the 
north.13 The Pratomagno ridge similarly insulates the upper Arno valley (Valdarno di 
Sopra) and Arezzo’s contado from Florence, while the imposing mountains of the 
Tuscan-Emilian Appennines rise to the north of the Valdisieve.14 This broken landscape 
was an important geographic barrier to early Florentine expansion. In the mountainous 
																																																																																																																																																																					
six-mile radius of the city. For Pisa, see Wickham, Sleep walking, chapter 3, in particular 
81-83, for Pisan curtailment of signorial rights. 
11 On Rome and its hinterland, see Wickham, Medieval Rome (Oxford, 2015), 35-
110, and 36-38 for Rome’s contado, the Agro Romano. Peter Partner, The lands of St. 
Peter (Berkeley, 1972), remains the best survey of the medieval Papal States’ political-
diplomatic history. 
12 Conti, I, 63. 
13 See the maps and summary in Klapisch-Zuber and Herlihy, Tuscans and their 
families, 29-52. 
14 See the maps of the Florentine countryside and the major mountain passes in 
Day, “Early economic development,” 15-16. 
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north of the Fiorentino, bordering the Romagna, it would not be complete until the early 
fifteenth century.15  
The population of the Florentine contado varied with this geography, and was 
unevenly dispersed.16 As so often is the case in medieval Italy, the surviving 
documentation is usually limited to lands that were contained in patrimonies, monastic, 
signorial, or otherwise, generally leaving out the higher altitudes.17 This remained true 
even into the mid-Trecento, and was more so the case earlier. The high Mugello, north of 
the Valdisieve, is a particular blank spot before the thirteenth century, although Enrico 
Faini has done some interesting work with passing mentions in the Pisan account of the 
city’s Balearic expedition, the Liber Maiolichinus, of the traffic in lumber from the 
Mugello to the Tuscan maritime cities.18 Elio Conti proposed that some of the 
Fiorentino’s hill zones were overpopulated by c. 1100, and began to empty out as a result 
of immigration to Florence.  
Around 1200, the flatlands immediately around Florence still consisted of 
partially flooded marshland. Toponymic evidence from the area immediately outside 																																																								
15 For the Florentine Romagna, see Paolo Pirillo, “La Romagna fiorentina,” in 
Castelli medievali e neomedievali in Emilia-Romagna), eds. M.G. Muzzarelli and A. 
Campanini (Bologna, 2006), 191-96. On peasant resistance to Florentine exactions in this 
region, see Samuel Cohn, Jr., Creating the florentine state: Peasants and rebellion, 1348-
1434 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999). 
16 On Tuscan rural settlement, see the classic study of Giovanni Cherubini, 
“Forme e vicende degli insediamenti nella campagna toscana dei secoli XIII-XV,” in 
Signori, contadini, borghesi: Ricerche sulla società italiana del basso medioevo 
(Florence, 1974), 145-74, and the more recent studies by Paolo Pirillo, collected in 
Construzione di un contado. I fiorentini e il loro territorio nel basso medioevo (Florence, 
2001). 
17 Faini, Firenze, 36: “Le zone più autenticamente montane sono anche quelle 
peggio documentate, ho tentato di spiegare perché: le terre sopra le quali gravavano diritti 
di sfruttamento collettivo erano meno di frequente oggetto di transazioni patrimoniali.” 
18 See Faini, Firenze, 27-30, for his discussion of a mention of the Mugello in the 
Liber Maiolichinus (1130s). 
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Florence demonstrates this: Padule, Isola, Piscina; Varlungo, an old ford (Vadum 
longum), now in the southeastern outskirts of the comune of Florence.19 Chestnut 
cultivation was practiced in some of the contado, in particular in the Chianti and on the 
slopes of the Pratomagno.20 A major development in the thirteenth-century Fiorentino 
was the intensification of grain cultivation, especially on episcopal estates, which 
produced resistance by rural communes.21 Mezzadria (sharecropping) contracts would not 
develop until the later Duecento.22 Enrico Faini has proposed that the indebtedness of 
peasant cultivators (contadini) led to the advent of the mezzadria contract, at least in the 
Fiorentino.23 
  Rural lordships and local rivals in the Fiorentino 
The topic of land ownership leads to the other major reason for the slowness with 
which Florence came to dominate its hinterlands: resistance from the powerful rural 
																																																								
19 See Conti, I, 61, for millenial overpopulation in the medium and high hill-
country; on population generally for the period before the fourteenth century, see Conti, I, 
60-69.  
20 Faini, Firenze, 35. 
21 On thirteenth-century rural unrest, see George W. Dameron, Episcopal Power 
and Florentine Society, 1000-1320 (Cambridge, MA., 1991) [hereafter “Dameron, 
Episcopal power”], 136-40. 
22 There is a rich literature on the mezzadria system, and its incredibly long 
duration in central Italy. See above all Conti for the Fiorentino; Mario and Alessandro 
Dani, La mezzadria nelle terre di Siena e Grossetto dal medioevo all’età contemporanea 
(Siena, 2011), is an excellent introduction to the topic as a whole, and the social and legal 
logic behind the system’s establishment and duration. Ian Ochiltree, “Mastering the 
sharecroppers: Land, labour, and the search for independence in the US South and South 
Africa”, Journal of African Studies 30:1 (Mar., 2004), 41-61, is a useful comparative 
approach to the class politics of sharecropping in a modern (although classicaly 
“backward”) context. 
23 Faini, Firenze, 107. 
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lordships that surrounded Florence, and rival urban communes such as Siena and Pisa.24 
Two of the most important signorial lineages in the later history of the March of Tuscany, 
the Guidi and Cadolingi, were based in the area around Florence.25 These families, 
originally installed as counts by King Berengar I (888-924), had built up significant 
holdings in Tuscany over the tenth and eleventh centuries, including lands usurped from 
the Florentine bishops.26 The bishops gradually rebuilt their patrimony in the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries, buying castelli in the countryside to ward off the Guidi and 
Cadolingi, as well as upstart, reformed monasteries such as Vallombrosa.27 By the early 
twelfth century, the episocpate possessed significant properties and castles in the 
mountainous Mugello and Val di Sieve north of Florence, and in the Val di Pesa to the 
southwest.28  
The bishops continued to cooperate closely with the Florentine commune as it 
expanded, with the commune vigorously defending rural episcopal lands and rights, as a 
																																																								
24 William R. Day, Jr., “The early development”, is the best account of Florence’s 
early development and should become standard once it is published; see 51-61, for rural 
seigneurial power and the Florentines’ actions against it. 
25 Dameron, Episcopal power , 24-28, provides a good overview of these two 
lineages’ early history. For the early activity of the Counts Guidi, see Natale Rauty’s 
edited collection of the relevant documents, Documenti per la storia dei Conti Guidi in 
Toscana: Le origini e i primi secoli (887-1164) (Florence, 2004). The best study of a 
single Tuscan comital family is Michelangelo Abatantuono and Luciano Righetti’s study 
of the Conti Alberti, neighbors and rivals to both the Conti Guidi and Florence: I conti 
Alberti, secoli XI-XIV (Bologna, 2000). Throughout this study, I refer to this signorial 
family as the Conti Alberti, to distinguish them from the urban mercantile family, the 
Alberti del Giudice. 
26 Dameron, Episcopal power, 27. For the collapse of the Regnum Italicum, see 
Wickham, Early medieval Italy (Ann Arbor, 1981), “The failure of the state: Political and 
institutional change in northern Italy, 875-1024”, 168-93. 
27 Dameron, Episcopal power, 43-45. 
28 Dameron, Episcopal power, 69. 
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wedge into the political and economic life of rural areas.29 This was entirely predictable: 
Unlike their colleagues in Arezzo, Florentine bishops had never possessed comital 
powers from the Canossa, so they did not act as a rival source of power as the commune 
slowly emerged in the twelfth century. Furthermore, the Florentine episcopate was deeply 
entwined with urban lineages, in particular the Visdomini and Tosinghi.30 This habitual, 
close cooperation between Florence’s bishops and the commune would continue, right up 
to the War of the Eight Saints (1375-78). This cooperation was based on the dense 
interconnections between the bishops and the office-holding families of the city.  
There is an intriguing parallel here between Florence and Siena, despite the cities’ 
long and ongoing history of mutual resentment and disdain.31 Unique among the cities of 
northern and central Italy, the Sienese episcopate remained in the hands of a local family, 
the Malavolti, until 1371. During times of crisis such as the lead-up to Montaperti (1260), 
the Sienese bishops’ local origins and horizons made them ready and willing allies of the 
commune, with potentially decisive results for the effectiveness of public power.32  
																																																								
29 Dameron, Episcopal power, 68-69: “Another reason for the collaborative 
rapport between the episcopate and the commune was the simple fact that the Visdomini 
and Tosinghi-the episcopal administrators during a vacancy-were members of the 
Florentine consulate [in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries]….” 
30 For the Visdomini and the thirteenth-century episcopate, see Lansing, 
Florentine magnates, 65-76, and Dameron, “Florentine magnates”. Faini, Firenze, 179-
85, is a prosopograhical study of the Florentine bishop’s entourage in the 1230s, based on 
the roster of oath-taking episcopal fideles preserved in the Bulletone series. 
31 A structural comparison of the two cities, so central to medieval Italian history 
and so deeply entwined in a variety of ways, alas does not exist yet. 
32 Brad Franco, The legend of Montaperti (Siena, 2012), is the best succinct 
introduction to medieval Sienese history, the city’s episcopate, and the lead-up to 
Montaperti in English. 
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The cooperation between the Florentine commune and episcopate contrasts 
sharply with how the commune dealt with other rural lordships.33 Especially before the 
mid-thirteenth century, these rural lordships constituted rival systems of power to the 
commune, struggling against it for the same roadways and river valleys and human 
resources.34 Four major rural lordships vied for control of the contado with Florence: the 
Cadolingi, Guidi, Ubaldini, and Alberti. Taken together, these families’ rural holdings 
ringed Florence and hindered its access to crucial routes through the Arno Valley and its 
hinterland, including the crucial pilgrims’ route, the Via Francigena.35 The Cadolingi died 
out in 1113, but the division of their lands between the Tuscan bishops, the emperor, and 
the Conti Alberti immediately brought Florence into conflict with the latter. Matilda of 
Canossa smoothed this over by appointing an Alberti as bishop, but this in turn led to a 
rupture with the Guidi following her death in 1115.  The Guidi withdrew from the city, 
refusing to recognize Florentine jurisdction and allying themselves with the Holy Roman 
Emperor. Intermittent warfare continued between Florence and these two rural lineages 
throughout most of the century, and indeed with the Guidi into the Quattrocento.  
The Ubaldini, the scourge of Florence’s Appennine borders, had originated as 
vassals of the Tuscan margrave, the Guidi, and the Florentine bishops.36 Their lodgment 
in the Mugello gave them a potential stranglehold on traffic across the Appennines 
between Florence and the Romagna, a stranglehold they would activate numerous times 																																																								
33 For what follows, see Dameron, Episcopal power, 70-77. 
34 I paraphrase here George Dameron, Episcopal power, 69. 
35 For the Tuscan road network in the Middle Ages, see the classic by Johann 
Plesner, Una rivoluzione stradale del Duecento (Florence, 1979). 
36 The only detailed study of the Ubaldini is Laura Magna, “Gli Ubaldini del 
Mugello: Una signoria feudale nel contado fiorentino,” in Nobilità e ceti dirigenti in 
Toscana nei secoli XI-XIII, ed. Comitato di studi sulla storia dei ceti dirigenti in Tosana 
(Impruneta, 1982), 13-63. 
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in the later Middle Ages. By the later twelfth, the main feudal families in the Fiorentino 
were the various branches of the Guidi, the Alberti, the Ubaldini, the Ubertini, and the 
Pazzi of the upper Valdarno.37 While the commune gradually pushed these families out of 
the river plains, they showed a remarkable tenacity in resisting the commune during the 
fourteenth century, despite losses of territory and defeats.38 These rural lineages appear 
later in the Trecento in denunciations to the Executor, and will be discussed in chapter 
five. 
It is worth emphasizing Tuscany’s polycentric political geography during the 
thirteenth century. The region’s dense urban network resulted in a cluster of autonomous 
communes close to Florence: Prato, Pistoia, Arezzo, Siena, and S. Gimignano, to name 
only the nearest.39 Some towns, particularly Lucca and Pisa, had already passed their 
peak by the 1280s, but before the plague, future Florentine dominance was far from 
obvious.40 Well into the fourteenth century, these were vigorous communes capable of 
holding their own against Florence and pursuing their own policies. For example, Pistoia, 
despite its small contado, maintained its independence from Florence into the early 
fourteenth century. Lucca, under the leadership of Castruccio Castracani, crushed the 
Florentines at Altopascio in 1325 and conquered Pisa.41 It was only with the demographic 
																																																								
37 Zorzi, La trasformazione, 214. 
38 I disagree here with Day’s argument for the readiness of rural lineages to 
submit to the commune: Day, “The early economic development of Florence,” 115-117. 
He is no doubt right, however, regarding the importance of cooperation and compliance 
over military conquest, despite the chronicles’ overemphasis on this: see Day, “Early 
economic development,” 101-02. 
39 See Zorzi, La trasformazione, 209-13, for the urban network of thirteenth-
century Tuscany. 
40 Zorzi, La trasformazione, 210. 
41 Giampaolo Francesconi, Districtus civitatis Pistorii. Strutture e trasformazioni 
del potere in un contado toscano (secoli XI-XIV) (Pistoia, 2007), is an exhaustive and 
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collapse of the later fourteenth century that Florence emerged as the definitively 
hegemonic inland power in Tuscany. 42  Even then, Siena remained an independent 
republic until the sixteenth century, and the Pisans famously refused to accept Florentine 
conquest, straight through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.43 Florentine hegemony 
over Tuscany in the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was economic far more than 
military or political. 
The power of the rural lords of the Fiorentino was amplified by the fact that, as 
the commune emerged, there were not many urban landowners to counterbalance the 
rural lordships’ power and resources or, just as importantly, rural clientele networks. 
With the notable exception of the bishops and cathedral chapter, Florentines were slow to 
invest in rural land. Enrico Faini’s recent study of a 1231 oath sworn by the bishop’s 
most important fideles reveals that the bishop’s entourage was primarily city-based: 32 of 
the 40 identifiable lineages were urban families.44 This situation changed in the thirteenth 
century, due to rural landowners moving to the city: rural merchants, notaries, and local 
elites constituted an important element in the flow of population to Florence.45 By 
																																																																																																																																																																					
thorough study of the Pistoiese between the emergence of the commune and the 
Florentine conquest.  
42 For the demographic collapse of the Tuscan towns in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries see Andrea Zorzi, “La formazione e il governo del dominio territoriale 
fiorentino,” in Zorzi, Andrea and William J. Connell, eds. Lo stato territoriale fiorentino 
(secoli XIV-XV) (San Miniato, 2001), 189-224, at 193-94. 
43 Mario Ascheri, “Nel cuore del Dugento: Siena capitale ‘Europea’?” in 
Montaperti, eds. M. A. Ceppari Ridolfi & P. Turrini (Siena, 2013), 7-11, is a brief 
exploration of Siena, not Florence, as the central Tuscan hub during the thirteenth 
century. 
44 Faini, Firenze, 181-892. On the paucity of urban landowners during the twelfth 
and early thirteenth centuries, see Faini, Firenze, 150-54. 
45 On landowners’ migration and social mobilty, see Zorzi, La trasformazione, 
221, and Paolo Pirillo, Famiglia e mobilità sociale nella Toscana medievale (Florence, 
1992). 
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comparison, there is a significant contrast here with early and high medieval Rome, 
where urban ecclesiastical foundations apparently owned the entire area out to the 25-
mile marker, the Agro Romano. These diaconal churches and urban monasteries 
traditionally leased agricultural land to city-based landowners through three-generation 
emphyteusis contracts (emphyteusis), ensuring Rome’s firm control on its immediate 
hinterland, and the direct flow of the Agro’s foodstuffs to the city.46  
Economically speaking, perhaps the most important feature of the contado’s 
relationship with Florence concerned rents and surpluses. Florence’s actions in its 
contado in the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries were motivated by the twin needs 
of securing communications from the city to the borders of its territory, and increasing 
the city’s share of the surplus extracted from the contado’s peasantry.47 This surplus was 
itself expanding during the high Middle Ages: factors behind increased agricultural 
productivity in Florentine Tuscany included the expansion of the area under cultivation, 
infrastructure improvements, the dissemination of rural credit, and the suppression of 
rural signorial jurisdiction in the countryside.48 This was a common problem facing the 
nascent communes of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: especially before the 
development of city taxation, cities usually only had access to surpluses via landlords’ 
																																																								
46 On the Agro Romano and urban landownership patterns, see Wickham, 
Medieval Rome, 53-60. Incidentally, this had major consequences for settlement patterns, 
and the near-total absence of peasants from the surviving documentation: Wickham, 62-
71, for the absence of villages (with a few exceptions), and 71-77, for peasant invisibility 
in most surviving documentation. 
47 For the commune’s control of the road network in the fourteenth century and 
the economic networks linking town and country, see Firenze e le sue campagne nel 
Trecento. Mercanti, produzione, traffici, trans. I. Chabot and P. Pirillo (Florence, 2005), 
“La politica stradale del comune nexl XIV secolo,” 57-136. 
48 Day, “Early economic development,” 200. See Day,  “Early economic 
development,”, 148-201, for agricultural production for the twelfth-thirteenth centuries. 
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exactions from tenant farmers.49 This process was sometimes contested in the thirteenth 
century: George Dameron uncovered several cases of collective resistance to the 
exactions of the Florentine bishops, which intensified Florentine involvement in the 
countryside as the bishops called in communal officials to support them against unruly 
rural tenants.50 The resistance grew out of the bishop’s efforts to commute money rents to 
grain rents, with adverse consequences for direct producers seeking to sell their produce 
on the Florentine market.51 The Florentines aided the bishops in their disputes with rural 
vassals, largely because the episcopal mensa served as a proxy for Florentine control.52  
Despite this resistance, from the early thirteenth century, Florence could usually rely on 
grain reaching its markets, through the grain tax on rural vassals or direct sales; at the 
same time, the Florentine tax system was gradually emerging. 
How many people lived in the contado before the disasters of the fourteenth 
century? Tuscany was one of the most densely populated regions on the Italian peninsula 
before the disasters of the fourteenth century, and probably in all of Europe.53 The 
demographic and economic boom of the 11th-13th centuries was particularly beneficial 
for the region. Later medieval Tuscany was characterized by its singularly dense urban 
																																																								
49 Wickham, Medieval Rome, 38. 
50 See in particular the case study of S. Casciano in Dameron, “Episcopal lordship 
in the diocese of Florence and the origins of San Casciano Val di Pesa, 1230-1247,” 
Journal of Medieval History 12 (1986): 135-54. 
51 See Dameron, Episcopal power, 86-92, and 130-40, for episcopal political 
economy and rural push back in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Fiorentino. Day, “The 
population of Florence,” 109, discussses the pressure on peasants from the urban grain 
market. 
52 Dameron, Episcopal power, 69. 
53 Giovanni Cherubini, “Una terra di città: Toscana nel basso Medioevo,” in 
Scritti Toscani: L’urbanesimo medievale e la mezzadria (Florenc, 1991), 22-23. 
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network, leading Giovanni Cherubini to christen it “una terra di città.’’54 The population 
of Florence and its contado has long been a source of controversy, mainly hinging on the 
meaning of the numbers that Giovanni Villani provides in his Nuova Cronica.55 William 
R. Day has argued that a rural population of around 90,000 in 1175 is probably 
conservative, given these clusters of dense settlement.56 By 1300, this had increased to 
around 260,000.57 Rural immigration to the city is a classic theme of medieval Italian 
historiography, and characterized the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in particular.58 
Florence from the mid-thirteenth century drained people away not only from its own 
contado, but northeastern Tuscany: the effect on Prato was particularly notable. Based on 
falling papal tithes, parts of Florentine Tuscany may have been depopulated by the early 
fourteenth century.59 A significant element of this immigrant population consisted of 
rural landowners, such as the Franzesi Della Foresta, studied by Paolo Pirillo and Enrico 
																																																								
54 Cherubini, “Una terra di città: Toscana nel basso Medioevo,” in Scritti Toscani, 
21-34. 
55 See Giovanni Villani, Nuova cronica, 3 vols., ed. Giuseppe Porta (Parma, 1991) 
[hereafter “G. Villani, Cronica”], vol. 2, 12.94, at 197-202, for most of the numbers in 
debate.  
56 W.R. Day, Jr., “The population of Florence before the Black Death: Survey and 
synthesis,” Journal of Medieval History 28 (2002) [hereafter “Day, Population”]: 93-129, 
at 119 for 90,000 as conservative. 
57 See the population table in Day, “Population,” at 120.  
58 The classic here is Johann Plesner, L’emigrazione dalla campagna alla città 
libera di Firenze nel XIII secolo (Florence: Papafava, 1979). More recent treatments are 
Enrico Faini, “L’emigrazione dal Valdarno Superiore a Firenze nel XII secolo: una storia 
mancata,” in Storie di una pieve del Valdarno. San Romolo a Gaville in età medievale a 
cura di P. Pirillo e M. Ronzani (Rome, 2008), 105-21, and William R. Day Jr., 
“Population growth and productivity: rural-urban migration and the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector in thirteenth-century Florence,” in Labour and labour markets 
between town and countryside (Middle Ages-19th century), eds. B. Blondé, E. Vanhaute, 
M. Galand (Turnhout, BE, 2001), 82-110. 
59 Day, “Population,” 124. 
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Faini.60 If city air did make some peasants free, it also enriched contadini who were 
already among the first ranks in their rural paese’s socioeconomic world. 
The scramble for Tuscany, c. 1100-1200: The collapse of the Tuscan March and 
Florence’s early contado wars 
The March of Tuscany disintegrated in the early twelfth century, following the 
series of civil wars between the Canossa, staunch supporters of the reform movement, 
and the German emperors.61 Florence held out for the reformers and the Canossa, and 
stood off an imperial siege in 1080.62 Pisa (along with Genoa) responded quickly to this 
power vacuum, with a Pisan commune visible by the 1100s.63 Inland, change was more 
gradual. The first-tier Tuscan elite, castle-holding families such as the Guidi, Conti 
Alberti, and Ubaldini, left Florentine urban politics and began tightening control over 
their rural territories, and where possible, expanding them.64 None of these families were 
powerful enough to reconstitute the March, however, and it dissipated following 
Matilda’s (1115). The cities were now on their own, although it would not become clear 
that the Regnum Italicum was a thing of the past until mid-century.65 
From the 1120s, inter-city wars became commonplace all over north-central Italy. 
A major hallmark of the emergence of the city-states was, in fact, their savage delight in 																																																								
60 See the Faini, “L’emigrazione”, and Pirillo, Famiglia. 
61 Wickham, Sleep walking, 180-87, provides an excellent summary account of 
this process and local responses. 
62 Giovanni Villani, Nuova cronica. Ed. Giuseppe Porta (Parma 
, 1991) 3 vols. [hereafter “G. Villani, [book number, chapter number]”], IV.XXIII. I once 
lived on the Via Campo d’Arrigo on Florence’s northeastern outskirts, perhaps so named 
because the emperor Henry IV’s army camped here during the siege. 
63 The Pisans can already been seen acting in common by the 1090s: see 
Wickham, Sleep walking, chapter 2, for the Pisan commune. 
64 For aristocratic abandonment of the city, see Cortese’s conclusions in Signori. 
65 Wickham, Sleep walking, 200-05, nicely summarizes the collapse of the 
Kingdom of Italy. 
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fighting each other; only outside threats such as Frederick Barbarossa could force them to 
act together.66 Florence, like other cities, responded to this power vacuum with military 
conquest. William R. Day, Jr., has demonstrated that the Countess Matilda did not 
delegate imperial power to Florence, as Robert Davidsohn believed: conclusive evidence 
for urban imposts in the countryside only survives from 1156.67 Unfazed by this, the 
Florentines, according to Giovanni Villani, were already destroying defiant castles such 
as Monte Orlandi in 1107.68 In the same year they destroyed the castle of Montemurlo, a 
Guidi fief, between Pistoia and Prato.69 Villani claims they did so in order to keep Prato 
free of Guidi control; perhaps this was a response to efforts by the Guidi or Conti Alberti 
to extend their control from Prato into the Fiorentino. After two unsuccessful campaigns 
(1123, 1124), the Florentines finally conquered their archrival Fiesole in 1125, razing the 
fortress.70 
The Florentines also targeted rural lords and neighboring towns that were 
interfering with traffic to the city, or which could emerge as competing points of 
attraction for commerce and the agricultural surplus. The castello of Figline Valdarno 
was taken and razed in 1170, after Fiesole’s bishop had obtained papal permission to 
move the seat of the see to Figline.71 Florence’s treatment of the Buondelmonti lineage 
demonstrates how Florentine interests often dovetailed with episcopal rights. The 
																																																								
66 Wickham, Sleep walking, 201-02. 
67 See Day’s thorough discussion of the issue in “Early economic development”. 
68 G. Villani, 4.25. Day, “Early economic development,” 62, discusses this 
passage. 
69 G. Villani, 4.26. 
70 Day, “Early economic development,” 64, ftnt. 35, discusses why the 1125 
campaign succeeded. 
71 Day, “Early economic development,” 66-67, discusses the Fiesolano bishops’ 
(unsuccessful) machinations to wriggle out of the shadow of Florence. 
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Buondelmonti had been episcopal vassals from 1092, and required to provide troops for 
the bishops. The Buondelmonti contingent had abandoned the Florentine army during the 
siege of Montegufoni in 1135, giving the commune sufficient grounds to besiege and raze 
the lineage’s chief stronghold, Montebuoni. The Buondelmonti had also been collecting 
tolls on traffic up the Valdigreve between Florence and Siena.72 Montebuoni fell to the 
Florentines, who razed it to the ground. The Buondelmonti would soon become a major 
player in the urban politics of the commune.  
Greater lords such as the Guidi and Conti Alberti were a greater challenge. The 
Florentines fought numerous wars with both lineages from the 1140s on. The great 
houses did not unite against Florence, however. The Conti Alberti joined the Florentines 
for an attack on the crucial border town of Poggibonsi, which lay on the Via Franciegena, 
in 1156. This did not stop them from being targeted later in the twelfth century by the 
commune. Following the rise of the commune at Prato, the Alberti had founded 
Semifonte as a commerical center to rival Florence and threaten communications 
between Florence and the Valdelsa. Before Frederick Barbarossa’s descent into Tuscany 
in 1185, the Florentines procured an oath of fealty from the Conti Alberti; the Alberti 
foundation of Semifonte may have been destroyed in 1184 for the first time, but Count 
Alberto was styling himself comes Albertus de Summofonte in 1185.73 The Florentines 
definitively eradicated Semifonte in 1202, razing its buildings and banning any building 
																																																								
72 The relevant accounts are in Sanzanome, 128, and G. Villani, 4.36. See also 
Day, “Early economic development,” 68-69 
73 Day, “Early economic development,” 81, citing Davidsohn, Storia, 1, 862, n. 1. 
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on the site, pour encourager les autres: Florence would brook no competitors within the 
boundaries of its contado.74  
The fundamental strategic goal for Florence in these early wars was securing 
communications in the city’s hinterland, and driving out competitors for local hegemony. 
Although the Florentines were usually successful in these campaigns, they were 
comparatively small-scale affairs. The age of really devastating warfare, affecting entire 
regions, requiring massive funds and dragging on for years, would come in the fourteenth 
century. Florence’s high medieval contado wars could, rather, be seen as a medieval 
Tuscan analogue to the Beer Wars fought between American gangsters of the 1920s: 
bloody, internecine, and sure to attract the attention of anyone keeping records, but also 
limited and intermittent struggles to gain control of crucial economic assets, and shut out 
the competition in the broader context of a power vacuum, created in one case by the 
collapse of the March, in the other by the Volstead Act’s prohibition of alcohol.75 As with 
the victors of the Beer Wars, such as Charles “Lucky” Luciano, Florentine success over 
rivals such as the Conti Alberti or Figline Valdarno depended on superior organization, 
well-timed aggression, and the sense to compromise and negotiate as well as fight; this 
tactical success was also grounded in a robust economy and burgeoning population.  
The city: Demography, economy, social classes and institutions, ca. 1200-1300
 Florence’s urban population in the 1280s hovered around 85,000, and by 1300 
																																																								
74 On Semifonte and its legend, see the conference volume Semifonte in Val 
d’Elsa e i centri di nuova fondazione dell’Italia medievale, ed. Paolo Pirillo (Florence, 
2004). 
75 See James Fentress, Eminent gangsters: Immigrants and the birth of organized 
crime in America (New York, 2010). 
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had increased to 105,000.76 In 1100, the city scarcely reached beyond the Carolingian-era 
additions to its Roman walls.77 The Countess Matilda may have incorporated the castello 
of Altafronte (the ruins of which are the foundation for today’s Museo Galileo) into this 
circuit, but the first major expansion of the city’s wall circuit was carried out from 1172-
1175, when the city’s population hovered at around 15,000.78 The city’s population had 
grown tremendously to 85,000 by the time work began on Florence’s final wall circuit 
(1284-1333).79 This circuit spanned eight and a half kilometers, with 73 towers and 15 
gates, and fully incorporated the southern borghi of the Oltrarno (S. Frediano, S. Spirito, 
S. Niccolò), and the mendicant foundations of the later thirteenth century (S. Spirito, S. 
Maria Novella, S. Croce, Ognissanti, S. Marco).80 The final wall circuit deliberately 
included empty spaces, for future population. The city’s population peaked in 1338, 
before the demographic disaster of the Black Death wiped out perhaps half the city’s 
population. The city’s population would not overgrow its medieval wall circuit until the 
eighteenth century.81 
																																																								
76 Day, “Population,” 120. 
77 The best recent studies of the pre-Duecento cityscape are Jacopo Bruttini, 
“Enclavi urbane a Firenze: Il caso della famiglia Uberti,” Annali di Storia di Firenze VI 
(2011): 5-35, with invaluable maps and sketches of the high medieval city, and Faini, 
Firenze, 37-45.  
78 Franek Sznura, L’espansione urbana di Firenze nel Dugento (Florence, 1975), 
44. For Florence’s population in 1200, see Day, “Population,” 120. 
79 See Najemy, A History, 98-99, for a detailed map and explanatory key of the 
wall circuit, its gates, and significant buildings in the late thirteenth-century city. 
80For the third wall circuit, see Giovanni Cherubini, “La Firenze di Dante e di 
Giovanni Villani,” in Scritti Toscani, 46-47.  
81Najemy, A History, 100. 
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Figure 1: Florence’s medieval urban area: The orange line denotes the Roman-era wall; the 
castle of Altafronte was later incorporated into this circuit. The 1172-1175 wall circuit 
incorporated the borghi surrounding the Roman wall into the city.  The 1284-1333 circuit is 
clearly visible around the city’s density clusters, illustrating the city’s explosive growth up to 
1348. From Antonio Campani’s Guida della città di Firenze ornata di pianta e veduta (Florence, 
1822) 
  
In the thirteenth century, Florence overtook its regional rivals such as Pisa and 
Siena and emerged as the economic powerhouse of Tuscany. This economic dynamism 
largely explains the flood of rural immigration to the city, as well as the city’s explosive 
social conflict.82 Underlying this economic expansion were several factors: rising 
agricultural productivity, infrastructural investments, the expansion of credit, and the 
reserve army of labor pouring in from the contado.83 The early commune’s infrastructural 
																																																								
82 My discussion of Florence’s early industry is based largely on Goldthwaite, 
Economy, particularly 12-36 and 114-125, and Day, “Early economic development,” 
ch.5, “Manufacturing, urban development, finance”. 
83 Day, “Early economic development,” 201-02, for this. On credit in real estate 
transactions, see Faini, Firenze, 100-09. 
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investments (in particular, bridges and roads) greatly facilitated the movement of goods 
in the city, and in the countryside.84 A reliable labor surplus, care of its countryside and 
neighbors, allowed Florentine industries to staff their burgeoning workshops and mills, 
especially the textile and building trade. The latter was a major growth industry as the 
thirteenth-century commune launched ambitious building projects.85 
The Florentine textile industry alone staffed three hundred workshops in the first 
decade of the fourteenth century, employing more than 30,000 people.86 In the 1330s, 
Giovanni Villani valued the textile industry at the astonishing sum of 1,200,000 florins 
per annum. An industry of this size and value indicates the profound transformations at 
work in city and countryside during this period. The wool guild, the Calimala, is attested 
from 1212.87 By mid-century, the textile industry was important enough to rewire other 
sectors of the urban economy: by the early fourteenth century, some millers were 
converting grain mills into fulling mills to service the textile industry.88 The textile 
industry was interwoven with Florence’s nascent banking and finance sectors: Florentines 
																																																								
84 On infrastructure, see Day, “Early economic development,” 238-283. See 
Lansing, Florentine magnates, 6-7, for Florence’s bridges and the years of their 
construction. 
85 On this, see Sznura, L’espansione; for estimates of the number of people 
employed in the building trades, and Florentine building projects to the 1350s, see 
Najemy, A History, 103-09. 
86 Day, “Early economic development,” 204, drawing on Giovanni Villani’s 
numbers. Hidetoshi Hoshino, Industria tessile e commercio internazionale nella Firenze 
del tardo medioevo, eds. F. Franceschi, S. Tognetti (Florence, 2001), is the best account 
of the Florentine textile industry and international commerce during the later Middle 
Ages. 
87 Day, “Early economic development,” 206-07, notes that the organization may 
have existed since 1193. 
88 Day, “Early economic development,” 225. 
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were investing in business partnerships specifically for manufacturing pannos florentinos 
di lana, woolen cloth of the Florentine kind, in 1244.89 
An important element in the myth of Florence is the image the Florentines 
established for themselves in the fourteenth century as international bankers and 
merchants. While this development emerged from regional exchange within Florentine 
Tuscany, there is an element of truth to his reputation. Florentine families such as the 
Bardi, Peruzzi, and Frescobaldi were among the leading bankers in later medieval 
Europe, and in their activity finance, high politics, and Florentine annonarial politics 
fused. It is still unclear when the Florentines emerged as the papacy’s go-to bankers, but 
by the mid-thirteenth century, the Florentines played a substantial role in curial 
banking.90 The papacy frequently intervened in Florentine politics and also aided 
Florentine merchants abroad; the papacy also granted special privileges in the Papal 
States: Umbria, Romagna, le Marche, and Lazio.91 By the early fourteenth century, the 
Bardi and Peruzzi were funding Plantagenet wars with France.92 This banking activity 
flooded the Florentine companies with liquid capital, typically scarce in a predominantly 
agrarian world. Before the secular crisis of the fourteenth century, banking companies 
possessed capital reserves dwarfed those of their international merchant counterparts in 
Venice and Genoa.93 
																																																								
89 Day, “Early economic development,” 218. 
90 Day, “Early economic development,” 232-33. 
91 Day, “Early economic development,” 235. 
92 Goldthwaite, Economy, is a comprehensive account of Florence’s later 
medieval economy. See Armando Sapori, La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e 
dei Peruzzi (Florence, 1926), 5-94, for the banking activities of the Bardi and Peruzzi in 
England during the fourteenth century. 
93 Najemy, A History, 114. 
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There were important connections between the cloth industry, papal banking, and 
Florence’s demand for primary agricultural products. Even after expanding its control 
over the contado and its products in the twelfth century, by the mid-thirteenth century, 
the city had grown beyond what its hinterland could supply.94 The Florentine cloth 
industry also needed larger markets for its burgeoning production. The solution lay in 
international politics. With the papacy as middleman, Florentine bankers led by Gino 
Frescobaldi provided loans to Charles of Anjou when he invaded the Kingdom of Sicily 
and deposed Manfred von Hohenstaufen following the latter’s defeat at Benevento 
(1266).95 Following Charles’ definitive victory over Conradin at Tagliacozzo (1268), 
Florentine loans to the Angevins and investments in the south grew dramatically.96 In 
exchange for these loans, the Florentine companies received the right to collect church 
revenues and trading privileges in the Angevin Mezzogiorno. From this development, 
two major results ensued, significant for Florence and for the recently conquered 
Mezzogiorno: a vastly expanded market emerged for Florentine products, in particular its 
textiles, and a steady and almost unlimited supply of grain for the Arno City.97  
It is worth emphasizing the medium- and long-term negative consequences that 
both these developments had for the mainland South. The Florentine companies bear as 
																																																								
94 On the city’s rural hinterlands, see C.M. De La Roncière, Firenze e le sue 
campagne nel Trecento. 
95 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 12; Najemy, A History, 116.For recent 
historiography on the Angevin era in southern history, see Serena Morelli, “La 
storiografia sul Regno angioino di Napoli: Una nuova stagione di studi”, Studi Storici 
41:4. 
96 For the Angevin alliance, see David Abulafia, “Southern Italy and the 
Florentine Economy, 1265-1370,” Economic History Review 33 (1981): 377-88, at 379 
for early loans. 
97 See Day, “Early economic development,” 235-36, for the probable papal 
facilitation of textile imports to the South. 
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much blame as anyone in the Middle Ages for the exploitation of the South and its 
reduction to a primary products-producing, semi-colonial region in relation to the north.98 
The volume of Florentine grain imports from the Mezzogiorno is staggering, with 45,000 
tons of Apulian grain shipped to Florence in 1311 alone.99 The Angevins were at war for 
a large part of their tenure as kings of Naples, and were quite willing to exchange trading 
concessions, royal titles, and tax-farming privileges for ongoing war loans. The Angevins 
largely funded these through Florentine loans, forming an ongoing, symbiotic 
relationship based on credit and concessions.100 Following the Sicilian Vespers of 1282, 
the Florentines profited handsomely from funding the Neapolitan kings’ failures to 
reconquer the island.101 The companies made a killing from this southern trade, aided by 
the fact that some of them gained privileges to collect port taxes in the Regno’s Adriatic 
provinces. The Frescobaldi gained permission to export wheat from the Apulian ports to 
Venice in 1283, prompting Venetian complaints that a non-Adriatic town was supplying 
them. In 1308, the Peruzzi gained control of the tax on grain exports from the Abruzzi, 
which they had a stake in.102 Individual Florentines also rose to high places in the 
Neapolitan court, gaining lands and concessions in the mainland South. The Florentine 
textile industry exported finished Florentine cloth to the South, which lacked its own 
textiles industry; once in place, this import-export relationship hindered southern 
																																																								
98 Sicily, in this as in many other ways, went its own way, according to Stephan 
R. Epstein: Epstein, An island for itself (Cambridge, 2003). On the later degradation of 
the southern economy and its cultural consequences, see John A. Marino, “Economic 
idylls and pastoral realities: The ‘trickster economy’ in the Kingdom of Naples,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 24:2 (Apr., 1982), 211-34. 
99 Abulafia, “Southern Italy,” 382. 
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industry.103 Tuscany and the South were entwined largely to the misfortune of the latter 
during the later Middle Ages.  
While grain imports always exceeded Florentine exports to the Mezzogiorno, this 
ignores the way in which individual Florentines made their fortune as royal officials in 
the South, accruing lands and titles from the Angevins.104 Florentine merchants exported 
grain throughout the Mediterranean, not only to their hometown.105 The Florentines also 
exported southern livestock, reflecting a deep penetration of the Mezzogiorno’s pastoral 
interior. Florence’s demand for primary agricultural products came at dire cost to the 
people of the Mezzogiorno: during a 1329 famine, Florentines were allowed to continue 
exporting grain from the Pugliese ports.106 Politically, southern grain imports and 
opportunities for the organized plunder of the South kept the Florentines in the Guelf 
camp until after the Black Death, and ensured that the Angevins would be intermittent 
players in Florentine politics until the expulsion of Walter of Brienne in 1343.107  
Southern grain shipments reached Florence from Pisa or Ancona via the 
Appennines.108 While most grain came from the South, Florence continued to import 
grain from within Tuscany, as well as Sardinia, imported through Pisa and other 
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Tyrhennian ports.109 The necessity of keeping the roads clear for Florentine merchants, 
grain convoys, and Florentine armies was a major motivation for the commune’s 
struggles against rural lineages, and led to the commune’s reorganization of roads around 
Florence.110 Thus, the city’s food supply remained at the center of the city’s political 
economy straight through the period on the regional, inter-regional, and international 
level.  
In the late thirteenth century, the Florentine economy was at its height, with 
Florentines active from Acre to London and enmeshed in Europe’s high politics at the 
papal, Plantagenet and Angevin courts. The Florentine textile and banking sectors would 
never surpass the prosperity of the period before the 1340s. Yet local concerns, above all 
the need to supply the city’s explosive growth and maintain security for primary products 
and Florentine merchants, and regional exchange between Florence and its contado, 
remained an important part of the Florentine economy.  
Another factor underlying Florence’s economic dynamism was its development of 
a civic identity with the willpower, and public institutions with the resources and 
strength, to allow it to defend Florentine merchants and business interests, and facilitate 
commerce in the city and contado.111 Investment in the economy in turn guaranteed a 
certain baseline of security for the contado during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
This basic, structural prosperity persisted into the early fourteenth century despite the 
ongoing factional conflicts between Guelfs and Ghibellines and later popolani and 
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supplies, see Zorzi, La trasformazione, 224, and  
110 Zorzi, La trasformazione, 224, citing Plesner. 
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magnati. The economic downturn of the mid-fourteenth century was a major factor 
separating the experience, ambitions, and decisions of fourteenth-century Tuscans, elites 
and non-elites, from their ancestors of the previous two centuries. It is an irony of 
Florentine history that the economic and demographic downturn of the 1340s came 
following a comparatively long period of civil peace, 1310-1338. This multi-faceted 
crisis involved the bankruptancy of the major banking companies, the contraction of the 
textile industry, and the destruction of the Tuscan reserve army of labor following the 
Black Death; the onset of longer, costlier wars accompanied the travails of Tuscany’s 
unhappy fourteenth-century inhabitants. This change in the broader socioeconomic, 
political, and cultural structures of everyday would lead to profound changes in 
Florentine Tuscany in the years after the first visitation of the Black Death (1348).112 
In recent years, Enrico Faini has greatly enhanced our understanding of the 
emergence of Florentine civic identity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This might 
be described in less abstract terms as a sense of living together in common: Florentine-
ness.113 This was a process, not a given; because of the small scale of Florence in the 
twelfth century and the mass of abruptly deracinated immigrants from the countryside, 
																																																								
112 On Florentine Tuscany’s late medieval transformation, see the conference 
volume edited by Andrea Zorzi and William J. Connell, Lo stato territoriale fiorentino 
(secoli XIV-XV). Ricerche, linguaggi, confronti. San Miniato, 2001). 
113 See in particular by Faini: “Una storia senza nomi: Storia e memoria a Firenze 
ai primi del Duecento,” Bulletino dell’istituto storico italiano per il medio evo 108 
(2006): 39-81; “Alle origini della memoria comunale.” Quellen und Forschungen aus 
italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 68 (2008): 61-81; Firenze, 1-20, 127-36; and 
“Le memorie del territorio nella dei secoli XII-XII: strategie di condizionamento   
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Florence was a young town, despite being a Roman foundation.114 The city’s relative 
economic unimportance, the lack of a bishop with comital powers (de facto or de iure), 
and the city’s frail control over its hinterland meant that when the Countess Matilda died 
in 1115, the Florentines lacked both a useable past and civic consciousness; they would 
have to craft them in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.115 
Without this civic consciousness, there could be no commune in an organized, 
coherent sense. Faini has argued that the development of this civic consciousness 
underlay the communal chronicles that become frequent in north-central Italy from the 
late eleventh century. These early chronicles, which either preceded or accompanied the 
earliest communal institutions, as operating between civic history and communal history, 
that is, between an urban community acting together and doing so through institutional 
mechanisms.116 The emergence of a civic identity should be seen as a first phase in the 
socio-political activity and cultural production that resulted, in the later thirteenth 
century, in the fully articulated popular culture of the late ducentesco Florentine 
commune.117 Florence was, however, a late starter in civic identity as in so many other 
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areas.118 Pisa, Genoa, Milan, and many other cities had fairly well-attested institutions 
such as the consulate by the 1130s at the latest, well before the first passing mention of 
the Florentine consuls, in 1177, as Chris Wickham has shown in his recent study of the 
Italian communes’ fitful emergence.119 Early communal chronicles were typically 
produced by professionals, often notaries and judges, involved in their city’s public 
life.120 The most famous is probably that of the Genoese chronicler Cafarro, who wrote 
the first part of the commune’s official history after accompanying the Genoese 
compagna’s fleet on the First Crusade.121  
The classical past was an important element in the communes’ civic identity. In 
an important recent study, Carrie Beneš has explored the many forms that appropriating 
the Roman past took in the Italian communes.122 Padua, for example, prided itself on its 
foundation by Antenor, despite his medieval reputation as a traitor, while Perugia made 
much of its connection to the elusive figure of Eulistes, and its status as one of the 
Etruriae capita, the chief Etruscan towns opposing Roman expansion.123 Classical 
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monuments and ruins, such as Perugia’s famous Etruscan gate, silently attested to the 
communes’ Roman past.  
Legal transformations were another, fundamental aspect of communal formation. 
The later twelfth through the mid thirteenth century was a period of intense legislative 
activity for the urban communes: here, the communes’ classicizing culture combined 
with macro-level political developments.124 Following the Lombard League’s triumph 
over the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick “Barbarossa” II at Legnano (1176) and the 
peace of Constance (1183), the urban communes gained the right to issue laws. These 
triumphs over the Empire combined with the experience of the inter-city leagues to 
expand the communes’ experimentation in institutional innovation.  
Many cities issued their first statutory compilations in the late twelfth century, as 
part of the broader emergence of models and methods of civic living and civic 
assocation.125 Pisa, well away from the main warzones in the struggles between 
Barbarossa and the northern communes, led the way in its statutory activity. In 1155, the 
Pisan commune decided to issue the city’s bipartite, Romanist law code, the Constitum 
																																																								124	Hagen	Keller, “Gli statuti dell’Italia settentrionale come testimonianza e fonte 
per il processo di affermazione della scrittura nei secoli XII e XIII,” in Le scritture del 
comune. Amministrazione e memoria nelle città dei secoli XII e XIII, ed. G. Albini. Turin: 
Scriptorium, 1998), 61-94, at 74: “Gli statuti dell’Italia settentrionale come testimonianza 
e fonte per il processo di affermazione della scrittura nei secoli XII e XIII,” in Le 
scritture del comune, ed. G. Albini. Turin, 1998. 61-94, “La fase decisiva dello sviluppo 
dei codici statutari sembra essere il periodo che va dagli ultimi anni del regno di Federico 
Barbarossa ai primi anni del regno di Federico II.”	125	The	best	brief	discussion	of	the	twelfth	century’s	importance	is	Elisa	Occhipinti,	L’Italia dei comuni. Secoli XI-XIII (Rome, 2000), 51-53. Occhipinti notes the 
significance of the post-Constance period on 51: “Dopo la pace di Costanza, nel corso del 
secolo XIII si ebbe una grande fioritura di statuti comunali, segno della maturità acquisita 
dai comuni in quanto organi di autogoverno, che elaboravano le proprie leggi, definivano 
le modalità della loro applicazione, stabilivano le forme di controllo e le sanzioni per i 
trasgressori, delineando così un proprio modello normativo di convivenza civile.”	
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legis and usus. The commission of local (i.e., non-Bolognese) legal experts 
(constitutores; sapientes) finished its work in January 1161.126 The other Tuscan cities 
were much slower to follow the Tyrhennian city’s lead.127 Volterra’s earliest statutes, the 
first among the inland Tuscan towns, were drafted between 1210-1224.128  
Florence was late to codify its laws even by Tuscan standards: the first surviving 
statutes date from 1322-1325. The Florentines also never adopted Roman law, certainly 
not in the unusually thorough manner of the Pisans. The commune’s earliest legislative 
documents are ordinances: the Camera del Comune’s ordinances of 1289, and, above all, 
the Ordinances of Justice (1293, 1295).129 It is unclear why these ordinances-whose 
nature I discuss in chapter 2-preceded a statutory corpus, and this is a question I intend to 
address in future research. It is possible that the instability of thirteenth-century 
Florence’s regimes is reflected in its documentary survival here as with most of the 
commune’s pre-1343 records, and that statutes predating those of 1322 have perished. 
																																																								
126On twelfth-century Pisa, see Wickham, Sleep walking, 67-117, at 71-73, and 
Wickham, Courts and conflict in twelfth-century Tuscany (Oxford, 2003). The best recent 
study of high medieval Pisa is Alma Poloni, Trasformazioni della società e mutamenti 
delle forme politiche in un Comune italiano: il Popolo a Pisa (1220-1330) (Pisa, 2004). 127	Enrico	Faini,	“Le tradizioni normative delle città toscane. Le origini (secoli 
XII-metà XIII),” ASI (2013): 419-81, is the best recent survey of the Tuscan communes’ 
twelfth- and thirteenth-century statutory material. He discusses the Volterran statutes, 
which include rubrics dating to 1199, at 422-26.	128	Enrico	Fiumi,	Statuti	di	Volterra	I	(1210-1224)	(Florence,	1951).	129	On	Florence’s	early	statutory	corpus,	see	Faini,	“Le	tradizioni,”	432-33;	Lorenzo	Tanzini,	“Il più antico ordinamento della Camera del Comune di Firenze: le 
‘Provvisioni Caononizzate’ del 1289,” Annali di Storia di Firenze I (2006): 139-179; and 
Tanzini’s study Statuti e legislazione a Firenze dal 1355 al 1415 (Florence, 2004). 
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This hypothesis is supported indirectly by Dino Compagni’s mention of a commission 
appointed in 1295 to review the statutes of the Capitano del Popolo and Podestà.130  
 Twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Florence lacked not only a coherent body of 
statutes, but also a historically-attested classical past. Florence was a second-rate 
provincial municipality under the late Republic and early Empire, lacked major Roman 
monuments, and the authority of classical authors to attest to its Roman-ness 
(Romanitas). The educated elite of notaries and jurists, men such as Sanzanome, was 
crucial here in confecting a classical past where one did not exist. Communal chronicles 
were influenced in structure and forms of evidence by judicial processes, and this brings 
us to communal institutions. Judicial activity played an important role in early communal 
development, and its products, in particular witness testimony, can be read as evidence 
for a sense of civic community.131 This is not a coincidence; many of these chroniclers 
were notaries or otherwise involved in their cities’ public affairs.  
These civic histories are evidence for a gradual change in the Italian cities’ self-
perception as autonomous entities, or rather, the emergence of this self-perception was 
this change. The shift occurred at the moment (approximately after the 1170s) when the 
Italian urban commune was beginning to look like it had a chance of surviving its origins 
as a temporary expedient in response to the collapse of the Regnum Italicum of the 
eleventh century.132   
Florence’s earliest chronicler, Sanzanome, was active from the 1190s until at least 
the 1230s. He was a member of the commune’s ruling clique, and may have been related 																																																								130	Compagni, 1.18. 	
131 Faini, “Alle origini,” 72-73. 
132 Wickham, Sleep walking, is now the main reference for this process. I entirely 
concur regarding the ad hoc, improvised nature of the communes. 
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to the Infangati, a prominent consular-era lineage.133 Like other chronicles, Sanzanome’s 
work primarily addresses wars, especially with local rivals and the Empire, famines, and 
the Florentine bishops’ careers.134 He probably minimized or ignored episodes of internal 
conflict intentionally, in stark contrast to later Florentine chroniclers such as Dino 
Compagni; the commune was too fragile to admit to such rifts.135 Crucially, Sanzanome 
retails the origin-stories of Florence that would become a standard part of Florence’s 
mythos.136 He did so to justify the Florentine conquest of Fiesole in 1125; this was an 
important part of the Florentines’ search for (or invention of) a useable past in place of 
oblivion.137  
Sanzanome, in constructing the Fiesole-Florence rivalry’s mythical classical past, 
was constructing a civic identity to set against the people of Fiesole just as the latter 
succumbed definitively to Florentine control. The myths of Roman Florence would 
undergo many changes and additions in the later Middle Ages, but the core of it, the 
enmity between Florence and Fiesole and Julius Caesar’s intervention, developed by 
Sanzanome and Brunetto Latini, was an important part of the classicizing cultural milieu 
that produced the Ordinances of Justice.The active participation of urban professionals 
such as Sanzanome was an important component of the Florentine commune, then, from 
the beginning. This artisanate social base would characterize every popular regime of the 
																																																								
133 Faini, “Una storia senza nomi,” 40. On Florence’s elite in the age of the 
consuls, see Faini, “Il gruppo dirigente fiorentino dell’età consolare,” in Archivio Storico 
Italiano CLXII (2004), 199-231. 
134 Faini, “Alle origini,” 70-71. 
135 For the reasons behind this, see Faini, “Alle origini,” 65-68. 
136 For Sanzanome’s inventive classicizing, see Faini, “Una storia,” 42-45. 
137 Faini, “Una storia,” 42. 
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thirteenth century, although Florentine notaries would never dominate public affairs as 
their Bolognese peers did, in Giuliano Milani’s republic of notaries.138  
Figures such as Sanzanome were Florentine representatives of what Chris 
Wickham has described as the urban communes’ third-tier elites.139 These were urban 
professionals or wealthy merchants whose skills or wealth gave them an entry to the 
world of the second-tier, partially feudal, elites who ran the early communes and 
generally served as consuls-families such as the Giandonati and Uberti. Florence’s robust 
economy undoubtedly accelerated the rate of replacement within its elites during the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The area’s first-tier elite, signorial families such as the 
Guidi and Conti Alberti, had withdrawn from the city by the early twelfth century and 
were more interested in developing their dominions as rival power centers than in 
participating in the early commune.140 Families such as the Ubaldini, Buondelmonti and 
Visdomini are examples of the city’s second-tier elites. These were episcopal vassels, 
families with some wealth and influence. The choice for them was to play the commune’s 
game and maintain or establish an urban presence, or to invest in the sort of signorial 
lifestyle that the Guidi exemplified.141 The Ubaldini chose the latter, and never resided in 
Florence; the Buondelmonti and Visdomini became notable players in the political arena 
of Florence. Over the twelfth century, rural transplants such as the Uberti swelled their 
																																																								
138 On Bolognese notaries and the commune, see Sarah Rubin Blanshei, Politics 
and justice; Giuliano Milani, L’esclusione dal comune. Conflitti e bandi politici a 
Bologna e in altre città italiane tra XII e XIV secolo.(Rome, 2003); and Brian R. 
Carniello, “The rise of an administrative elite in medieval Bologna: Notaries and popular 
government, 1282-1292,” Journal of Medieval History 28 (2002): 319-347.  
139 See Wickham, Sleep walking, 190-94, for these elites. 
140 For comparisons with other Italian cities, see Wickham, Sleep walking, 190-
91. 
141 I draw here largely on Wickham’s discussion in Sleep walking, 191-92. 
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ranks, but again, these were small and medium landowners from the contado or rural 
centers like Figline; they were not the area’s first-tier elite. Wickham’s characterization 
of a second-tier elite as a major player in the early comune certainly holds true for 
Florence. 
This requires some explanation, given that the social identity of the Florentine 
(and indeed, communal) elites has a long and contentious history, discussed in the 
introduction   Scholarship has focused on two linked questions: How much continuity 
was there between this early communal second-tier elite and the milites who dominate 
our sources on the Florentine scene until at least the Primo Popolo (1250-1260)? In turn, 
how much continuity existed in Florence between the milites and the later magnati? 
Thanks to detailed studies by, among others, Jean Claude Maire-Vigueur and his 
students, Enrico Faini and Silvia Diacciati, these questions can now be answered fairly 
definitively. Viewing the milites as the armed collectivity of the city’s cavalry (milites 
pro comune) instead of a fixed, Duby-style ordo, as Maire-Vigueur has argued, means 
that the milites comprised perhaps 10-15% of the urban population, greatly broadening 
the participatory group in the early commune.142 This group, the “milites cittadini” to use 
Stefano Gasparri’s phrase, fought on horseback for the commune, often receiving 
privileges, including tax exemptions.143 Silvia Diacciati has definitively demonstrated 
that the Florentine magnate families of the 1280s-1290s were descended from the older 
																																																								
142 See Maire-Vigueur, Cavaliers, 217-74, for his argument and methodology, in a 
discussion of north-central Italy as a whole.  
143 See Enrico Faini, “La memoria dei milites,” in I comuni di Jean-Claude Maire 
Vigueur, eds. M.T. Caciorgna, Sandro Carocci, Andrea Zorzi (Rom, 2014), 113-33, for a 
review of the historiography on the milites, and their culture. 
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elite families of the consular age, the milites.144 Only six families with origins in the 
populus became magnates later in the thirteenth century.145 Some of the magnate families 
only rose to prominence in the thirteenth century, but these identified wholly with the 
militia. Thus, the magnates of the 1290s were descended from the second-tier elites that 
controlled the early, consular-era commune. Their lifestyle, originating as it did in the 
improvised responses to the early twelfth-century collapse of the March of Tuscany, 
stood in direct contrast to the civic ethos being fashioned at Florence by the late 
thirteenth century.146 
The third-tier elite, notaries such as Sanzanome or the distinguished Alberti del 
Giudice lineage (no relation to the Conti Alberti), constituted the populus, along with 
wealthier merchants, and from the 1250s, they were the commune’s rising social class.147 
By the late thirteenth century, the degree of professional organization and the wide 
diffusion of associative ethos had resulted in a newly vocal sub-group within the populus, 
the popolo minuto. Their triumph was anything but certain in the early thirteenth century, 
however, and the struggle between popolani e magnati, quoting the title of Diacciati’s 
study, was the dominant feature of Florentine society and politics in the Duecento. 
																																																								
144 See Maire-Vigueur’s programmatic preface to Diacciati’s study, particularly 
XIII: “In primo luogo, credo di poter dire che il libro di S. Diacciati mette un punto finale 
alla questione delle origini sociali delle famiglie magnatizie.” 
145 Maire-Vigueuer, “Presentazione,” in Diacciati, XIII. The six families were the 
Amieri, Bardi, Cerchi, Corsi, Frescobaldi and Mozzi. 
146 For the magnates’ culture, with its strong borrowings from French chivalric 
culture, see Lansing, Florentine magnates, 145-63. 
147 The best concise discussion of the thirteenth-century popular leading group is 
Alma Poloni, Potere al popolo. Conflitti sociali e lotte politiche nell’Italia comunale del 
Duecento (Milan, 2010); see also the same author’s Lucca nel Duecento. Uno studio sul 
cambiamento sociale. Pisa, 2009). 
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What held together the society of this city on the make? One of the popolo’s great 
assets in its struggles against the milites was its associational ethos of consensual action, 
symbolized in the commune’s origins as a sworn organization (societas; coniuratio).148 
Its capacity for collective action via organizations (societates; universitates) based on 
profession, neighborhood, religious devotion, and military service was crucial to its 
successes in the later thirteenth century; in the second half of the century, many cities 
developed societates populi, representing the popolo as a whole.149  As always in Italy, 
no two cities were exactly alike in terms of the origins of these societies, and their role in 
communal government.150 In the Piedmont, an area with a “total absence of arte,” 
professional organizations or guilds, the popolo of Asti, Alba, and Chieri organized 
territorially, by quartieri or rioni.151 At Perugia, there was a total identification between 
the societies of the popolo and the craft guilds; at Bologna, professional guilds, especially 
the notaries, had a major role in communal government. The unifying principle of these 
various associations was their origin, in the breakup of the Kingdom of Italy and the 
devolution of power to the city level.152 In a vacuum of legitimate urban institutions, the 
																																																								
148 On this see Poloni, Potere al popolo, 33. 
149 Enrico Artifoni, “Corporazioni e società di ‘Popolo’: un problema della 
politica comunale nel secolo XIII,” in Quaderni Storici 74/a. XXV: 2 (1990),  
150 Giansante, “Ancora magnati e popolani”, discusses the historiography on these 
societies, with examples of different criteria for organization.  
151 The quote is from Giansante, “Ancora magnati e popolani,” 551; for 
Piemontese organization, see Renata Bordone’s study of Asti, “Magnati e popolani in 
area Piemontese, con particulare riguardo al caso di Asti,” in Magnati e popolani 
nell’italia comunale (Pistoia, 1997), 397-419, at 397-99. 
152 See Wickham, Sleep walking, 20 
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people of the north-central Italian cities organized themselves for collective action of all 
kinds in these societies.153 
Regardless of the contrasts between different cities, these associations and 
societies were often the core around which communal institutions formed.154 
Neighborhood associations provided the first Florentine consuls, and are documented 
from 1138; after 1150, the professional associations would dominate the city’s politics.155 
These included the societas militum, representing the civic militia discussed above, and 
the societas peditum, the foot soldiers. The Florentine societas peditum would morph 
during the thirteenth century into the societas populi, representing the popolo as a 
political faction against the milites.156 Other associative forms, particularly religious 
groups, will be discussed below, in the analysis of the Ordinances of Justice and the 
decisive role that Florentine religious life and ideas played in the events of the 1290s.  
These assocations were not democratic or egalitarian in the modern sense of the 
words, and where popular regimes seized power for long periods, there was a marked 
tendency for the new regime to fossilize into an oligarchy.157 Nevertheless, urban regimes 
founded on neigbhorhood or professional associations and headed by men such as 
Nameless (Sanzanome, Florence), Girardo “Shit-pesto” (Cagapisto, a Milanese consul in 
1154), or Arderico “Shit-in-your-pants” (Arderico Cagainosa, a Milanese consul in 1140 
																																																								
153 See Lansing, Florentine magnates, for the Florentine neighborhood societates’ 
response to the collapse of the Ponte Vecchio in 1177. 
154 Giansante, “Ancora magnati e popolani,” 551-54, is an important comparison 
between the societates of Bologna and Florence. 
155 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 10. 
156 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 11. 
157 The paradigmatic study of this process is Blanshei, Politics and justice. 
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and 1144) were quite enough to shock and horrify elite, northern European commentators 
such as Otto von Freising.158  
By the second quarter of the thirteenth century, many of the major institutions of 
Florentine government were in place. It is unclear whether the Countess Matilda’s death 
in 1115 resulted in an immediate devolution of jurisdiction and power to the Florentines. 
The Florentines may have usurped the imperial datium, the payment owed to the crown 
by subjects, as early as 1156.159 By 1200, the datium had become synonymous with the 
hearth tax (focatium) levelled on rural households.160 This was in addition to 
extraordinary levies for public works and emergencies.161 These must have become quite 
unextraordinary in the twelfth century, as Florence initiated its contado wars with its 
conquest of Fiesole in 1125. Traditionally, the nobility (milites) was exempt from the 
hearth tax, and Florence exempted many rural lineages from it in the twelfth century.162 
The Florentines would progresively strip away the rural nobility’s tax exemptions in the 
thirteenth century, however, and by 1220 were subjecting newly-conquered rural nobles 
to all imposts.163 The extension of a uniform tax system across its contado, gradual and 
piecemeal though it was, marked a significant step in the emergence of public power at 
Florence, and in its control of the countryside. 
																																																								
158 Wickham discusses this phenomenon in Sleep walking, 51-52; 
François Menant, “Une forme de distinction inattendue: L’anthroponymie scatologique 
de l’élite communale lombarde,” in Écritures de l’espace social (Paris, 2010), 1-23, is a 
thorough prosopographical study of Caca- names in the Lombard communes. 
159 Day, “Early economic development,” 104. 
160 The focarium in the later twelfth century usually amounted to 26 denarii per 
year: Day, “Early economic development,” 104.  
161 Day, “Early economic development,” 104. 
162 Day, “Early economic development,” 106. 
163 Day, “Early economic development,” 107. 
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The rapid economic growth of Florence helped intensify the cycle of replacement 
in the Florentine rural and urban elite, and this had ramifications on the institutional 
level.164 First documented as representing neigbhorhood associations in 1138 (but with no 
consular judicial acts until 1172165), the consuls were answerable to an assembly 
(arringum) meeting in the cathedral by the 1150s.166 This number was expanded to 
include the merchants’ consuls (consules mercatanti), who first appear in 1184.167 By the 
later twelfth century, the consular system could not incorporate enough of the city’s 
second- and third-tier elites to maintain social peace. An early sign of this was the civil 
war of 1177-80 between elite factions centered round the Giandonati and the philo-
imperial Uberti.168  
Conflict continued to center on control of the consulate until the institution of the 
Podestà, first attested in Florence in 1193 when the potestas Gherardo Caponsacchi led a 
Florentine army against the castello of Trebbio.169 The office of the podesterià was 
already widespread across north-central Italy by the later twelfth century, and arose from 
the need for a stable, institutionalized executive with (theoretically) no partiality for the 
various factions of the cities.170 The podestà did not definitevely supplant the consuls as 
																																																								
164 See Wickham, Sleep walking, 194-95, for the cycle of replacement as a factor 
in the varying developments of different comuni.  
165 Faini, Firenze, 279. 
166 Davidsohn, Storia, I.999-1002. 
167 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 11’12, referring to Santini,  
168 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 11. For more information on this civil war, see 
Andrea Zorzi, “I rettori di Firenze. Reclutamento, flussi, scambi (1193-1313),” in I 
podestà dell’Italia comunale. Parte I, ed. Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur (Rome, 2000) 
[hereafter “Zorzi, ‘I rettori’”]. 453-594, at 485-88. 
169 Zorzi, “I rettori,” 488. 
170 For the institution and its origins, see Daniel Waley and Trevor Dean, The 
Italian city-republics, 4th ed. (Harlow, England, 2010), 40-44. The anonymous Genoese 
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chief executive of Florence until 1211, and the first podestà were Florentines, but from 
1207, the office could only be held by foreigners.171 Between 1207 and the institution of 
the Capitano del Popolo (1250), the podestà was the Florentines’ supreme judicial and 
military leader, and the commune’s political figurehead. Consultation remained key to 
the podesterial regime, however. The podestà was required to consult the consuls of the 
military societies, and from mid-century, the professional associations took a greater role 
in politics as well.172 The Florentines often recruited their podestà from the smaller towns 
of Umbria, or Le Marche, such as Gubbio or Iesi.173  
“The good old popolo”174: Florence’s first popular regime (1250-1260) 
The next foreign-staffed office emerged from a turning point in Florentine history, 
the creation of the Primo Popolo on 20 October 1250.175 The regime formed after the 
death of Frederick II and the collapse of Ghibelline/imperial hegemony in Tuscany. This 
was part of a broader moment in medieval Italian history where, to use the language of 
the 1940s, the wind was blowing from the North: the death of Frederick II triggered the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
chronicler quoted at p. 42 is particularly revealing on motivations behind creating the 
office.  
171 Lorenzo Valgimogli, introduction to the Archivio di Stato di Firenze’s Elenchi 
nominativi dei Podestà del comune di Firenze e dei Capitani del Popolo in carica dal 
1343 al 1502, Indice degli Inventari nn. 25-30 (Florence, 2002), 3. This guide and Zorzi’s 
“I rettori” are the standard guides to the office of Podestà at Florence. 
172 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 11. 
173 Valgimogli, Elenchi nominativi, 3. This pattern would hold through much of 
the fourteenth century, with many popular officials hailing from Umbrian communes 
such as Gubbio and Perugia and Marchigiano comuni including Ancona, Fano, and 
Macerata. See chapter three for this. 
174 The quotation is from G. Villani, 7.54, in a description of the castle the 
Florentines garrisoned at Pistoia, which lasted “as long as the good old popolo….” (durò 
il buono popolo vecchio.” 
175 The standard account of the first popular regime is now Diacciati, Popolani e 
magnati, 105-204. Najemy, A history, 66-72, provides a succinct summary of the 
institutional and electoral innovations of the regime, and its social base. 
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formation of popular regimes in communes across north-central Italy.176 Florence’s first 
popular regime found its social base in the armed societies of the popolo, which formed 
the core support for the regime just as the guilds would for the second popular regime.177 
The Primo Popolo’s major institutional innovations were a group of 12 elders (Anziani) 
and the Capitano del Popolo. In a careful prosopographical analysis, Silvia Diacciati has 
identified a large number of novi homines among the anziani: there was a real 
discontinuity between this first popular regime and the previous Florentine ruling class.178 
More abstractly, the Primo Popolo represented the partial triumph of Florence’s third-
level elite: partial, because military defeat in 1260 led to the regime’s immediate 
dismemberment. The popular regime consisted primarily of wealthy merchants, bankers, 
and professionals, and sought to limit the power of the second-level elite which had 
dominated the commune to that point, and who had dragged it into the internecine strife 
of the Guelf-Ghibelline conflict.179 The regime excluded knights, Maire Vigueuer’s 
milites pro comune, from the deliberative and legislative councils of the popolo.180 Far 
more so than any previous Florentine regime, the Popolo anchored itself in the military, 
professional, and neighborhood associations. The cloth merchants’ guild, the Calimala, 
																																																								
176 For the “nuovi venti di rivolta” sweeping the communes from 1250 onward, 
see Poloni, Potere al popolo, 45-50. 
177 Zorzi, “I rettori,” 528. 
178 Diacciati, Popolani e magnati, 109-10: “Da una lettura superficiale dei nomi 
[of the Anziani], fatta eccezione per alcuni casi, si ha l’impressione di trovarsi di fronte a 
un gruppo costituito in buona parte da persone non use a frequentare i luoghi del potere, 
un gruppo dunque sostanzialmente differente da quello che aveva dominato la scena 
politica nel cinquantennio appena trascorso.” 
179 Giovanni Villani, VI.39, 269-71, provides a list of the Guelf and Ghibelline 
lienages in the early years of the conflict. On the Guelf-Ghibelline conflict in Tuscany, 
see in general Federico Canaccini, Ghibellini e Ghibellinismo in Toscana da Montaperti 
a Campaldino  (1260-1289) (Rome, 2009). 
180 Najemy, A History, 68.  
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was particularly well-represented among the Popolo’s anziani.181 The regime 
reconfigured the commune’s administrative divisions into twenty armed neighbhorhood 
companies with a standardbearer and rectors, and divided the contado into ninety-six 
parishes, each equiping a milita company.182 The city itself was divided into sixths 
(sestieri): Porta del Duomo, S. Piero Maggiore, S. Pier Scheraggio, Oltrarno, Borgo S. 
Trinita, and S. Pancrazio.183 
The Primo Popolo transformed the physical landscape of Florence. Factional 
strife between the city’s second-tier elites, milites such as the Uberti and Visdomini, had 
inscribed itself on the civic landscape. By the mid-twelfth century, Florence’s skyline 
was dominated by the elite families’ private towers, with as many as 150 by 1200.184 
These towers rose as high as 120 braccie, 230 feet or 70 meters.185 Modeled in part on 
the rocche of the contado, these towers collectively were a stark defiance of any hint of 
public power. They were monuments to the elite families’ power in their neighborhood 
enclaves, and implied that the Florentines feared each other more than any force beyond 
the city’s walls.186 The Uberti lineage, emblematic of the consular age’s second-tier 
ruling elite, made particularly effective use of their tower enclaves in the city’s center.187  
																																																								
181 Diacciati, 112-16, discusses Calimala representation in the regime. 
182 Najemy, A History, 66-67. 
183 See Lansing, Florentine magnates, 14-15, for a map of the sestieri. 
184See Map 1 in Najemy, 8-9, with a key, for the towers and palaces of the elite 
families in the thirteenth century. Lansing, The Florentine magnates, 84-105, is a 
comprehensive account of these towers, their organization, and their role in elite family 
strategies and politics. See, more recently, Faini, “Società e società cittadina. Sui pacta 
turris del XII secolo,° in Società e poteri nell’Italia medievale eds. S. Diacciati and L. 
Tanzini (Rome, 2014), 19-39, including a newly-discovered tower pact. 
185 Najemy, A History, 69. 
186 Lansing, Florentine magnates, describes these towers’ origins and layouts. 
187 For the Uberti properties in the city, see Bruttini, “Enclavi urbane a Firenze: il 
caso della familia Uberti”, with important recent archaeological information and helpful 
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The center of their power lay in what is now the Piazza della Signoria and the Palazzo 
Vecchio, the subsequent construction of which marked the symbolic triumph of public 
power in the city. From their enclaves in the old castello d’Altafronte and the Lombard-
era fortification of the Guardingus, built on the Roman amphitheater, the Uberti 
controlled access to the city’s easternmost bridge, the Ponte Rubaconte, and the area 
around today’s piazza S. Croce. It is no wonder that they very nearly took over the city in 
the late twelfth century, and were able to terrorize the city’s rulers into the 1250s. 
The first popular regime acted decisively against these bulwarks of elite 
arrogance, restricting their height to 29 meters (96 feet), and founding a center of 
communal counter-power, the Palazzo del Popolo (now the Bargello) in 1255.188 
Previously, the city’s leaders had met in private homes, going in fear of Ghibelline 
families such as the Uberti. The Palazzo’s epigraphic inscription boasted of the 
achievements of the Florentine people, equating them with Rome at its height.189 The 
inscription and the Palazzo itself testify to the vigor and self-confidence of the first 
popular regime. Further additions to the city’s physical infrastructure included the Ponte 
Santa Trinita, completed in 1252.190 This was immediately followed by the construction 
of the Via Maggio (formerly Via Maggiore), a broad, straight thoroughfare leading from 
the city’s Oltrarno gate, across the new bridge and into the city center. The Via Maggio 
and S. Trinita bridge cut straight through the Frescobaldi enclave on the Oltrarno bank of 																																																																																																																																																																					
reconstructions of the Uberti properties; earlier discussions include Lansing, Florentine 
magnates, 95-97, and R. Davidsohn, Storia, vol. I, 827. 
188 Diacciati, Popolani e magnati, 105. 
189 Latin and Italian versions of the epigraph are provided in Diacciati, Popolani e 
magnati, 105. For an English translation and analysis ascribing it to Latini, see R. 
MacCracken, The dedication inscription of the Palazzo del podestà in Florence with a  
walking tour to the monuments (Florence, 2001). 
190 Sznura, L’espansione, 122. 
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the river, still called Piazza Frescobaldi. Construction began on the church of S. Spirito in 
1250, and Ognissanti in 1251. The years of the Primo Popolo were later seen as a golden 
age by the Florentines, and justifiably so. The longest-lasting innovation of these years 
was economic: in 1252, the Florentines began minting their famous gold florin, almost 
simultaneously with the Genoese genovino. The florin, featuring the city’s patron saint 
John the Baptist on one side and the Florentine fleur de lis on the other, became a major 
international currency and was a bold assertion of Florence’s de facto autonomy from the 
empire, following as it did Frederick II’s minting of gold coins in imitation of the Roman 
emperors.191 
The Primo Popolo also embarked on a whirlwind string of victories in Tuscany. 
The early 1250s saw a series of Florentine triumphs over rural lords and Ghibelline 
neighbors. In 1251, the Florentines overthrew the rulers of Ghibelline Pistoia, and exiling 
discontent Florentine Ghibellines, implicitly aligned the heretofore neutral regime with 
the Guelfs.192 This inaugurated a series of contado battles with Ghibelline Pisa and Siena, 
which the Florentines beat off in 1251-52.193 That same year, they defeated an army of 
Romagnole Ghibellines and Ubaldini at the latter’s stronghold of Montaccianico.194 In 
1252, they captured the castello of Figline Valdarno, held by Florentine Ghibellines and 
count Guido Novello of the ContiGuidi. The same year the Florentines beat the Sienese 
again, at Montalcino. Giovanni Villani eloquently captures the spirit of self-confident 
collective action underlying these victories:  
																																																								
191 For the florin, see Goldthwaite, Economy of Renaissance Florence, 48-57.  
192 Giovanni Villani, Cronica, 7.43, at 334-35. 
193 G. Villani, 743, 341-43, for these battles. 
194 G. Villani, 7.47, “come I Fiorentini sconfissono gli Ubaldini in Mugello”, at 
341. 
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“And they [the Florentine host] returned with great victory to Florence from many 
battles in the field, victories, and many lands and castles; but at that time [1252] the 
Florentines were united by the good popolo, and were personally in the armies on horse 
and foot, and with courage and ability, such that all the factions were quite daringly 
bringing victory and triumph back to Florence…”195 
 This	passage	demonstrates	the	crucial	social	and	military	distinction	between	the	cavalry	and	footsoldiers	(“a	cavallo	e	a	a	piè”),	and	is	intriguing	for	Villani’s	conception	of	Florentines	unity.	The	regime	held	together	the	Florentines,	cavalry	and	infantry	alike,	and	the	various	parties	within	the	city.	Despite	the	Florentines’	notorious	factionalism,	they	were	capable	of	acting	corporatively-yet	this	collective	action	consisted	not	of	an	integrated,	homogeneous	collectivity	but	a	coalition	of	the	various	societates	and	factions,	not	their	abolition.	Villani’s	telling	“but”	(“ma	a	quello	tempo…”)	implies	that	the	“great	victory”	at	Montalcino	was	only	possible	because	it	happened	under	the	popular	regime.	Writing	in	the	1340s,	Villani	was	undoubtedly	contrasting	this	period	of	solidarity	with	the	renewed	factional	and	class	strife	of	the	period	1343-1348,	as	well	as	the	strife-ridden	later	thirteenth	century.	The	Primo	Popolo	was,	indeed,	a	golden	age	in	Villani’s	eyes.	In	Book	Seven,	he	repeatedly	refers	to	the	peace,	tranquility	and	prosperity	of	the	city	in	the	Primo	Popolo’s	years	of	victory,	praising	the	happy	state	of	the	city	under	the	signoria	del	
popolo.196	
																																																								
195 G. Villani, 8.52, 345: “E tornaro in Firenze con grande vittoria di più battaglie 
di campo, vinte e più terre e castella; ma a quello tempo I Fiorentini  erano uniti per lo 
buono popolo, e andavano in persona a cavallo e a piè nell’osti, e con cuore e con 
franchezza, sicché di tutte parti bene aventurosamente in questo ano recarono triunfo e 
vittoria in Firenze.” I read “parti” as “factions”, although “parties” would convey the 
same sense of an internal political faction or clique. 
196 G. Villani, 7.50: “In questo tempo [1252] la città per la signoria del popolo in 
felice stato….” 
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	 In	1253,	the	Florentines	again	subdued	Pistoia	and	created	a	fortified	castello	in	the	Pistoiese	Porta	Fiorentina,	“which	lasted	as	long	as	the	good	old	popolo.”197		They	beat	the	Sienese	in	1254,	seized	the	crucial	frontier	castello	of	Poggibonsi,	and	continued	on	to	Volterra,	where	the	army	achived	a	“beautiful	and	unforeseen	victory”	which	detached	Volterra	from	the	Ghibelline	camp.198	When	the	army	approached	Pisa,	drunk	on	victory	and	rampaging	through	Tuscany,	the	Pisans	sued	for	peace.	Well	could	the	Florentines	call	1254	“the	victorious	year”.199		In	1259,	the	Alberti	strongholds	of	Vernio	and	Mangona,	in	the	upper	Val	di	Bisenzio,	fell	to	the	commune’s	army,	although	they	would	have	to	be	retaken	in	1273.	The	Alberti	were	subsequently	forced	to	swear	obedience	to	the	commune.200			These	victories	were	a	major	turning	point	in	Florence’s	control	of	its	
contado.	Although	the	Primo	Popolo	would	fall	six	years	later,	none	of	its	regional	rivals	could	stand	against	a	popular	Florentine	regime,	at	least	militarily.	The	region’s	old	first-level	nobility,	such	as	the	Guidi	and	Ubaldini,	could	still	offer	resistance	to	the	Florentines,	yet	could	not	seriously	contest	control	of	Tuscany	after	the	death	of	Frederick	II.	Siena	progressively	lost	the	battle	for	sub-regional	“quasi-cities”	such	as	Poggibonsi	and	S.	Gimignano,	leaving	it	confined	to	a	territory	lacking	any	major	urban	centers.201	Pisa,	struggling	to	hold	onto	its	various	Mediterranean	possessions,	could	not	devote	its	full	attention	to	holding	off	the	Florentines	from																																																									
197 G. Villani, 7.54: “…i Fiorentini vi facessono uno castello il quale fosse in sulla 
porta che viene da Firenze, e quello si facesse guardare per gli Fiorentini; e così fue fatto 
forte e bello, con tutto che assai dispiacesse a’Pistolesi ma tuttora si tenne per gli 
Fiorentini infino che durò il buono popolo vecchio.” 
198 Villani, 7.57, at 349-51 in the Parma edition. 
199 G. Villani,7.58, 351-52. 
200 G. Villani, 7.63, at 362-63. 
201 Zorzi, La trasformazione, 227. 
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inland	encroachments.	Following	the	crushing	Genoese	victory	at	Melloria	(1284),	the	city	was	a	rapidly	declining	power,	even	more	so	once	it	lost	its	island-contado	of	Sardinia	to	the	Aragonese	in	the	1320s.	A	final	victory	over	the	Aretines	at	Campaldino	in	1289	confirmed	Florentine	hegemony	in	northeastern	Tuscany.	In	his	account	of	the	year	1260,	Giovanni	Villani	provides	us	with	a	vivid	description	of	a	Florentine	raid	on	the	Senese	in	May,	featuring	the	commune’s	
caroccio,	the	battle	wagon	and	symbol	of	communal	identity	characteristic	of	the	medieval	Italian	city-states.202	His	description	of	the	caroccio	and	its	importance	to	the	commune	are	remarkable	testimony	to	the	Italian	city-states’	fierce	
campanilismo,	and	the	physical	manifestation	of	Florentine	arrogance	in	their	years	of	triumph:	“The	lordly	pride	of	the	old	popolo	and	of	our	ancestors	in	the	army	was	supported	by	these	two	ostentatious	things,	the	caroccio	and	its	bell.”203	Villani	provides	a	description	of	the	caroccio’s	procession	from	its	lodgings	in	the	church	of	S.	Giovanni	through	the	Mercato	Nuovo	to	summon	the	communal	army.204	The	
caroccio	was	the	symbolic	and	functional	nerve	center	of	the	army:	the	commune’s	armies	marched	according	to	the	ringing	of	a	bell,	the	Martinella,	placed	in	a	“castle	of	wood”	(castello	di	legname)	fixed	on	the	cart.205		As	the	heart	of	the	army,	capturing	the	enemy’s	caroccio	was	a	clear	sign	of	victory	on	the	battlefields	of	
																																																								
202 G. Villani, 7.75, at 369-71. The  
203 G. Villani, 7.75, at 370: “Di queste due pompe del carroccio e della campana si 
reggea la signorevole superbia del popolo vecchio e de’nostri antichi nell’osti.” 
204 G. Villani, 7.75: “Quando s’andava in oste, e’ conti vicini e’ cavalieri il 
traevano dell’opera di San Giovanni, e conduciello in su la piazza di Mercato Nuvo, e 
posato per me’ uno termine che ancora v’è d’una pietra intagliata a caroccio, sì-
ll’acomandavano al popolo.” 
205 G. Villani, 7.75. 
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communal	Italy.206		In	this	case,	the	Florentines	were	victorious,	trampling	the	banners	of	Manfred	von	Hohenstaufen	before	the	gates	of	Siena	and	taking	it	back	to	Florence.207	Such	displays	of	the	commune’s	honor	and	Sienese	dishonor	reaffirmed	the	operational	unity	of	the	Florentine	commune.	
		Figure	2:	The	Florentine	
caroccio	(far	left),	in	a	miniature	illustrating	a	Siense	attack	on	the	Florentine	army	outside	
Siena,	May	1260.	The	bell,	la	Martinella,	is	visibile	at	top-left.	From	a	fourteenth-century	
manuscript	of	Giovanni	Villani’s	Cronica.	
	 Shortly	thereafter,	however,	the	Florentines’	victory	tour	of	Tuscany	came	to	an	abrupt	halt.	On	4	September	1260	a	coalition	of	central	Italian	Ghibellines	lead	by	the	Sienese	and	a	contingent	of	German	mercenaries,	wiped	out	a	larger	Guelf	army	perhaps	30,000	altogether,	with	a	Florentine	contribution	that	Daniel	Waley	
																																																								
206 William Caferro, “Honor and insult: military rituals in late medieval Tuscany,” 
in Late medieval and early modern ritual. Studies in Italian urban culture. eds. S. Cohn, 
Jr., M. Fantoni, F. Franceschi, and F. Ricciardelli (Turnhout, BE, 2013), 183-210, at 184. 
207 Villani, 7.75. 
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reckoned	at	around	16,100	men.208	The	best	studies	of	Montaperti	are	by	Sienese	historians,	or	those	writing	from	a	Sienese	perspective;	the	Florentines,	for	obvious	reasons,	have	not	dwelled	on	their	greatest	single	military	defeat.209		Siena’s	dominance	over	Florence	would	end	in	1267,	at	the	battle	of	Colle	Valdelsa,	but	Montaperti	was	a	symbolic	capstone	of	Siena’s	medieval	greatness.	The	“great	carnage	and	devastation”	made	the	river	Arbia	run	red	with	Florentine	blood,	as	Dante	put	it	in	his	imagined	argument	with	Farinata.210	There	is	no	way	of	knowing	how	many	men	Florence	lost	at	Montaperti.	Yet	it	must	have	wiped	out	a	significant	part	of	the	city	and	contado’s	men	of	military	age:	all	but	200	of	the	men	in	the	Florentine	contribution	were	natives	of	the	Fiorentino.211	Giovanni	Villani’s	description	of	the	Ghibelline	captains’	meeting	may	be	fictional,	and	certainly	overstates	the	importance	of	Florentine	exiles	under	Farinata	degli	Uberti	to	the	Ghibelline	triumph.	Nevertheless,	it	paints	a	vivid	picture	of	all	Florence’s	enemies	assembled	to	finally	destroy	their	prosperous,	and	now	prone,	scourge:	“And	in	the	said	parliament	[of	the	victors	of	Montaperti,	called	by	the	imperial	captain	Giordano	d’Asti	at	Empoli]	all	the	nearby	cities,	and	the	counts	Guidi,	the	counts	Alberti,	and	those	of	Santa	Fiore,	and	the	Ubaldini,	and	all	the	barons	around	proposed	and	were	in	agreement,	for	the	betterment	of	the	Ghibelline	party,	to	destroy	the	city	of	Florence	entirely,	and	reduce	it	to	an																																																									
208 Daniel Waley, “The army of the Florentine republic from the twelfth to the 
fourteenth century,” in Florentine studies: Politics and society in renaissance 
Florenceed, Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, IL., 1968), 70-108, at 77-78. The Libro di 
Montaperti ed. C. Paoli (Florence, 1889), records the composition and origins of the 
Florentine host. 
209 See in particular: Montaperti. Storia, iconografia, memoria, eds. Maria 
Assunta Ceppari Ridolfi & Patrizia Turrini (Siena, 2013) and Alla ricerca di Montaperti: 
Mito, fonti documentarie e storiografia, ed. E. Pellegrini (Siena, 2009). 
210 Inferno X, 85-87: “Lo strazio e ‘l grande scempio che fece l’Arbia colorata in 
rosso, tal orazion fa far nel nostro tempio.” 
211 Waley, “The army of the Florentine republic,” 77. 
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unwalled	settlement,	so	that,	in	its	condition,	it	would	never	again	have	renown,	fame,	or	power.”212		Villani	claims	that	Farinata	degli	Uberti	intervened	to	save	his	patria,	in	a	move	that	evokes	the	blinkered,	myopic	civic	pride	of	the	Florentine	milites.	Perfectly	willing	to	butcher	their	fellow	Fiorentines	on	the	battlefield,	nobles	such	as	Farinata	still	saw	Florence	as	their	homeland.213	The	scene	may	be	a	legend,	but	it	probably	is	indicative	of	the	deep-seated	resentment	and	hatred	that	the	Florentine	commune’s	success	had	aroused	in	its	neighbors	near	and	far.	The	Alberti	and	Guidi	were	no	doubt	thinking	of	their	many	castelli	the	Florentines	had	destroyed,	while	the	Sienese	and	Aretines	would	no	doubt	have	desired	to	rid	themselves	of	the	by-now	dominant	economic	power	in	the	area.214	It	is	doubtful	that	destroying	Florence	would	have	permanently	hindered	the	city’s	recovery,	however.	There	is	an	analogy	here	with	Frederick	Barbarossa’s	similarly	punitive	destruction	of	Milan	in	1162,	and	the	city’s	quick	recovery.	Florence	and	Milan	were	simply	too	big	to	fail	by	the	time	the	imperial	party	had	a	chance	to	destroy	either	of	them.	
																																																								
212 G. Villani, VII.LXXI, at 385: “E nel detto parlamento tutte le città vicine, eà 
conti Guidi, e’ conti Alberti, e que’ [Aldobrandeschi] da Santa Fiore, e gli Ubaldini, e 
tutti i baroni d’intorno propuosono e furono in concordia, per lo migliore di parte 
ghibellina, di disfare al tutto la città di Firenze, e di recarla a borgora, acciò che mai di 
suo stato non fosse rinnomo, fama, né podere.” 
213 See the famous exchange between Farinata and the poet in Inferno, X.  
214 For the problems surrounding Villani’s account, see the conference volume 
Tra storia e letteratura. Il parlamento di Empoli del 1260. Atti della giornata di studio in 
occasione del 750° anniversario, eds. Vanna Arrighi and Giuliano Pinto (Florence, 2012). 
The best recent study of Villani’s chronicle is Franca Ragone, Giovanni Villani e i suoi 
continuatori. La scritture delle chronache a Firenze nel Trecento (Rome, 1998). 
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Figure	3:	Farinata	degli	Uberti,	one	of	the	Ghibelline	captains	at	Montaperti	(1260).	
According	to	Florentine	legend,	which	downplayed	the	Sienese	contribution	to	
Florence’s	defeat,	his	intervention	saved	the	city	from	destruction	following	the	bloody	
rout	on	the	Arbia.	Portrait	from	Andrea	da	Castagno’s	1449-1450	fresco	cycle	
“Illustrious	People”,	at	Villa	Carducci,	Florence.	
			 		In	what	must	have	been	a	calculated	insult	to	the	Florentine	Guelfs	and	
popolo,	Count	Guido	Novella	of	the	Counts	Guidi	(defeated	by	the	Florentines	at	Figline	Valdarno	in	1252,	and	later	to	flee	the	field	without	fighting	at	Campaldino	in	1289)	was	installed	as	Manfred	von	Hohenstaufen’s	vicar	over	the	city.	A	Ghibelline	regime,	dominated	by	the	Uberti,	ruled	Florence	between	1260-1267,	abolishing	the	office	of	Capitano	del	Popolo	and	the	anziani.215	The	leaders	of	the	Primo	Popolo,																																																									
215 The best account of the Ghibelline regime remains Sergio Raveggi, “Il regime 
ghibellino,” in S. Raveggi, M. Tarassi, D. Medici, and P. Parenti, Ghibellini, guelfi e 
popol grasso (Florence, 1978), 1-72, with an appendix of participants in the Ghibelline 
regime at 69-72. See also Diacciati, popolani e magnati, 211-37, and Faini, “I sei anni 
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including	Brunetto	Latini,	were	exiled.	The	Ghibelline	regime	collapsed	immediately,	however,	upon	Charles	of	Anjou’s	victories	over	the	remaining	Hohenstaufen	at	Benevento	(1266)	and	Tagliacozzo	(1268).	The	Florentine	popolo	immediately	seized	the	opportunity	provided	by	the	Angevin	invasion	to	depose	the	Ghibellines	and	defy	Count	Guido	Novella,	who	foolishly	left	the	city	with	his	army	in	November,	to	find	the	gates	closed	and	the	populace	armed	against	him	upon	his	return.			 Conclusion:	Toward	the	second	popular	regime	and	the	guild	priorate		 I	have	tried	to	highlight	the	social	and	geographical	setting	of	the	contado,	the	early	commune’s	most	important	innovations,	and	some	of	the	reasons	for	Florence’s	success	in	gradually	absorbing	its	hinterland.	Nothing	preordained	Florence	for	this	role;	in	the	early	twelfth	century,	it	was	hardly	a	city	at	all,	still	less	a	community.	This	began	to	change	as	the	region’s	first-tier	elites	disengaged	from	urban	politics,	leaving	the	city-based	second-level	elite,	families	such	as	the	Uberti	and	Caponsacchi,	to	build	up	family	enclaves	in	the	city	and	monopolize	the	consulate.	The	Florentines	of	the	later	twelfth	and	thirteenth	centuries	managed	to	craft	a	civic	identity	and	an	ability	to	act	together,	despite	major	internal	divisions;	this	was	an	important	first	step	in	the	emergence	of	the	popolo	Fiorentino	as	a	distinct	political	force.	By	mid-century,	the	network	of	professional	and	military	associations	had	crystallized	into	the	Primo	Popolo.	Despite	its	eventual	overthrow,	the	first	popular	regime	put	the	capstone	on	the	first	phase	of	Florentine	expansion.	It	built	roads,	trimmed	the	towers	of	the	milites,	and	its	armies	enjoyed	major	victories	before	Montaperti.	The	Primo	Popolo	had	demonstrated	the	shrewd																																																																																																																																																																						
dimenticati: Spunti per una riconsiderazione del governo Ghibellino di Firenze: 1260-
1266,” in Tra storia e letterature, 29-49. 
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political	skills,	willpower,	and	organizational	abilities	of	the	city’s	third-level	elite,	the	professionals	and	wealthy	merchants	who	from	now	on	would	set	the	tempo	of	political	developments.	Despite	the	Ghibelline	revival	of	1260-67,	the	popolo	never	lost	its	capacity	for	action,	and	the	Ghibelline	regime	could	not	control	the	substantial	investments	and	foreign	assets	of	the	great	Florentine	banking	families,	such	as	the	Bardi,	Cerchi	and	Mozzi.	When	the	international	situation	changed	for	the	better	in	1266-67	the	Florentines	acted	with	remarkable	swiftness,	restablishing	the	offices	of	Anziani	and	Capitano	del	Popolo	in	1267.216	The	Florentine	commune	had	furthermore	developed	an	identity	and	institutions	that	endured	through	the	travails	of	mid-century.	By	the	1270s,	the	city	had	paved	streets,	several	bridges	over	the	Arno,	several	new	churches,	and	would	soon	begin	construction	of	its	final	wall	circuit	and	the	grand	new	Duomo.	The	Palazzo	del	Podestà	(1255)	demonstrated	the	commune’s	symbolic	triumph	over	private	power	in	the	city.	The	city	ruled	its	contado	through	its	constituent	parishes	and	military	companies,	and	by	the	later	thirteenth	century	had	developed	a	tax	system	with	progressively	fewer	exemptions	for	the	nobility.	The	Tuscan	road	network	was	under	Florentine	control	in	times	of	peace,	and	the	gold	florin	was	spreading	throughout	Europe.	By	1267,	Florence	was	the	hegemonic	center	of	a	densely	populated,	economically	robust	region.	Ongoing	immigration	from	the	countryside,	despite	the	destabilizing	effects	deplored	by	Dante,	ensured	continual	demographic	growth	in	the	city	and	ensured	the	manpower	necessary	for	the	city’s	industries.	Florentine																																																									
216 Najemy, A History, 75. 
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economic	dynamism	generated	ripple	effects	throughout	Tuscany.	The	Florentine	bishops,	eager	to	tap	the	urban	grain	market,	spent	much	of	the	thirteenth	century	trying	to	ensure	rents	in	kind	from	their	vassals.	These	same	vassals’	resistance	to	episcopal	exactions	led	in	some	cases	to	the	formation	of	prosperous	rural	communes	such	as	S.	Casciano	in	Valdipesa.	The	quasi-cities	of	the	area,	such	as	Figline	or	S.	Gimignano,	prospered	economically	from	regional	exchange	with	the	city.	Rural	lords	such	as	the	Guidi	and	Alberti	were	incapable	of	seriously	challenging	Florence	without	external	support,	which	evaporated	following	the	events	of	1266-68.	The	Primo	Popolo	had	laid	the	physical,	institutional,	and	ideological	infrastructure	around	which	the	Florentine	commune	would	develop	in	the	next	century,	as	it	expanded	beyond	its	old	contado.	
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2: “Maxima videtur esse discordia in hac civitate”1: The Florentine popolo, the Ordinances of 
Justice, and Social Conflict in Florence, c. 1280-1302 
 
Abstract: This chapter analyzes the sociopolitical conflicts in Florence during the 1290s. These 
conflicts clustered around the Ordinances of Justice (1293-1295), which crystallized popular 
solidarity against the magnates-yet the popolo itself fractured once in power, along internal 
divisions of socioeconomic standing, and over the question of how to treat the magnates. Scholars 
of this period in Florentine history have traditionally focused on the clash between the magnati e 
popolani, and not the tensions within the popular party. This results from a restrictive 
understanding of the popolo as a sociohistorical entity. This tradition has also seen the popolo as 
virtually synonymous with the guilds: the rest of Florence’s population is usually excluded from 
discussion of the contest between magnates and popolani, or treated as a demagogically-inspired 
rabble under Giano Della Bella. I read the various redactions of the Florentine Ordinances as a 
product of divisions within the popolo: these divisions were also dual in nature, resulting from 
differences in socioeconomic background and horizons between the popular elite (popolo grasso; 
grassi popolani) and their less wealthy, locally-based peers (popolo minuto; menopossenti). 
These produced differences between the two wings in regard to the bases of popular power, and 
how to deal with the magnates. At precisely the moment when the popolo minuto’s interests 
began to diverge from those of the grassi, the Ordinances were initially an attempt to shore up 
support for the guild priorate. The second part of the chapter analyzes how the lesser guildsmen 
and workers of Florence, contested and appropriated popular ideology in a more radical form 
under the leadership of Giano Della Bella, and the response from Florence’s ruling group. 
Remigio dei Girolami’s 1295 sermons to the priorate are revealing in this regard, and the last part 
of the chapter is a study of Remigio’s sermons before the priorate in their social context. Reading 
Remigio dei Girolami’s sermons in conjunction with the final 1295 Ordinances of Justice, and 
placing both in their specific social context, reveals the heterogeneity and political significance of 
the Florentine popolo, the coherence of its ideology despite the fissures this masked, and the 
intersecting and conflicting ties between magnates and popolani, elite and minuti alike. 
 
     Introduction 
 In the 1290s, tensions between Florence’s popolo and the city’s older military 
elite (milites, soon to be branded magnati) crystallized around communal institutions and 
legislation. The establishment of the priorate (1282) and the Ordinances of Justice (1293, 
1295) were landmarks in the struggle between the two groups, which largely supplanted 
the Guelf-Ghibelline conflict which had dominated Florentine politics for most of the 
																																																								
1 The quote is from Remigio dei Girolami, sermon XXVII, in “I sermoni 
d’occasione, le sequenze e i ritimi di Remigio Girolami fiorentino,” eds. G. Salvadori & 
V. Federici, Scritti Vari di Filologia (Rome, 1902) [hereafter “Salvadori and Federici, 
page number”], at 482: “Instinctu dyabolico vel divino iudicio maxima videtur esse 
discordia in hac civitate.” 
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thirteenth century.2 Despite the magnates’ hostility and the civil war between the Black 
and White Guelfs, this was the period when Florence’s guilds established themselves as 
the commune’s institutional bedrock.3 Yet the guild regime and the popolo itself, like its 
peers in the other Italian city-states, was never a homogeneous mass.4 Wealth, profession, 
and family allegiances divided Florentine society. The wealthiest merchants were often at 
odds with the artisans, middling merchants, and laborers who constituted the majority of 
Florence’s population.5 Thus the popolo is usually divided, in our sources and in modern 
historiography, into the popolo grasso (grassi) and the popolo minuto or 
minuti/menopossenti. 6 The tensions within the Florentine popolo and its cultural and 
																																																								
2Federico Canaccini, Ghibellini e Ghibellinismo in Toscana da Montaperti a 
Campaldino (1260-1289) (Rome, 2009), is a thorough study of the conflict in the later 
thirteenth century. See also Vieri Mazoni, Accusare e proscrivere il nemico politico,  
(Pisa, 2010), on Trecento Ghibelline trials, and the conference collection Guelfi e 
ghibellini nell’Italia del Rinascimento, ed. M. Gentile (Rome: Viella, 2005). 
3 See John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral 
Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982) [hereafter "Najemy, Corporatism"], for 
Florentine politics in this period. 
4 See Alma Poloni, Potere al popolo. Conflitti sociali e lotte politiche nell’Italia 
comunale del Duecento (Milan, 2010), at 9-44, for a clear and concise statement of the 
origins and heterogeneity of the popolo of the thirteenth-century communes.  
5 The best studies of the daily lives of the working poor in medieval Florence are 
Franco Franceschi, “La mémoire des laboratores à Florence au début du XVe siècle » in 
Annales ESC  (September-October 1990), 5, 1143-67; “Il mondo del salariati urbani,” in 
La mobilità sociale nel medioevo, ed. Sandro Carocci (Rome, 2010), 289-306; and “…E 
seremo tutti ricchi”: Lavoro, mobilità sociale e conflitti nelle città dàItalia medievale 
(Pisa: Pacini, 2012); Alessandro Stella, La Révolte des Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le 
travail (Paris: ÉHESS, 1993) and Samuel Cohn, Jr., The laboring classes of renaissance 
Florence (New York, 1980). 
6 The terminology I use here is necessarily ambiguous and polyvalent. In the 
historiography on the Italian communes, popolano/i broadly refers to the middling ranks 
of the non-elite urban population. Chris Wickham, Medieval Rome (Oxford, 2015), at 
325, discusses the ambiguity of the usually cognate term populus in a processional 
context, for an earlier period. The guild elite and merchant oligarchs, the grassi, became 
functionally indistinguishable from the aristocratic elite as the Trecento wore on: George 
W.Dameron, “Revisiting the Italian Magnates: Church Property, Social Conflict, and 
Political Legitimization in the Thirteenth-Century Commune,” Viator 23 (1992) 179.  
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judicial products are the theme of this chapter. It does not provide a general survey of the 
period or Florentine politics. The age of Dante is one of the most-studied periods of 
Florentine history, indeed of the Italian Middle Ages, and the reader may consult 
excellent recent studies of this formative period in Tuscan and Italian history.7   
 The chapter’s guiding questions are twofold: How did popular ideology affect 
social change at Florence, and what factors conditioned and constrained the popolo’s two 
factions, the grassi and minuti, during the 1290s? The Florentine popolo’s political goals 
and discursive claims crystallized in the Ordinances of Justice (1292-1295), a series of 
laws based on Bolognese models, and the Florentine hallmark of a broader north-central 
Italian trend towards popular regimes and the (typically partial) exclusion of magnates 
from political power.8 Drafted by the commune’s priors and legal experts, these laws 
expressed the popolo’s claims to political legitimacy and restricted the magnates’ access 
to political office. The Florentine popolo in turn created institutions tasked with turning 
this ideology into reality. The court of the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice was 
																																																								
7The best introductions to the period are the survey and document collection, 
Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur and Enrico Faini, Enrico Faini, Il sistema politico dei comuni 
italiani (secoli XII-XIV). Milan, 2010), and Poloni, Potere al popolo. The classics are 
Giovanni Tabacco, The struggle for power in medieval Italy, trans. R. B. Jensen 
(Cambridge, 1989) and Philip Jones, The Italian city-state (Oxford, 1997). Recent 
surveys of the struggle between magnates and popolo, and thirteenth-century Florence, 
are: Carol Lansing, The Florentine magnates (Princeton, N.J, 1991); John M. Najemy, 
Najemy, A history of Florence, 1200-1575 (Oxford, 2006) [hereafter “Najemy, History”] 
63-95; and Silvia Diacciati, Popolani e magnati (Spoleto, 2011) [hereafter “Diacciati, 
Popolani”], 303-88.  
8 The scholarship on the Bolognese popolo and the Bolognese Ordinances of 
Justice is extensive. See Sarah Rubin Blanshei, Politics and justice in late medieval 
Bologna (Leiden, 2010), for an exhaustive treatment with recent bibliography, and 
Giuliano Milani, “Bologna’s two exclusions and the power of law experts,” (2002. 
http://fermi.univr.it/RM/biblioteca/scaffale/m.htm#Giuliano%20Milani). For the popular 
party as an Italian phenomenon, see above all Jones, Italian city-state, “The century of 
the Popolo. Commercialization, democratization, and the challenge of tyranny,” 485-521.  
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founded two years after the city burned in a fire (1304) resulting from factional street 
fighting between magnate lineages. 
 Studies of political and social events in late thirteenth-century Florence have 
typically focused on elite identity and the Florentine commune’s ongoing attempts to 
tame this elite by reconfiguring the city landscape and political-judicial exclusion.9 Yet 
divisions within the popolo are just as important for an understanding of this period’s 
vicissitudes. The promulgation of the Ordinances of Justice was a tactical move by the 
grassi, intended to shore up support for the popular regime in a time of drastic social and 
economic change. The Ordinances also legitimized the seven “major” trade guilds as the 
basis of Florentine government. In doing this, the Ordinances’ creators drastically 
curtailed the number of legitimate guilds in Florence and its environs. Richard A. 
Goldthwaite has estimated that there were as many as 70 of these by the later thirteenth 
																																																								
9 The classic studies of the “magnate question” are: Gaetano Salvemini, Magnati 
e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295 ed. Ernesto Sestan (Milan, 1966 [1899]); Nicolai 
Ottokar, Il comune di Firenze alla fine del Dugento. Turin, 1962 [1926]), Nicolai 
Rubinstein, “La prima legge sul ‘sodamento’ a Firenze,” Archivio storico italiano 2: 2 
(1935): 161-72; Desiderio Cavalca, “Il ceto magnatizio a Firenze dopo gli ordinamenti di 
giustizia,” Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano 40-41 (1967-68): 85-132, and Nicolai 
Rubinstein, La lotta contro i magnati in Firenze (Florence,1939); Marvin Becker, “A 
study in political failure: The Florentine magnates, 1280-1343,” Mediaeval Studies 27 
(1965): 246-308; S. Raveggi, M. Tarassi, D. Medici, and P. Parenti, Ghibellini, Guelfi e 
popolo grasso: I detentori del potere politico a Firenze nella seconda metà del Dugento 
(Florence: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, 1978) [hereafter “in I detentori, [page number]”]; 
and Lansing, Florentine magnates. For a later period, see Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, 
Retour à la cité: Les magnates de Florence, 1340-1440 (Paris, 2006). The best recent 
study of social class and political exclusion is Sarah Rubin Blanshei’s towering Politics 
and justice in late medieval Bologna (Leiden, 2010). For an illuminating discussion of 
Blanshei’s work read in comparison with the Florentine situation, see Massimo 
Giansante, “Ancora magnati e popolani: Riflessioni in margine a Politics and Justice di 
Sarah R. Blanshei,” Archivio Storico Italiano 637: III (2013): 543-70. 
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century.10 This was a move towards the sort of oligarchic closure that Sarah Rubin 
Blanshei has reconstructed for Bologna in the same period. The Florentine oligarchy 
never constricted entry in the way the Venetians and Bolognese did, yet the matter of 
guild numbers demonstrates the intra-class antagonisms of the popolo minuto and the 
grassi, and its ideological aspects will be explored below. I trace this struggle within the 
popolo through the various redactions of the Ordinances and the Dominican preacher 
Remigio dei Girolami’s 1295 sermons before the priorate, the city’s governing body from 
1282. I focus on the language used to justify the elite guildsmens’ consolidation of power 
against the magnates, and then in the face of opposition from the lower ranks of the 
popolo. This language is virtually identical in both cases.11  
The Florentine experience was not representative of other communes. A major 
difference between Florence and Bologna, so similar in other ways during the thirteenth 
century, is documentary survival, which has in turn shaped the historiography on the two 
cities.12 Florence’s judicial archives do not survive before 1343, whereas Bologna, along 
with Perugia, is home to the richest collection of archival material in Italy before the 
fourteenth century, while Lucca’s ecclesiastical documentary run stretches back to the 
																																																								
10 See Richard Goldthwaite, The Economy of renaissance Florence (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 2009) [hereafter “Goldthwaite, Economy”], at 343, for the 
number of guilds or guild-like organizations among even minor craftsmen such as 
Fiesole’s stone-cutters.  
11 The most recent, and the only comprehensive, edition of the relevant statutory 
material is La legislazione antimagnatizia a Firenze, eds. Silvia Diacciati & Andrea Zorzi 
(Rome, 2013). All citations of the Ordinances are from this edition, which supplants 
those of Salvemini and Cardini and makes systematic comparison between the redactions 
possible for the first time. 
12 Giansante, “Ancora,” is the best comparison of Bologna and Florence; for the 
myth of Florence, see Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, “Il problema storiografica. Firenze 
come modello e mito di regime popolare,” in Magnati e popolani nell’italia communale 
(Pistoia, 1997), 1-16. 
	 114	
eighth century.13 This has led historians of Florence to focus less on the mundane 
political and social practices of the Florentine popular commune than its cultural products 
and electoral scrutinies.14 There is a lingering assumption in the historiography on 
medieval Italy to conflate the rest of the peninsula’s experience with that of Florence. 
This is due in part to a venerable Anglo-American tradition of Florentine-centric 
Renaissance scholarship, and also to the association between Dante and Brunetto Latini, 
foremost exponent of the Florentine popolo’s thought-world.15 Yet Florence did differ 
from other communes, first of all chronologically. The Bolognese popular regime had a 
far stronger grip on the levers of power than their Florentine peers.16 The Bolognese 
popolo was an innovator in many ways: in its early assertion of power within the 
commune (1228), its political-judicial exclusion of the old milites, in documentary 
innovations, and even in surrendering the libertas of the city of S. Petronio to a signore, 
the papal legate Bertrando del Poggetto (1327).17 The Bolognese popular regime, not the 
second popular regime at Florence, has increasingly become a baseline model of 
comparison with other communes, with fruitful results.18 In addition, Alma Poloni’s 
																																																								
13 Giansante, “Ancora,” 543-46, describes the wealth of the Archivio di Stato di 
Bologna, and the city’s twentieth-century historiographical tradition. The best study of 
high-medieval Lucca is Alma Poloni, Lucca nel Duecento (Pisa, 2009). 
14 The work of Silvia Diacciati and Piero Gualtieri are important recent exceptions 
to this. See the former’s Popolani and “Popolo e regimi politici a Firenze nella prima 
metà del Duecento,” Annali di Storia di Firenze I (2006), 37-81, and the latter’s Il 
comune di Firenze tra Due e Trecento: partecipazione politica e assetto istituzionale 
(Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2009). 
15 See Enrico Artifoni, “I governi di ‘popolo’ e le istituzioni comunali nella 
seconda metà del secolo XIII,” Reti Medievali 4:2 (2003), retrieved from: 
http://www.rmojs.unina.it/index.php/rm/issue/view/13 
16 Giansante, “Ancora,” 552-64, provides initial points of comparison between 
Florence and Bologna, with prospects for future research. 
17 Giansante, “Ancora,” 568. 
18 See the historiographical discussion in Giansante, “Ancora”.   
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studies of sociopolitical and economic change in Florence’s nearby neighbors, Pisa and 
Lucca, are a major contribution to historians’ understanding of popular politics in 
Tuscany.19 
The two sectors of the popolo subscribed to substantially the same ideological 
framework and rhetoric. At Florence, Brunetto Latini in particular influenced the popular 
party’s conception of a city governed by iustitia, concordia, and pax (justice, concord, 
and peace) as the highest earthly goods, and the goals of secular government.20 This 
rhetoric hid and exposed the rift between the popular elite and its artisanal and laboring 
supporters. This rift arose from the socioeconomic experiences of the two sectors of the 
popolo, between, for example, the members of the Calimala and Lana and the taverners 
(Vinattieri) or belt-makers (Correggiai); this contrast manifested itself in the extended 
battle between the minuti and grassi over the number of official guilds, i.e., those 
represented in the government. This battle, which extended from the later thirteenth 
century up to the counter-revolutionary coup of 1382, was the broader context for the 
creation of the Ordinances of Justice.  
A major feature of medieval Florentine history was the structural reliance of the 
popular oligarchy on its non-elite social base, the minuti, in times of dramatic social 
crisis, and its attempts at any other time to restrict and discipline these laborers and 
																																																								
19 Alma Poloni, Trasformazioni della società e mutamenti delle forme politiche in 
un Comune italiano: il Popolo a Pisa (1220-1330) (Pisa, 2004) and Lucca nel Duecento. 
Uno studio sul cambiamento sociale (Pisa, 2009). 
20 Diacciati, Popolani, 310: “…Brunetto Latini fu il portavoce di un’idea di 
società civile governata da quella concordia tra cittadini che, sola, poteva garantire pace e 
quiete a tutta la comunità e di conseguenza benessere e prestigio alla città.” Samuel Y. 
Edgerton, Jr., “Icons of justice”, Past & Present 89 (Nov., 1980), 23-38, discusses this 
iconography at Florence. 
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tradesmen.21 Justifying popular government in terms of containing the magnates enabled 
the popular regime to mobilize effective, united action at decisive moments in this period, 
such as the attempted magnate revolt of 5 July 1295. This dependence on the popolo 
minuto and the elite’s legitimizing rhetoric, however, opened the way for the Giano Della 
Bella’s wing of the popolo to attempt a more radical overhaul of the commune. In 
attempting to implement their different understandings of the discourse’s shared ideas, 
the grassi and minuti collided, weakening the popolo in the face of an elite resurgence as 
the fourteenth century began.22  
Recent studies of the period have rehabilitated much of Gaetano Salvemini’s 
classic, historical materialist reading of this period. Based on the careful archival work of 
Enrico Faini and Silvia Diacciati, the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries saw a 
real transformation-if not a 1789-style revolution-in the nature of political institutions and 
culture in Florence, and the composition of its ruling group.23 This does not require 
accepting Salvemini’s analysis or preoccupation: it was a natural product of his training 
and ideological sympathy with the deterministic Marxism of the era of the Second 
International.24 This transformation may also be seen in terms of the final victory in the 
game of urban politics of what Chris Wickham has described as third-level elites: urban 
professionals and wealthy merchants such as the early thirteenth-century chronicler 
																																																								
21 The best study of this dynamic’s consequences for formal Florentine politics is 
Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus. 
22 The best account of the period 1292-1302 remains Patrizia Parenti, “Dagli 
Ordinamenti di Giustizia alle lotte tra Bianchi e Neri,” in Ghibellini, Guelfi e Popolo 
Grasso, 239-323. 
23 See Faini, Firenze, and Diacciati, Popolani. On the  
24 See Giansante, “Ancora,” 549-51, for a discussion of this turn in Italian-
language scholarship. 
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Sanzanome and the bankers who invested in the Italian South, over the old second-level 
elite of the commune’s consular age.25  
I propose to extend this by interpreting the struggle between Giano Della Bella’s 
radical wing of the popolo and the moderates led by families such as the Girolami as an 
initial challenge from a would-be fourth level in the game of urban politics attempting to 
lever its way into power in the name of the same discursive package avowed by their 
immediate superiors. This fourth level could be characterized by membership in one of 
the “minor” guilds, or those which never received recognition in the Florentine 
constitution or electoral politics; it would have contained recent rural immigrants and 
even foreigners, the un- or underorganized laboring poor. This was the popolo in its 
widest sense; further research, may indicate real fissures even within the minuti, but the 
basic schema proposed is a flexible approach to an ambiguous, rapidly changing period 
and the identity of those who lived through it. This line of research could be extended 
into the fourteenth century, up to the earthquake in Florentine society that was the 
Ciompi revolution and the oligarchic counter-revolution of 1382. The ultimate failure of 
this fourth level elite, the popolani minuti, to attain power was perhaps due as much to 
the economic contraction of the fourteenth century as anything else. I am here adopting 
and consciously inverting Alma Poloni’s argument for the syncronicity of the commerical 
and popular revolutions in the urban Italian communes.26 
																																																								
25 See Wickham, Sleep walking, ch. 5, “Italy,” for this schema and its application 
to the north-central Italian communes. 
26 Alma Poloni, Lucca nel Duecento, especially ch. 1, “Mobilità sociale e crescita 
economica tra XII e XIII secolo,” 21-60, for this connection. 
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This leads to the broader problem of the relationship between ideology and socio-
economic change.27 Ideological claims are not simply a crude justification of power, nor 
a ghost of the economic infrastructure.28 The reflection theory devised by Marx and 
characteristic of fin-de-siècle Marxist writing on culture and history is nonsense, but then 
again, most Marxist writers discarded this model many years ago.29 Ideological products, 
to retain their explanatory value in a given historical moment both to those crafting them 
and their audience, cannot remain static. Although the leading group of the ruling class 
may legitimize its rule to itself and its subordinates through a given cluster of concepts 
such as pax, iustitia and concordia, subordinate groups can appropriate and reconfigure 
this same cluster, especially if the balance of class forces requires the ruling class to 
mobilize these subordinate groups to carry out its goals, as was the case at Florence in the 
1290s. This process can substantially limit the leading group’s room for maneuver, even 
if the subordinate group (here, the popolo minuto) is ultimately unsuccessful in retaining 
																																																								
27 Luis M. Pozo, “The mechanisms of class accomodation in precapitalist Europe: 
a study in hegemony,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 29.3 (2006) [hereafter “Pozo, 
‘mechanisms’] 227-69, and Chris Wickham, “Memories of underdevelopment: What has 
Marxism done for medieval history, and what can it still do?” in Marxist historiography 
for the 21st century, ed. Chris Wickham (Oxford, 2001), 34-48. 
28 See Aldo Mazzacane’s introductory remarks on jurisprudence’s impact on late 
medieval society in his “Law and jurists in the formation of the modern state in Italy,” in 
The origins of the state in Italy, 1300-1600, ed. Julius Kirshner (Chicago, 623-63, and 
Eric Hobsbawm’s comments in The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (New York, 1987), at 62. 
29 Patrick Lantschner, “The ‘Ciompi Revolution’ constructed: Modern historians 
and the nineteenth-century paradigm of revolution,” Annali di Storia di Firenze 4 (2009): 
277-97, is a critique of the application of 19th-century categories (class, state, etc.) to the 
premodern past. Lantschner’s work on these concepts can be profitably compared with 
Vivek Chibber’s defense of Marxism and its conceptual toolkit in “How does the 
subaltern speak?: An interview with Vivek Chibber” 
(https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/04/how-does-the-subaltern-speak/) )(2013); see also 
Chibber’s critique of subaltern studies, Postcolonial theory and the specter of capital 
(London: Verso, 2013). 
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its hold on political power.30 The concrete implications of this argument become clear 
when discussing the aftermath of the failed magnates’ revolt of July 1295. 
This discussion expands upon George W. Dameron’s 1992 article interpreting 
Italian antimagnate legislation as a whole.31 Dameron argued that the main purpose of the 
urban communes’ antimagnate legislation was to legitimate new criteria for membership 
in the urban elite. In order to do this, the popolo grasso needed to shore up its support 
among the popolo minuto at just the moment when these two groups’ class interests were 
diverging along socio-economic lines, particularly the issues of guild membership and its 
electoral privileges and how to treat the magnates. The antimagnate legislation 
demonized the magnates, thus justifying the new regime of the major guildsmen to the 
minuti.32 Simultaneously, elements of the mercantile elite were drawing closer to the 
magnates in functional terms, through business partnerships and marriage alliances.33 I 
expand upon Dameron’s account of antimagnate legislation in two ways. If antimagnate 
legislation bridged the gulf between the grassi and the minor guildsmen, what role did 
these minor guildsmen and non-guild workers themselves play in this process? Under 
Giano Della Bella’s leadership, the popolo minuto wrested this antimagnate discourse 
away from the guild elite, sharpening the Ordinances to decisively marginalize the 
magnates and assert a broader role for themselves in elite politics.  																																																								
30 See Antonio Gramsci’s comments in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. 
& trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (New York, 1971), 52-55, on the 
relationship between subaltern and ruling social groups.  
31 Dameron, “Revisiting the Italian magnates: church property, social conflict, and 
political legitimation in the thirteenth-century commune.” Viator 23 (1992): 167-87. 
32 Andrea Zorzi has also described the anti-magnate legislation in terms of 
creating a demonized, magnate “other” for the popolo: Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia a 
Firenze nel tempo degli ordinamenti di giustizia,” in Ordinamenti di giustizia fiorentini, 
ed. Vanna Arrighi (Florence, 1995), 138. 
33 Dameron, “Revisiting,” 179. 
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Remigio’s sermons, employing the same language of the Ordinances, legitimized 
the expulsion of Della Bella and the merchant elite’s reconquest of political power: those, 
using the language of the 1290s, capable of giving to each his right.34 Scholars have long 
recognized the impact of the political context on Remigio’s sermons.35 Yet these 
connections are typically acknowledged without accounting for the fact that Remigio’s 
supposedly impartial calls for pax in fact granted legitimacy to a particular wing of the 
popular party: the conservative, established guildsmen, among whom the Girolami played 
a leading role.36 This legitimation occurred at a crucial point in the events of the 1290s, 
following the deposition of the popolo minuto’s leader, Giano Della Bella, from the 
priorate and his exile from Florence. Remigio may have been sincere when speaking of 
the bene comune, yet this bene comune was itself an ideological product, not a corruption 
or distortion of a neutral value; reading it as such is to perpetuate the ideological claims 
inherent in Remigio’s original position.37  
Remigio’s sermons may be read as ideological products of a particular moment of 
acute polarization within the popolo, stemming from the question of how to treat the 
magnates; Della Bella’s banishment arose from this same context. The Dominicans of S. 
Maria Novella were not a third party standing above the city’s social conflicts, but deeply 
entwined with them; this is particularly the case with Remigio dei Girolami, whose 																																																								
34 See Najemy, History, 103, for the Ordinances’ appropriation of the Roman law 
understanding of Iustitia. 
35See Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia,” 143-44, for a succinct account and the major 
works on Remigio. 
36 Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia,” 143, desribes the Girolami as “una della più potenti 
famiglie di ‘popolo.’” See also Daniel R. Lesnick, Preaching in medieval Florence: The 
social world of Franciscan and Dominican spirituality (Athens, GA., 1989), 107-08, for 
the Girolami. 
37 Pozo, “Mechanisms,” 228, makes a similar point regarding scholars accepting 
the priority of vertical over horizontal ties in the precapitalist past. 
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family and position enmeshed him so deeply in public affairs. This rhetoric arose in the 
factional strife of late thirteenth-century Florence, but it would endure as a fundamental 
element in Florentine political and legal discourse long into the fourteenth century.38 This 
rhetoric’s vocabulary became a key part of late medieval Florentines’ public identity, and 
of the language rural people used when addressing the Florentine courts. 
The End of Angevin rule and the rise of the guild regime at Florence 
Silvia Diacciati has characterized the period 1267-1280 as the “game of parties”, 
as the various Florentine factions jockeyed for position under the Angevins.39  During 
these years, the guilds became increasingly central to formal politics. The seven “major” 
guilds were recognized as participants in the government for the first time in 1266, when 
a committee of thirty-six Guelfs and Ghibellines allowed the guilds to arm themselves 
and assemble publicly in times of emergency.40 Angevin intervention cut short this 
attempt at re-founding the popular regime, however, and during the 1270s Charles of 
Anjou ruled the city through lieutenants, who abolished popular institutions but not the 
guilds.41  The hallmark of the regimes governing Florence between 1260-1282 was their 
instability and inability to devise institutional solutions to rapidly changing political 
conditions.42 Executive magistracies such as the Fourteen (eight Guelfs, six 
																																																								
38 I use the term “rhetoric” here in the sense defined by Averil Cameron, 
Christianity and the rhetoric of empire: the development of Christian discourse 
(Berkeley, 1991), 13: “I do not use it [“rhetoric”] in its technical sense, but rather in the 
current, far looser sense it seems to have acquired, by which it can mean…‘characteristic 
means or ways of expression”; these modes may be either oral or written…” 
39 Diacciati, Popolani e magnati, ch. 3, “Il gioco delle parti”, 209-302. 
40 Najemy, A history, 75-77. 
41 Najemy, A history, 75. 
42 See Diacciati, Popolani, 243-59, for the period 1267-1280. 
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Ghibellines)43 were typically unable to implement their decisions due to bitter factional 
divisions between Florentine Guelfs and Ghibellines and external powers’ frequent 
interference, in particular the papacy and the Angevin French.  
This situation changed in 1282, with the collapse of Angevin hegemony in 
Tuscany following the Sicilian Vespers.44 The guild priorate emerged from this political 
vacuum. Through the priorate, the major trade guilds would dominate Florentine politics 
from 1282 up to the Black Guelfs’ coup of 1301-02, and again following Corso Donati’s 
death in 1308.45 The principle of consensus between guild representatives in fact became 
the underlying constitutional principle of the commune until the counter-revolution of 
1382 and the rise of the Albizzi-dominated oligarchy. 
The membership of Florence’s guilds constituted a significant part of the city’s 
male population. By 1292-1293, Florence had twenty-one officially recognized guilds.46 
With a combined membership of around 8,000 members, the guilds encompassed perhaps 
28-30% of the city’s adult males. These twenty-one guilds were divided between the 
seven major, five middle, and nine minor guilds. The fourteen middle and minor guilds 
constituted the popolo in its narrower, traditional sense: the third-level elite of bankers, 
professionals, and merchants who together dominated Florentine politics. John Najemy 
has argued that, given the political weakness of the nine minor guilds, the swing vote in 																																																								
43 See Salvemini [1899], 320-33, for the 1279 peace of Cardinal Latino, which 
established the committee of Fourteen. 
44 For Charles of Anjou and the Angevins, see Amideo De Vincentiis, “Le 
signorie angioine a Firenze. Storiografia e prospettive,” in Reti Medievali. Iniziative on 
line per gli studi medievistici: Rivista 2/2 (2001) 
(www.storia.unifi.it/_RM/rivista/mater/DeVincentiis.hm). 
45 Dameron, “Revisiting,” 179. 
46 The information in this paragraph is taken from Najemy, History, 39-44, and 
Goldthwaite, Economy, 342-49. Goldthwaite, Economy, 345, provides a table of the 21 
guilds and their members. 
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Florentine political crises lay with the members of the seven major guilds and the five 
middle guilds.47 These divisions cut across professional organization and political 
affiliation. Obscured at times, they never entirely disappeared. Yet the guilds emerged 
over the course of the Duecento as the only institutions capable of maintaining a measure 
of institutional continuity in a city beset by internal divisions, exacerbated by intermittent 
intervention from outside powers such as the Hohenstaufen and Angevin dynasties.48 
Emerging out of attempts to maintain Cardinal Latino’s peace between the Guelfs 
and Ghibellines, the priorate initially consisted of six representatives of the guilds, one 
from each sesto of the city. 49 The chroniclers Marchionne di Coppo Stefani and Dino 
Compagni both saw the aftermath of the Florentine victory at Campaldino (11 June 1289) 
as crucial to the guilds’ progressive domination of the priorate.50 Knights of distinguished 
second-level elite families, such as Corso Donati and Vieri de’Cerchi, distinguished 
themselves on the field-in direct contrast to the behavior of the old feudal elite such as 
Count Guido Novella, “who did not await the end, but fled without striking a blow of his 
sword,” according to Compagni.51 Upon their return to the city, these grandi began to 
abuse the city’s artisans and merchants, according to Marchionne Coppo di Stefano.52 
Compagni similarly claims that, despite the grande e potento stato of the popolo in 1289-																																																								
47 Najemy, Corporatism, 11-12. 
48 George W. Dameron discusses religious responses to this social change in 
Florence and its church in the age of Dante (Philadelphia, 2005), 164-217. 
49 Compagni, 4.10-11. For the peace of Cardinal Latino, see Salvemini [1899], 
320-33. 
50On Campaldino, see Marchionne Coppo di Stefano, Cronaca fiorentina di 
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, ed. Niccolò Rodolico (Città di Castello, 1903) [hereafter 
Cronaca fiorentina, [rubr. #, page 3], rubr. 181, p. 65, and Compagni, 1.10, and Herbert 
L. Oerter, “Campaldino, 1289”, Speculum 43 (1968), 429-50. 
51 Compagni, I.10: “Il conte Guido non aspettò il fine, ma sanza dare colpo di 
spada si partì.” 
52 Cronaca fiorentina, 182, 66. 
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1293, the nobili afflicted the popolani with many injuries, including “beatings and other 
villainies.”53 The popolo responded by combining the five “minor” guilds with the seven 
“major” guilds, whose consuls became the priors.54  
Numerous proposals for expanding the priorate were debated before the 
Ordinances of Justice were initially promulgated, in 1293. Dino Pecora-later an enemy of 
Dino Compagni and Giano Della Bella, but in 1292 a resolute popolano-proposed 
doubling the size of the priorate to twelve members, one from each guild, in a November 
24, 1292 meeting of the legislative assemby.55 Following the creation of the office of the 
Standardbearer of Justice, the Standardbearer became the seventh prior.56 Electoral 
procedures for the priorate and the guilds’ role in the commune thenceforth become a 
central issue in Florentine politics for the next century.  
According to Dino Compagni, the early priors quickly betrayed their trust as they 
aligned themselves with the Guelfs:  
“Whence the good citizens of the popolo were malcontent, and were cursing the office of the 
Prior, because the Guelf grandees were lords, [and] the citizens entering that office were striving 
not to observe the laws, but to corrupt them.”57  
 																																																								
53 Compagni, 1.11: “Ritornati i cittadini in Firenze, si resse il popolo alquanti anni 
in grande e potente stato; ma i nobili e grandi cittadini insuperbiti faceano molte ingiurie 
a’ popolani, con batterli e con altre villanie.” 
54 Cronaca fiorentina, 182, 66: “Tornata l’oste in Firenze i Grandi erano 
insuperbiti e trattavano male i mercatanti ed artefici, ed il soldo che doveano avere i 
soldati si rovesciavano a’ mercatanti ed agli artefici, e per questa cagione si ristrinsono 
l’Arti insieme, ed ebbono case e consoli; le quali Arti furono queste…[sic], e quando 
toccava la elezione erano de’ Priori.” 
55 See Najemy, Corporatism, 33-42,for electoral proposals, and 34-35, for Dino 
Pecora’s plan. 
56 The sesti were the basic units of administrative organization for the city until 
1343. See Najemy, Corporatism, 17-25, for the priorate’s origins. See La legislazione 
antimagnatizia, 15-18, for the rubric establishing the office of Standardbearer of Justice. 
57 Compagni, 1.5: “…i cittadini che entravano in quell’uficio [the priorate], non 
attendeano a observare le leggi, ma a corromperle.” 
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Certain elements of the popolo grasso, such as the Cerchi family, imitated the older 
families of the commune’s militia to such a degree that they would become magnates in 
the 1290s.58 This fusion of Florence’s older second-level elite with elements of the 
newer, third-level elite was facilitated by marriage and business ties with the older elite 
lineages, with the grassi manipulating the laws to favor their kinsmen and business 
partners.59  
Compagni does not qualify the word popolani in this passage, as he usually does 
in his chronicle. The passage likely refers, however, to the assemblage of lesser guilds 
and quasi-guilds, the urban neighborhood associations and parish-based groups that 
constituted the Florentine popolo minuto, as well as discontented members of the second- 
and third-level elite, men such as Giano della Bella and Compagni himself. By 1292, the 
major issue facing the guilds was the issue of how many citizens would be allowed to 
participate in elections and government.60 How far down the socio-economic ladder 
would participation in public life extend, and on what organizational bases? What 
implications would this have in the workplace as well as in the legislative councils, and 
which segments of the popolo would turn a capacity for collective action into institutional 
power? 
Florentine	Society	in	the	1290s	 
																																																								
58 On thirteenth-century turnover in ruling elites, see Paolo Cammarosano, “Il 
ricambio e l’evoluzione dei ceti dirigenti nel corso del XIII secolo”, in Magnati e 
popolani nell’italia communale (Pistoia, 1997), 17-40. 
59 Compagni, I.V: “Onde i buoni cittadini popolani erano malcontenti, e 
biasimavano l’uficio de’Prior, perché I Guelfi grandi erano signori.” The Cerchi are the 
paradigmatic Florentine example of a nouveau riche mercantile family imitating the 
mores of the grandi: see Andrea Zorzi, “La faida Cerchi-Donati,” in La trasformazione, 
95-120. 
60 Najemy, History, 82. 
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This	section	surveys	Florentine	society	in	the	1290s:	its	different	components,	and	conflicts	between	and	within	them.	It	is	not	a	detailed	study	of	the	medieval	Tuscan	working	classes’	socio-economic	and	cultural	world,	which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	study.61	The	reader	can	profitably	consult	the	voluminous	studies	of	Franco	Franceschi	and	Giovanni	Cherubini	for	a	more	detailed	picture.	62		The	elite	popolani	grassi	are	even	better	studied.	In	particular,	recent	publications	from	Giuliano	Milani	and	Antonio	Montefusco’s	collaborative	study	of	the	Alighieri	is	a	major	contribution	to	knowledge	of	the	age	of	Dante.63		What	strategic	and	tactical	assets	did	the	Florentine	popolo	have	in	its	struggle	against	the	old	second-tier	elite	and	its	third-tier	avatars?	What	structural	limitations,	social,	economic,	or	cultural,	conditioned	the	popolo’s	choices,	and	contributed	to	its	inability	to	thwart	the	elite	revival	of	the	early	1300s?	I	examine	
																																																								
61 Two of the best recent studies of the Tuscan cities’ socioeconomic life are 
Alma Poloni’s monographs on Lucca and Pisa. See in particular “Lucca come distretto 
industriale” in her Lucca nel Duecento, 87-110, and “Politica e società tra Duecento e 
Trecento: Il ricambio del ceto dirigente popolare,” in Trasformazioni della società e 
mutamenti delle forme politiche in un comune italiano: Il Popolo a Pisa (Pisa, 2004), 
241-274. A good introduction to the lives of the medieval working classes in England is 
Christopher Dyer, Standards of living in the later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1989). 
62 Of Cherubini’s numerous studies, see Signori, contadini, borghesi (Florence, 
1974) and Il lavoro, la taverna, la strada. Scorci di Medioevo (Naples, 1997), in 
particular in the latter, “Artigiani e salariati nelle città italiane del tardo Medioevo”, 31-
54, and “La taverna nel basso Medioevo”, 191-224. Franceschi’s numerous works 
include “Il mondo dei salariati urbani,” in La mobilità sociale nel medioevo, ed. Sandro 
Carocci (Rome, 2010), 289-306; “Un ‘distretto industriale’ fiorentino?”, in Alle porte di 
Firenze: il territorio di Bagno a Ripoli in età medievale, ed. P. Pirillo (Rome, 2007), 213-
28; and “La storiografia economica sul Rinascimento e le sue metamorfosi: qualche 
reflessione” in The Italian renaissance in the twentieth century, eds. A.J. Grieco, M. 
Rocke, and F. G. Superbi (Florence, 2002),153-72.  
63 See the studies collected in the monographic volume of Reti medievali 15, 2 
(2014), “Dante attraverso i documenti. I. Famiglia e patrimonio (secolo XII-1300 circa)”, 
available at http://www.rmojs.unina.it/index.php/rm/issue/view/28, in particular those of 
Enrico Faini and Silvia Diacciati. 
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the	popolo	minuto	as	an	emergent	fourth	level	in	communal	politics,	building	upon	Chris	Wickham’s	four-leveled	model	of	elite	turnover	for	medieval	Italy.64	Tuscany’s	first-level	elite,	old	signorial	families	like	the	Guidi	and	Conti	Alberti,	had	ruralized	as	a	response	to	the	civil	wars	of	the	late	eleventh	century,	withdrawing	from	Florence.65	They	were	a	declining	force	by	the	late	thirteenth	century,	yet	still	possessed	large	holdings	in	Florence’s	contado.	Capable	of	drawing	on	venerable	connections	to	the	peninsula’s	Ghibelline	party	and	consistently	favoring	the	German	emperors,	these	families’	first-tier	international	connections	had	perversely	become	a	hindrance	as	imperial	power	flickered	out	in	Italy	during	the	twelfth	century.	Temporary	revivals	under	aggressive	rulers	such	as	Frederick	Barbarossa	or	Henry	of	Luxembourg	were	just	that,	temporary,	and	imperial	recognition	of	comital	powers	for	these	families	availed	them	little	against	Florence.	The	papal-Angevin	triumph	of	the	1260s	dealt	a	major	blow	to	this	first-level	elite,	following	on	the	heels	of	the	first	popular	regime’s	string	of	Tuscan	victories	and	their	own	internal	divisions.		Below	them	were	the	commune’s	older	lineages,	descendents	of	the	milites	
pro	comuni	such	as	the	Buondelmonti,	Caponsacchi,	and	Firidolfi.	Many	of	these	families	were	also	in	decline	by	the	later	thirteenth	century,	weakened	by	a	century	of	factional	struggle	over	the	political-economic	resources	of	Florence	and	its																																																									
64 See Wickham, Sleep walking, and Medieval Rome, for this model in an Italian 
and Roman context.  
65 M.E. Cortese, Signori, castelli, città. L’aristocrazia del territorio fiorentino tra 
X e XII secolo (Florence, 2007), is an exhaustive prosopographical study of the 
Fiorentino’s high medieval elite and the early rural signorie; for their relationship with 
the city, see especially “Al centro del comitatus: le stirpi signorili ed i loro rapporti con la 
città”, 209-58. 
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commune.	The	natural	tendency	towards	turnover	among	elites	was	exacerbated	by	the	vagaries	of	the	Guelf-Ghibelline	conflict,	with	long	periods	of	exile	and	property	destruction	crippling	some	families,	like	the	Uberti.	This	elite	turnover	was	facilitated,	as	at	Genoa	and	Milan,	by	the	thirteenth-century	economic	boom.	Nevertheless,	the	old	military	families	remained	an	important	factor	in	urban	politics,	especially	if	they	had	gone	into	banking	or	the	cloth	trade,	like	the	Frescobaldi,	or	supported	the	popular	party,	like	the	Della	Bella.		Some	of	them	adapted	to	the	shifting	foundations	of	economic	and	political	prestige	through	marriage	alliances	with	the	gente	nuove.	Corso	Donati’s	string	of	marriages	exemplifies	this	tactic.	After	an	unknown	first	wife,	he	became	engaged	to	Tessa	degli	Ubertini,	whose	father	was	a	Cerchi,	who	are	Compagni’s	archetypal	gente	
nuove,	aping	the	milites’	lifestyle.	Corso	quickly	alienated	the	Cerchi,	however,	by	marrying	up	the	social	ladder	to	a	daughter	of	the	famous	condottiere	Uguccione	della	Faggiuola.66	Florence’s	second-level	elite	had	fairly	evenly	divided	between	Guelfs	and	Ghibellines,	based	on	expediency	and	marriage	or	business	networks.		The	third	level	of	Florentine	Tuscany’s	urban	elite	was	the	popolo	grasso.	The	Florentine	grassi	emerged	stronger	from	each	regime	change	of	the	later	thirteenth	century,	and	by	the	1290s	were	the	dominant	element	in	Florentine	politics,	allowing	for	a	substantial	overlap	in	lifestyle	and	economic	wealth	between	segments	of	the	grandi	and	grassi.	The	popolo	grasso	was	composed	of	families	whose	economic	resources	were	not	strictly	tied	to	the	city	of	Florence	and	
																																																								
66 Ironically, it was Uguccione Della Faggiuola who would crush a Florentine 
army at the head of the central Italian Ghibellines, at Montecatini (1315).  
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Florentine	Tuscany.67	The	Mozzi,	Bardi,	or	Peruzzi	possessed	the	sort	of	capital	reserves	made	possible	through	the	large-scale	banking,	finance,	and	exchange	that	the	Tuscans	helped	pioneer.		In	choosing	the	city	as	their	focus	while	their	aristocratic	betters	ruralized	and	signorialized,	the	early	tweflth	century	second-level	elites	had	unwittingly	ensured	an	important	advantage	for	their	descendents.	Because	their	wealth	was	not	primarily	tied	to	land,	members	of	the	popolani	grassi	could	act	quickly	in	times	of	crisis	or	opportunity,	and	possessed	the	assets	and	connections	on	an	Italian	and	international	scale	that	allowed	them	to	survive	periods	of	exile	or	disfavor	in	their	hometown,	as	the	Medici	and	Strozzi	later	would.	Here	as	in	matters	of	culture,	they	were	similar	to	some	of	their	magnate	rivals	for	power.		The	Frescobaldi,	bankers	and	merchants,	later	magnates,	may	have	been	socially	and	economically,	if	not	culturally,	indistinguishable	from	the	Peruzzi,	another	wealthy	banking	family	who	remained	popolani.	The	Uberti,	despite	their	reputation	as	the	Florentine	example	
par	excellance	of	the	city’s	old	“feudal”	elite,	similarly	possessed	the	resources	to	sustain	Farinata	for	years	in	exile	before	his	chance	for	revenge	came	at	the	battle	of	Montaperti	(1260).	Their	family	wealth	initially	developed	through	urban	and	sub-regional	exchange,	investment,	and	finance.	This	could	then	be	channeled	into	the	
																																																								
67 Sergio Raveggi, “I grandi mercanti, occulti protagonisti”, in I detentori, 53-62, 
remains the best concise study of this factor, which can now be read in light of Silvia 
Diacciati’s“Dante: relazioni sociali e vita pubblica”, in Dante attraverso i documenti. I. 
Famiglia e patrimonio (secolo XII-1300 circa), eds. G. Milani, A. Montefusco, Reti 
medievali. 15, 2 (2014)): 243-270.  
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increasingly	interconnected	Eurasian	economy	of	the	first	world	system.68	This	shrewd	manipulation	of	investment	capital,	combined	with	the	papal-Angevin	alliance,	gave	third-level	families	such	as	the	Alberti	del	Giudice	or	the	Girolami	economic	and	political	opportunities	that	were	denied	to	the	minuti.		My	proposed	fourth	level	of	Florentine	urban	politics,	the	popolo	minuto,	never	supplanted	the	grassi	in	terms	of	institutional	power.	The	grassi	and	minuti	diverged	in	terms	of	access	to	political	resources	and	institutions,	and	this	explains	in	part	the	fissiparous	nature	of	the	second	popular	regime.	Within	the	minuti,	tensions	existed	between	members	of	the	minor	guilds	and	the	more	prosperous	local	artisans	and	shopkeepers	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	unskilled,	semi-	or	unorganized	laborers	that	made	up	the	majority	of	the	population.	These	divisions	were	a	structural	feature	of	Florentine	political	life,	as	were	the	conflicts	they	engendered.	Divisions	intersected	within	and	across	professional	or	organizational	lines,	and	membership	in	formal	associations	like	the	guilds	did	not	guarantee	adherence	to	the	popular	party	in	times	of	crisis.69		The	elite	popular	families’	response	to	the	Ghibelline	regime	of	1260-1267	indicates	the	gulf	between	them	and	the	minuti	in	terms	of	resources,	and	hence	the	ability	to	profit	from	events.	Sergio	Raveggi	aptly	labelled	the	mercantile	companies	
																																																								
68See Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before european hegemony: the world system A.D. 
1250-1350 (Oxford, 1991), for the first world system and what Abu-Lughod calls its 
“restructuring” (or, as one wishes, crisis and transformation) in the fourteenth century. 
69I echo here Patrick Lantschner’s recent arguments on the contingent and 
polycentric nature of medieval urban political conflicts. See his “Revolts and the political 
order of cities in the late Middle Ages,” Past and Present 225 (Nov. 2014): 4-46, and The 
logic of political conflict in late medieval Europe (Oxford, 2015), particularly “Volatile 
guilds and parties”, at 110-17, in reference to later medieval Bologna and Liège. 
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headed	by	these	elite	families	as	the	hidden	protagonists	of	1260-67.70	While	Montaperti	devastated	the	Florentines	demographically	and	politically,	many	of	the	leading	popular	families	weathered	the	crisis	well,	particularly	those	who,	although	affiliated	with	the	Primo	Popolo,	had	not	held	high	office.	This	was	due	in	part	to	their	assets	abroad,	which	the	Ghibelline	regime	was	helpless	to	control.	This	applies	as	well	to	the	struggle	between	the	grassi	and	their	foes	among	the	milites	and	rivals	for	power	in	the	popolo	minuto.	The	horizons	of	the	former	were	conditioned	by	their	local,	partially	landed	wealth;	party	affiliation;	and	family	strategies;	those	of	the	latter,	by	limited	and	localized	resources	(probably,	in	many	cases,	no	more	than	a	popolano’s	shop	or	tools),	local	social	networks,	and	local	loyalties.		An	example	of	these	mercantile	elite	families’	survival	under	the	Ghibelline	regime	comes	from	just	after	Montaperti.71	In	1261,	a	delegation	which	ceded	Florentine	castles	in	the	contado	to	the	Sienese	included	individual	members	of	the	Cerchi	(later	magnates,	at	that	point	popolani	grassi),	Medici,	Amieri,	and	Peruzzi,	all	later	to	play	important	roles	in	Florentine	politics.	Similarly,	despite	the	bonanza	windfall	that	would	ensue	from	close	Florentine	cooperation	with	the	papacy,	popes	Urban	IV	and	Clement	IV	had	to	entreat,	request,	and	finally	threaten	many	of	the	banking	families	before	they	came	over	to	the	anti-imperial	camp.	Other	families,	including	the	Cerchi	and	Frescobaldi,	went	over	to	the	papal	camp	in	1263-65,	and	
																																																								
70 Raveggi, “I grandi mercanti, occulti protagonisti”, in I detentori, 53-62. 
71 The information in this paragraph is taken from Raveggi, “I grandi mercanti,” 
54-56. 
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profited	from	it;	in	both	cases,	canny	familism	and	opportunism,	not	party	politics,	most	likely	dictated	their	actions.		During	the	years	of	Angevin	hegemony	in	central	Italy,	the	great	Florentine	families’	far-flung	interests	required	them	to	maintain	a	fine	instinct	for	the	balance	of	power.	This	international	dispersion	of	investments	and	family	personnel	was	an	asset	against	internal	enemies,	such	as	the	restored	Ghibelline	regime,	but	could	be	a	weapon	in	the	hands	of	more	powerful	entities	like	the	papacy.	Initially,	these	great	popular	families	benefitted	from	their	lack	of	deep-rooted	ties	to	the	papal	or	imperial	camp.	Only	the	papacy	at	its	medieval	height	under	Innocent	III’s	successors,	controlling	vast	resources	and	at	the	apex	of	the	European	diplomatic	and	economic	scene,	could	offer	large	enough	enticements,	and	threaten	serious	enough	economic	sanctions,	to	compel	the	greatest	banking	families	such	as	the	Bardi	to	do	much	of	anything	against	their	will.	The	real	test	of	strength	between	the	Florentine	oligarchy	and	the	See	of	S.	Peter	would	not	come	until	the	1370s,	and	in	that	struggle	the	Florentines	managed	to	hold	their	own,	if	not	triumph.72		The	families	of	the	popolo	grasso,	including	those	such	as	the	Cerchi	and	Pulci	who	would	later	be	branded	as	magnates,	had	built	up	their	initial	wealth	through	local,	regional	activity:	small-scale	credit,	banking,	and	investment	in	the	booming	
																																																								
72 On the War of the Eight Saints (1375-78), see William J. Connell, “The War of 
the Eight Saints in Florentine memory and oblivion” in Society and individual in 
renaissance Florence, ed. W.J. Connell (Berkeley, 2002), 173-214, and A.W. Lewin, 
Negotiating survival: Florence and the Great Schism, 1378-1417 (London, 2003) and 
Richard C. Trexler, The spiritual power: republican Florence under interdict (Leiden, 
1974). 
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textile	trade.73	When	the	opportunity	for	truly	large-scale,	international	investment	and	exchange	came	with	the	Angevin-papal	alliance	of	the	1260s,	these	families	possessed	the	capital	necessary	to	seize	it,	after	initial	papal	goading.	The	expanded	horizons	afforded	by	the	south	Italian	and	Mediterranean	trade,	and	banking	and	cloth	operations	beyond	the	Alps,	catapulted	these	families	into	the	top	tier	of	the	Florentine	ruling	class,	in	a	process	that	reflects	a	similar	dramatic	change	in	circumstances	among	Rome’s	“new	aristocracy”	of	the	late	twelfth	century,	as	some	of	these	families	became	the	baroni	di	Roma	following	Innocent	III’s	reconquest	of	Lazio.74	In	Florence,	the	rise	of	the	popolani	grassi	opened	the	way	for	a	challenge	from	below	by	their	social	inferiors,	the	minuti,	just	as	the	grassi	were	beginning	to	openly	challenge	the	milites	for	control	of	the	commune.	Despite	the	commune’s	aggression	under	the	Primo	Popolo	and	the	city’s	ongoing,	if	erratic,	development	of	public	power,	the	Florentine	commune’s	the	resources	and	possibilities	were	more	limited	and	Tuscan-specific	than	those	of	the	greatest	Florentine	families	which	composed	part	of	its	ruling	elite.	The	vast	wealth	and	international	horizons	of	these	lineages	provided	them	with	a	crucial	trump	card	in	the	game	of	politics.	When	this	wealth	was	combined	with	their	marriage	and	business	alliances	with	second-level	families,	their	regional	clientelar	networks,	and	a	charismatic	leader	like	that	great	noble	reprobate	Corso	Donati,	the	great	Florentine	families	effectively	controlled	the	city,	regardless	of	the	particular	regime																																																									
73 See above, ch. 1, and W.R. Day, Jr., “Early economic development of 
Florence.” 
74 On the Roman barons and Lazial rural lordships, see Sandro Carocci, Baroni di 
Roma. Dominazioni signorili e lignaggi aristocratici nel Duecento e nel primo Trecento 
(Rome, 1993). Wickham, Medieval Rome, is the best study of the period before the 
thirteenth century. 
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in	power.	Their	wealth	allowed	them	to	manipulate	formal	politics,	engineering	elections	to	the	priorate,	as	Marchionne	di	Coppo	Stefani	said	of	Corso	Donati,	through	“secret	means”	(segreti	modi)75		Who	constituted	the	popolo	minuto?	The	category	itself	changes	meanings	depending	on	source	and	time	period.76	Dino	Compagni,	himself	a	committed	
popolano	and	bitter	enemy	of	the	grandi,	had	a	different	estimation	of	the	minuti	than	Giovanni	Villani,	a	popolano	closer	to	the	oligarchic	grassi	than	his	predecessor.	Limited	resources	would	have	resulted	in	ambitious	popolani	minuti	focusing	on	local	associations	and	public	office-holding	as	strategies	for	social	mobility,	whereas	for,	say,	the	Peruzzi,	membership	on	the	priorate	was	one	among	many	strategies	for	defending	the	family’s	wealth	and	holding	onto	the	mechanisms	of	public	power,	perhaps	not	as	important	as	the	expansion	of	the	family	business.	This	localism	was	the	strength	and	weakness	of	the	Florentine	minuti,	especially	in	periods	of	crisis	such	as	1293-1295,	or	during	the	civil	war	between	Black	and	White	Guelfs	of	the	first	decade	of	the	1300s.	The	local	interconnectivity	which	sustained	the	social,	religious,	and	political	life	of	the	popolo	minuto	enabled	rapid	mobilization	for	decisive	action,	especially	after	the	establishment	of	the	offices	of	the	Capitano	del	Popolo	and	Standardbearer	of	Justice,	who	became	the	foci	of	the	popular	party	in	its	official	guise.		The	minuti	could	be	a	decisive	factor	in	internal	urban	conflicts,	such	as	the	July	1295	street	fighting	and	standoff	between	popolani	and	magnati	that	ended																																																									
75 Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, ed. Niccolò Rodolico (Città 
di Castello, 1903) [hereafter “Stefani, [rubric, page number]], 202, 73. 
76 The best discussion of the term and its polyvalence in Italian sources is Alma 
Poloni, Potere al popolo. 
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with	Dominican	mediation.	Providing	a	large	part	of	the	city’s	foot	militia	(pedites)	some	of	them	would	have	had	military	experience-not	only	at	Campaldino	or	in	Florence’s	numerous	small	contado	wars,	but	also	in	garrison	duty	and	siege	warfare.	This	experience	of	organized	combat	combined	with	their	habits	of	association	in	parish	confraternities,	guilds,	or	neighbhorhood	associations	would	have	made	them	an	effective	strike	force	in	urban	combat.	Faced	with	powerful	external	foes,	however,	such	as	Charles	of	Valois’	knights	in	1301-02,	the	popolo	
minuto	were	powerless.77	Taking	on	an	enemy	of	the	Angevins’	caliber	would	have	required	a	prolonged	mobilization	of	the	commune’s	army,	disrupting	the	urban	and	regional	economy	and,	if	things	went	badly,	potentially	wrecking	the	very	infrastructure	of	the	popolo	minuto’s	livelihood:	the	shops,	stalls,	and	mills	where	the	minuti	made	their	living.	Furthermore,	after	the	Primo	Popolo’s	decade-long	run,	later	popular	regimes	had	remarkably	little	staying	power.	Faced	with	entrenched	opposition	from	the	magnates	but	also	their	richer	superiors	the	grassi,	the	minuti	were	incapable	of	maintaining	themselves	in	power.	This	was	a	hallmark	of	every	period	of	intense	collective	action	in	Florence:	1293-95,	1343-1348,	and	1378.	Dissension	within	the	popolo	combined	with	the	relative	coherence	of	the	Florentine	
grassi	and	their	economic	resources	to	undermine	Florentine	popular	regimes	fairly	rapidly.	This	is	in	stark	contrast	to	Bologna,	where	the	popolo	remained	in	power	in	some	form	from	1228	to	the	city’s	submission	to	the	papacy	in	1323.	Social	networks	also	limited	the	popolo	minuto’s	possibilities.	Solidarity	within	the	popolo,	based	on	associations,	trades,	and	public	life,	existed	in																																																									
77 On the Black Guelfs’ appeal to Charles of Valois, see Compagni, 2.6-10. 
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competition	with	a	rival	system	of	urban	power,	elite	clientelism.	Clientelism	is	usually	difficult	to	trace	empirically,	but	it	is	clear	that	it	was	not	simply	a	case	of	magnate	patrons	surrounding	themselves	with	indigent	minuti.	Prosperous	popolani	were	just	as	likely	as	the	menopossenti	to	appear	in	a	magnate’s	famiglia,	or	form	a	working	political	alliance	with	the	magnates.78		Florentines	could	be	patrons	and	clients	simultaneously.	Elite	patronage	offered	a	variety	of	protection	from	or	in	the	courts,	and	a	source	of	credit	in	hard	times.	Clienteles,	in	turn,	ensured	the	Florentine	elite	a	readily	mobilized	armed	force,	a	public	entourage,	and	a	visible,	personal	status	symbol.	This	elite	clientelism	was	not	separate	from	or	subordinate	to	the	official	political	realm.	Rather,	clientelism	overlapped	or	clashed	with	party	affiliations	and	political-economic	calculations,	functioning	as	a	black	market	in	power	that	could	better	one’s	position	in	the	legitimate	economy	or	politics.	Elite	clienteles	also	included	rural	followers,	from	the	families’	Tuscan	estates.	Dino	Compagni	described	Florence’s	most	infamous	magnate,	Corso	Donati,	as	typically	accompanied	by	many	rural	henchmen	and	having	a	great	entourage-whom	he	used,	Donati	notes,	to	inflict	“many	fires	and	many	assaults,	and	major	damage”	on	his	enemies,	the	Cerchi.79		
																																																								
78 This is the standard panoply of benefits for clients in a patron-client 
relationship; for a case of a prosperous member of the popolo apparently allying himself 
with Corso Donati as a patron, see Dino Compagni’s castigation of Dino Pecora in his 
Cronica, 1.13. 
79 Compagni, 2.20: …col quale molti masnadieri si raunavano e gran sèguito 
avea, molte arsioni e molte ruberie fece fare, e gran dannaggio a’ Cerchiu e a’ loro amici 
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The	Ordinances	of	Justice	were	intended	to	fracture	this	clientelar	system	in	town	and	country:	both	factions	of	the	popolo	shared	this	aim.80	The	first	step	in	this	was	solidifying	the	commune’s	physical	control	over	the	city,	by	attempting	to	limit	citizens’	movements	in	times	of	trouble.	Rubric	XXXIII	of	the	July	1295	Ordinances,	originally	one	of	Giano	Della	Bella’s	additions	to	the	January	1293	edition	and	adopted	unaltered	in	later	redactions,	declared	that	“should	there	be	any	trouble,	violent	brawl,	disturbance,	or	tumult	in	the	city	of	Florence,	or	when	the	Standardbearer	of	Justice	was	performing	his	duties,	”	popolani	were	forbidden	“to	go	or	hasten,	or	to	be	or	remain	with	or	without	arms	at	the	house	of	any	noble	or	of	a	magnate	of	the	city	of	Florence	or	the	district.”81	Those	who	continued	to	do	so	would	be	fined	200	fiorini	piccioli.	The	city’s	shops	were	to	remain	closed	when	the	Standardbearer	of	Justice	was	performing	his	duties	(rubr.	46),	and	magnates	were	prohibited	from	assembling	at	the	location	of	a	crime	when	the	Standardbearer	arrived	(rubr.	47).	Rubric	37	banned	unarmed	people	(inermes)	from	impeding	the	Standardbearer’s	militia	when	they	were	gathered	“in	any	place,	on	the	occasion	of	any	wrongdoing”.82	In	the	cramped	streets	and	narrow	backalleys	of	Florence’s																																																									
80 See Lansing, Florentine magnates, 168-76, for the role of neighborhood 
clientelism in factional struggle. This does not discount the role that a less chaotic form 
of patronage would play in early Renaissance politics. 
81 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 98, Rubric 33: “…ea die vel nocte quo vel qua, 
quod absit, aliqua briga, rixa, rumor vel tumultus esset in civitate Florentie, vel quando 
vexillifer iustitie iret vel traheret ad aliquem locum pro suo offitio exequendo, nullus 
popularis civitatis vel comitatus Florentie aliquo modo vel causa audeat vel presummat 
ire vel trahere, esse vel stare cum armis vel sine armis ad domum alicuius nobilis vel 
magnatis civitatis Florentie vel districtus.” 
82 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 99, rubric 37: “Item si continget pedites iustitie 
convenire cum armis in aliquo loco occasione alicuius mallefitii vel rumoris vel aliqua 
alia occasione vel causa, quod inermes non debeant se simul miscere cum eis ad penam 
librarum decem f.p. pro quolibet contra faciente, exceptis familiaribus dominorum 
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center,	it	would	have	been	easy	for	a	few	carefully	placed	“bystanders”	to	disrupt	the	popolo’s	militia	and	abet	escaping	criminals,	magnate	or	otherwise.83	Debt	and	credit	were	a	less	flashy,	probably	more	insidious,	form	of	patron-client	connection.	Elite	lending	was	a	potentially	powerful	form	of	clientelism.	Controlling	a	neighborhood	could	be	done	cleanly	and	effectively	through	the	ties	of	debt	instead	of	maintaing	a	large,	armed	entourage.	After	the	anti-magnate	legislation,	the	former	was	a	more	prudent	and	less	costly	option,	and	the	financialization	of	Florentine	patron-client	relations	over	the	Trecento	deserves	more	study.	These	sorts	of	financial,	clientelar	ties	were,	again,	not	restricted	to	magnates;	elite	grassi	were	equally	avid	lenders	and	patrons,	and	popolani	could	be	simultaneously	patrons	and	clients.	Over	the	long	term,	such	ties	may	have	acted	as	a	brake	on	the	ability	of	the	popolo	minuto	to	fundamentally	improve	its	situation,	enmeshed	as	it	was	at	the	intersection	of	competing	loyalties	and	constrained	by	debt.	Occupation,	and	thus	guild	status,	did	not	map	onto	neighborhood	and	its	cognate	forms	of	association,	such	as	parishes.	Because	of	this	fissure	in	the	associational	coordinates	underlying	popular	solidarity,	elite	patronage	networks	could	thrive	in	the	interstices.	These	ties,	which	usually	do	not	appear	in	surviving	documentation,	would	have	undercut	efforts	to	maintain	popular	solidarity.		 There	was	another	brake,	internal	to	the	popolo,	on	the	popolo	minuto’s	capacity	to	challenge	the	Florentine	elite	for	power,	and	hold	it	once	there:	its																																																																																																																																																																						
priorum et vexilliferi et consiliariorum eius et aliorum armatorum, quos presens 
capitulum non astringat.” 
83 See Michael Herzfeld, Evicted from eternity (Chicago, 2009), 124, for the 
Roman rioni of Trastevere and Monti, and the Fascist-era “cleaning up” of these 
working-class neighborhoods’ physical fabric, which residents had reconfigured to enable 
locals to better escape from snooping officialdom. 
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uneasy,	ambiguous	relationship	with	the	mass	of	unskilled	workers,	underemployed	day	laborers,	and	other	laboring,	but	documentarily	opaque,	strata	of	the	city’s	population.	Because	guild	membership	has	often	been	equated	with	participation	in	political	life,	some	scholars	have	assumed	that	the	numerically	weak	minor	guilds	formed	an	ineffectual	counter	within	the	popolo	to	the	numerically	dominant	twelve	major	guilds.84	Workers	who	were	not	enrolled	in	the	guilds	are	thereby	implicitly	excluded	entirely	from	public	life.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	the	Ordinances	of	Justice	artificially	restricted	the	number	and	political	strength	of	the	guilds,	reflecting	a	more	complex	reality	in	which	it	was	lilely	unclear	which	guilds,	or	which	working	alliances	within	the	guilds	as	a	totality,	would	emerge	to	dominate	the	priorate.	If	Richard	A.	Goldthwaite	is	correct	in	his	estimate	of	around	seventy	guilds	in	existence	before	1293,	these	would	have	made	up	a	far	larger	part	of	the	city’s	adult	male	population	than	Najemy’s	estimate	of	28-30%	of	the	adult	males	as	guild	members	for	1293.	It	is	possible	that	a	majority	of	the	adult	male	population	of	Florence	could,	potentially	at	least,	participate	in	decisive	moments	of	social	conflict.	Without	discounting	the	weight	of	normative	political	processes	and	the	officially	legitimized	21	guilds,	it	seems	erroneous	to	discount	this	mass	of	semi-organized,	or	potentially	organizeable	labor.		I	have	proposed	a	broadening	of	the	Florentine	popolo	minuto	to	include	not	only	the	membership	of	the	middle	and	minor	guilds,	but	the	majority	of	Florence’s	skilled	and	unskilled	workers.	Their	potential	for	collective	action	was	based	on	shared	labor,	a	desire	to	defend	themselves	and	their	families	in	times	of	social																																																									
84 Najemy, History of Florence, 43-44. 
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conflict,	and	a	shared	fear	of	the	magnates.	Under	Giano	Della	Bella,	they	would	find	a	leader	capable	of	temporarily	hijacking	the	popular	movement	and	its	decision-making	process	from	the	grassi,	and	their	apathy	in	the	face	of	the	elite	revival	of	the	later	1290s	would	leave	Florence’s	second	popular	regime	suspended	in	the	air,	bereft	of	an	active	social	base	willing	to	defend	it.			 The	ability	of	the	minuti	to	intervene	(or	their	decision	not	to)	should	not	obscure	their	position’s		structural	weaknesses.	The	artisans,	shopkeepers,	craftsmen	and	unskilled	laborers	of	the	popolo	minuto	were	local	actors,	typically	incapable	of	independent	action	beyond	the	city	level	and	then	only	briefly.	Buoyed	along	by	the	thirteenth-century	economic	boom	like	their	superiors,	their	economic	horizons	were	limited	to	the	local,	regional	and	sub-regional	trade.	This	in	turn	meant	that	they	lacked	the	liquid	capital	which	provided	strategic	flexibility	to	wealthier	families,	popular	or	not;	thus	when	the	minuti	squared	off	against	the	wealthier	elements	of	the	popolo,	they	possessed	a	temporary,	tactical	advantage	in	their	ability	to	rapidly	mobilize	broad	segments	of	the	population,	but	were	in	the	strategically	disadvantageous	position	of	being	unable	to	draw	on	the	wide-ranging	networks	and	assets	of	their	foes,	who	usually	regained	the	strategic	initiative	with	ease.		 The	Florentine	church,	in	all	its	various	forms,	must	be	included	in	any	account	of	the	popolo.	While	the	Florentine	episcopal	office	and	its	rights	were	a	lucrative	resource	for	the	Florentine	elite,	other	ecclesiastical	formations	played	a	more	ambiguous	role	in	the	1290s.	The	mendicant	orders	especially	occupied	a	crucial	position	in	urban	politics.	Simultaneously	foreign	to	and	deeply	embedded	
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within	the	communes’	fabric	and	urban	society,	the	Dominicans	and	Franciscans	played	an	important	role	in	communal	politics.	The	commune	employed	the	mendicants	as	treasury	officials	because	of	their	assumed	impartiality,	yet	mendicant	foundations	were	hardly	free	of	aristocratic	influence.	85	The	Franciscans	of	S.	Croce	behaved	so	badly	during	the	first	decade	of	the	fourteenth	century	that	Ubertino	da	Casale	singled	them	out	for	particular	opprobrium	in	a	letter	to	pope	Clement	V.86	In	the	Franciscan	foundation	of	S.	Croce,	the	scions	of	magnate	families	such	as	the	Agli	lived	in	relative	comfort,	untroubled	by	the	Rule	of	S.	Francis.	Sylvain	Piron’s	careful	study	of	S.	Croce	undermines	the	assumption	that	the	Florentine	mendicants	would	have	naturally	sided	with	the	
popolo.	Yet	wealthy	families	of	the	popolo	were	also	represented	among	the	mendicants	at	Florence,	Remigio	dei	Girolami	being	the	most	famous	example.	The	Spiritual	Franciscans,	however-the	most	vocal	critics	of	such	mendicant	laxity-maintained	a	phantasmic	presence	in	later	medieval	Florence,	emerging	in	times	of	trouble	such	as	the	War	of	the	Eight	Saints	to	lead	the	popolo.		These		ambiguities	within	the	mendicant	organization	and	vis-à-vis	the	mendicants	and	the	wider	community	also	characterized	the	Franciscans’	brethren,	the	Dominicans,	and	their	behavior	during	the	1290s.	Remigio	preached	before	the	Priorate	in	1295,	and	it	was	the	Dominicans	who	prevented	the	popolo	from	taking																																																									
85 On the mendicants in communal government, see the conference volume 
Churchmen and urban government in late medieval Italy, c. 1200-c. 1450, cases and 
contexts, eds. F. Andrews & M.A. Pincelli (Cambridge, 2014), and Augustine Thompson, 
Cities of God: the religion of the Italian communes, 1125-1300 (College Park, PA, 2006). 
86 Sylvain Piron, “Un couvent sous influence. Santa Croce autour de 1300”, dans 
Nicole Bériou, Jacques Chiffoleau (éds.), Économie et religion. L’expérience des ordres 
mendiants (XIIIe-XVe siècle) (Lyon, 2009), 321-355, at 323-324, for Ubertino. I thank 
Sharon A. Farmer for sharing this reference. 
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punitive	vengeance	on	the	magnates	following	their	revolt	of	July	1295.	The	mendicants	were	an	important	potential	force	in	urban	politics,	whose	decisions	were	conditioned	as	much	by	family	ties	as	by	the	dictates	of	their	order.	If	the	mendicants	possessed	one	overriding	strategic	aim	at	Florence,	it	would	likely	have	been	the	simple	pacification	of	the	city,	on	any	terms.	As	it	happened,	such	a	pacification	would	be	carried	out	by	the	popolani	grassi,	not	the	popolo	minuto,	as	the	events	of	July	1295	reveal.	It	would	be	the	the	mendicants,	above	all	Remigio	dei	Girolami,	who	granted	legitimacy	the	popolo’s	leadership.	Florentine	civic	and	popular	identity	was	a	recent	construction	even	in	the	thirteenth	century.	As	the	later	medieval	economic	boom	reached	its	peak	in	the	late	Duecento,	the	humbler	part	of	the	Florentine	popolo	lacked	the	experience	in	taking	and	using	institutionalized	political	power	that,	for	example,	the	Bolognese	popolo	possesed,	having	controlled	the	commune	since1228.	In	the	1290s,	the	Florentine	
minuti	had	to	rapidly	achieve	their	goals	or	fail.	This	process	can	be	seen	above	all	in	the	years	of	Giano	Della	Bella’s	leadership	of	the	popular	party.	Della	Bella	himself	exemplifies	the	limitations	of	the	Florentine	popolo:	the	minuti	were	perfectly	willing	to	follow	a	scion	of	the	old	aristocracy,	an	unusual,	and	unusually	radical	one,	to	be	sure,	but	still	part	of	the	old	elite.87	That	a	deracinated	member	of	the	old	elite	would	emerge	as	the	most	radical	popular	leader	until	those	of	the	Ciompi	speaks	to																																																									
87 For a comparison with popular signorie elsewhere, see Alma Poloni’s 
illuminating discussion in Potere al popolo, 51-58, and Riccardo Rao, Signori di Popolo. 
Signoria cittadina e società comunale nell’Italia nord-occidentale, 1275-1350. (Milan, 
2012). John Koenig, Il ‘popolo’ dell’Italia del nord nel XIII (Bologna, 1986), and 
especially John Grundman, The Popolo at Perugia, 1139-1309 (Perugia, 1992), are 
important studies of popular movements elsewhere in the north-central peninsula. Pierre 
Racine, “Le ‘popolo’: groupe social ou group de pression?” Nuova Rivista Storica 73 
(1989): 133-50, is a rather nasty attack on Koenig’s arguments. 
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the	paradoxical	and	contradictory	position	of	the	minuti.	This	was	a	group	caught	between	the	clientelar	networks	of	the	elite	and	the	associative	life	of	their	workplaces	and	social	networks,	which	gave	them	the	capacity	for	collective	action.		
 The Ordinances of Justice: First Redaction (January 1293) 
The three-way struggle between magnates and the two elements of the popolo for 
political resources and phsyical control of the city produced the Ordinances of Justice, a 
crucial document in Florence’s political development.88 The first version of the 
Ordinances was promulgated on January 18 1293 by the priors who took office on 
December 15 1292, working with three jurists.89 These priors hailed from established 
guild families with a long history of involvement in the commune’s political life: they are 
clear representatives of what I have called the city’s third-level elite, the popolani grassi. 
As Silvia Diacciati has observed, they were anything but revolutionary.90  
This first edition of the Ordinances in many ways confirmed and codified 
processes already in effect, most importantly, the guilds’ centrality to Florentine 
politics.91 Despite its economic, political, and cultural efflorescence, the Florentines still 
did not possess a body of civic statutes, and would not until 1322-1325: the Ordinances 																																																								
88 The following account of the politics surrounding the priorate is largely based 
on Najemy, Corporatism, 44-63, and Salvemini, Magnati, 138-85. 
89 Diacciati, Popolani, 368, and La legislazione antimagnatizia, xxvi; Stefani, 
197, 70-71, lists the priors who drafted the Ordinances. 
90 Diacciati, Popolani, 368: “La commissione incaricata della stesura degli 
Ordinamenti….non può essere certo considerata ‘rivoluzionaria.’” The priors were: Pela 
Gualducci, Maso di Lamberto dell’Antella, Messer Palmieri di messer Ugo Altoviti, 
Monpuccio di Chiaro Girolami, Lapo Pratesi, and Gaddo di Forese Falconieri (Najemy, 
Corporatism, 44, ftnt. 1). For the background of these priors, see Nicolai Ottokar, Il 
comune di Firene alla fine del Dugento (Turin, 1962 [1926]). 
91 Salvemini, Magnati, 138-39, and Silvia Diacciati, introduction to La 
legislazione, xii-xii, both note the frequent elision of differences between the January and 
April 1293 redactions of the Ordinances, citing the chroniclers Dino Compagni, pseudo-
Brunetto Latini, and Giovanni Villani.  
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of Justice are thus significant as the first coherent body of legislation by the Florentine 
commune. Since Gaetano Salvemini’s classic study (1899), Florentinists have focused on 
the procedures laid out in the Ordinances for participation in Florentine politics, and their 
implications for turnover in the Florentine ruling class.92  
The political lexicion of the Ordinances is as significant as the electoral and 
institutional procedures they outlined. The original, official copy of the Ordinances does 
not survive, and the earliest copy lacks the famous Roman-law definition of iustitia found 
in all subsequent redactions and copies of the Ordinances.93 They did not dramatically 
change, however, from the January 18 1293 edition to that of July 6 1295, with the 
exception of the rubrics inserted by Giano Della Bella.94 Here the priors and jurists fully 
expressed the Florentine popular party’s discourse on good government, centered on the 
language of justice and peace, and anchored in the commune’s institutions as exercising 
just order. The term “ordinances” had particular resonance in communal law, 
distinguishing them from statutes. Whereas statutes became part of the municipal 
constitution until explicitly annulled, an ordinance was binding for a limited time, 
typically a year.95 A series of ordinances, however, often remained in force much longer. 
																																																								
92 Najemy, Corporatism, remains the best study of the topic.  
93 Diacciti, La legislazione antimagnatizia, xxvii, and Salvemini, Magnati e 
popolani, 140-41. 
94 I use the edition of the July 6 1295 Ordinances in La legislazione 
antimagnatizia (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Fondo Nazionale, II, 1, 153). The second 
paragraph of the introduction also appears in the fourteenth-century manuscript copy of 
ordinances and statutes preserved in Florence’s Archivio di Stato: ASF, Statuti del 
comune di Firenze [hereafter SCF], 3.3r.  
95 Salvemini, Magnati, 142. 
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The Ordinances of Justice were thus a crucial part of the Florentine constitution and, 
originally, a juridical exception overriding and absorbing the rule.96  
It is tempting to dismiss the language of justice, concord, and peace found in the 
Ordinances’ introduction as political catchwords, simply justifying or hiding the real 
interests of the popular party as it seized control of the commune and set about altering 
the bases of political power in Florence. Most twentieth-century scholarship on the Italian 
communes took this line of interpretation.97 This attributes to the Florentine popolo 
minuto an unthinking, almost herdlike mentality that it definitely lacked, and to the 
popolo grasso a conspiratorial grand strategy that it probably lacked. This was not a 
Leninist vanguard party, but a heterogeneous group whose political unity lay largely in its 
hostility and opposition to the old milites.98 Furthermore, as Silvia Diacciati has 
demonstrated, this language was a fundamental component of the popolo’s cultural and 
political identity long before the power struggle of the 1290s. This was true not only in 
Florence, but across north-central Italy.99 Bologna, the republic of notaries, led the way in 
the development of a language of justice and peace, with Rolandino dei Passegeri and the 
city’s notaries heading the popolo there.100 In its opening incipit and two introductory 
																																																								
96 Salvemini, Magnati, 142: “”…ma non di rado a una serie di Ordinamenti si dà 
fin da principio una validità definitiva….”  
97 See Philip Jones, The Italian city-state: From commune to signoria (Oxford, 
1997), 496-502, for this view. 
98 I echo here Sara Ahmed’s comments in “Affective Economies,” Social Text 
79:22:2 (2004), 118: “Together we hate, and this hate is what makes us together.” 
99 For popular culture in communal Italy, see Diacciati, Popolani, 309-29. 
100 For Bologna the definitive study is Blanshei, Justice and politics. See also 
Massimo Giansante, “Uomini e angeli. Gerarchie angeliche e modelli di potere nel 
Duecento,” Nuova Rivista Storica 81 (1997): 349-72; Sara Menzinger, Giuristi e politica 
nei comuni di popolo: Siena, Perugia e Bologna, tre governi a confronto (Rome, 2006), 
and Antonio Ivan Pini, “Magnati e popolani a Bologna nella seconda metà del XIII 
secolo,” in Magnati e popolani nell’Italia comunale (Pistoia, 1997), 371-96, and Brian R. 
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clauses, the Ordinances lay out the foundations of guild rule and the popular party’s 
approach to politics. Roman law legal terminology, Guelf orthodoxy, and the twin virtues 
of pax and concordia were central to the Florentine popolo’s political culture. The 
introduction of the January 1293 Ordinances bear detailed scrutiny before moving on to 
their role in the tumultuous period between January 18 1293 and the magnate revolt of 
July 5 1295. 
The Roman legal inheritence was an important influence on the communes’ 
institutions, and on popular ideology at Florence, as elsewhere.101 Florence and Bologna 
were major centers for cultural expressions of popular ideology, and due to the weight of 
Dante, Brunetto Latini, and Dino Compagni in the scholarship, Florence has traditionally 
been taken, mistakenly, as a sort of ideal-type of a popular commune.102 Latini’s 
Ciceronian conceptualization of the role of justice in politics exemplified this ideology, 
standing in stark contrast to the milites’ ethos of honor and amoral familism.103 The 
Ordinances’ incipit opens with a clear reference to Roman law and Justinian’s Corpus 
iuris civilis, defining iustitia as “the constant and perpetual desire [of] allotting to each 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Carniello, “The rise of an administrative elite in Bologna: Notaries and popular 
government, 1282-1292.” Journal of Medieval History 28 (2002): 319-347. 
101 For Roman law and its reception in the early communes, see Wickham, Courts 
and conflict (Oxford, 2003), in particular 108-67. 
102 Enrico Artifoni, “Corporazioni e società di ‘popolo’: un problema della 
politica comunale nel secolo XIII” in Itinerarium. Università, corporazioni e mutualismo 
ottocentesco: fonti e percorsi sotrici. Atti del convegno di studi di Gubbio, 12-14 gennaio 
1990, ed. E. Menestò and G. Pellegrini (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull’Alto 
Medioevo, 1994), 17-40, is the best study of this assumption; see also Massimo 
Giansante, “Ancora magnati e popolani: Riflessioni in margine a Politics and Justice di 
Sarah R. Blanshei.” Archivio Storico Italiano 637: III (2013): 543-70, at 550-52. 
103 On Latini’s career, see Najemy, “Brunetto Latini’s Politica,” in Dante Studies 
112 (1994): 33-51, and Diacciati, Popolani, 309-11. Edward C. Banfield developed the 
concept of amoral familism in his controversial The moral basis of a backward society, 
with Laura Fasano Banfield (New York, 1978 [1958]). 
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one his right; therefore the below-written ordinances are deservedly being pronounced ‘of 
justice,’ having been promulgated for the utility of the res publica.”104 Salvemini long 
ago noted the importance of iustitia in the ideological and cultural struggle between 
magnates and the popolo.105 Silvia Diacciati, echoing Carol Lansing, has argued that this 
cultural preoccupation was tied to the development of a more active conception of justice, 
which in the thirteenth century “acquires ever more the right to autonomously persecute 
and punish crimes in order to defend itself, law and public peace.”106 Massimo Vallerani 
has clearly demonstrated the development of this “ideology of the penalty” in Alberto 
Gandino’s Tractatus de maleficiis (1287-1301).107 This was more an ideal than reality, as 
Vallerani has himself shown, but enforcement was a different matter than the text of the 
law itself.108  
This reconceptualization of justice is evident in the rubrics of the Ordinances, 
which charge the Capitano del Popolo, Standardbearer of Justice and the Podestà with 
																																																								
104 Salvemini [1899], 384: “Quoniam iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius 
suum unicuique tribuens; ideo infrascripta que merito Iustitie ordinamenta appellantur 
pro reipublice utilitate edita sunt.” Cardini does not reproduce the incipit in his edition of 
the 1293 Ordinances. 
105 Salvemini, Magnati, 142: “…noi abbiamo veduto come la parola ‘giustizia’ 
risuoni piuttosto spesso nelle lotte fra i partiti dei nostri Comuni.” 
106 Diacciati, Popolani, 311: “Negli ultimi decenni del Duecento la giustizia, dalla 
natura in parte ancora negoziale e arbitrale, acquisce sempre più il diritto di perseguire 
autonomamente e punire i delitti per tutelare se stessa, le leggi e la pace pubblica.” 
Lansing, Florentine magnates, 206-07, makes substantially the same point. For 
Bolognese analogues, see Sarah Blanshei, “Criminal law and politics in medieval 
Bologna,” Criminal Justice History 2 (1981): 1-30. 
107 Massimo Vallerani, Medieval public justice, trans. Sarah Rubin Blanshei 
(Washington, D.C., 2012) [hereafter “Vallerani, Medieval public justice”], in particular 
65-67. 
108 Dameron, “Magnati,” 185. For thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century 
developments in judicial process and their relationship to politics, see Massimo Vallerani, 
“The inquisitorial trial in the political struggles in Bologna between the Duecento and 
Trecento,” in Medieval public justice, 272-305. 
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actively and aggressively prosecuting criminals. Rubric nine of the January 1293 
Ordinances, for example, made provisions for spies and secret denouncers to report 
magnate crimes to the Podestà, who was to have “free judgment for the sake of inquiring, 
investigating and examining” these crimes; the equation between investigation 
(inquirere) and punishment (punire), a hallmark of the inquisitorial procedure, is also 
stated clearly. If the podestà did not investigate malleficia and punish the lawbreakers, 
according to the period of days allowed by the Ordinances, he was to be deposed.109 The 
Ordinances’ incipit appealed to a well-known conceptual and cultural lexicon, justifying 
the extension of the popolo’s power, in part through offices such as the Capitano del 
Popolo, and the curtailment of the magnates’ power. 
The second paragraph of the Ordinances demonstrates the centrality of Catholic 
orthodoxy and political theology to the commune and Florentine public life.110 Recent 
scholarship has significantly contributed to our understanding of the communes’ political 
theology, and the importance of religious ritual and institutions in the city-states.111 
																																																								
109 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 22: “Et in predictis omnibus et singulis 
dominus potestas habeat liberum arbitrium inquirendi et investigandi et cognoscendi, et 
teneatur et debeat ipsa malleficia et quodlibet eorum investigare et condempnare contra 
facientes, ut dictum est, infra quintam diem post co(m)missum malleficium et postquam 
denuntiatum ei fuerit vel ad eius notitiam pervenerit, scilicet malleficia mortis et vulneris 
in vultu et debilitationis membri; quod si non faceret, cadat et privatus sit a regimine sue 
podesterie.” 
110 On the tendency in older scholarship to ignore the political theology of the 
communes, see Dameron, Episcopal lordship and florentine society, 4-7. A major 
exception has been C. M. De La Roncière’s scholarship on Florentine and rural Tuscan 
religion: see the essay collection Religion paysanne et religion urbaine en Toscane (c. 
1250-c. 1450) (Aldershot, 1994).  
111 There is a wide literature on the lived religion of the Italian communes. See 
most recently: Mary Doyno, “Urban religious life in the Italian communes: the state of 
the field” History Compass 9:9 (September 2011), 720-30, for the historiography; the 
essay collection Churchmen and urban government in late medieval Italy, c. 1200-c. 
1450, cases and contexts, eds. Frances Andrews & Maria Agata Pincelli (Cambridge, 
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George W. Dameron has convincingly argued that the commune saw itself as a chosen 
instrument of God’s earthly designs.112 This complemented a central feature of iustitia in 
communal life: its dual capacity as a distributive balance, and the goal towards which 
earthly government was, theoretically, directed.113 During the thirteenth century, Florence 
seems to have been a center for Italian Catharism; the Dominican inquisition of 1244-45 
indicted members of several elite lineages, such as the Pulci and Baroni.114After the 1267 
expulsion of the Ghibellines, Catharism faded out and the Florentine Guelfs eagerly 
utilized orthodox religious traditions to assert their legitimacy and ties to the papal-
Angevin alliance.115 This popular political theology crystallizes in the paragraph 
following the incipit, which invokes Christ, the Virgin Mary, John the Baptist, and 
Florence’s dual patron saints, Reparata and Zenobius, “under whose name and patronage 
the Florentine city is governed,” in addition to God’s other saints, male and female.116  
																																																																																																																																																																					
2014); Frances Andrews, The early Humiliati (Cambridge, 2006); Augustine Thompson, 
Cities of God: the religion of the Italian communes, 1125-1300 (College Park, PA., 
2006), and Katherine L. Jansen, The making of the Magdalen: preaching and popular 
devotion in the later Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ, 2001). 
112 Dameron, Florence and its church in the age of Dante (Philadelphia, 2005), 
217. See also the thematic issue of Annali di Storia di Firenze 8 (2013), Il cristianesimo 
fiorentino. Tradizioni e peculiarità di una storia secolare, eds. Pietro Domenico 
Giovannoni, Maria Pia Paoli, Lorenzo Tanzini, available online at: 
http://www.fupress.net/index.php/asf/issue/archive. 
113 Lantschner, Logic, 33.  
114 For Florentine Catharism, see Carol Lansing, Power and purity: Cathar heresy 
in medieval Italy (Oxford, 1998), 71-75. 
115 Lansing, Power and purity, 76. 
116 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 57: “Ad honorem, laudem et reverentiam 
domini nostri Iesu Christi, et beatissime Virginis Marie matris sue, et beati Iohannis 
Battiste, et sancte Reparate, et beati Zenobii, sub quorum vocabulo et patrocinio 
florentina Civitas gubernatur; et aliorum Sanctorum et Sanctarum Dei….” 
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Having listed the commune’s rectors, this second paragraph invokes the 
conceptual apparatus of the guild government and the popular party. The Ordinances 
were being promulgated 
“for the true and perpetual concord and union, preservation and growth of the 
peaceful and tranquil condition of the Guildsmen and Guilds, and of the entire popolo, 
and furthermore of the entire Commune and civitas and district of Florence.”117 
 
Coupling Catholic orthodoxy and veneration of Florence’s patron saints with the popular 
party’s rectors and regime, this paragraph is a masterpiece of political rhetoric, presenting 
an ideal as reality.118 In a deft rhetorical move, the incipit lumps any opponents of the 
present regime in with Ghibellines and heretics, placing them beyond the pale of 
Florentine politics. The Ordinances’ opening thus effectively circumscribed the realm of 
acceptable political discourse in Florence. This inclusive exclusion continues as the 
notary, Bonsignor, declares that the priors and popular rectors were acting “on behalf of 
indispensible reason and the evident utility of the res publica, and for the observation of 
true Justice.”119 This underlined the function that Carol Lansing has identified for 
thirteenth-century Orvieto’s sumptuary laws and statutes against public displays of grief: 
the Ordinances’ description of the commune and its leadership was a representation of 
																																																								
117 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 5: “…nec non ad veram et perpetuam 
concordiam et unionem, conservationem et augmentum pacifici et tranquili status 
Artificum et Artium, et omnium popularium, et etiam totius Communis et civitatis et 
districtus Florentie.” 
118 See Dameron, Florence and its church, 224-6, for the role of patron saints’ 
cults in communal ideology. 
119 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 57. The full clause is: “et pro necessaria causa 
et utilitate rei publice evidenti, nec non pro vere Iustitie observatione, sub felici nomine 
provisa, edita et firmata; sub annis salutifere incarnationis domini nostri Iesu Christi 
millesimo ducentesimo nonagesimo secundo, indictione sexta, die decimo ottavo intrante 
mense ianuarii.” 
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good order.120 The sequence of collectives the Ordinances encompassed may be read as a 
hint at the emerging social and political hierarchy under the popolani grassi. The guilds 
(Arti) and their members were at the top, ruling the republic. Next came the popolo, in 
both senses, as a class and action group, followed by the commune as a public power. 
The commune was followed by the city in its episcopal-Roman formulation (civitas), and, 
last and least, the Florentine district-referring here presumably to the contado and 
distretto.121  
 The introduction of the Ordinances remained unchanged through the various 
redactions of 1293 and 1295, and summed up the popolo’s self-conception. The 
introduction to the Ordinances of Justice expressed a view of good government and 
correct order, using a vocabulary that was a familiar part of popular political discourse. 
Mendicant preaching, especially that of the Dominicans, played a major role in 
championing civic peace as a goal of civic government.122 This religious ideal gradually 
inserted itself into judicial thought, as the judge came to be seen as the official who 
applied laws, whose goal was civic peace.123 Pacification was the central concern of 
Cardinal Latino’s 1281 mediation between Florence’s Guelfs and Ghibellines, which 
																																																								
120 Lansing, Passion and order. The restraint of grief in the medieval Italian 
communes (Ithaca, 2007), at 37-41, for communal statutes and the social order. 
121On the civitas, see Philip Jones, The Italian city-state. From commune to 
signoria. Oxford, 1997), 55-67, and “Civitas sibi princeps,” 335-58. See also Niall 
Atkinson, ““The republic of sound. Listening to Florence at the threshold of the 
Renaissance.” I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance 16:1/2 (2013), 57-84, at 59-62, 
for the distinction between the city as a physical space and a collective. 
122 See Giulia Barone, “L’ordine dei predicatori e le città. Teologia e politica nel 
pensiero e nell’azione dei predicatori,” in Mélanges de l’Ecole français de Rome, Temps 
modernes T. 89 2 (1977): 609-18, and Lesnick, Preaching, 108-09. 
123 Diacciati, Popolani, 325. 
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called for a peace of the parties.124 Brunetto Latini’s thinking on justice further adopted 
and modified this Christian ideal under the influence of classical thought.  
Specific phrases had become popular rallying cries by the time they found their 
way into the Ordinances. The locutions pro bono pacis et concordie and its Tuscan 
variant, pacifico stato della città, link the Ordinances to the broader development of the 
popolo in central Italy: Diacciati has traced it to Perugian documents of 1201.125 It first 
appears at Florence in a 1282 arbitration agreement between two members of the elite 
Cavalcanti lineage and one Loste del fu Amadore di Gualterotto.126 From 1284-85, the 
Capitano del Popolo was charged with preserving the “pacificus et tranquillus status 
civitatis Florentie.”127 The phrase was also typically invoked in peace pacts between 
people of all ranks, as Katherine L. Jansen’s recent work has shown.128 
How widespread were these understandings of justice, peace, and concord? They 
were transmitted to the urban and rural masses in part through texts. Italy in general was 
an unusually literate place in the Middle Ages, and Florence and its territories were 
abnormally literate even for medieval Italy. Florence in 1338 may have had an urban 
schooling rate for both genders of 67 to 83 percent.129  The visual arts also played an 
important role in disseminating popular ideology. Maria Monica Donato has recently 
argued that Ambrogio Lorenzetti consciously modelled his famous Allegoria del Buon 																																																								
124 Salvemini [1899], 322: “…super concordia et pace partium predictarum 
presentem sententiam ferimus….” 
125 Diacciati, Popolani, 330.  
126 NA, 11250, c. 69r, 16 February 1282 (cited in Diacciati, Popolani, 329).  
127Zorzi, “I rettori,” 573, quoting PR, 1, cc. 12r-16v (15 January 1284/85): “ita et 
taliter quod pacificus et tranquillus status civitatis Florentine conservetur.” 
128 Katherine L. Jansen, “Pro bono pacis. Crime and Dispute Resolution in Late 
Medieval Florence: the Evidence of Notarial Peace Contracts,” Speculum 88.2 (April 
2013): 427-56. 
129 Paul Grendler, Schooling in renaissance Florence  (Baltimore, 1989), 72. 
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Governo on the frescoes, now lost, that Giotto painted for the Florentine Palazzo del 
Popolo in 1328.130 Giotto’s frescoes, in turn, parallel Remigio dei Girolami’s treatises on 
justice and concord. Silvia Diacciati has argued based on these connections that visual art 
served to publicize and explain the popolo’s conception of Iustitia outlined above, 
thereby transcending literate, elite circles to be received by a “quite vast public.”131 
Failures to live according to the commune’s buon governo were represented visually, as 
well. The Palazzo del Podestà (now the Bargello) and other public buildings displayed 
the consequences of crime, and the famous pictures of shame (pitture infamanti) 
depicting fraudulent merchants and debtors publicly ridiculed and shamed those who 
dishonored themselves with deceit and fraud.132 This deceitful behavior contrasted with 
the commune’s ideal citizen, an ideal which had emerged in popular discourse by the 
later thirteenth century. This ideal citizen lived from his own labor (de suo labore), was a 
member of a guild or corporative association(s), was an orthodox Catholic, avoided vices 
such as gambling, and forsook the vendetta; all of this contrasted directly with the 
lifestyle of the magnates.133 As Giuliano Milani and Massimo Vallerani have shown, 
																																																								
130 M.M. Donato, “Dal comune rubato di Giotto al Comune sovrano di Ambrogio 
Lorenzetti (con una proposta per la ‘canzone’ del Buon Governo’),” in Medioevo: 
Immagini e ideologie, ed. A. C. Quintavalle (Milan. 2005), 489-509 , also cited in 
Diacciati, Popolani, 323. Diacciati also (Popolani, 328) draws attention to a Paduan 
fresco painted by Giotto in the 1290s.   
131 Diacciati, Popolani, 326: “Non si trattava, quindi, di dottrine destinate a 
rimanere all’interno di esclusivi circoli di sapienti e letterati, ma di idee che non solo 
dovevano circolare abbondantemente nell’ambiente comunale, ma che altrettanto 
copiosamente venivano recepite da un pubblico molto vasto.” 
132 On the visual aspects of infamia, see above all Gherardo Ortalli, La pittura 
infamanate nei secoli XIII-XVI (Rome, 1979); “Icons of justice.” Past & Present 89 
(Nov., 1980): 23-38; and Edgerton, Pictures and punishment: Art and criminal 
prosecution during the Florentine Renaissance (Ithaca, 1984). 
133 Vallerani, “Procedure and justice” in Medieval public justice, 69; see also 
Andrea Zorzi, “Battagliole e giochi d’azzardo a Firenze nel tardo Medioevo: due pratiche 
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judicial guarantees and penalties were closely pegged to a citizen’s failure or success in 
living up to this standard.134 Judicial penalties, such as executions, also functioned as 
staging grounds to reaffirm the wronged social order. The rhetoric of buon governo and a 
social order founded on justice and obediance of the laws was not a one-way imposition 
from above. Public processionals in particular could turn into sites where the popolo 
contested or overturned this performance of right order.135 The 1299 trial and execution 
in Bologna of the pursemaker Bompietro, a suspected Cathar heretic, famously turned 
into a riot because the Bolognese popolo stridently disagreed with the Dominican 
inquisitors’ condemnation. Bompietro was a good man (bonus homo; omo bono) of the 
commune, not a malefactor or anti-social nobleman.136  
																																																																																																																																																																					
sociali tra disciplinamento e repressione” in Gioco e giustizia nell’Italia di comune, ed. 
Gherardo Ortalli (Treviso, 1993), 71-107. On forsaking the vendetta, see Carol Lansing’s 
reading of Albertano da Brescia’s treatises, urging restraint and forebearance: Lansing, 
Passion and order, 159-71. 
134 Vallerani, “Procedure and justice”; Milani, L’esclusione dal comune. Conflitti 
e bandi politici a Bologna e in altre città italiane tra XII e XIV secolo (Rome, 2003). 
135 There is a vast literature on the politics and semiology of ritual in history; a 
useful starting point for historians is Late medieval and early modern ritual. Studies in 
Italian urban culture, eds. Samuel Cohn, Jr., Marcello Fantoni, Franco Franceschi, and 
Fabrizio Ricciardelli (Turnhout, BE., 2013), with a useful introduction; on penal rituals in 
the later communes, see Andrea Zorzi, “Le esecuzioni delle condanne a morte a Firenze 
nel tardo medioevo: tra repressione penale e cerimoniale pubblico”, in Simbolo e realtà 
della vita urbana nel tardo medioevo: Atti del V convegno storico italo-canadese, 
Viterbo, 11-15 maggio 1988, eds. Massimo Miglio & Giuseppe Lombardi (Viterbo, 
1990), 153-253, and “Rituali di violenza, cerimoniali penali, rappresentazioni della 
giustizia nelle città italiane centro-settentrionali (secoli XIII-XV), in Le forme della 
propaganda politica nel Due e nel Trecento), ed. P. Cammarosano (Rome, 1994), 395-
425. 
136 Lorenzo Paolini and Raniero Oriolo have edited the relevant documents for the 
1299 inquisition and trial: Acta S. officii Bononie ab Anno 1291 usque ad Annum 1310, 2 
vols. (Rome, 1982). On Catharism in Duecento Bologna, see Lorenzo Paolini, L’Eresia a 
Bologna fra XIII e XIV Secolo I: L’Eresia catara alla fine del duecento (Rome, 1975) and 
“Domus e zona degli eretici: l’esempio di Bologna nel XIII secolo,” Revista di storia 
della chiesa in Italia 35 (1981): 371-87. 
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 Recent scholarship has demonstrated the broad appeal of this complex and 
multifaceted popular rhetoric, without allowing for how different groups could interpret 
and refashion it for their own ends. Giano Della Bella’s actions have recently been 
characterized as “excesses,” the politics of the Florentine popolo minuto as “vindictive”. 
This seems to accept the contemporary assumption that the lower orders were 
substantially unfit to govern, thereby simply elaborating on our sources’ ideologically 
charged view of the situation.137 To dismiss the activities of Giano Della Bella and his 
supporters as vindictive or irresponsible is to miss an important part of the popolo’s 
rhetoric, and its appeal. For the laborers of Florence, true peace and concord was only 
possible if the magnates were entirely excluded from office, as the April 1293 redaction 
did. The minor guildsmen and minuti were responding to years of provocation and 
oppression.138 This was not irresponsibility or (simply) vengeance, but rather the popolo 
minuto’s logical reaction to a fluid situation that finally gave them a chance to check their 
enemies, the magnates, while improving their position vis-à-vis the grassi.139 
An exclusive focus on the intellectual and political elite of the Florentine popolo 
effectively negates the importance of Silvia Diacciati’s point, that the popolo’s discourse 
was not restricted to this literate elite. This point stands even if Della Bella and other 
popular leaders hailed from this same elite. The need of the grassi for popular support 
forced them into an overdependence on the popolo minuto, temporarily giving the lower 																																																								
137 The quotes are from Diacciati, Popolani, 372-73; on ideology and source 
analysis, see Pozo, “Mechanisms,” 227.  
138 Salvemini, Magnati, 163: “Questo Popolo minuto, che dispone per la prima 
volta del potere politico dopo anni e anni di oppressioni e patimenti, non ha tempo di 
badare a scrupoli giuridici: egli odia i Grandi e vuol ridurli al nulla, convinto di averne il 
diritto e di essere dalla parte dela giustizia….” 
139 See Lantschner, Logic, 29-39, for medieval urban rebels’ use of the same 
discourses on liberty and justice as official institutions. 
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ranks of the popolo access to political power in 1293-1295.140 In what follows I largely 
follow Salvemini’s reading of the events of 1293-95, the biennial period in which Giano 
Della Bella dominated the politics of the Florentine commune. I differ, however, in 
focusing on the shared ideological lexicon tying together the popolo grasso and the 
popolo minuto. Overemphasizing the strife between the grassi and the grandi, Salvemini 
overlooked the importance of this ideology, and its dynamic role in the fissures between 
the two wings of the popolo. The rhetoric that crystallized in the Ordinances’ incipit 
established the position of the popolo’s leadership, and was appropriated by the radicals 
in the April 1293 redaction.   
Yet during the winter and spring of 1295 the balance of power shifted back to the 
older popular elite, the third level of the hierarchy sketched above. Remigio’s sermons 
before the Priorate make this clear, invoking the biblical and Aristotelian language of 
popular discourse to justify the expulsion of Giano; the supremacy of law; and a 
rapproachment between the popolani grassi and the magnates in July. Salvemini was 
correct in identifying the 1290s as a particularly sharp point in the class struggle at 
Florence. Yet his overdetermined understanding of class struggle as a conflict between a 
feudal class of grandi and the bourgeois popolo grasso led him to downplay the 
importance of rifts within the popolo, and the ambiguous, polyvalent nature of a shared 
ideology that remained in spite of intraclass tension. Ever since, scholars have mainly 
preoccupied themselves with disproving Salvemini’s argument for a new, bourgeois class 
replacing an older, feudal class in the Florentine power structure.  
																																																								
140 Salvemini, Magnati, 160: “La lotta inacerbitasi obbligò necessariamente il 
Popolo grasso ad appogiarsi ancora di piú al Popolo minuto....”  
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Figure 4: Giano della Bella with the Standard of Justice, 
from a fourteenth-century illuminated manuscript copy of Giovanni Villani’s Cronica. 
 
Giano Della Bella and the Radical Phase of Florence’s Second Popular Regime 
(February 1293-March 1295) 
“Questa manifestazione: merda. Il futuro: merda.  Voglio solo la mia vendetta.” 
-Banner at an anti-austerity protest, Florence, 2013 
 Giano Della Bella is one of the strongest personalities to emerge from Florentine 
chronicles of the late Duecento and early Trecento, along with Corso Donati. The two are 
a pair of matched opposites in Compagni.141 The Della Bella were a second-level elite 
family of the consular age, attested from the late tweflth century and appearing in 
Paradiso XVI as one of the families in Cacciaguida’s exalted, mid-twelfth century 
Florence.142 The lineage appears in the Liber extimationum, drawn up following the 
Guelfs’ 1267 return to power, with their wealth largely coming from land.143 The Della 
																																																								
141 See Giuliano Pinto, “Della Bella, Giano” in Dizionario biografico degli 
Italiani vol. 36 (1988), online edition (http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giano-della-
bella_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/), for Giano’s life and activity. 
142 C.T. Davis, “Il buon tempo antico,” in Florentine studies: politics and society 
in renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, 1969), 45-69, for 
Cacciaguida’s lament; see Pinto, “Della Bella, Giano”, for the earliest attestations of the 
Della Bella. 
143 Najemy, History, 22. The most recent edition of the Liber extimationum is 
Liber Extimationum, ed. Olof Brattö (Göteborg,1956). 
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Bella were a rare example of a second-level elite family that had not died out or lost 
power to the guild regime. By the 1290s, most of the lineages mentioned by Cacciaguida 
were extinct or languishing in obscurity, supplanted by genti nuove such as the Cerchi.144 
Dante, who would benefit from Giano’s fall, sneered at this uomo popolare for having 
abandoned his ancient family’s knighthood and privilege (milizia e privilegio) to side 
with the popolo.145 
Compagni, discussing the abuses of the grandi following the 1289 battle of 
Campaldino, describes Giano as  
“a great and powerful citizen, wise, valiant and a good man…very bold and of a good 
family, to whom these offenses were displeasing….”146 
 
Giovanni Villani, narrating Della Bella’s fall, notes his vindictive nature and how he used 
his power in the commune to pursue a vendetta against his neighbors, the Abati.147 It is 
uncertain how far we should trust Villani, however. The chronicler, writing in the mid-
fourteenth century, was perhaps using Giano’s fate as a warning to would-be despots in 
the wake of the disastrous, later lordships  (signorie) of Charles of Calabria and Walter of 
Brienne, in the 1320s and 1340s, respectively.148 The earlier, anonymous author of the 
																																																								
144 Compagni, 1.20, describes the Cerchi, in contrast to the Donati, as “uomini di 
basso stato, ma buoni mercatanti e gran ricchi…” Villani (Cronica, 8.1) similarly 
describes Giano as “uno valente uomo, antico e nobile popolano, e ricco e possente….”  145	Dante,	Paradisio	XVI.130.	See	Catherine	Keen,	Dante	and	the	City	(Stroud:	Tempus,	2003),	at	34-35.	
146 Compagni,1.11: “Onde molti buoni cittadini popolani e mercatanti, tra quali 
fun un grande e potente cittadino (savio, valente e buono uomo, chiamato Giano della 
Bella, assai animoso e di buona stirpe, a cui dispiaceano queste ingiurie se ne fe’capo e 
guida….” 
147 Villani, 9.8: “Era presuntuoso e volea le sue vendette fare, e fecene alcuna 
contra gli Abati suoi vicini col braccio del Comune.” 
148 Villani, 9.8: “E nota che questo è grande esemplo a que’ cittadini che sono a 
venire, di guardarsi di non volere essere signori di loro cittadini né troppo presuntuosi, 
ma istare contenti a la comune cittadinanza….”  
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Cronica fiorentina traced Giano’s alignment with the popolo to a 1292 dispute with Berto 
dei Frescobaldi, although this may be an anachronistic attempt to discern personal 
motives for broader conflicts.149 It would be surprising if Della Bella and his younger 
brother, Taldo, did not pursue their familial disputes through public institutions; Corso 
Donati would do much the same as he plotted Giano’s downfall in 1295, according to the 
chronicler Marchionne Coppo di Stefano.150 It is possible that Giano’s ultimate aim was 
to become signore of Florence: Dino Compagni accused Rosso Della Tosa of the same.151 
It is probably impossible, and fruitless, to establish a hierarchy of motivations for Della 
Bella’s actions; certainly the milites-magnates were capable of acts of heroism in the 
commune’s service, while also pursuing narrowly familistic goals at the same time. 
Florence’s popolo minuto was at its height from 1293 to early 1295, expressing 
and justifying its hold on power with the same language and institutions the elite Guelf 
regime had used since the 1280s. Giano Della Bella was elected to the priorate for 
February 15-April 15 1293, although he was able to influence events before this. His 
partisans Dino Compagni and Albizzo Corbinelli were involved in the November 1292 
debates over electoral reform for the priorate, when Dino Pecora was still allied with the 
popolo minuto.152 On April 10 1293, the new redaction of the Ordinances, containing four 
																																																								
149 Cronica fiorentina compilata nel secolo XIII, in Testi fiorentini del dugento e 
dei primi del trecento, ed. Alfredo Schiaffini (Florence, 1954), 138; on the irrelevance of 
the Frescobaldi episode, see Pinto, “Della Bella, Giano.” 
150 Cronica fiorentina, 204, 72. 
151 Compagni, III.II. This Roman resemblance may have been intentional: 
Compagni, for example, compares Corso Donati to Catiline: Compagni, 2.20. 
152 Najemy, Corporatism, 37; Diacciati, Popolani, 355. 
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new rubrics and a new incipit was approved by the legislative councils and 
promulgated.153  
Whereas the January Ordinances were enacted for the peaceful state of “the entire 
people and commune and city and district of Florence,” the April redaction was made on 
behalf of the ”tranquility of the popolo and Commune of Florence.”154 Having 
momentarily wrested control of the priorate away from the popolo grasso, the radicals in 
the popolo also appropriated its language; the minuti were implicitly equating themselves 
with the commune as a whole. Perhaps it was not so outrageous. Numerically, the minor 
guildsmen and unskilled laborers certainly outnumbered the grassi and grandi. The April 
additions are significant in that they show the specific actions that the Florentine popolo 
minuto took when in power, and illuminate some of their aspirations. They can be read as 
evidence for the popolo minuto’s ability to utilize the opportunity provided by the 
willingess of the popolo grasso to mobilize the minuti to carry through their initial, fairly 
modest, version of the Ordinances.  
The first of the new rubrics banned compensatory payments to magnates for 
goods destroyed by the commune. This was done “so that the populares of the city of 
Florence may be safeguarded in their justice and tranquillity and may thrive and not be 
injured while engaged in this [i.e. making their living]”. The rubric covered houses, 
buildings, goods, and any other magnate possessions that the Standardbearer of Justice 
																																																								
153 For the new rubrics, see La legislazione antimagnatizia, 45-53. 
154 La legislaztione antimagnatizia, 46: “…et ad fortificationem et augmentum 
felicium Ordinamentorum Iustitie pro tranquillitate Populi et Comunis Florentie 
editorum.” 
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destroyed or devastated.155 The Signoria also henceforth refused to hear petitions for 
compensation from magnates. The second new rubric granted the Standardbearer of 
Justice the same privileges as the Capitano del Popolo and priors, in a partial 
identification, on a technical level, of the popolo’s leader with the priorate, in a typical 
act of addition, not substitution, of offices. 
The third rubric increased the number of footsoldiers available to the 
Standardbearer, and reveals the scale and scope of the popolo minuto’s ambition to 
control the city. The Standardbearer’s pre-existing 1,000-man militia was increased to 
2,000, with an additional 150 masters of stone and wood, and 50 piconarii fortes: 
literally, strong pick-ax men, probably sappers. A 2,000-man militia with a contingent of 
skilled sappers would have been a formidable army in urban warfare, able to build and 
destroy siegeworks and level the magnates’ tower-houses.156 The composition of this 
proposed, enlarged militia demonstrates the confederate nature of Florence’s popular 
party, built condominium-style over pre-existing-and not, necessarily, commensurate- 
neighborhood, administrative, and professional organizations. Each sesto, the 
administrative sixths into which Florence was divided before the reform of 1343, 
contributed a contigent to the popular militia. The sesti of S. Piero Scheraggio and the 
																																																								
155 La legislaztione antimagnatizia, 47: “pro bono, pacifico et tranquillo statu 
popoli et comunis Florentie facti et facte sunt et fient in futurum, ad hoc ut populares 
crescant et in ea aliquatenus non ledantur, quod quidem ad comune bonum totius civitatis 
noscitur pertinere, et ideo provisum et ordinatum est quod a comuni Florentie seu ab 
aliquo regimine seu officio vel officiali civitatis Florentie vel a vexillifero iustitie qui fuit 
vel pro tempore fuerit seu ab aliqua alia persona, nullo iure, modo vel causa petatur aut 
peti possit vel debeat aliqua emendatio vel restitutio pro aliquo dampno dato vel facto, 
dando vel fiendo in aliquibus seu de aliqubius domibus, edifitiis, bonis et rebus 
quomodocumque destructis et vastatis seu deterioratis aut destruendis, vastandis vel 
deteriorandis modo et tempore predicto.” 
156 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 48-49. 
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Oltrarno were to contribute 400 men each, those of the other sesti 300 each. There are 
two possible explanations for the larger contributions from the Oltrarno and S. Piero 
Scheraggio: they may have been the most populous sesti and hence could provide a larger 
contingent, or perhaps the popular regime was appealing to its most reliable 
neighborhood support bloc in calling on these sesti; A thorough study of the later 
thirteenth-century city’s neighborhoods does not exist, but the Oltrarno and the area of S. 
Piero Scheraggio, southeast of Via Roma/Via Por S. Maria and centered on piazza S. 
Croce, contained large numbers of recent arrivals, and both contained important on 
mendicant foundations: S. Spirito in the Oltrarno, and S. Croce in S. Piero Scheraggio. 
Both of these would replace the sesti and become the quartieri of S. Spirito and S. Croce 
after 1343. Recent arrivals, settled in newer parts of the city and perhaps less integrated 
into urban clientelar networks than those living in the city center, may have formed a core 
element of the second popular regime’s support. The Oltrarno possessed several working-
class enclaves, and many of the Ciompi rebels of 1378 hailed from the area.157 This 
hypothesis requires further research on the neighborhoods of late thirteenth-century 
Florence, however.  
These contigents of three to four hundred men were subdivided into units of 100, 
which were each given their own banner (banderia), each featuring the commune’s 
emblem, a vermillion cross on a white field. These banners were entrusted to 
standardbearers (banderii), who reported to the Standardbearer of Justice in times of 
																																																								
157 On the Ciompi and their geography, see Alessandro Stella, “Fiscalità, 
topografia e società nella seconda metà del Trecento,” ASI 558 (1993): 797-862, and La 
Révolte des Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le travail. Paris, 1993), and Niall Atkinson, 
“The republic of sound. Listening to Florence at the threshold of the Renaissance,” I Tatti 
Studies in the Italian Renaissance 16:1/2 (2013) 57-84, with useful maps. 
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emergency. In an intriguing move by this radical priorate, the banderii were to be elected 
by the priors of the guilds and the Standardbearer of Justice.158 Accounts of the street 
fighting of this period are unclear on whether this system worked in practice, but the 
concept was significant. A well-organized civic milita based on sesti would be lead by 
the Standardbearer of Justice, with centrally appointed standardbearers (banderarii) 
supervising each unit of one hundred men in each sesto’s contribution.  
This organization would strengthen the formal and operational link between 
communal officials and the neighborhood-based militias, tightening the Signoria’s 
control over the city. The office of banderarius, elected by the commune’s highest 
officials but leading units from the city’s various sesti, could have served as an important 
resource: this was the sort of position that prosperous popolani like Compagni’s nemesis, 
Dino Pecora, “The Sheep,” could have used to operate as middlemen between powerful 
patrons among the city’s elite-both magnates and office-holders-and their own clientele 
in a given neighborhood or association. Multiplying public offices, whatever their official 
purpose, also could serve as a way to generate rewards and enticements for one’s political 
clientele. The second popular regime did not last long enough to fully restructure 
Florence’s ruling elite, the commune, and its patronage mill. Yet the added rubrics 
demonstrate the lines along which the minuti may have intended to proceed, if time had 
been on their side.  
In an addition that would be adopted with unchanged language as rubric 33 of the 
1295 Ordinances, popolani were now forbidden from assembling at magnates’ homes, 
																																																								
158See La legislazione antimagnatizia, 49-50. 
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armed or unarmed, in times of trouble.159 On an institutional level, the April Ordinances’ 
most important rubric excluded the magnates from various communal councils, including 
that of the Capitano and the guild consulates.160 This priorate also enlarged the list of 
magnate houses from 38 to 72 lineages, although it is unclear what criteria were used in 
adding the new families.161 Later in 1293, magnates were barred from the priorate 
altogether.162 These moves, combined with the ordinances on physical control of the city, 
were intended to marginalize the magnate lineages from Florentine political life. Despite 
their brief hold on power, Giano and the radical faction of the popolo left an imprint on 
the commune. It is easy to understand why Giovanni Villani confused the January and 
April redactions, conflating them into one 1293 edition.163 With these changes, the 
radical wing of the popolo had sharpened the Ordinances into a lance aimed at the 
magnates. 
 What role, then, did the popolo’s discourse of justice and social peace play in the 
factional and social struggles of late thirteenth-century Florence? And how did the 
popular party’s discourse on good government change in the hands of the popolo minuto? 
																																																								
159 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 52: “Item, pro libertate et tranquillitate boni et 
pacifici status populi, provisum et ordinatum est ea die vel nocte quo vel qua, quod absit, 
aliqua briga, rixa, rumor vel tumultus esset in civitatis Florentie [sic], vel quando 
vexillifer iustitie iret vel traeret ad aliquem locum pro suo offitio exequendo, nullus 
popularis civitatis vel comitatus Florentie, aliquo modo vel causa audeat vel presummat 
ire vel traere, esse vel stare cum armis vel sine armis ad domum alicuius nobilis vel 
magnatis civitatis Florentie vel districtus.” The fine for doing so would be 200 fiorini 
piccioli.  
160 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 52. 
161 Salvemini, Magnati, 165. 
162 Najemy, Corporatism, 54, ftnt. 15; the measure is in Salvemini [1899], 424, 
rubr. L.. Salvemini (Magnati, 170) hypothesizes that this established a legislative 
sanction for what had become a custom since the January 1293 Ordinances.  
163 G. Villani, 9.1, in which the chronicler conflates the earlier regime with that of 
Giano Della Bella. For this problem, see the discussion in Salvemini, Magnati, 138-40. 
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Following Nicolai Ottokar’s 1926 study of the period, scholars generally dismissed the 
popolo’s rhetoric as mere cant. This was the case until the revisionist work of Jean-
Claude Maire Vigueur on twelfth- and thirteenth-century urban militias and Silvia 
Diacciati on Duecento Florence,164 Franco Cardini, editor of the 1993 edition of the 
January 1293 Ordinances, snidely dismissed the popular party’s claims: “The ‘Justice’ 
rhetorically invoked in 1293 and 1295 was that of a party, of one faction triumphing over 
another: but that knew well how much its triumph was conditional and imperfect.”165 
Andrea Zorzi similarly has discerned a “general campaign of discrediting” orchestrated 
by the leadership of the popolo.166 Demonizing the magnates was indeed fundamental to 
the popular party’s strategy, as it gradually wrestled control of public discourse away 
from the grandi.  
This view of the popolo’s rhetoric, and how ideologies function, is, hwoever, 
perhaps too mechanistic. It is predicated on a sharp distinction between magnates and the 
upper ranks of the popolo, despite an increasingly common culture,167 and attributes the 
capacity for intellectual production and manipulation solely to this mercantile and 																																																								
164 Maire Vigueur, Cavaliers et citoyens, 217-19, 337-62; Wickham, Sleep 
walking, 11-12, summarizes the impact of Maire Vigueur’s study on the scholarship. 
Diacciati, Popolani, is now the standard account of thirteneth century turnover in the 
city’s ruling class.  
165 Franco Cardini, “Avvegna che col popol si rauna…”: Genesi e caratteri degli 
ordinamenti di Giustizia”, in 15: “La ‘Giustizia’ retoricamente invocata nel ’93 e nel ’95 
era quella di una parte, di una fazione che trionfava sull’altra: ma che ben sapeva quanto 
il suo trionfare fosse condizionata e imperfetto.”” 
166 Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia,” 136: “L’elaborazione normativa di un’immagine 
negativa del magnate trovò corrispondenza in una più generale campagna di discredito 
orchestrata dalla dirigenza di ‘popolo’….”” 
167 Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia,” notes this shared propensity for the vendetta. 
Peace-making, the typical solution to the vendetta, also was not a monopoly of the 
magnates: Katherine L. Jansen, “Pro bono pacis. Crime and Dispute Resolution in Late 
Medieval Florence: the Evidence of Notarial Peace Contracts,” Speculum 88.2 (April 
2013): 427-56. 
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banking elite. The popolani grassi become a sort of power-hungry gang of 
Machiavellians, manipulating the minuti with one hand and artificially demonizing an 
older elite on the other.168 This unjustifiably attributes to the grassi a domination of 
public life and culture that it did not possess: popular discourse was not imposed from 
above on an inert population, nor did it entirely shut out the older chivalric ethos so 
cherished by the magnates and their ancestors, the milites pro comuni.169 On the level of 
practical politics, this view also dismisses the non-elite elements of the guild regime, not 
to mention the non-guild organized population, as a force capable of influencing events. 
This view of the conflict between magnates and popolo assumes that ideology remains 
the same once it is disseminated, and cannot be decoupled from the intentions of its 
manufacturers. Philip Jones, writing in 1965, summarized the “realist” school of thought 
in a pithy epigram: “The popular movements of the thirteenth century merely raised, 
without solving, the problem of the governing class.”170 It could be added that no regime 
of the period did so, with the exception perhaps of Venice; not until the territorial 
patchwork of Italy began to cohere in the fifteenth century did semi-stable governing 
classes emerge, as the city-states’ territories cohered. 
 Even if Jones was correct in retrospect, it cannot explain the ability of Giano 
Della Bella’s supporters to shove the popular movement much further than envisioned by 
the grassi, and the serious social unrest this push unleashed. It also ignores the ways in 
																																																								
168 See Alma Poloni’s judicious remarks in Potere al popolo, 108-115. 
169 On the magnates’ culture and thought world, see above all Carol Lansing, 
Florentine magnates, 145-63, and 212-28, and Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, Cavaliers et 
citoyens, 285-336. 
170 Jones, “Communes and despots: The city state in late medieval Italy,” 
reprinted in Communes and despots in medieval and renaissance Italy (London, 2010 
[1965]), 8.  
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which popular rhetoric was contested in the same way as political power. This is reflected 
in the fact that the additions which Della Bella’s priorate made to the Ordinances in the 
April 1293 were expunged from the edition of 6 July 1295; even Della Bella’s enemies 
among the ruling group were willing to utilize the legislative innovations he had made, in 
a modified form. Valorizing popular discourse is not to take sources like Giovanni Villani 
or Remigio dei Girolami at their word. When they spoke of the popolo grasso’s goals as 
a civic-minded attempt to impose pax, iustitia, and concordia on the city, Lenin’s old 
question, who/whom? applies here: whose justice, and at whose expense?  
This argument is in response to some of Silvia Diacciati’s conclusions in 
Popolani e magnati, dismissing the aspirations of the minuti for a city purged of the 
magnates as a political force, and their capacity for collective action, as opposed to 
manipulation by Giano Della Bella. Diacciati’s approach to the events of the 1290s is 
refreshing insofar as it takes the claims of the popolo seriously, in stark contrast to the 
previous, unproductive tendency of simply dismissing the popular regimes’ cultural and 
social program as simple slogans. Yet perhaps it takes the protestations of figures such as 
Remigio dei Girolami a bit too much at their word, leading to a dismissal of the popolo 
minuto’s actions as excessive, vindictive, and contrary to the rhetoric of the popolo’s own 
aims. Furthermore, even if she is correct in asserting that the popular elite sought to 
pacify the city, there is an important implication here. As Andrea Zorzi observed in 1993, 
popolani engaged in vendetta as much as the magnates, and the problem of urban 
violence was not necessarily synonymous with the problem of the magnates.171 Given the 
intensity of the conflict between popolo and magnates, a general pacification of Florence 
																																																								
171 See Zorzi, “Politica,” 109-13, for the vendetta. 
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was again a question of who/whom?: Who would disarm whom? Who would pacify the 
city, at whose expense, and under what leadership? And did a desire to pacify the city 
necessarily imply forsaking popular vengeance against the magnates? 
The third new rubric of April 1293 was a start in resolving these questions, at 
least in theory. If the popular regime had had the time or political capital to implement 
these reforms, they would have substantially strengthened the commune. Pacification of 
the city would have been possible under Della Bella’s leadership, since in a contest 
between the Standardbearer of Justice’s militia and the magnates, without external allies 
to aid the latter, there was no question of the outcome, as the fighting of July 5 1295 
would prove. It it just possible that Della Bella and some elements of the popolo’s 
leadership intended to force a decisive showdown with the magnates, and were creating a 
force capable of winning this clash. Pax was not simply a catchword, nor an impartial 
value: whereas pacification for the minuti meant crippling the magnates, for the grassi, 
pacification also required neutralizing the popolo minuto as a political force, or at least 
decapitating its leadership. Peace in and of itself, mendicant protestations to the contrary, 
may not have seemed the highest good for the popolo minuto in the early 1290s, certainly 
not when they had the legislative and political-institutional initiative. They would, 
however, quickly lose this to the grassi, who in turn would be unable to withstand 
revived magnate factionalism in the early fourteenth century.  
     The fall of Giano Della Bella and the eclipse of the popolo minuto (March-July 1295) 
The April 1293 redaction of the Ordinances was one element in a larger program 
aimed at eliminating the grandi from political life, and drastically curtailing their 
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prosperity.172 Further legislation established that, in the commune’s courts, two 
witnesses’ testimony was now enough to condemn a magnate according to public opinion 
( publica fama) in its role as a form of proof.173 The priorate also established a committee 
to determine what rights and properties of the commune the magnates had usurped, and a 
special prison was established for them, Le Stinche (see figure 5, below). In an 
anthropologically weighted act, it was sited on properties confiscated from the Ghibelline 
and now magnate family of the Uberti, whose most famous member, Farinata, led the 
Florentine exiles at Montaperti (1260). Opening in 1302, the prison became known after 
1304 as Le Stinche after the Cavalcanti lineage’s castle  in the Val di Greve where some 
of the prison’s early residents, members of the White Guelf faction, were captured.174 
  The magnates were now also were barred from entering the palace of the 
Podestà and the Capitano del Popolo. Berto dei Frescobaldi, in a famous scene of 
Compagni’s Cronica, lamented this ban, declaring in a meeting with his fellow magnates, 
“if we beat one of our servants, we’re destroyed. Therefore, my lords, I counsel that we 
should escape this servitude.”175 Compagni may have invented the speech, but it reflects 
																																																								
172 The information in this paragraph is largely taken from Salvemini, Magnati, 
170-79. 
173 On publica fama as a form of proof, see Vallerani, Justice, 106-12; for fama as 
a form of legal status, see Thomas J. Kuehn, “Fama as a legal status in Renaissance 
Florence,” in Fama: The politics of talk and reputation in medieval Europe (Ithaca, 2003), 
27-46. The best study of fama’s development in medieval European jurisprudence is 
Francesco Migliorino, Fama e infamia (Catania, 1985). 
174 For the Florentine siege and destruction of Le Stinche, see G. Villani, Cronica, 
IX.75. On the functioning of le Stinche, see Halina Manikowska, “The Florentine 
communal prison-le Stinche-in the fourteenth century,” trans. Aleksandra Rodzinska-
Chojnowska, Acta Poloniae Historica 71 (1995), 133-60. 
175 Compagni, I.15: “’Come i cani del popolo aveano tolti loro gli onori e gli ufici 
non osavano entrare in palagio: i loro piati non possono sollicitare: se battiamo uno 
nostro fante, siamo disfatti’…”  
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the volatile polarization of the city: the old elite was arrayed against the popolo, while the 
grassi were beginning to turn against Giano and the popolo minuto.  
 
Figure 5: The Florentine public prison, Le Stinche, on the present-day site of the Teatro Verdi. 
Built on the site of old Uberti properties and named after the Cavalcanti castle at which some 
early first prisoners were taken, the prison opened in 1302. Oil painting by Fabio Borbottoni, 
Isola delle Stinche e via del Fosso dal lato di levante from his Vedute di firenze antica (1820-
1902). 
 
 The priors also took action during this period against rural magnate lineages, 
curtailing feudal dues and establishing Florentine fortifications (castelli) in the Valdarno 
to restrain the magnate Pazzi lineage’s exactions on peasant labor there.176 This was a 
first step towards reducing the number of magnate refuges and castles in the contado. The 
July 6 1295 redaction of the Ordinances included a lengthy rubric forbidding unnamed 
counts (most likely branches of the Conti Guidi and the Conti Alberti) from owning 
																																																								
176 Salvemini, Magnati, 172, quoting Provvisioni cit., IV, 79, 80. Se also G. 
Villani, 9.17. 
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goods, lands, or possessions in Florence’s contado, and banned magnates from defending 
them in advisory meetings with the Signoria.177  
Efforts to exert more direct control over the countryside did not work-the Black 
and White Guelfs would make extensive use of rural refuges-but it reflects the fact that 
Della Bella and the popolo minuto were aiming not merely to curtail the violence and 
power of the grandi. Their intention may have been to eliminate the magnates as a 
political and economic force, reconfigure the urban militia into a force staffed by and for 
the popolo, and undermine the ties between the magnates and their rural cousins. This 
was not a revolution in the modern sense of the term, yet it did target the commune’s 
legislative framework and institutions as the main sites of struggle against their foes.178 
The commune was by this point the city’s crucial political resource, an invaluable 
resource to be parcelled out among patron-client networks of the popolo. Personal 
vengeance, family advancement, state formation, and simple machine politics were not 
mutually exclusive to men like Giano Della Bella or Corso Donati. 
As a result of this activity, Della Bella became the focus for the rage of the 
grandi, while also alienating sections of the popular elite.179 These included the legal 
experts (esperti di diritto), who have been called the Florentine popular movement’s 
conscience.180 Silvia Diacciati’s study has revealed the central role that these jurists, 
																																																								
177 The 1295 ordinance is rubric LIV, La legislazione antimagnatizia, 106-07. 
178 Lansing, Florentine Magnates, 204-05, notes that rubric VIII of the 
Ordinances (La legislazione antimagnatizia, 75) permitted magnates to beat their 
servants. This rubric is absent from the January and April 1293 Ordinances, however, and 
appears to have been added to the July 6 1295 redaction, making it a product of the 
restored elite priorate that deposed Giano Della Bella. For the January-April Ordinances, 
see La legislazione, cc. 1r-16v: the Ordinances of January, 17r-21 are the April additions. 
179 Salvemini, Magnati, 177; Najemy, Corporatism, 61. 
180 Diacciati, Popolani, 383. 
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Compagni’s “damned lawyers,”181 played in Florence’s Secondo Popolo, and this was the 
group that he blamed for the conspiracy that would unseat Giano Della Bella. The judges 
and notaries likely turned on Giano for two reasons: the clear usurpation of communal 
institutions in the service of the popolo minuto as class weapons against the grandi, and 
the concomitant infringement upon their professional prerogatives and status.182 Without 
denying the importance of the jurists’ rhetoric of iustitia and pax, we should not accept 
what are fundamentally partisan claims at face value.183 Nor should we privilege cultural 
differences as the essence of the struggle between the magnates and the popolo.184  
No doubt the maladetti giuristi believed in the professional ethos of the rule of 
law, and in themselves as the guardians of good order. They still played a distinct and 
vital role in the popolo grasso’s conquest of power, just as their predecessors, such as 
Sanzanome, had taken a leading role in the early commune. The rhetoric of iustitia, pax, 
and concordia justified the rule of the grassi to the other elements of Florentine society, 
papering over the fissures of urban society while expanding the ambit of public power. It 
was thus necessary to reassert legal experts’ primacy as the only legitimate custodians of 
law and order in the face of challenges from below. Society’s defenders had to defend 																																																								
181 Compagni, I.12. 
182 Najemy, Corporatism, 61. 
183 I follow here Marx’s comments in “The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,”: 
Karl Marx, Surveys from exile: political writings, vol. 2, ed. David Fernbach, trans. Ben 
Fowkes (London: Verso, 2010), 174: “In historical struggles one must make a…sharper 
distinction between the phrases and fantasies of the parties and their real organization and 
real interests, between their conception of themselves and what they really are.” 
Similarly, Luis Pozo, “Mechanisms,” 228, warns against “perpetuat[ing] the ideological 
infatuation that such mechanisms [for reconciling antagonistic social groups] intend to 
foster in the first place.” 
184 Diacciati, Popolani, 383: “Al diritto era dunque riconosciuta anche una 
funzione regolatrice di una società che, se voleva far trionfare giustizia e pace, non 
poteva in alcun modo rinunciare alla legalità.” See also Diacciati, Popolani, 399-401, for 
the role of the law experts in the rise of the popolo. 
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themselves in turn from the newest group to make a bid for a role in the commune’s 
affairs.185 This dynamic, which first emerges at Florence in the events of the 1290s, 
would characterize tensions in the popolo until the fall of the last popular regime, in 
1382. 
By the spring of 1295, Giano Della Bella was a marked man. There are several 
accounts of Della Bella’s downfall, all hinging around conspiracies involving Corso 
Donati and the jurists, although they may not have been conspiring together: there was 
more than enough room in Florentine politics for multiple backdoor conspiracies.186 Dino 
Compagni reports repeated magnate efforts to assassinate him or, barring that, defame 
him among the guildsmen.187 Marchionne di Coppo Stefani claims that Corso Donati was 
simultaneously working behind the scenes to ensure that the priors for February and 
March 1295 would be partial to the magnates.188 A more insidious threat came from 
within the committee of fourteen arbitri appointed to reform the statutes of the Podestà 
and the Capitano del Popolo in January 1295.189  
The sequence of events leading to Della Bella’s ban and exile on March 5 1295 is 
unclear, but Corso Donati and the jurists’ conspiracies, in the event, seem to have 
dovetailed. Corso’s planning ensured that his urban clientele and followers among the 																																																								
185 See Eugene Genovese’s comments in Roll, Jordan, Roll: The world the slaves 
made (New York, 1976 [1972]), 27: “The law must discipline the ruling class and guide 
and educate the masses. To accomplish these tasks it must manifest a degree of 
evenhandedness sufficient to compel social conformity; it must, that is, validate itself 
ethically in the eyes of the several classes, not just the ruling class.” 
186 See Compagni, I.16, Villani, Cronica, 9.8, pp. 22-25, and Cronaca fiorentina, 
204, 72-73, for accounts of Della Bella’s downfall.  
187 Compagni, 1.15. 
188 Cronaca fiorentina, r. 204, 73: “Messer Corso con gli altri [magnates] tennono 
segreti modi della elezione de’ Priori d’averla a loro modo e di uomini li quali volessero 
quello che eglino; e così ebbono.” 
189 Compagni, 1.18. 
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commune’s officials were ready to act upon any sign of weakness on Della Bella’s part. 
The chance came following another of Corso’s disputes, in which a man was killed; 
perhaps Corso initiated this vendetta to provoke Della Bella into doing something 
foolish.190 A corrupt judge absolved Corso in the podestà’s court, and the popolo minuto 
gathered, blaming him for the miscarriage of justice and shouting “Death to the podestà! 
To the flames, to the flames!” or “to arms, and long live the popolo!”191 The crowd 
attacked the Palazzo del Podestà, lead by Baldo dal Borgo and Giano’s younger brother 
Taldo Della Bella, “more out of the malevolence they had for messer Corso, than for 
concern with offended justice.”192 One might hesitate to identify such a strong distinction 
between the two motives as Villani does-again, the desire for vengeance or the pursuit of 
personal grudges does not necessarily exclude other, more “public-minded,” 
considerations. 
Giano Della Bella was with the priors when the attack happened, reflecting the 
priorate’s use of informal consultation by leading citizens. Della Bella went to the aid of 
the podestà, assuming he could tame the crowd.193 In an unexplained turn of events, 
despite his brother’s leadership of the crowd, the popolani turned against Giano and he 
fled.194 It is possible that clients of the Donati or other magnate families were present in 
the crowd, and helped turn it against Giano’s calls for restraint. Compagni, with the 																																																								
190 Compagni, 1.14. Compagni characterizes Giano as “more brave than wise” 
(“più ardito che savio”). 
191 Compagni, 1.16 (“’Muoia il podestà! Al fuoco, al fuoco!’”) and Villani, 
Cronica, IX.VIII, 22 (“’Muoia il podestà!’…’A l’arme, a l’arme, e viva il popolo!’”). 
192 Compagni, 1.16: “I primi cominciatori del furore furon Taldo della Bella e 
Baldo dal Borgo, più per malivolenzia aveano a messer Corso, che per pietà dell’offesa 
giustizia.” Villani, Cronica, 9.8, 23, gives a more detailed, and more negative, account of 
the attack.  
193 Compagni, 1.18. 
194 For the fire in the Palazzo del Podestà, see Compagni, I1.16.  
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lapidary observation that “many men did strange things in that uproar”, describes how 
men such as messer Baldo dell’Ammirato, “who had many enemies”, specifically 
targeted records of pending cases.195 In the chaos that followed, some Florentines sided 
with Giano, while others blamed him for the riot; still others wanted to continue the 
rioting, saying, “after what we’ve begun, we’ll burn the rest” (“Poi che cominciato 
abiamo, ardiamo il resto”).196 Such a disturbance (romore) was upon the land, Compagni 
says, that the souls of all were stirred against Giano.197  
This was a public disgrace of the worst kind for a leader such as Della Bella, 
whose power by this point came entirely from the popolo minuto, upon which all 
accounts of the situation agree. If Della Bella was in fact, as Villani asserted, trying to 
make himself a popular signor, this episode was the deathknell of such an effort. Giano’s 
failed attempt at popular leadership, and subsequent route, took place on the city’s 
greatest public stage, the Piazza della Signoria, where the Palazzo dei Priori was soon to 
rise: failure on this scale gave all of Giano’s enemies their chance. An anonymous 
chronicler reports that he was blamed when a 15-year old was found dead in a grammar 
school, because the “grandi popolani” had betrayed him to the grandi.198 Marchionne 
Coppo di Stefano and Giovanni Villani both claim that someone denounced Della Bella 
																																																								195	Compagni, 1.16: “E acciò procurò bene uno giudice che avea molti adversari, 
e stava in corte con accuse e con piatiò e avendo processi contro, e temendo esser punito, 
fu tanto scalterito con suoi sequaci, ch’egli spezò gli armari, e stracciò gli atti, per modo 
che mai non si trovorono. Molti feciono di strane cose in quel furore.”	
196 Compagni, 1.16. 
197 Compagni, 1.16. 
198 Cronica fiorentina in Schiaffini, 141: “In questo tenpo, nel Garbo, in una 
schuola di gramatica, si trovò morto uno garzone giovane di XV anni, il quale avendo 
riotta con Giano della Bella, fu plubicato per tutta la cittade che ‘l detto Giano l’avea 
facto uccidere: onde poco tenpo dimorò che ‘l detto Giano da tutti i grandi popolari, per 
trattato di Grandi, fu tradito.” 
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to the Capitano del Popolo for, of all things, disturbing the peaceful state of the 
commune, and blaming him for the riot. The Capitano duly launched an inquest.199 
Giano’s enemies must have appreciated the poetic justice of this champion of iustitia’s 
fate, and this irony may have made the ploy more appealing; every account of the affair 
indicate that the conspirators had succeeded.  
Some of the popolo minuto remained loyal to Giano, however. The minuti 
gathered at Giano’s house, demanding his appearance and ready to arm themselves, while 
his brother brought the battle-standard of the popolo to the grain market and meeting 
point of Orsanmichele; the popolo minuto was apparently ready to fight whatever forces 
the commune itself was mustering.200 Whereas the radical wing of the popolo had, under 
Giano Della Bella’s leadership, sought to occupy the commune, now the commune had 
been wrested away by the grandi popolani. This was a real juncture in the crisis: would 
Della Bella rally his core supporters and confront his enemies, who had managed to turn 
the entire apparatus of the commune against him? Doing so would, as Giovanni Villani 
recognized, have inaugurated a serious bloodletting involving all of Florence’s classes.201 
Della Bella refused to fight, however; Compagni says that his consorts, the Magalotti-
another powerful popular family, who will reappear in chapter 4-counselled him to leave 
Florence in order to calm the popolo.202 This may be an indicator of how severely Della 
																																																								
199 Cronaca fiorentina, 204, 73: “Ed al nuovo Priorato [the priorate stacked with 
Corso’s men] fu data una notificazione al Capitano del Popolo che Giano della Bella avea 
perturbato il pacifico stato e con arme assalito il Podestà e cacciatolo di palagio. Il 
Capitano formò inquisizione e richieselo….” Giovanni Villani, Cronica, 9.8, 24, gives 
substantially the same account.  
200 G. Villani, Cronica, 9.8, 24: “il popolo minuto sì conturbò, e andavano a casa 
Giano della Bella, e proffereagli d’esser collui in arme difenderlo, o combattere la terra.” 
201 G. Villani, Cronica, 9.8, 24. 
202 Compagni, 1.16. 
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Bella had alienated the popolani grassi: the Magalotti were an ancient Florentine family, 
attested from the eleventh century, and whose first appearance on the priorate was in 
1283, a year after its foundation.203 In Giovanni Villani’s account, Della Bella is 
portrayed as a tragic figure, as he realizes that his former allies among the grassi had 
abandoned him and that the popolo minuto would have to face the combined power of 
grandi and grassi alone. 
While there is no way to verify Villani’s explanation for Giano’s flight, it points 
to an underlying fact of Florentine politics. The popolo minuto was uable to confront the 
grandi popolani alone, let alone the magnates allied with the grandi. Villani’s insight was 
one that the radical Ciompi of August 1378 did not possess, and they were crushed when 
they confronted the other guilds in open battle on the Piazza della Signoria. As Patrick 
Lantschner has argued in an important recent study, coalitions of action groups-organized 
urban groups with divergent interests-were crucial to the success of urban revolts.204 
None of the classes in Florence-the grandi, grassi, and minuti-were capable of directly 
dominating the city on their own, to the total exclusion of the other groups, and each 
group failed when it tried to do so in the Later Middle Ages. This strategic reality means 
that, whatever his reasons for leaving, Della Bella saved the city and his supporters a 
futile bloodbath in choosing not to fight. Della Bella was condemned as contumacious 
following his flight; some of his followers were also accused, and he died in exile. 
Closing his account of the March events, and before explaining the civic exemplum to be 																																																								
203 On the Magalotti, see the”Descrizione” on the Archivio di Stato di Firenze’s 
website: http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/siasfi/cgi-
bin/RSOLSearchSiasfi.pl?_op=getsprod&id=FIDD000141&_cobj=yes&_language=ita&
_selectbycompilationdate=SI&curwin=secondwindow (accessed 9.01.15). 
204 See Lantschner, Logic of political conflict, at 60-63, for action groups, and 77-
86, for coalitions.  
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had from Giano’s fate (don’t try to become signor), Villani commented that those who 
had exiled Della Bella for contumacy had done great damage to the city and especially to 
the popolo. Villani praised him as “more loyal and straightforward a popolano and lover 
of the common good than any man of Florence”, and the praise was deserved. 205   
Subsequent events proved the truth of the words Compagni attributes to Vieri de’ 
Cerchi and Nuto Marginolli: “‘Strike the shepherd, and the sheep are dispersed.”206 The 
priors who followed Giano’s exile seem to have been a mixture of Donati appointees, 
indecisive popolani grassi, and middling guildsmen like Dino Pecora, himself a Donati 
client. While the popolo would defeat the magnate insurrection later in 1295, the popolo 
minuto’s leadership cadre-men like the Della Bella brothers, Dino Compagni -was 
devastated by exile, political disgrace, criminal charges, or, in Dino Pecora’s case, 
defection. The balance of power now lay with the magnates and popolani grassi, who had 
alienated their lesser allies with their exile of Della Bella.  
Remigio dei Girolami, the magnates’ revolt, and the final version of the Ordinances of 
Justice (April-July 1295) 
 The Dominicans stepped into this leadership void in February-July 1295. The 
Dominican preacher Fra Remigio dei Girolami’s sermons are a crucial part of the 
																																																								
205 G. Villani, Cronica, 9.8, 24-25: ““e [Giano, that is] veggendo che lla loro forza 
con quella de’ grandi era molto possente , e già raunati a casa i priori armati, non si volle 
mettere alla ventura della battaglia cittadinesca, e per non guastare la terra, e per tema di 
sua persona non volle ire dinanzi, ma cessossi, e partì  di Firenze a dì 5 di marzo, 
isperando che ‘l popolo i rimetterebbe ancora in istato; onde per la detta accusa, overo 
notificagione, fu per contumace condannato nella persona e isbandito, e in esilio morì in 
Francia (ch’avea a ffare di là, ed era compagno de’ Pazzi), e tutti i i suoi beni disfatti, e 
certi altri popolani accusati co llui; onde di lui fu grand danno alla nostra citade, e 
massimamente al popolo,  
206 Compagni, 1.13: “Molti ordini dierono per uccidere il detto Giano [Della 
Bella], dicendo: ‘Percosso il pastore, fiano disperse le pecore.’” 
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background to the events of mid-1295, and the final redaction of the Ordinances of 
Justice on July 6 1295. Scholars have long recognized Remigio’s role in the tumultuous 
events of 1294-95.207 Intellectual historians have also acknowledged the connection 
between his political-theological treatises and the bitter factional strife between Black 
and White Guelfs.208  Based on a reading of his four sermons before the priors, however, 
I argue that the events of 1293-1295 also played a significant role in the formation of 
Remigio’s political thought-and that his interventions themselves played a role in these 
events.  
To be clear, in what follows I am not arguing that Remigio dei Girolami’s 
sermons to the priorate were the decisive factor in the Florentine government’s actions of 
1295: this would attribute far too much influence to one figure and his interventions, and 
in any case the priors, like every other social group discussed in this study, acted for a  
plethora of reasons. Rather, I read Remigio’s sermons to the priorate in 1295 as a cognate 
to the Della Bella’s version of the Ordinances of Justice. Read together, the two sources 
indicate the centrality of the Florentine popolo’s institutions and political language to the 
commune’s public life by the 1290s: this is the lexicon one employed to legitimize one’s 
actions. Della Bella’s followers used and reshaped the Ordinances and their lexicon to 
justify a fuller exclusion of the magnates from political power and public life. Almost 																																																								
207 Salvemini, Magnati, 188; Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia,” 143-44; Diacciati, 
Popolani, 380. 
208 There is a large and ever-greater literature on Remigio’s work, primarily his 
political theology and scholastic pedigree. For Remigio’s life and works see, in general, 
Charles T. Davis, “An early political theorist: Fra Remigio de’Girolami,” in Dante’s Italy 
and other essays (Philadelphia, 1984) [1960], Emilio Panella, “Per lo studio di Fra 
Remigio dei Girolami (†1319),” Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 10, 1979; Panella, “Nuova 
cronologia remigiana,” in Archivum Fratrum Predicatorum 60 (1990), 145-311; and 
Teresa Rupp, “Damnation, individual and community in Remigio dei Girolami’s de bono 
communi,” History of Political Thought 21 (2000), 217-36. 
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simultaneously, Remigio employed this same discourse, combined with the authority of 
his religious vocation and the language of Catholic orthodoxy, to legitimize the 
deposition and expulsion of Giano Della Bella from the city in 1295.  
Remigio’s sermons also can be used as a source for understanding the struggle 
within the popolo, marking as they do the popolo grasso’s reappropriation of the rhetoric 
of iustitia. Remigio may have been peacemaker and mediator between warring factions; 
he also was an apologist for Florence’s mercantile oligarchy and its expulsion of the 
radical wing of the popolo from communal government in the spring of 1295. His 
sermons, justifying as they did Giano’s exile from Florence in iustitia’s name and his 
later sermon calling for peace between magnates and the popolo, was a call for elite unity 
against this dangerously demogogic tribune of the popolo minuto-and this call was 
expressed in much the same language as that employed in the Ordinances.  
Remigio’s sermons were also part of a wider trend. In the thirteenth century, the 
communes of north-central Italy produced a distinct religious culture, which changed, 
and changed with, the communes.209 The centrality of Catholicism to the communes is 
vividly demonstrated by the fact that many communes housed the communal 
battlewagon, the caroccio, in the city’s Duomo: civic pride and religious identity were 
indistinguishable. There were real fissures along religious lines in many communes, as 
																																																								
209 See Thompson, Cities of God, 4-8, for a periodization of this popular religion. 
In the wide literature that now exists on the subject, see in particular the following, which 
discuss communal Italy as a whole: Doyno, “Urban religious life”, a survey of the topic; 
Thompson, Cities of God; Lansing, Power and Purity; Dominic Lesnick, Preaching in 
medieval Florence. The social world of Franciscan and Dominican spirituality. Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989); Frances Andrews, The Umiliati; Janine Larmon 
Peterson, “Contested sanctity: Disputed saints, inquisitors, and communal identity in 
northern Italy, 1250-1400” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1 January 
2007) and Jansen, The making of the Magdalen. 
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Carol Lansing’s study of Orvieto and Lorenzo Paolini’s studies of Bolognese heresy have 
shown.210 Yet the general tendency was for orthodox Catholicism to buttress public 
institutions and vice versa, despite some cities’ conflictual relationship with their 
bishop.211 At Florence, the commune’s orthodox Catholicism and Guelf loyalism 
expressed themselves in support for new religious foundations, especially the mendicant 
churches and the new cathedral: political theology fused here with public works programs 
to create some of the city’s most notable monuments. As George Dameron has argued, by 
the early fourteenth century, orthodox Catholicism, the Florentine-Angevin-papal 
alliance, and Florentine mercantile interests had fused into a powerful public ideology. 
Remigio’s sermons, legitimizing the priorate, were a crucial product of this, a product 
which themselves influenced events.  
 Remigio most likely preached his first sermon to the priors in late January 1295, 
as the committee of fourteen was revising the commune’s statutes.212  Calling for the 
commune’s aid in enlarging the Dominican church of S. Maria Novella, Remigio’s 
sermon came from the Psalm “Confitebor tibi in ecclesia magna, in populo gravi laudabo 
																																																								
210 Lansing, Power and purity; Lorenzo Paolini, L’Eresia a Bologna fra XIII e 
XIV Secolo I: L’Eresia catara alla fine del duecento. Rome, 1975). 
211 Maureen C. Miller is the premier scholar of the Italian cities’ conflicts with 
their bishops. See in particular her The formation of a medieval church: ecclesiastical 
change in Verona, 850-1150 (Ithaca, 1993); The bishop’s palace: architecture and 
authority in medieval Italy (Ithaca, 2000); and “Italy in the long twelfth century: 
Ecclesiastical reform and the legitimization of a new political order, 1059-1183,” in 
European transformations, 950-1200, ed. Thomas F.X. Noble (Notre Dame, IN., 2012), 
117-31.  
212  I follow the dating of Remigio’s sermons to the priors outlined in G. Salvadori 
and V. Federici, “I sermoni d’occasione, le sequenze e I ritimi di Remigio Girolami 
fiorentino,” in Scritti Vari di Filologia (Rome, 1902) 467-69. See also Stefani, r. 20, for 
these events. 
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te.”213 After elaborating on the syncronicity of Guelf orthodoxy and the commune’s 
prosperity, confirming the commune’s sacrality,214 Remigio turns to the state of the 
popolo and its leaders’ duties. Remigio declares that if the popolo wishes to govern, it 
must possess the gravity of a seed, not the lightness of straw, arguing that this undergirds 
the priorate’s solemnity (gravitas).215 This was a classic contrast between gravity and 
levity in public affairs that would have appealed to Remigio’s audience. Reiterating the 
classic Dominican understanding of peace,216 Remigio then reminds the priors that if they 
desire to rule in peace, justice had to be done, “because peace will be the work of 
justice.”217 Using the rhetoric of the popular regime, the sermon’s call for gravitas and 
justice hints at dissatisfaction with the changes of the last two years and the need for 
steadfast action in the affairs of the commune. There is no indication that Remigio was 
aware of the conspiracy against Giano Della Bella, but the conspirators on the committee 
of arbitri could hardly have hoped for a better ideological screen, under which to act 
against the popular radicals. 
Remigio’s second sermon to the priors probably dates to some time between 
Corso Donati’s attack on a kinsman on January 23, 1295, and Della Bella’s flight from 
the city on March 5. It may also date from immediately after Della Bella’s exile.218 
Coming as they did during or just after the riot at the Palazzo del Podestà and Giano’s 																																																								
213 Sermo XXIV, in Salvadori and Federici, 481. 
214 See Thompson, The religion of the Italian communes. 
215 Remigio in Salvadori and Federici, 481: “dicit autem gravi, quia populus sit 
vult utiliter dominari, gravitatem grani debet habere, non levitatem palee que a vento 
elevatur, sicut fecit officium Priorum precedentium.” 
216 Diacciati, Popolani, 317. 
217 Remgio in Salvadori and Federici, 481: “Iustitia enim facienda est si vultis in 
pace regnare, quia erit opus iustitie pax, ut dicitur Ysa.XXII.” 
218 Salvadori and Federici, 468; Salvemini [1899], 382-83, reprints the record of 
the “tumulto” arising from one of Corso Donati’s quarrels.  
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exile, Remigio’s sermon can be read as a validation of Giano’s deposition and exile. 
Whatever the exact date, the urgency of the sermon reflects the state of the city during the 
tumultuous months before the attempted magnate coup of July 5, and the final redaction 
of the Ordinances on July 6 1295.219 Invoking the familiar phrases of guild government 
and the popular party, he reminds the priors of their duty to act for the common good, and 
“not on behalf of this person or house, or that, nor on behalf of these men or those,” since 
the priors were laboring for the commune and the comuni bono.220 In his exegesis upon 
Judges XIX, Remigio appeals to the priors for provident consultation and harmonious 
concord, insisting upon following the common will in regard to an unspecified event.221 
In a sermon that otherwise carefully avoids mentioning specific names, Giano’s name 
stands out all the more. Following Maccabees II.IV, Remigio warns the priors that they 
must beware to do nothing against the spirit of the biblical injunction, “on behalf of 
Giano or otherwise.”222 
This sermon threw the institutional weight of the Florentine Dominicans behind 
the priorate and the various conspiracies against Giano and his followers. Remigio’s 
preaching also legitimated the collectivity of particular, individual priors directly 
responsible for Giano’s expulsion. Given that Corso Donati had infiltrated the priorate 
																																																								
219 Salvadori and Federici, 468: “Ad ogni modo è certo che riflette [i.e., the 
sermon] lo stato della città in quel periodo.” 
220 Sermo XXV, in Salvadori and Federici, 482: “non pro bono huius persone vel 
domus, vel illius, nec pro bono horum vel illorum, sed sicut estis facti et positi in officio 
per comune, ita laboretis pro comuni bono.” 
221 Sermo XXV, in Salvadori and Federici, 482: “Ferte sententiam et in comune 
decernite quod facto opus sit. Istud verbum vos hortatur ad quatuor officio vestro valde 
necessaria, scilicet ad providam deliberationem.” 
222 Sermo XXV, in Salvadori and Federici, 482: “iuxta illud II Machabeorum IV 
‘Communem utilitatem universe multitudinis considerans.’ Unde cavendum est vobis ne 
contra hoc aliquid faciatis, vel pro Iano et cetera.” 
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with some of his men, Remigio was bestowing his blessing upon priors who the city’s 
working people may have been seen as illegitimate; he was thereby asserting the 
priorate’s power and continuity with the popular party’s conservative wing. This sort of 
legitimation may have been a key component in the lack of organized resistance from the 
popolo minuto. It atleast would have invigorated the grassi as they reasserted their 
control over the commune.   
In addition to his religious vocation, leadership position within the Dominicans, 
and Paris schooling, Remigio’s family background made him an attractive spokesman for 
the regime. Remigio’s father Chiaro was one of the Anziani of the Primo Popolo and 
Remigio’s brother Salvi was a representative of the Arte della Lana, the wool guild, at 
the inception of the priorate in 1282.223 Three of Remigio’s nephews also served as 
priors. Mompuccio dei Girolami was a signatory of the original, January 1293 draft of the 
Ordinances of Justice. Corso Donati’s Black Guelfs would later exile Mompuccio with 
his brother, Girolamo, in 1302.224 The Girolami were a distinguished popular family, and 
Remigio’s support, with the implied weight of the local Dominicans behind it, would 
have been an important boon to the priors following Giano’s expulsion and a rising tide 
of magnate anger. 
In my reading of Remigio’s sermon XXVII, I follow Gaetano Salvemini’s 
reasoning regarding the events of July 5-6 1295. The magnates sought, according to 
Giovanni Villani, to abolish the ordinances that blamed an entire lineage for the crimes of 
individual members, and which allowed charges which popolani brought against 																																																								
223 See Najemy, Corporatism, 44, and Charles T. Davis, “An early political 
theorist: Fra Remigio de’Girolami,” in Dante’s Italy and other essays (Philadelphia, 
1984) [1960], 199, for the Girolami. 
224 Najemy, Corporatism, 44; Davis, “An early Florentine political theorist,” 199. 
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magnates to be proven by only two witnesses via publica fama.225 The popolo’s sustained 
legislative attack on them had finally united the magnates as a group, and major lineages 
patched up their feuds.226 Villani says that the urban magnates had summoned a 
following of “peasants and other footmen on foot in great quantity.”227 The confederated 
magnate force was divided into three contingents led by Forese degli Adimari, Geri 
Spini, and Vanni Mozzi. These units assembled in the piazza of the baptistry of S. 
Giovanni, in the Mercato Nuovo (today known as the Mercato del Porcellino), and in the 
piazza al Ponte, probably on the Arno side of the Ponte Rubaconte near the Mozzi 
townhouse.228 Despite this planning, the magnate contingents were unable to link up, due 
to the barricades the popolo had erected-perhaps care of those sappers envisioned in the 
Ordinances? Giovanni Villani says that the magnates were unable to occupy the city 
(correre la terra).229 The anonymous chronicler usually referred to as pseudo-Brunetto 
Latini speaks of a daylong battle, “a cavallo e a piede in tutte parte” of the city, in which 
the magnates were bested. 
It is unclear whether the reformed popular militia envisioned by the April 
Ordinances materialized. Pseudo-Brunetto attributes the popular victory to “la grazia di 
																																																								
225 G. Villani, Cronica,, 9.12. 
226 G. Villani, Cronica,, 9.12, 29. These feuds included those between the 
Adimari and Tosinghi and the Bardi and Mozzi. 227	G.	Villani,	Cronica,	9.12:	“…i	grandi	per	sé	a	cavalli	coverti,	e	colloro	séguito	di	contadini	e	d’altri	masnadieri	a	piè	in	grande	quantità….°	
228 G. Villani, Cronica, 9.12. 
229 G. Villani, Cronica,, 9.12. The magnates had gathered “per volere correre la 
terra. I popolani s’armarono tutti co’ loro ordini e insegne e bandiere, e fuorono in grande 
numero, e asseragliarono le vie della città in più parti, perché i cavallieri non potessono 
correre la terra….” See Richard Trexler, “Correre la terra. Collective insults in the late 
Middle Ages.” In Mélanges de l’Ecole français de Rome. Moyen-Age, Temps modernes. 
T 96, N. 2 (1984): 845-902, at 846-47, for variants of the phrase in later fourteenth-
century writers. 
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Dio,” for the popolo lacked any leadership.230 Giovanni Villani and Marchionne Coppo di 
Stefano, however, claim that the popolo armed itself and gathered outside the priors’ 
quarters, at the Cerchi compound near the piazza della Signoria.231 This victory is further 
proof that in a contest between Florentines alone, the popolo united could handle the 
magnates, even, apparently, without formal leadership. If I am correct in hypothesizing 
that Della Bella and some elements of the popolo had been preparing for an explosion for 
some time, this is not surprising. Given such a total victory, however, why did the 
popolani not eliminate the magnates for good, as Baldo della Tosa warned they would do 
in 1294, according to Compagni?232 Salvemini accepts Giovanni Villani’s account, in 
which the Domincans, almost certainly including Remigio, intervened to prevent a 
bloodbath, in the name of civic peace. 
It thus seems reasonable to read Remigio’s sermon XXVII233 as a response to the 
magnates’ rebellion of July 5, 1295. Giovanni Villani attributed the magnates’ rebellion 
to quite specific grievances, namely the harsher measures of the April 1293 Ordinances. 
Remigio, on the other hand, laments that “by diabolical instinct or divine judgment, the 
greatest discord is seen to be in this city.”234 Concord, in contrast, Remigio defines as the 
																																																								
230 Cronica fiorentina in Schiaffini, 144. The full passage is: “e combattendo 
quasi tutto il giorno a cavallo ed a piede in tutte parti, i grandi da’ popolari per la grazia 
di Dio fuorono isconfitti, non avendo il popolo alkuno capo di suo aiuto.” 
231 G. Villani, Cronica,, IX.XII; Cronaca fiorentina, 208, 74. 
232 Compagni, 1.15. 
233 Salvadori and Federici, 468-69, list this as sermon XXVI, but quote from 
sermon XXVII in their discussion of its dating. 
234 Sermo XXVII, in Salvadori and Federici, 482: “Instinctu dyabolico vel divino 
uidico maxima videtur esse discordia in hac civitate.” 
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highest good of the city as an urban community (civitas).235 The sermon deploys the full 
range of biblical citations to support the demand that “every injustice must be removed 
from the statutes of the city.”236 Read in this context, Remigio was most likely advocating 
a revision of the Ordinances and mercy for the magnates, since they were unable to 
overcome the popolo, regardless of the street battles. 
This is exactly what happened. The Signoria changed the number of witnesses 
necessary to prove accusations against a magnate through publica fama from two to 
three. According to Villani, the priors did this against the will of the popolo, and the 
chronicler observed that “in this novelty lay the roots and beginning of the disgrace and 
bad condition of the city of Florence”, for the grandi, defeated but unbroken, “never 
ceased to seek a mode to subdue the popolo to their power”.237 The popolo blamed the 
priors, and stoned them when they left office; the progressive demoralization and 
deterioration of the popolo’s fighting ability dates to the spring and summer of 1295, 
following on Della Bella’s exile and the priors’ perceived betrayal of the popular cause. 
I have argued that Remigio’s sermons before the priors are significant for social 
conflict at Florence for two reasons. They legitimized the current priors in the potentially 
anarchic situation following the conspiracy against Giano and the popolo’s decapitation. 
The sermons’ language, drawing on the constellation of terms found in the Ordinances, 
																																																								
235 Sermo XXVII, in Salvadori and Federici, 482: “concordia, que nihil aliud est 
quam unio vel coniunctio cordium idest voluntatum ad idem volendum, sit summum 
bonum civitatis….” 
236 Sermo XXVII, in Salvadori and Federici, 483: “omnis iniustitia removenda est 
a statutis civitatis et cetera.” 
237 G. Villani, Cronica, 9.12: “Ma pur questa novitate [the change in the number 
of witnesses]] fue le radice e cominciamento dello sconcio e male istato della città di 
Firenze che ne seguì, apresso, che da indi innanzi i grandi mai non finarono di cercare 
modo d’abattere il popolo a lloro podere…” 
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marked the reappropriation of the language of good government and Iustitia by the 
conservative grassi after the dominance of the more radical wing of the popolo. Given 
the political context and his status as one of Florence’s leading intellectuals and scion of 
an influential family of the popolo grasso, Remigio’s calls for unanimity, concord, and 
justice, can be read as a demand for the popular elite to close ranks in the face of 
challenges from the popolo minuto and the magnates. Remigio implicitly rejected the 
popolo minuto’s intention of eliminating the magnates. Functionally, Remigio’s sermons 
were an apologia for the deposition and exile of Giano, the curtailment of the popolo 
minuto’s participation in the commune’s formal politics, and a softening of the regime’s 
stance towards the magnates. 
The magnates may have failed to regain their old role at the head of the commune, 
let alone take over the city. On July 6, 1295 however, the priors issued a third and final 
redaction of the Ordinances of Justice, probably under the influence of Remigio’s 
sermon. While magnate lineages were still subject to serious restrictions on political 
rights, these revisions moderated the April 1293 redaction and restricted the ambit of the 
Ordinances. The new additionss modified the mode of election of the Priorate, and 
restricted security payments by magnates exclusively to those lineages already inscribed 
as grandi: implicitly, no new lineages would be added, at least by this popular regime.238 
In criminal cases, magnates would only be tried according to the Ordinances in cases of 
intentional (studiose et premeditate) injury to popolani; the Ordinances’ scope was also 																																																								
238 For these two rubrics, see La legislazione antimagnatizia, 62-65. The revision 
to rubric III has been the subject of debate since Ottokar critiqued Salvemini’s 
interpretation in “A proposito della presunta riforma costituzionale adottata il 6 luglio 
dell’anno 1295 a Firenze,” Archivio Storicio Italiano 7th ser. 91 (1933): 173-79. Najemy, 
Corporatism, 63, n. 47, reviews the issue in detail, which concerns internal guild politics 
more than the themes I discuss here. 
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limited in cases resulting in death.239 Rubric VII stated that the Ordinances did not apply 
in cases of popolani being wounded in magnate feuds, while rubric VIII declared that 
magnates would not be prosecuted under the Ordinances for beating their servants: Berto 
dei Frescobaldi’s lament was answered here, and by a popular priorate.240 Finally, rubric 
XIII established procedures for dealing with false denunciations of magnates.241 These 
new ordinances mixed mollification (rubr. XIII, VII) with an ongoing effort to delineate 
boundaries between magnates and popolani. I would propose that rubric VIII should be 
seen as another attempt to break up clientelar networks through legislation. Lack of 
protection under the Ordinances may have been intended as an inducement to domestic 
servants (famulas) and armed members of the magnates’ entourages (scutiferos et 
famulos) to sever their ties with the lineages, or at least reconsider particularly brazen 
acts of mayhem during factional feuds.242 
One of the most important aspects of the 1295 Ordinances has been little 
discussed: the fact that the five new rubrics inserted in the April 1293 Ordinances were 
retained, with language unaltered, in the July 6 redaction.243 Despite the deposition of 
																																																								
239 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 68, for the interpolation “studiose vel 
premeditate.” See Salvemini [1899], 396, for this as an interpolation 
240 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 75, for rubrics VII and VIII. 
241 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 80. 
242 La legislazione antimagnatizia, VIII, 75: “Item cum multotiens contingat 
dominos et dominas suos scutiferos et famulos et famulas propter eorum culpas et 
inobedientiam castigare, provisum et ordinatum et declaratum est quod, si contigerit 
huiusmodi scutiferos et famulos et famulas cum aliquo magnate co(m)morantes offendi 
per dominum suum vel dominam vel aliquem de sua familia, in eo casu non vendicent 
sibi locum ordinamenta iustitie, set remaneat iuri comuni et statutis comunis Florentie et 
domini capitanei, dummodo appareat per public instrumentum quod talis offensus vel 
offensa ante ipsam offensam fuerit scutifer, famulus vel famula eiusdem domini vel 
domine.” 
243 Cf. the April rubrics, La legislazione antimagnatizia, 47-53, with rubrics XXX 
(p.95), XXXI (95), XXXII (96-98), XXXIII (98), and XXIV (89).  
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Giano Della Bella, events had moved the Signoria too far to entirely discard the results of 
his two years in power. Retaining these rubrics, the leaders of the popular party 
strengthened the commune-normatively, at least-while discarding the ideological weight 
of Giano’s faction. The priorate also added a slew of additions to the Ordinances, most of 
them further regulating magnate-popolano interactions.  
The most significant aspect of the July 6 1295 Ordinances, however, concerned 
the popular militia. Undoubtedly a response to the confused, albeit successful, fighting of 
the day before, rubric XXXII of the new Ordinances doubled the milita to a potential pool 
of 4,000 men, on the same lines as the April Ordinances outlined. In addition to this, the 
1295 Ordinances’ rubric XXXIX called for an additional levy of five hundred men each 
from the suburban plebati of S. Giovanni di Firenze, Ripoli, Fiesole, Santo Stefano in 
Pane and Giogole, all within a short walk of Florence’s urban center. These contingents 
were given one standarbearer each, and reported to the Standardbearer of Justice. In a 
visualization of these communities’ subordinate but honored place in the Florentine state, 
each plebatus’ insignia was to be displayed on their banner, beneath the insignia 
iustitie.244 Rubric XL provisioned for a further pool of 1,000 men from the rural portion 
of each sesto.245 These troops were to be equipped and compensated by the commune if 
their own resources did not suffice: such an expansion would have been a considerable 
addition to the commune’s expenses. Not satisfied with this expansion of the militia’s 																																																								
244 La legislazione antimagnatizia, XXXIX, 100: “Item quod de plebatibus Sancti 
Iohannis de Florentia, de Ripolis, de Fesulis, de Sancto Stepano in pane et de Iogole 
habeantur et eligantur quingenti pedites, qui habeant in armis insignia iustitie et sint de 
sequimento vexilliferi iustitie, qui debeant obedire mandatis priorum et vexilliferi iustitie. 
Et quod in quolibet dictourm plebatuum habeatur unus banderarius, que bamderie 
habeant insiigna iustitie. Et in qualibet bamderia sit signum parvulum sui plebatus.” 
245 La legislazione antimagnatizia, XL, 100: “Quod mille pedites per sextum 
eligantur in comitatu”. 
	 191	
paper strength, the priors doubled the number of urban troops, to contain new contingents 
of pikemen (inter quos sint cum gialdis sive lanceis quadringenti pedites ex predictis) 
and 100 archers or crossbowmen. The archers were to have their own insignia, and each 
urban sesto was to develop its own banner, to aid identification during emergencies.  
None of this reconfiguration of the milita took place, because of t the popolo’s 
weakness, and an incipient magnate revival under the incorrigible Corso Donati and his 
Black Guelfs. Yet it is evidence for how the priorate, badly rattled by the events of 1295, 
attempted to regain control of the situation through increasing the size of the popular 
militia-the very same way that Giano Della Bella had proceeded to consolidate popular 
power within the commune’s institutional apparatus. The new Ordinances envisioned a 
commune strong enough to vanquish its enemies, but firmly under the control of the elite 
wing of the popular party-and with a strengthened militia directly controlled by the 
commune. 
Taken together, the July 6 redaction’s additions confirmed the popolo grasso’s 
hold on the commune, and their reappropriation of the institutions and rhetoric that had 
been in contest for the last few years. The Ordinances had been blunted, reshaped for 
their original purpose of limiting the political rights of the grandi while not eliminating 
them from Florentine social and political life completely. The popolo minuto, effectively 
decapitated, was unable to offer effective resistance in the face of the elite revival of the 
late 1290s and the first decade of the Trecento. If Dino Compagni can be believed, even 
the leadership of the grassi melted away as the Black and White Guelfs polarized the 
city. The grassi had met and defeated the popolo minuto’s challenge, after its limited 
success during 1293-95. The result would be the sort of vicious factional strife that 
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Remigio’s sermons ostensibly sought to prevent, as the Cerchi and Donati pursued their 
factional feuding in Florence and in the contado through the Black and White Guelf 
factions.246 
Some concluding remarks 
I have argued that scholars’ fixation with the magnate-popolo struggle in Florence 
has obscured the substantial divisions within the popolo itself, which were based on 
socio-economic factors and a competition for the same political resources. This 
historiographical oversight of the minuti ignores the impact that the popolo minuto had on 
the commune’s ideology of good government, and implicitly views them as pawns of the 
popolo’s leadership. This distorts the picture that emerges from the sources, and denies 
the minor guildsmen, artisans, and petty shopkeepers of Florence any active role in the 
social and political struggles of the late Duecento, despite their importance in the events 
of 1293-1295. I have argued that the challenge of the popolo minuto under Giano Della 
Bella in 1293-1295 constituted a serious threat to the grassi as well as the magnates, and 
that the actions of the Florentine political and intellectual elite must be understood as 
responses to this challenge. That the attempt was made, and left a discernible mark on the 
commune’s legitimizing discourse and official documentation, is as significant as the 
ultimate failure of the popolo minuto’s occupation of the commune’s institutions.  
																																																								
246 For this period, see Guido Pampaloni, “I magnati a Firenze alla fine del 
Dugento,” Archivico storico italiano XXXIX, disp. IV, 387-423, Patrizia Parenti, “Dagli 
Ordinamenti di Giustizia alle lotte tra Bianchi e neri.” in I detentori, 239-326, and Marvin 
Trachtenberg, “Founding the Palazzo Vecchio in 1299: The Corso Donati  
paradox,” Renaissance Quarterly 51:4 (1999): 967-93.  
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The two wings of the Florentine popolo subscribed to the same ideology, centered 
on the rhetoric of justice, peace, and concord, and were indebted to Dominican preaching 
and the civic writings of Brunetto Latini. This ideology appealed to both groups and 
framed the struggle within Florence as one between a quarrelsome, selfish, violent elite 
and an enlightened, moderate body of guildsmen and artisans. For the grassi, this 
discourse justified and legitimized their usurpation of power from the older elite, and 
ensured the support of the popolo minuto in doing so. This rhetoric was a major asset as 
the grassi challenged the magnates, but a chasm opened up between the guild elite and 
the minuti in 1293. For the minor guildsmen, the Ordinances of Justice were a weapon to 
be used against the magnates, to pacify the city and establish a government representing 
their interests, not merely those of the merchant elite, through an expansion and 
consolidation of state power in the city and contado. This popular challenge failed with 
the deposition and exile of Giano Della Bella, and the 1295 reconciliation between the 
popolani grassi and the magnates. 
Yet in 1293-95, the popolo minuto had intervened decisively in Florentine 
politics, with Giano Della Bella manipulating popular rhetoric to suit his party’s aims and 
forcing the grassi onto a tightrope between the magnates and minuti. This tactical 
constriction would force the grassi into a compromise with the grandi that left it weak in 
the face of the elite revival of the early 1300s. This was one episode in the Florentine 
mercantile elite’s wider failure to resolve the contradiction inherent in espousing a 
rhetoric of collective struggle against elite privilege, while attempting to exclude the 
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minor guilds and the vast majority of urban laborers from the city’s government.247 The 
Florentine popolo had not lost its capacity for collective action in the years 1295-1308; it 
had simply lost the initiative, due in part to its own, internal divisions and the 
intervention of external powers. The next chapter explores some of the Florentine 
popolo’s institutional achievements, in spite of these constrictions. 
																																																								
247 See Antonio Gramsci’s more general remarks on the fate of the communes’ 
middle classes compared to those of northern Europe, in Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, ed. & trans. by Quentin Hoare (New York, 1971), at 53: “The Italian 
bourgeoisie was incapable of uniting the people around itself, and this was the cause of 
its defeats and the interruptions in its development.” 
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3: Between town and country: The court of the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice, rural legal 
knowledge, and narrative strategy in denunciations 
 
Abstract: This chapter scrutinizes the Executor’s court’s establishment and operations, and its 
relationship with Tuscan society. The discussion of the court’s origins leads to an analysis of the 
role that low-ranking communal officials (rettori, cappellani, syndici) played in disseminating 
legal knowledge among rural people, and reporting crime to the Executor’s court. I argue that 
their role in the judicial system was more complex than scholars have assumed. These low-level 
functionaries retained their role as mediators between the Florentine state and rural communities 
until at least the 1360s. I also try to reconstruct information networks used by the commune’s 
officials and their analogues among rural people. I then examine the most tangible results of this 
legal knowledge and information networks: the denunciations (denuncie, tamburagioni, cedulae) 
initiating inquests by the Executor’s judges. I argue that these denunciations demonstrate the 
diffusion of the Florentine popolo’s rhetoric among rural Tuscans, the use of this rhetoric as a 
framing device for legal action, and the attempts of Tuscans to shape the actions of the judiciary. 
The chapter draws primarily on statutory law and denunciations against magnates and Florentine 
officials from the period 1343-1368. 
 
Introduction 
What was the function of the court of the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice, as 
envisioned in statutory law? And how did this differ from popular perceptions of the 
court?1 Answering this question requires an understanding of how information circulated 
between court and contado. This was a two-way street: rural Tuscans needed a fairly 
sophisticated understanding of the Executor’s court, and its role within the broader 
framework of the Florentine state, to initiate legal proceedings. The Executor’s court in 
turn had to solicit these peoples’ knowledge at every stage of an inquest, from the initial 
reportage of a crime to the labyrinthine disputes between legal representatives 
(procuratores) on the technicalities of each stage of an inquest.  
By the mid-fourteenth century, the Executor’s court was a venerable part of the 
Florentine state. Its establishment and operation bridge two periods that are often 
segmented in scholarship: the later thirteenth century and the mid-fourteenth century, an 
																																																								
1 I follow previous scholars in referring to the office of the Esecutore degli 
Ordinamenti by its Latin shorthand, “Executor.” 
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age of myriad crises, the main focus in the final two chapters.2 Close scrutiny of 
information networks and their products through the prism of the Executor’s court 
illuminates how Tuscans learned about, and tried to manipulate, the foreign-staffed courts 
of the Florentine state.  
After reviewing the establishment of the court and its array of officials, I turn to 
denunciations to the Executor: the denuncie indicate how legal knowledge played itself 
out textually.3 I read the denunciations as a genre, a series of texts broadly similar in 
context and structure and expressing a particular view of the world, the rhetoric of the 
Florentine popolo. I do not argue, however, that the consistent use of the rhetoric and 
imagery of the Ordinances implies an unquestioning acceptance of the Florentine state’s 
truth claims by those who wrote the denunciation. Those writing the denunciations were 
not victims of the commune’s hegemony, but rather, consciously appealing to a pre-
existing rhetoric in order to fit their version of reality into the official discourse of the 
Executor’s court. The authors of the denunciations had to make the Florentine popolo’s 
rhetoric their own, for tactical reasons: the resulting repetition in structure represented the 
veracity of the denunciations’ content.4  
While it is usually impossible to reconstruct the socio-economic background of these 
authors, this very fuzziness indicates some of the ideological work the denunciations 
																																																								
2 Halina Manikowska, “Accorr’uomo: il ‘Popolo’ nell’amministrazione della 
giustizia di Firenze durante il XIV secolo,” Ricerche storiche XVII (1988), has 
characterized the end of the fourteenth century through the first decades of the fifteenth 
as the “decadenza instituzionale dell’ordinamento imperniato sui rettori forestieri….” 
3 The terms denuncia/e, cedula/ae, and tamburagione/i interchangeably here to 
refer to denunciations to the Executor’s court. 
4 See Daniel Lord Smail’s comments on Marseillais witness testimony in 
“Witness programs in medieval Marseille,” in Goodich, Michael, ed. Voices from the 
bench (London, 2006), 229. 
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carried out. The denuncie distill the complex social reality of Florentine Tuscany into two 
groupings: the popolo and its oppressors, primarily the magnates but, at times, corrupt 
Florentine officials. As previous scholars have noted, magnates themselves could use the 
denunciation system, yet they had to do so while rhetorically inhabiting the persona of 
the menopossenti.5 This judicial maneuvering had analogues outside of the Executor’s 
court. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber has explicated the process by which magnate lineages, 
or sub-sections of these lineages, consciously appealed to and manipulated the popolo’s 
rhetoric in their “return to the city”.6 I argue that rural Tuscans possessed formal equality 
of opportunity when dealing with the Executor’s court, due to the anonymity of the 
denunciations. Anyone with the requisite legal literacy could attempt to manipulate the 
judicial machinery of the Executor’s court. 
Yet equality before the law did not guarantee equality of outcome. Although any 
Florentine could initiate a case with the Executor, the outcome depended on a variety of 
factors. Activating the machinery of Floretnine public justice was a high-stakes gamble in 
a three-way exchange between the Florentine courts, rural communities, and the 
magnates. The uniformity of the denunciations’ content and rhetorical structure indicates 
the practical use of the popolo’s ideology, and the variety of ways it could be deployed, 
across several decades of judicial activity. 
Judicial acts from the Executor’s court survive from 1343, thirty-six years after the 
court’s establishment. By then, rural Tuscans had a sophisticated understanding of the 
court and how it worked. The patchwork survival of the Executor’s records hinders my 																																																								
5 For denunciations most likely written by magnates, see Christiane Klapisch-
Zuber, Retour à la cité: Les magnates de Florence, 1340-1440 (Paris, 2006) 
 [hereafter “Klapisch-Zuber, Retour”],111. 
6 See, for this process of reintegration, Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 285-305. 
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ability to definitively state how rural Tuscans learned about the mechanics of the 
Executor’s court, and whether this may have had an impact on the rate of complaints 
from the contado vis-à-vis those from the city of Florence.7 Nor is it possible to 
reconstruct in any coherent manner possible changes in judicial procedure or the 
activities of the Executor between the court’s establishment and the mid-1340s.8 Treasury 
records do not survive continuously until 1342, and it is thus also impossible to establish 
rates at which magnates paid fines until the mid-1340s.9 It is possible, however, to 
reconstruct how the court was supposed to act from the relevant rubrics of the Statutes of 
the Podestà and Capitano del Popolo of 1322-25.10  
It is also difficult to reconstruct how Florentines learned about the court’s procedure. 
My sources for this issue are once again the statutes and the Executor’s atti. Despite the 
necessity of a fairly sophisticated, legal literacy for initiating inquests with the Executor, 
oral reportage was central to this process. This oral dimension was crucial to the 
workings of the Executor’s court, even when legal rights, responsibilities, and procedure 
presumed literacy on the part of Tuscans, or at least familiarity with the textual culture of 
the courts.11 This dissemination was carried out by officials of the Executor’s messengers 
																																																								
7 See Claudia Caduff, “Magnati e popolani nel contado fiorentino: dinamiche 
sociali e rapporti di potere nel Trecento,” Rivista di storia dell’agricoltura 33:2 
(December, 1993) [hereafter “Caduff, ‘Magnati’”], 16, for this trend.  
8 The Executor’s court is, however, occasionally mentioned in scattered 
references from narrative works: see, for example, Klapisch-Zuber’s discussion of 
Simone Della Tosa’s Annali fiorentini in Ritorno, 102. 
9 The first register in the series ASF.Camera del Comune, Uscite series, is from 
1334; registers 2-4 date to 1342-44. 
10 There are scattered references to the Executor in notarial registers from the 
1320s and 1330s, but these are so fragmentary as to prohibit a reconstruction of wider 
patterns in office-holders’ behavior. 
11 The best introductions to medieval literacy remain M.T. Clanchy, From 
memory to written record: England, 1066-1307, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1992) and Brian Stock, 
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(berovarii) but also by Florentines themselves, through public knowledge (publica fama). 
Knowledge of what to say in court and how to say it, like knowledge of property rights, 
was established in part by talking in public.12 
A basic methodological question faces historians working with medieval court 
records: how closely did the courts’ and notaries’ Latin approximate to the volgare of 
witnesses, defendents, and the world outside the courtroom?13 Many of the initial 
denunciations to the Executor are written in a rough Tuscan and the Executor’s notaries 
did not re-arrange the structure or syntax of these denunciations when copying them into 
their registers. One consequence of this is the temptation to assume that these 
denunciations bring the reader closer to the fourteenth-century authors than otherwise 
possible, as if their lack of Latinity somehow guarantees their status as an organic 
expression of a certain mentalité.14 This is true in one way: to the extent that the 
denunciations’ authors appealed to a shared ideology, the cedulae indeed expressed the 
ideology originating with the popular regimes of the 1280s-90s, and enshrined in the 
Ordinances of Justice. My analysis of the denunciations as a genre draws on a sampling 																																																																																																																																																																					
The implications of literacy: written language and models of interpretation in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries (Princeton, 1987). 
12 Chris Wickham, “Fama and the law in twelfth-century Tuscany,” in Fama: the 
politics of talk and reputation in medieval Europe, eds. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord 
Smail (Ithaca, 2003) 20. 
13 There is a substantial body of work on this question for late-medieval 
Languedoc and accused heretics’ testimony before ecclesiastical inquisitions. See in 
particular Leonard E. Boyle, O.P., “Montaillou revisited: Mentalité and methodology”, in 
Pathways to medieval peasants, ed. Rodney J. Raftis, Papers in Medieval Studies 21 
(Toronto, 1981), 119-20, and John H. Arnold, “ ‘A man takes an ox by the horn and a 
peasant by the tongue’: Literacy, orality and inquisition in medieval Languedoc,” in 
Literacy and learning in medieval England and abroad, ed. S. Rees-Jones (Turnhout, 
2003): 31-47. 
14 John Arnold, Inquisition and power. Catharism and the confessing subject in 
medieval Languedoc (University Park, PA., 2001), addresses these issues in a 
Languedocian context.  
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of tamburagioni from 1343-1368. They are selected for the amount of information they 
provide on the verbal exchanges and physical contexts of magnate crimes, but are in 
other ways representative of the structure and content of denunciations. I provide brief 
context for each denunciation before analyzing its rhetoric and structure, and how it 
compares to other tamburagioni.  
The Executor’s Court: Origins and Information-gathering 
During the thirteenth century, the Florentines had established a series of popular 
offices, beginning with the Capitano del Popolo (1250) and the Standardbearer of Justice 
(1293), in an ongoing attempt to separate the commune’s officials from the faction-ridden 
society surrounding and producing them. This process arose from the struggles over the 
commune’s institutions, which were, among other things, a resource for elite factions and 
patron-client networks.15 The tendency of socio-economic associations to fuse with the 
commune can be traced to the creation of the seven rectores super capitibus artium, who 
appear in a document from July 1193.16 The Executor was the last of these popular 
offices to be established. Florence’s priors and the Standardbearer established the office 
of the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice on December 23, 1306, and the court began 
operation in 1307.17  																																																								
15 On the the political crises leading to the creation of the office of Podestà, who 
had replaced the consuls by the 1210s, see Enrico Faini, Firenze nell’età romanica 
(1000-1211) (Florence, 2010), 341-59.  
16 On this series of popular officials and their recruitment, see Andrea Zorzi, “I 
rettori di Firenze. Reclutamento, flussi, scambi (1193-1313),” in I podestà dell’Italia 
comunale. Parte I, ed. Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur (Rome, 2000), 453-594 in general 
and, for the Executor in particular, 481-82. Diacciati, Popolani e magnati (Spoleto, 
2011), 6-17, discusses the earlier phases of this process; see Diacciati, 7, for the seven 
rectors. 
17I cite here the ordinances on the Executor found in the Latin version of the 1295 
Ordinances: ASF, Statuti.3, rubrics LXXXXVIII-CXI. These were redacted following the 
expulsion of the Duke of Athens in 1343: Zorzi & Diacciati, La legislazione, XXXI-
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The office was intended to legitimate the commune’s institutions by creating an 
impartial authority above and beyond the other organs of communal government.18 As 
Andrea Zorzi has observed, the Executor was envisioned as “the custodian of political 
orthodoxy, the political rector charged with the application of the Ordinances and the 
syndication of the other rectors.”19 The office was created as a mechanism to enforce the 
Ordinances of Justice, specifically to defend “impoverished and powerless persons from 
the oppression of the magnates and the potenti.”20  The opening clauses of the rubrics 
reveal the inability of other popular officials to enforce the Ordinances, speaking of the 
diversas tempestates guerrarum engulfing the city.21  The civil war between Corso 
Donati’s Black Guelfs and the Cerchi-led Whites had climaxed two years before the 																																																																																																																																																																					
XXXII. See Zorzi & Diacciati, 263-371, for the volgare version of the Ordinances, 
redacted and compiled at an unknown date. I use the volgare Ordinances when the Latin 
version is unclear. Lorenzo Valgimogli, introduction to Elenchi nominativi degli 
Esecutori degli Ordinamenti di Giustizia in carica dal 1343 al 1435 (ASF, Indice 
dell’Inventario n. 31) (Florence, 2004) [hereafter “Valgimogli, Elenchi Nominativi”], 2, 
states that the court was established in 1307, based, I assume, on the fact that the court 
began operations in 1307; Klapisch-Zuber and Zorzi also give the founding date as 1307. 
I follow, however, the date given in the foundational statute: ASF, Statuti del comune di 
Firenze [hereafter “Statuti.[register number].[folio number”], 3.30v, rubric LXXXXVIII: 
“In dei nomine Amen. Anno sue salutifere Incarnationis Millesimo Trecentesimo sexto, 
indictione quinta, die vigesimotertio, intrante mense Decembris.” Desiderio Cavalca, “Il 
ceto magnatizio a Firenze dopo gli ordinamenti di giustizia.” Rivista di storia del diritto 
italiano 40-41 (1967-68), 85-132, also dates the court’s foundation to 1306.  
18 On the earlier failures of the podesterial regime and the office of the Capitano 
del Popolo, see Zorzi, “La crisis del regime podestarile,” in La trasformazione, 25-56. 
19 Zorzi, “I rettori,” 463: ”il custode dell’ortodossia politica, il rettore politico 
incaricato dell’applicazione degli Ordinamenti di Giustizia e del sindacato degli altri 
rettori.” 
20 ASF, Statuti.3.32r: “Et iuret dictus Executor et dicta sua familia….observare et 
observari facere omnia ordinamenta Iustitie et observare et manutenere in libertate 
populum florentinum et personas miserabiles et impotentes ab oppressionibus magnatum 
et potentum defendere.” 
21 ASF, Statuti.3.31v: “Quoniam parum esset iura condere nisi essent magistratus 
qui ea tuerentur propter quorum defectum ordinamenta iustitie populi Florentie diu quasi 
languida iacuere ac in propter diversas tempestates guerrarum quas hactenus est passus 
populus florentinus.” 
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court’s establishment, with the devastating fire of 1304, which burned large sections of 
the city.22  The creation of the Executor’s office should be seen as a belated assertion of 
public power by the popular commune against the magnates, who had held the balance of 
power in the city since the turn of the century. Two years after the court was established, 
Corso Donati, “il Barone”, would meet his end at the hands of the commune’s Catalan 
mercenaries.23 These two events, in 1306 and 1308, were two of the last incidents in what 
could be called the classic phase of the magnate-popolo struggle at Florence. After 
Donati’s death, the sort of open conflict within the city between magnates and a united 
popolo which had characterized Florentine factional conflict since the twelfth century 
would only recur once more, in 1343, following the Duke of Athens Walter of Brienne’s 
expulsion following his tenure as lord of the city. 
The new rubrics, added to the final redaction of the 1295 Ordinances, placed 
numerous strictures on those elected as Executor. The ordinances stipulate that the 
Executor be a foreigner, a zealous Guelf, and a vir plebeius, “who according to the vulgar 
Florentine tongue is called a popolaris, not a miles.”24 The Executor was not to be 
selected from the same city as the current Podestà or Capitano del Popolo, and was not 
required to be Tuscan. He was banned from seeking or receiving gifts beyond his salary 
																																																								
22 For the last phase in the political struggles of the late Duecento and early 
Trecento, see G. Villani, Cronica, 8.39, and Compagni, 3.8-9. Compagni is, however, 
strangely silent on the creation of the office of the Executor. Cavalca, “Il ceto 
magnatizio,” 124-28, provides a summary of the socio-political context for the court’s 
foundation.  
23 For Corso’s death, see Compagni, 3.21. 
24 ASF, SCF.3.31v: “unus probus et legalis vir plebeius qui secundum vulgari 
Florentiae dicitur popolaris non miles….” 
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“from the Florentine commune or any individual person, ecclesiastical or secular.”25 Nor 
was he to associate in a familiar way with the other popular officials. He was specifically 
banned from eating or drinking anywhere except his lodgings, in the recently built 
Palazzo dei Priori.26  
Initially, the Executor was selected by a secret scrutiny of the priors and the 
standardbearers (vexilliferi) of the neighborhood militia companies. In 1336, the twelve 
good men (duodecim boni homines) were added to this selection committee.27 The 
Executor’s staff, also foreign and usually from the same city as he, was to be composed 
of one judge, two notaries, and twenty policemen (berrovarii; It., masnadieri, 
berrovieri).28 Perhaps as an attempt to isolate the official from the vicissitudes of urban 
strife, the Executor was to remain in the city when investigating a crime. If a crime did 
occur in the contado, he was to dispatch a judge, notary, and one of his messengers 
(berrovarii) to investigate.29 
																																																								
25 ASF, SCF.3.32r. The full clause is: “Et quod nichil ultra vel aliter aliqua 
ragione vel causa possit ipse vel aliquis de dicta sua familia a comuni florentine vel 
aliqua singulari persona ecclesiastica vel seculari petere percipere vel habere vel enseium 
autem donum recipere.”  
26 ASF, SCF.3.32r: “Et nullam familiaritatem habeat cum domino potestate 
capitani prioribus et vexillifero iustitie vel alio rectore comunis florentie…nec extra suum 
hospitium vel habitationem commedat vel bibat[,] ipse vel aliquis de sua familia in 
civitate burgis vel sub burgis Florentie.” See Marvin Trachtenberg, “Founding the 
Palazzo Vecchio in 1299: The Corso Donati paradox,” Renaissance Quarterly 52:4 
(1999): 967-993, for a careful analysis of the building of the Palazzo dei Priori. 
27 Valgimogli in Elenchi, 2. See Najemy, Corporatism, 89-95, for the office of the 
twelve good men, and early Trecento electoral politics. 
28 ASF, SCF.3.31v: “habeat unum iudicem legistam duos notarios et viginti 
masnaderios seu berrovarios foreses….” For policing in the communes, see Sarah Rubin 
Blanshei, “Crime and law enforcement in medieval Bologna.” Journal of Social History 
16 (1982): 121-38. 
29 ASF, SCF.3.rubrc. XXXXVIIII.32v: “Et si contigerit debere fieri executionem 
in comitatu vel districtu florentine tunc dictus executor teneatur mictere iudicem suum et 
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The foundational rubrics of 1306 envisioned a situation in which the Executor, as his 
title indicates, simply carried out the decisions of the Capitano del Popolo and Podestà. 
These officials received denunciations and accusations, although the Executor was to be 
consulted in cases involving possible false denunciations.30 The Ordinances of Justice 
obliged urban and rural popolani to report magnate crimes. Sons of the victims were to 
report the incident if over the age of fourteen; if they were legal minors, their guardians 
were to make denunciations for them.31 The report was to be made within three days of 
the crime if it happened in the city, and within ten days if in the contado. If the victim 
survived, he was to make a denunciation himself or be fined 50 lire, or fiorini piccioli.32  
 How did Florentines learn of these requirements, and more broadly, the Florentine 
state’s demands from its subjects? The problems here concern literacy and the diffusion 
of legal knowledge among rural Tuscans. Italy was a leader in medieval European 
literacy, as far back as the eighth century.33 Scholars have demonstrated the precocious, 
widespread literacy of Florentines and their rural cousins, based primarily on evidence 
																																																																																																																																																																					
unum de notariis eius et de masnaderiis eius quot voluerit ad locum in quo fieri debebit 
talis executio.” 
30 ASF, SCF.rubr.CI.33v: “Quod potestas et capitanus teneantur recipere 
accusationes et denuntiationes contra magnates clam et palam et de modo et de forma 
procedendi in eisdem.” 
31 Ordinamenti in Diacciati & Zorzi, La legislazione, 79: “Item provisum et 
ordinatum est quod in omnibus et singulis casibus quilibet offenderetur teneatur et debeat 
denuntiare domino potestati…videlicet filius vel filii mortui seu occisi si maior vel 
maiores fuerint quattuordecim annis; vel si minores essent eorum tutores….” 
32 Ordinamenti, in Diacciati & Zorzi, La legislazione, 79: “Et si viveret vulneratus 
vel offensus in persona, teneatur denuntiare seu denuntiari facere potestati iniuriam sibi 
factam….sub pena librarum quinquaginta f.p. eidem per dominum Potestatem auferenda 
et quotiens.” 
33 See Chris Wickham’s numbers for the percentage of witnesses signing their 
own name for eighth and ninth-century charters: Wickham, Early medieval Italy (Ann 
Arbor, 1980), 125. 
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from the Catasto of 1427.34 The most recent estimates have pegged the literacy rate for 
adult males in Trecento Florentine Tuscany at around 69.3%.35 The number of literate 
adults was most likely higher, since this estimate consists primarily of male writers of the 
Catasto’s, reports on their household goods (portate), and there is good evidence for 
widespread female literacy, at least among the urban elites. This literacy closely 
approximated to modern understandings of the term. Literate Florentines in 1427 were 
those who not only could read, but were capable of writing in Tuscan for the portate 
demanded by the ufficiali del Catasto.36   
 The situation may have been analogous in the mid-fourteenth century. Based on a 
famous passage in Giovanni Villani’s Cronica, Paul F. Grendler has estimated that 
Florence had a schooling rate of 67-83% in 1338.37 Robert Black has convincingly 
argued for the rough veracity of Grendler’s numbers; it appears that well above half the 
adult population of late medieval Florence was literate.38 Literacy, in the sense of being 
able to read and write volgare, was the norm in late medieval Florence.39 By pre-
industrial standards, this was a hyper-literate society. England, precocious birthplace of 																																																								
34 For literacy in Florentine Tuscany, see, in general, Robert Black, Education and 
society in florentine Tuscany, vol. I: Teachers, pupils and schools, c. 1250-1500 (Leiden, 
NL., 2007). 
35 Robert Black, “Literacy in Florence, 1427,” in Florence and beyond. Culture, 
society, and politics in renaissance Florence. Essays in honor of John M. Najemy, eds. 
David S. Peterson and Daniel Bornstein, (Toronto, 2008), 206. 
36 On the establishment and nature of the Catasto, see David Herlihy and 
Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Les Toscans et leurs familles. Une étude du catasto florentin 
de 1427, (Paris, 1978), 58-76. 
37 For this estimate, see Paul Grendler, Schooling in renaissance Florence. 
Literacy and learning, 1300-1600 (Baltimore, 1989), 72. 
38 See Black, “Literacy,” 206-09, for a discussion of the literacy rate in 1338 and 
1427. 
39 See Armanno Petrucci, “Reading and writing volgare in medieval Italy,” in 
Writers and readers in medieval Italy, ed. & trans. Charles M. Radding (New Haven, 
1995), 169-235, for vernacular literacy.  
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the Industrial Revolution, would not create a system for what Eric Hobsbawm called the 
mass production of elementary literacy until the early nineteenth century.40 Again, it is 
much more difficult to ascertain literacy levels among rural Tuscans. Yet even non-
literate rural people would have participated in literate culture-in part through complying 
(or ignoring) the demands for denunciation and testimony emanating from the city’s court 
rooms.  
 Nevertheless, information was still officially disseminated by word of mouth 
during this period. The statutes of the Podestà for 1325 make provisions for publicizing 
information including decisions of the Signoria and the names of the banned, if not the 
statutes in their entirety.41 In this redaction of the statutes the town criers (bannitori) are 
directed to read out announcements in the accustomed places (in locis consuetis) of each 
urban sesto.42 The ambiguity of Florence’s administrative and parochial organization is 
reflected in the wording. The rubric lists several different, partially overlapping, units of 
organization before clearly stating where the announcements were to take place.43 The 
“accustomed places” are clearly defined: each sesto had churches or intersections 																																																								
40 Eric J. Hobsbawm, The age of revolution, 1789-1848 (New York, 1962), 48. 
41 Statuti della repubblica fiorentina, ed. Romolo Caggese, rev. ed., eds. Giuliano 
Pinto, Franesco Salvestrini, Andrea Zorzi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1999 [1921])[hereafter 
“Statuti, [volume #], [book number], [rubric number]], 2.I.rubr. XI, de bannitoribus 
communis Florentie et eorum officio. 
42 See Stephen J. Milner, “‘Fanno bandire, notificare, et expressamente 
comandare’: Town criers and the information economy of renaissance Florence,” in I 
Tatti studies in the Italian renaissance 16:1/2 (2013), 107-51, in general and 136-37 for 
the sites of the proclamations by the bannitori.  
43 Statuti.II.1.rubr. XI: “Et quod dicti bannitores teneantur mictere banna…in 
qualibet parocchia cuiuslibet canonice et populi et etiam in qualibet contrata et burgo 
minutatim sui sextus….” Halina Manikowska, “Accorr’uomo: il ‘Popolo’ 
nell’amministrazione della giustizia di Firenze durante il XIV secolo,” 524-25, has noted 
the difficulties posed by the ambiguities of Florentine administrative organization. On 
Florentine urban administration, see also Herlihy & Klapisch-Zuber, Les Toscans, 119-
24. 
	 207	
recognized as information hubs.44 The “magnates’ priorate” of July-August 1343 
simplified the city’s organization into quartieri, but presumably the announcement sites 
of which the statutes speak remained the same.45 Stephen J. Milner has recently noted the 
persistence of certain places as information sites, drawing attention to the stipulation that 
the “accustomed sites” of rubric XI are explicitly those which were used by the bannitori 
“in the time of the Florentine popolo [that is, 1250-1260].”46 This is another example of 
the centrality of the first popular regime in Florentine collective memory, mirroring 
Giovanni Villani’s celebration of the Primo Popolo.  
How did this official information network operate? For the Trecento, the bandi-
autograph copies of the announcements of the bannitori-that Stephen Milner has 
analyzed for the Quattrocento and early Cinquecento are lacking.47 The libri 
bannimentorum of the Executor, however, largely substantiate the statutory evidence.48 
These registers contain pro forma inquests into the running of the commune’s prison, le 
Stinche, lists of officials deputed to posts in the contado, and occasional repetitions of 
																																																								
44 Statuti.II.1.rubr.XI. The sesti are: “…in sextu Ultrarni in crucichio [sic] ecclesie 
Sancti Nyccholay, et in quadruvio ‘quatuor leonum’, et in trivio seu ex oppositio 
domorum de Rinucciis; et in sextu Santi Petri Scheradii in quadruvio vie Ghibelline, in 
quadruvio ad domum de Peruççiis, et in platea Pontis Rubacontis; et in sextu Burgi in 
crucicchio fluminis Omnium Sanctorum; in sextu Santi Pranchatii ad crucicchium de 
Trinciavellis; in sextu Porte Domus extra portam veterem Sancti Laurentii et ad portam 
veterem Campi Corbolini; et in sextu Porte Sancti Petri in platea Sancti Ambroxii et in 
quadruvio domorum de Bastariis.”  
45 For the “magnates’ priorate” of 1343, see Najemy, Corporatism, 129-34.  
46 Statuti.II.1.rubr.XI: “in quibus soliti erant bannire tempore populi Florentie….” 
It is unclear whether this is a reference to the Primo Popolo 1250-60, or the Secondo 
Popolo of 1282-95.  
47 Milner, “‘Fanno,’” 115-22, for the bandi as a genre. 
48 Registers containing reports of the Executor’s bannitori are found under the 
Offitia Extraordinaria series of the Executor’s registers. This series contains 
syndications, general inquests, and bannimenta; the other series are the Acta Criminalia 
and the Acta Civilia.  
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some or all of the current statutes. A liber bannimentorum from Landuccio di ser Lando 
Bicci da Gubbio’s semester as Executor (December 23 1346-19 July 1347) demonstrates 
the practice and some of the content of the announcements of the bannitori.49 On 
December 24 1346, Landuccio ordered one of the commune’s criers, Domenico di 
Pasquino, to go through the city and announce a series of general proscriptions. These 
were not specific violations of the law, but a public recitation of actionable offenses.50 
They included blaspheming God and the Virgin Mary, counterfeiting money, going about 
after nightfall, bearing arms, and-for the commune’s officials-shaking down Florentines 
for bribes.51 This list assumes familiarity among the bannitor’s audience with the 
penalties stipulated in the Ordinances of Justice and the commune’s statutes.52 Each 
criminal item in Domenico’s list of announcements notes that the penalty “shall be done 
under the penalties contained in the selfsame statutes and ordinances.”53 The Executor’s 
court assumed that Florentines would know what the penalty was for a given offense.  
																																																								
49 See EOG.82.2v-6v for what follows. The register opens on 24 December 1346 
and ends with material from 22 June 1347. I cite this register as a typical example; others 
include AdE 10, 31, 45, 60, and CdP 22. See Elenchi, 14-28, for a complete list of men 
holding the office of Executor for 1343-1435. 
50 EOG.82.2v. Dominico is described (in the dative) as a “publico preconique 
bannitori comunis Florentie.”  
51 See EOG.82.2v-5v for the items that Dominico was to announce. 
52 The Ordinances in all their redactions constituted an autonomous body of law 
from the commune’s statutes, until they were inserted into the new statutes of 1409: 
Diacciati & Zorzi, La legislazione, XXXII-XXXIII. 
53 EOG.82.5v: The full item is: “Item. Statuta et ordinamenta nuptiarum 
matrimoniorum iuramentorum sponsaliciarum comuniorum propterea feudorum et omnia 
alia que in ipsis statutis et ordinamentis vel aliquo ipsorum continetur particulariter et 
divisum et quod nullus contra predicta vel aliquod predictorum faciat sub penis in ipsis 
statutis et ordinamentis contentis.” 
	 209	
What, then, of the countryside? The contado and distretto are absent from the 
rounds of the bannitori in general and from the deputation of the bannitor Domenico.54 
There is no mention in the statutes or the libri bannimentorum of localities outside the 
fourteenth-century wall circuit.55 Yet the tamburagioni clearly and consistently appeal to 
the statutes and Ordinances of Justice when denouncing the crimes of the potenti: rural 
people thought of themselves as under Florentine jurisdiction, or at least the persona they 
assumed in denunciations did so. A typical element of denunciations to the Executor is 
the remark that the crime in question was “against the form of law, of the statutes, [and] 
of the ordinances of the commune…..”56 Specific actions are also noted in passing as 
being against the Ordinances, in particular carrying offensive as well as defensive 
weapons. An undated tamburagione from 1345 denounces Gherardo di Jacopo degli 
Adimari for using offensive weapons “contra la forma deli ordini dela giustitia” when he 
robbed a collector of the commune’s indirect tax (gabelle), Jacopo di Corsino da 
Paginana.57  
																																																								
54 Domenico’s ambit is described thus (EOG.82.2r): “quod vadat et in locis 
pubblicis et consuetis per civitatem Florentie.” The next day, 25 December 1346, 
Domenico was directed to go though the “terras” (EOG.82.6r), but it is unclear whether 
this refers to a particular area, or the full ambit of the contado. 
55 Statuti.II.1.rubr.XI speaks of the contrata. I read this as a unit of urban 
organization corresponding to the parrochia, following Manikowska, “ ‘Acorr’uomo’”, 
525. The statutes consistently use the phrases comitatus and districtus when referring to 
the area outside the city and subject to Florentine control, as do the atti giudiziari. 
56 The quote is from EOG.397.24r (24 May 1363), reporting the occupation of a 
monastery in the rural pieve of S. Godenzo a Piedi Alpini: “contra formam iuris 
statutorum et ordinamentum communis….” 
57 CdP.24.5r (undated, but sometime between February 1-11 1345): “Notificasi a 
voi che Gherardo Jacopi deli Aldimari [sic] grande di Firenze contra la forma deli ordini 
de la giustitia del popolo de Firenze armato con arme da offendare e da diffendare et con 
consorti sive compangni asali et manumise Jacopo Corsini da Pagniana Canina del 
comuno d’Empoli del contrata de Firenze popolano de Firenze del destreto de Firenze 
gabelliere dela gabelle….” 
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Judicial registers are a good source of information for how legal knowledge and 
the Florentine courts’ operation reached rural people. The processual information 
following the initial denunciations indicates, however, that rural Tuscans most frequently 
dealt with these courts through the commune’s messengers (nuptii; bannitorii) charged 
with citing witnesses for criminal inquests and then reading out sentences.58 The 
Executor’s registers demonstrate that the same procedure was followed in the countryside 
as in the city.59 The Executor’s judge would depute a nuncio to cite the witnesses and the 
messenger would then report back. The wording of these reports indicates that, following 
the statutes of the Podestà, he would deliver citations to a witness’ house, at the local 
church, and in the neighborhood (vicinatus).60 The same procedure was followed when 
carrying out the bann for contumacious witnesses. The Executor’s judge would direct the 
precor et bannitor to read out the bann “before the palace of the Executor and in the other 
public and accustomed places,” stating that the contumacious witnesses were banned and 
now subject to a fine of twenty-five lire.61 
																																																								
58 The classical Latin nuntius is rendered as nuptio or numptio in the judicial 
registers. 
59 Manikowska, “ ‘Acorr’uomo’”, 526 ftnt. 7.  
60 EOG.122.3r, 28 July 1349: “Die XXVIII mense Julii: Relatio. Qui Andreas 
predictus yens et rediens retulit suprascriptis [the testes] et quemlibet ipsorum dombisu 
eorum solitis habitationis ecclesiis et vicinis et omnia et singula fecisse et dixisse prout 
continetur in suprascripto eius comissione.” 
61 EOG.122.3v, 28 July 1349:  “Dictus iudex ut supra sedens comissit imposuit et 
mandavit Martino Lapi publico preconi et banditori dicti comunis presentti et audienti 
quat<> vadat et ante palatium habitationis ipsius executoris et in aliis locis publicis et 
consuetis et ibidem sono tubecte premissio exbanniat et in banno ponat de dicta civitate 
Florentie eius comictatu et districtu surascriptos testes et quemlibet eorum in libr 
Vigintiquinque f.p.….” 
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Evidence for the rural dissemination of legal knowledge comes from inquests 
originating in the commune’s parish-based policing system.62 In the later fourteenth 
century, the basic units of Florentine adminsitration, the parishes (pivieri and popoli), 
gradually were replaced by broader units-the gonfaloni, in the city; the podesterie and 
vicariati, in the contado and distretto. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber and David Herlihy 
attributed the erosion in the countryside of these small-scale units of organizationto the 
advent of the sharecropping (mezzadria) system.63 The requirement of the mezzadrie that 
tenants live on their landlord’s farm “melted” the inhabited cores of the Florentine 
countryside’s popoli.64 Halina Manikowska and Andrea Zorzi have conclusively 
demonstrated that the popoli declined in importance as units of administration and 
policing in the contado during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.65 Yet they 
remained the fundamental unit of reference for those using the Executor’s court.66 
Particularly important in this context were the local officials of rural parishes (pivieri): 
																																																								
62 Andrea Zorzi, L’amministrazione della giustizia penale nella Repubblica 
fiorentina: Aspetti e problemi (Florence, 1988), is the best introduction to the Florentine 
judicial apparatus. 
63 Herlihy & Klapisch-Zuber, Tuscans and their families, 50.  
64 Herlihy & Klapisch-Zuber, Tuscans and their families, 50. 
65 Halina Manikowska, “‘Acorr’uomo’”, 525: “Nel Trecento, in particolare nella 
seconda metà del secolo, la parrochia-indicata nelle fonti con i termini di popolo, 
vicinanza, contrada-quale elemento dell’organizzazione sociale, compare con minor 
frequenza nei documenti, cedendo il posto alla compagnia del popolo.” For the decline in 
denunciations from the rural popoli in the Quattrocento, see Zorzi, “Aspetti e problemi 
dell’amministrazione della giustizia penale nella Repubblica fiorentina,” Archivio storico 
italiano CXLV (1987), 428. 
66 The definitive guide to Florentine Tuscany’s populi and pivieri for this period 
are Paolo Pirillo’s two volumes: Forme e strutture del popolamento nel contado 
fiorentino: I/I**. Gli insediamenti nell’organizzazione dei populi (prima metà del XIV 
secolo) (2 vols.: I, I**) and II. Gli insediamenti fortificati (1280-1380) (Florence: Leo S. 
Olschki, 2005) [hereafter “Pirillo, Forme.I/I**/II]. 
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the cappellani, sindici, and rectores of the parish churches.67 The cappellani were elected 
by residents of the urban parish (popolo; piviere) they were charged with supervising. 
They were charged with a variety of tasks, many related to public hygiene and the 
cleanliness of public streets and piazze.68 They also, however, were supposed to report 
“any evil deeds as committed in their populi or area,” and if they did not, they were to be 
fined 100 fiorini piccioli, at the discretion of the Podestà.69 In the 1340s the cappellani 
were still acting as stipulated in the statutes, in one of the earliest intact registers of 
denunciations and accusations to the Podestà, from early 1343/44.70 The Executor’s atti 
bear out the pattern that Manikowska has discerned for the second half of the fourteenth 
century: (urban) cappellani were little more than bearers of ill-tidings for the the foreign 
rectors, reporting assaults and homicide.71 This underlines, however, the basic role that 
low-level officials, anchored in their communities, continued to play in the relationship 
between the Florentine state and Tuscan society even in the later communal period. 
																																																								
67 Statuti.II.1.rubr.XV (47-48), for the election of the cappellani; 
Statuti.II.1.rubr.XXII (61-620) for the sindici and rectores. Cohn, “Crime,” 223-24, 
observed the relatively low status of the cappellani. 
68 Statuti.II.1.rubr. XVI (48): “Teneatur Potestas…facere iurare cappellanos 
omnes et singulos…ut habeat curam et solicitudinem platearum et viarum civitatits, 
burgorum et suburgorum que in suo populo sunt, ita quod stent semper de die et de nocte 
bene purgate de lapidibus et letamine….” 
69 Statuti.II.1.rubr.XVI: “Et teneatur quilibet cappellanus populorum civitatis, 
burgorum et suburgorum civitatis Florentie denuntiare domino Potestati….omnia 
maleificia quasi commissa in suis populis vel locis, a die quo commissa fuerint, dicendo 
nomina et prenomina malefactorum et unde sint, sub pena solidorum centum f.p., et plus 
et minus, ad voluntatem domini Potestatis, inspecta negotii qualitate.” 
70 Atti del Podestà [hereafter “AdP”], 33 (9 February-12 May 1344). AdP.16, a 
register of inquests for December 1343-June 1344 survives, but is so badly damaged that 
it is impossible to make a tally the number of cases originating with denunciations from 
the cappellani or rectores. 
71 Manikowska, “ ‘Acorr’uomo’”, 541-42: “Gli statuti…facevano dei cappellani 
laici e dei rettori dei pivieri sopratutto degli informatori dell’amministrazione della 
giustizia.” 
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The rural rectores and sindici were elected annually for the contado, and charged 
with specific police functions.72 Like the urban cappellani, they were required to 
denounce crimes in their bailiwick, in particular violent crimes such as homicide and 
assault.73 The Podestà’s liber inquisitionum for 1343/44 for the quartiere of S. Giovanni 
contains sixty-three inquests: of these thirty-four were initiated by cappellani, mostly 
from the urban pieve of S. Lorenzo. Twenty-two originated with rectores or syndici. Six 
came from ex officio inquests initiated by the Podestà himself.74 This corresponds to the 
general pattern Halina Manikowska has found for the earliest Florentine judicial acts for 
1343-48: the cappellani were an important element in the juridical apparatus, even if 
functionally they were little more than reporters of crime.75  
The rectores were still in place in the 1360s, at least in the countryside, still 
tasked with denouncing magnates and popolani alike to Florence’s public courts. 
Through a trick of the commune’s surviving documentation, these officials are usually 
visible only when they themselves are being denounced for gross dereliction of duty. A 
denunciation to the Executor entered in the court’s records on 4 February 1363 complains 
of a rector’s failure to denounce an assault on a popolano of S. Silvestro Montaio, deep in 
																																																								
72 Statuti.II.1.rubr.XXII (62-63): “Rectores et syndici populorum, plebatuum et 
communium seu villarum comitatus Florentie et eorum officia durent per annum.” See 
Laura de Angelis, “Il Valdarno,” 68, for these officials’ duties. 
73 Statuti.II.1.rubr.XXII (62-63): “Et dicti rectores, quilibet in suo populo, loco, 
communi vel universitate, teneantur denuntiare omnia malleficia vel quasi commissa in 
suo populo, loco, communi vel universitate, infra quintam diem a die quo malleficium 
commissum fuerit….” 
74 AdP.33. 
75 Manikowska, “ ‘Acorr’uomo,’” 544: “Ancora negli anni Quaranta, prima della 
peste nera, I cappellani laici costituivano un elemento indispensabile 
dell’amministrazione della giustizia. In base ai documenti incompleti pervenuti per gli 
anni 1343 e 1344…possiamo attribuire loro il ruolo di informatori principali del tribunale 
per quanto concerne I rei di percosse e di ferimenti.” 
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the Florentine Chianti.76 Sometimes the rectores are accused of actively colluding with 
magnate criminals. Gino di Manetto dei Buondelmonti was denounced for the murder of 
Giovannino, a popolano from the popolo of San Paolo d’Ema, sometime in late August 
1351.77 The denunciation’s author claimed that Bartolo di Lugo, rector of the popolo, 
was corrupted by Gino, and given twelve gold florins in exchange for not denouncing the 
murder and covering it up. The denouncer cited the current priest (presbiter) of the 
popolo, Balduino, “who buried the said dead man,” for evidence concerning the crime.78 
The case was unproven (non probatum), since all those who appeared to testify 
(including the current priest) claimed to know nothing of Giovannino’s murder.79 
Nevertheless, it highlights the crucial role that rural rectores could play as mediators 
between the Florentine state and localities-or the obfuscation they were capable of. It 
seems reasonable to hypothesize that these rectores, when they chose to do their job, 
would have been the main transmitters of communal law, especially the Ordinances, to 
the residents of Florentine Tuscany. Florence’s messengers, the nuptii, most likely spread 
this knowledge as well, as they moved about the contado citing witnesses and demanding 
information regarding criminals. Originating as they usually did in the parishes they were 
responsible for, another reasonable hypothesis is that rural cappellani and rectores, along 
																																																								
76 EOG.404.1r (4 February 1363): “Notum sit vobis [sic] domino executori quod 
Cennis olim Salvi popoli Sancti Silvestri de Montaio rector dicti popoli de anno presente 
et mense Agusti proximi parte cessavit denuptiare Gannuzzium Cole de popoli qui anno 
et mense predictis vulneravit Johannes Chelis San Leonardi dicti populi….” Pirillo, 
Forme I**.610, for the location of S. Silvestro Montaio.  
77 See EOG.157, 35r, for the initial denunciation. The denunciation is undated, but 
the process ran from the last day of August to the third of September. For the location of 
San Paolo, see Pirillo, Forme.II, 562. 
78 EOG.157, 35v: “Et ad vostram informationem predictorum placeat vobis 
mictere presbitero dicte ecclesie Sancti Pauli qui dictum mortuum seppeluit….” 
79 See EOG.157, 36v-37r, for testimony. 
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with parish priests, are likely candidates for authorship of many denunciations. They 
would have been ideally placed to aid rural people in denouncing crimes when they did 
not report them in person. Perhaps these officials resorted to anonymous denunciations 
themselves as an alternative to reporting them in their official capacity-as the case of 
Balduino the parish priest and Gino dei Buondelmonti shows, such rural officials were 
sometimes intimately tied to the magnates. This is a possibility I will pursue in future 
research. 
The Ordinances stipulated that each piviere in the city and contado was to 
nominate syndici; urban popoli were to do so within fifteen days of the Ordinances’ 
publication, while rural pivieri were given one month.80 The sindici are envisioned as 
troubleshooters for the commune’s popular officials within their popoli, acting “for the 
honor and grandeur and protection and good and peaceful state of the city and contado of 
Florence….”81 Expanding on the above-cited requirement that popolani denounce 
magnate crimes, the sindici were required to report crimes to Florence’s popular officials. 
This consisted of coming to the aid of anyone injured by a magnate, counseling them, and 
ensuring that the offending party was punished. Failure to give all due aid to popolani 
																																																								
80 Ordinamenti, rubr. LVII in Diacciati & Zorzi, La legislazione, 321: “…che tutti 
e ciascheduni [sic] popoli de la città di Firençe e tutti e ciascuni piovieri del contado e del 
distretto di Firençe sieno tenuti e debbiano fare e creare sindachi ydonei e sofficienti, 
infra quindici dì da la piuvicagione di questi coltai capitoli quelli de la cittade e infra uno 
mese quelgli del contado….” 
81 Ordinamenti, rubr. LVII in Diacciati & Zorzi, La legislazione, 321: “Et 
prometta ciascuno sindacho, per lo suo populo de la cittade e pioviere del contado, 
d’obedire a’ comandamenti de’ signori podest e capitano e defensore e de l’oficio de’ 
signori priori e gonfaloniere di giustitia in tutte cose le quali ad onore e grandezza e 
difesione e buono e pacefico stato de la cittade e del contado di Firençe e di tutto il 
populo di Firençe….” 
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carried a penalty of 25 lire for urban sindici and 100 soldi for those in the contado.82 
Rubric 60 of the statutes stipulates that these sindici should be drawn from the more 
esteemed and more powerful popolani of a parish, and that they had to receive their 
office from the Capitano del Popolo. Maddeningly, this rubric does not define how this 
upper rank of the popolo was defined; presumably public reputation played a major role 
in the process, and the underlying process of identifying social rank.83  
Claudia Caduff has noted the absence of these sindici from the judicial acts of 
1345-46, and these officials do not appear in later registers of the Executor.84  As 
described in the Ordinances, however, their duties were functionally indistinguishable 
from the rectores, and the three terms-sindici, rectores, cappellani-may have been 
cognates for the same officials and their duties. Along with the commune’s messengers 
and tax officials, these men would have constituted the sum of many rural peoples’ 
interactions with Florentine authority. the Executor.85 The job description of these sindici 
makes them likely candidates for writing denunciations and coaching rural people 
seeking to initiate criminal proceedings against magnates: yet this process of authorship 
is usually impossible to identify in surviving documentation.  
 																																																								
82 The stipulated duties and penalties are stated in Ordinamenti, rubr. LVIIII, in 
Diacciati & Zorzi, La legislazione, 323, entitled “Che li sindachi de’ popoli de’ piovieri, 
dal popolare offeso o da altera persona, colgl’uomini del popolo overo pioviere i quali 
vorranno, sieno tenuti lui aiutare dinançi a la podestà e capitano si che l’offeso rimanga e 
l’offenditore sia punito.” 
83 La legislazione antimagnatizia, 324: “Ancora, che’ detti sindachi de’ popoli de 
la cittade e de’ piovieri del contado siano e debbiano fatti per li popolari de’ detti popoli e 
piovieri de’ migliori e più potenti popolari di quello populo….e che cotali sindachi così 
creati sieno constretti di ricevere il sindacato del suo populo de la città overo del pioviere 
del contado per messer lo capitano e suoi iudici.” 
84 Caduff, “Magnati,” 27, ftnt. 38.  
85 Caduff, “Magnati,” 27, assumes that third parties normally assisted in crafting 
denunciations. 
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Narrating the crimes of the grandi: The rhetoric and structure of denunciations 
These denunciations, thousands of which survive in the Florentine archives, are an 
invaluable source for understanding how medieval non-elites interacted with the state.86 
They indicate the widespread rural diffusion of the second Florentine popular regime’s 
ideology of pax, iustitia and concordia by the mid-fourteenth century.  How did the 
tamburo-based denunciation system work in practice, and what do we gain through 
approaching the tamburagioni as a genre?87  Some scholars have argued that the Signoria 
intended the system to function as a sort of passive listening post, allowing the state to 
expand its knowledge of its territory and subjects through a one-way stream of 
information.88 Yet the denunciation system was open-ended, with tamburagioni written 
anonymously; some denouncers used this anonymity to complain about the failings of the 
Executor.89 Because of this, the tamburo system provides historians with a remarkable 
source for how resentment of elite arrogance and the failures of the state could be 
transformed into a mechanism initiating state activity. A close reading of the 
denunciationsn reveals something of how Tuscans conceived of the Executor’s duties. 
																																																								
86 According to the Archivio di Stato di Firenze’s website, 2283 registers and filze 
of the Executor’s court survive in total for the period 1343-1435: 
http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/siasfi/cgi-
bin/RSOLSearchSiasfi.pl?_op=getmainwindow&id=IFBA3736XX&_language=ita&_sel
ectbycompilationdate=SI&curwin=thirdwindow . It is almost impossible to estimate the 
total number of surviving denunciations given the fragmentary nature of the atti and the 
frequent repetition of denunciations for the same crime.  
87 For an art-historical discussion of the tamburo system, see Allie Terry-Fritsch, 
“Networks of urban secrecy: Tamburi, anonymous denunciations and the production of 
the gaze in fifteenth-century Florence,” in The visual culture of secrecy in early modern 
Europe, eds. Timothy McCall et. al. (Kirksville, MO., 2013), 162-81 (hereafter “Terry-
Fritsch, Networks”).  
88 This seems to be Terry-Fritsch’s main conclusion regarding the later uses of the 
tamburo system in “Networks,” 178. 
89 See Caduff, “Magnati,” 30-33, for a discussion of this. 
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I read the denunciations at one remove from the social context of their authors and 
main protagonists. This serves as the first part of a three-tiered approach to the 
complicated inquests found in the Florentine judicial registers. My analysis of the 
denuncie here as a textual world unto themselves is followed in chapter 4 by a discussion 
of the role judicial procedure played in disputes, in which a I attempt to answer a 
question that Thomas Kuehn asked of another genre, microstoria: “How does the filter of 
legal rules and terms operate to transfix social realities and subtly restructure them?”90 
This in turn leads us back to the reality beyond the text, that is, rural Tuscany and its 
residents, which are my focus for the rest of the study. 
The tamburo system was established in the Ordinances of 1293 and the final 
redaction of the Ordinances of 6 July 1295, as well as the 1322 statutes of the Capitano 
del Popolo. The Ordinances stipulated that there should be two boxes, one inside the 
Palazzo del Podestà (currently the Bargello), under the loggia that in the January 1293 
edition of the Ordinances is noted as “recently built,” the other, in the Palazzo del 
Difensore.91 As several scholars have noted, this was initiated a major trend in the 
practice of justice at Florence, as elsewhere: the resort to anonymous denunciations for 
																																																								
90 Kuehn, “Reading Microhistory: The example of Giovanni and Lusanna,” The 
Journal of Modern History 61:3 (1989), 515. 
91 Ordinamenti in Diacciati & Zorzi, La legislazione, 29: “Et fiant duo tambura, 
quorum unum stet in palatio domini Potestatis sub loggia noviter facta; et aliud 
tamburum, in palatio domini defensoris, in loco publico et aperto; in quibus tamburis sit 
licitum cuilibet mictere cedulam continentem illos tales qui fecerunt contra predicta vel 
aliquod predictorum in presenti ordinamento contenctorum. Et dominus Potestas et 
Defensor, et quilibet eorum, contra tales magnates dantes et recipientes, sive dari et recipi 
facientes, habeant liberum arbitrium investigandi et inquirendi predicta, et puniendi 
contra facientes ut dictum est. Et si alie cedule de aliis factis in dictis tamburis 
micterentur, pro nichilo habeantur.” See Statuti.1, liber quinto, rubr. LXVIIII, for a 
restatement of the tamburo system. The Podestà’s quarters were moved to the Bargello in 
the fourteenth century.  
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prosecuting malefactors, which gradually replaced the parish-based system of accusations 
and in-person reportage.92 By the early fifteenth century, tamburi for various tribunals 
were in place in the political-religious core of the city. One was located near the Duomo, 
two in the Piazza della Signoria (one located somewhere in the Piazza, the other in the 
Loggia della Signoria), one near the grain market of Orsanmichele. The last one, that of 
the Executor, was located in the Palazzo del Podestà, today’s Bargello.93  Cursory notes 
in the incipits of individual inquests indicate that the Executor’s tamburo was posted in a 
room on the lower level, probably in the interior courtyard, of the Executor’s palazzo, 
near that of the Capitano del Popolo in the Bargello.94 
The tamburo system was functioning as the statutes envisioned it when the surviving 
judicial acts pick up in November 1343.95 After 1349, there is a noticeable dropoff in the 
number of anonymous tamburagioni against magnates, as opposed to in-person 
accusations, denunciations against communal officials, and pro forma syndications of the 
priors and prison wardens.96 Samuel Cohn has claimed that by the mid-Trecento, the 
court was no longer interested in policing noble crime.97 This overstates the case. 
																																																								
92 On this process and what came before it, the best guide remains Zorzi, 
L’amministrazione della giustizia penale nella Repubblica fiorentina: aspetti e problemi 
(Florence, 1988). See also Klapisch-Zuber’s discussion in Ritorno, 167-69. 
93 Terry-Fritsch, 163, provides a helpful map of the location of Quattrocento 
tamburi. 
94 Caduff, “Magnati,” 23; EOG.157, 35r: “cassa tamburi, qua est in sala inferiore 
palatii residentie ipsius domini Executoris….” See also Valgimogli, Elenchi Nominativi, 
3: “La sede dell’Executor si trovava nella parte posteriore del Palazzo dei Priori, a fianco 
di quella del Capitano del popolo….” 
95 Caduff, “Magnati,” 25. 
96 I have not found a single tamburagione acted upon by the Executor for the 
period 1351-55 or 1360-64, but I do not have a satisfactory explanation for this.  
97 Cohn, Jr., “Criminality and the state in renaissance Florence, 1344-1466,” 
Journal of Social History 14:2 (Winter, 1980), 212. Cohn also ignores the fact that cases 
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Denunciations ignored by the Executor could be lodged with the Podestà or Capitano del 
Popolo, and Cohn ignored the rash of tamburagioni that survive from the period 1343-49 
and the 1360s.98 The court’s periodic silences regarding noble crime may also be a trick 
of documentation, for the tamburo system was suspended for cases against magnates at 
least twice in the later Trecento: from 1355-60, and from 1393-98.99  
The tamburo was opened once a week in the presence of the Executor, the Capitano 
del Popolo, and judges and notaries from each court.100 The notaries copied the 
tamburagioni into registers, and the judge determined if there were sufficient grounds for 
an inquest. Very few autograph copies of denuncie survive.101 The Executor’s court 
initially separated registers containing the denunciations and those containing the 
denunciations as well as their inquests, but these do not survive. The registers from the 
Capitano’s court contain all denunciations for a given week, while those of the Executor 
only contain denunciations leading to an inquest.102  
																																																																																																																																																																					
frequently passed back and forth between the Executor, Podestà, and Capitano, a point 
remarked upon by Caduff (“Magnati,” 26). 
98 EOG.119 and 122 (comprising together the period 16 January 1348/49-29 
December 1349), for example, consist entirely of anonymous tamburo denunciations and 
related processual information. See AdE.124 for witness testimony for these cases. 
99 For the suspension of the tamburo system, see Gene A. Brucker, Florentine 
politics and society, 1343-1378 (Princeton, 1962), 200; Caduff, “Magnati,” 27; Klapisch-
Zuber, Ritorno, 168-70, and her “Ruptures de parenté et changements d’indentité chez le 
magnats florentins du XIVe siècle,” Annales: E.S.C. 43 (1988), 1234. 
100 CdP.24 (1 February-31 July 1345) is a typical example of the transcription 
style for the Capitano’s registers, containing transcriptions of the tamburagioni, often 
undated and with no notes regarding the outcome of the denunciations. 
101 Milner, “‘Fanno’”, 118, notes that no original cedulae have come to light for 
the 15th or early 16th centuries, either. There was probably no reason to preserve them 
once the information they contained had been copied into judicial registers. 
102 Caduff, “Magnati,” 25, ftnt. 30: “Fino a noi sono arrivati solo i libri delle 
tamburagioni del capitano del popolo. Dell’esecutore si hanno solo le cedole che furono 
oggeto di incheste.” 
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I discuss judicial procedure and proof in the next chapter, in particular their role in 
shaping the actions of those in the Executor’s court, as well as the nature of our 
documentation. Here, I would like to treat the tamburagioni as a narrative genre. The 
tamburagioni affirm and exemplify a particular view of the world. Each cedula inserts 
the crime it reports into this broader context, but individual cedulae take on rhetorical 
weight in the context the Executor’s registers: one anecdote is followed by another. A 
1345 denunciation cited by Caduff is, perhaps, the purest form of this sort of anecdote: 
Simone dei Tosinghi beat a popolano of Santa Maria and threatened the author of the 
denuncia. Since the village was afraid of Simone, the author entrusted himself to the 
Executor, demanding justice for the love of God.103 This terse, 3-line denunciation can be 
seen as the basic model for how to write a tamburagione.104  
 The denunciations I discuss are drawn from the libri tamburagionum and libri 
inquisitionum of the Capitano and Executor. Some precede the Black Death of 1348, 
while others lie on the other side of that divide. All report magnate crimes against 
popolani. They were selected for particularly vivid language and are longer than many 
other denunciations, but are characteristic in all other ways.  
The central theme in these denunciations is the behavior of the magnates. Reading the 
denuncie, one is immediately struck by the disparity between the clear understanding of 
who and what this social category is, and the interminable debates among both 
																																																								
103 CdP.24, 3r: “Sichome Simone di Baldo di Tosinghi tolle il suo a Cito 
Bonacorsi da Travaglia del popolo de Santa Maria e anche me menaccia dela persona 
pero me riducho a voi che mi faciate ragione pero chella villa ne paura si chio me 
racomando per l’amore de dio.”  
104 Caduff, “Magnati,” 26: “essa è pure un esempio di come anche scrivere una 
denuncia anonima possa a volte essere un’impresa ardua per chi non è abituato alla 
penna.” 
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contemporary writers and modern historians over who exactly was a magnate, a member 
of the grandi, and the relation these two terms had with the quality of nobilitas.105 This 
clarity is due, most obviously, to the fact that in addition to communal officials, only 
magnates could be denounced to the Executor via the tamburo. Denouncers were 
required to denote the lineage of the perpetrator and whether he was a magnate of the city 
or contado: magnates are magnates because they appear in the cedulae. Yet this working 
definition fails to capture the uncertainty that developed over the Trecento regarding the 
“magnateness” of certain families, in particular those of the contado.106  
It also ignores an important element in how denouncers describe the magnates, an 
element which leads this tangle of definitions beyond the ambit of the statutes and 
towards broader social, or at least textual, reality. In most denunciations to the Executor 
and Capitano del Popolo, magnates are also described as grandi e possenti, or from a 
house of grandi et potenti.107 Whereas “magnate” was a legal definition, “grande e 
possente” linked this legal category to the social reality being denounced in the cedulae. 
The “greatness” of the magnates was a matter of power in its most physical and direct 
sense: grandigia or superbia.108  Perhaps the best translation of grande would be “big 
shot” (pezzo grosso; pezzo novante). This was someone with social and economic clout 
																																																								
105 See in particular the writings of Lapo da Castiglionchio, which Klapisch-Zuber 
uses to frame her analysis in “Nobles or Pariahs?”, 215, and Retour, 39-41. 
106 See Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 41-42, for this uncertainty and various ways of 
defining rural nobles.  
107 See, for example, CdP.24, 8r, where Pietro di Giuta dei Monte Rinaldi is 
described as “grande et potente et de la casa grande et potente de Signori da Monte 
Rinaldi del contado di Fiorenze.” 
108 I echo here Klapisch-Zuber’s remarks in “Nobles or Pariahs?”, 222-23, and 
Retour, 99. 
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because of their family and connections, probably arrogant and ready to exercise their 
rights, or impositions, to the full, usually to the detriment of the popolo.109 
This hubris and arrogance was based in part on the strength in numbers of these 
lineages. Klapisch-Zuber has demonstrated the sheer size of many of these families in 
terms of the number of adult males, at least before the plague cycles of 1348 and 1363-
64.110 This corresponds to the nature of magnate activity as depicted in the denuncie. 
Magnate crimes were often a family affair, with sons, brothers, cousins, and other family 
members accompanying the primary malefactor.111 Caduff has shown that it was usually 
the same members of a lineage committing crimes against popolani. This indicates that a 
constituent element of grandigia lay, for some of the magnates, in abusing and 
tyrannizing popolani. Demonstrating one’s power in public was a key part of the identity 
of these grandi e possenti. Behaving badly, through brigandage or assaults on popolani 
was simply what the powerful did, and had been doing for some time.112 For the 
recalcitrant magnates of the 1340s, this superbia perhaps lacked the pejorative 
connotations evident in the denuncie, or rather it was their mirror image: a magnate’s 
actions were honorable or reprehensible depending on the viewer.  
																																																								109	On	debates	regarding	chivalry	and	true	nobility	in	late	medieval	Italy,	see	Carol	Lansing,	The	Florentine	Magnates	(Princeton,	NJ.,	1991),	at	212-28,	and,	for	Brunetto	Latini’s	efforts	at	refashioning	chivalry,	Peter	W.	Sposato,	“Reforming	the	Chivalric	elite	in	thirteenth-century	Florence:	The	evidence	of	Brunetto	Latini’s	IL	
Tesoretto,”	Viator	46:	1	(2015),	203-27.	
110 See Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 464, table 3.1, for magnate males swearing oaths 
before the podestà. The Bardi were most numerous, with 138 adult males in the lineage in 
1344.  
111 See Caduff’s discussion of this in “Magnati,” 53. 
112 See Chris Wickham, Framing the early middle ages: Europe and the 
Mediterranean, 400-800 (Oxford, 2005), 177, and 570-73, for the late Roman comedy 
Querolus and aristocratic bad behavior in Gaul during Late Antiquity.  
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What was the nature of the “power” evoked in the epithet potenti? Klapisch-Zuber 
has demonstrated that, during the second half of the fourteenth century and into the 
1420s, the wealth of most magnate families steadily declined.113 By the time Cosimo the 
Old returned to Florence to assume de facto control of the city in 1434, most magnate 
families were among the middle ranks of Florentines in terms of wealth, which in part 
explains the reabsorption into the popolo of most of the remaining magnates: they no 
longer presented a serious threat to the Florentine state.114 This was not yet the case for 
the main period under consideration in this chapter, however, circa 1340-1370. During 
this period, families such as the Bardi were among the wealthiest in the city.115The 
epithet potens (pl. potenti, It. possente/i) was partially a matter of wealth.  
Of equal importance was a predilection towards violence. This trait was of primary 
importance in the origins of the Ordinances of Justice and the category “magnate.”116 The 
Ordinances emphasized violence within the elite lineages, the sort of violence 
exemplified in the Cerchi-Donati vendetta that exploded into the civil war between Black 
and White Guelfs between 1301 and 1304.117 During the mid-fourteenth century, 
however, the emphasis is on magnate violence against popolani. This violence and 																																																								
113 Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 85-98, and the tables detailing fluctuations in magnate 
wealth as assessed in a variety of ways. 
114 Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 92: “Così, quelli ammessi nel Popolo nell’ottobre 
1434 non risultano proprio più tra i “Potenti’ né per fortuna, né per numero: hanno 
raggiunto gli strati medi….” 
115 See Klapisch-Zuber, Ritorno, 70, for Bardi purchases of lands which they 
subsequently used as bases to terrorize the countryside. 
116 Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 45-46 On magnate violence in the late Duecento, see, 
in general, Lansing, Florentine Magnates, 164-91; Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia a Firenze al 
tempo degli ordinamenti antimagnatizi,” in Ordinamenti di giustizia fiorentini, ed. Vanna 
Arrighi (Florence, 1995), 105-47.  
117 On the Cerchi-Donati vendetta, see Zorzi, “La faida Cerchi-Donati,” in La 
trasformazione di un quadro politico. Ricerche su politica e giustizia a Firenze  
dal comune allo Stato territoriale (Florence, 2008), 95-120. 
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arrogance towards the popolo is another key element in outlining the grandi et potenti at 
the center of denunciations to the Executor.  
The first denunciation under consideration is from 21 February 1345, and was lodged 
against Boccaccio di Messer Rinaldo dei Gherardini.118 If the denunciation against 
Simone dei Tosinghi exemplifies the tamburagioni as a minimal form of reportage, that 
against Boccaccio is exemplary insofar as it frames a specific crime within a world of 
fixed values and oppositions. Boccaccio was denounced for an attack in February 1345, 
in the village of Belvedere just southeast of Colle Valdelsa, on the border with the 
Senese.119 Boccaccio, accompanied by his followers (fanti), assaulted one Nuccio di 
Giovanni Arrighi with a lance, giving him several wounds in the face and body.120 The 
wounds were serious enough that the denunciation’s author believed Nuccio would die. 
 The denunciation begins with some impassioned invective and exhortation. These 
lines slot the crime into a wider explanatory framework, in lieu of any statement of why 
the crime occurred. The author initially appeals to the Executor not on formal legal 
grounds, but based on the economics of the court’s position.  He then excoriates the 
Gherardini in language that also, implicitly, blasts the Florentine courts: 
“I come before you[,] who are supported by the Florentine popolo, mercy before God, give aid to 
the people so that there are not as many robberies as there are, all by the Gherardini, who have 
committed more homicides and evil deeds than all the houses of Florence, for God, aid us [in 
these affairs]….”121 																																																								
118 The denunciation and procedural material are found on EOG.21, 82r-83v; the 
denunciation itself is 82r-82v. 
119 The precise location of the attack is given (EOG.21, 82r) as “nella strada 
piunicha nella corte e distretto di Cholla di Valdelsa il luoco decto, Belvedere che dal 1 
l’erede di Nicolo Malavolti, a 2 il comune di Colle la quale fu di Misser Albizo di 
Tancredo, a 3 e 4 Messer Nicola di Francesci overo altri piveri confini.” 
120 EOG.21, 82r. See appendix one for my transcription of the denunciation. 
121 EOG.21, 82r: “Dinanzi atte che si sostengno del popolo di Fiorenze 
misericordia per dio soccorrete i popolani che non siano quanti robari chome sono tucto 
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All of this precedes the section of the denunciation providing the formal criteria needed 
for an actionable tamburagione: the offending magnate’s name, his family, the crime, and 
the place and year in which it was committed.122 These lines fit the specific crime being 
reported into a pre-existing, tripartite forcefield of obligations, hatreds, and character 
sketches, with the popolo as its fulcrum. On one hand is the Executor and, by implication, 
other popular officials, financed and sustained by the popolo. Yet they are not earning 
their keep, for Nuccio’s murder is one among many past magnate crimes that the 
Executor has not punished. The denunciation’s author casts this failure to discharge one’s 
duty in moral terms, as he begs for divine mercy so that the Executor will aid and support 
the popolani. This incipit indicates how the author saw the Executor and his duties, or 
better, how popolani described his duties when writing denunciations. The Executor is 
portrayed here not as an impartial executor of the Ordinances of Justice, but as a sort of 
protecting shield of the popolo and individual popolani.  
 The primary threat to the popolo is, of course, the Gherardini and the magnates in 
general. The author of the denunciation placed the Gherardini at the forefront of magnate 
criminality, committing as they have “more murders and crimes” than all the other 
Florentine magnate lineages. His rhetorical claim seems to be borne out by the evidence. 
Claudia Caduff found that Colle Valdelsa, along with Panzano in Valdipesa and 
Montevarchi, formed a triangle in which concentrated a numerical majority of rural 
denunciations. The Gherardini, similarly, were one of the most-denounced families from 
																																																																																																																																																																					
di per li Gherardini che anno facti piu micidi e malifici che tucte le case di Fiorenze, per 
dio, soccorrete a queste cose….” 
122 See Caduff, “Magnati,” 26, for these criteria. 
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the material Caduff studied, which is contemporaneous with this denunciation.123 The 
specific description of the assault on Nuccio fits other portrayals of magnate violence: 
Boccaccio was accompanied by an armed retinue (sua conpagnia), and the attack 
occurred on a rural public road (strada piunicha).  
 It is impossible to know whether the author of this denunciation was, in fact, one 
of the popolani whose misery they so eloquently describe; in any case, they did an 
excellent job of scripting themselves as such. Even if the denunciation was false, and 
there is no reason to think so, this category was the central one in the magnate-official-
popolano relationship. Even if categories such as “magnate” and “popolo” were tactical 
constructs deployed in the struggles of the late thirteenth century, they corresponded to a 
social reality that was fundamental to those writing denunciations, and which changed 
along with Florentine society and political culture. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber has argued 
that these terms took on a dialectical meaning based on the balance of power between 
magnates and popolani. The ideological positioning of the magnates as always and 
eternally opposed to the popolo was made real and exemplified through denouncing and 
excoriating the magnates, even if this process ignored the ways in which magnate 
lineages or individual magnates could regain popolano status.124 The two terms were a 
pair, with popular self-conceptions implicit in their definition of magnates.125 In the 
																																																								
123 Caduff, “Magnati,” 34. The other magnate families that were most frequently 
denounced also had residences or estates in this area: the da Monte Rinaldi, Ricasoli, da 
Grignano, Cavalcanti, Bardi, and Squarcialupi. 
124 For the process of reentering the popolo, see Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 285-306. 
125See Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, “Nobles or pariahs? The exclusion of 
Florentine magnates from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 39:2 (1997), 216-17: “these words [“magnate” and “popolano”] 
are not pure substances: They take their meaning in a dialectical relationship of 
forces….Because it is built around the idea not only of exclusion but also those of 
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denunciation against Boccaccio, fear and hatred of the magnates turns otherwise disparate 
rural Tuscans and Florentines into a coherent entity, the popolo di Fiorenze.  
This tripartite relationship between court, popolani, and magnati is repeated and 
underlined in the conclusion of the denunciation. The denouncer implores the Executor: 
“May it please you, for God, to punish those who have always been enemies of the 
Florentine poplo, the Gherardini.”126 The Executor is once again entreated to act as 
something more than a technical administrator of the law, to act as a righteous avenger of 
the popolo. This was also, perhaps, his Christian duty (“misericordia per dio…per dio, 
per dio”).  The denunciation explains a basic social reality in ideological terms, 
demanding harsher action from the courts based on that ideological perception of reality. 
The second denunciation, concerning events in the urban neighborhood of the 
Oltrarno, was lodged against the magnate brothers Sandro and Napoleone di Lipaccio dei 
Frescobaldi, in March 1347. According to the denunciation, in February of the same year, 
the two brothers assembled fifty henchmen in the family palazzo in piazza Frescobaldi, at 
the foot of the Ponte Santa Trinità over the Arno. In an ambiguous passage, the 
denunciation describes them as gathering stones and bricks and shooting a ballista at the 
night’s watch gathered in the piazza.127 This, the author explains, they were doing in 
order to cause confusion and strife in the city, “in order to ruin the good, peaceful, and 
																																																																																																																																																																					
distance and difference, the meaning of magnate could be constantly revised because that 
meaning followed from the idea that the popolo had of itself.” 
126 EOG.21, 82v: “Piaciavi per dio, per dio, punire i nimici stati sempre del 
popolo di Fiorenze che sono i Gerardini.” 
127 CdP.53, 6r: “…di nocte tempo gictarono di chasa loro più e più sassi e mactoni 
e saetarono uno quadrello con asta con penne de Ramo alle guardie del chomune di 
Fiorenze che guardavano in su la piazza dei dicti Freschobaldi…..” See the appendix for 
a full transcription of the denunciation.  
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tranquil status of the popolo and commune of Florence and of the Guelf Party….”128 The 
Frescobaldi had received aid from the signor of Volterra, Ottaviano dei Belforti. The 
denunciation describes Ottaviano here as Sandro and Napoleone’s cousin (loro coginato), 
who had sent the Frescobaldi many archers, presumably also Volterrani.129  
Perhaps the denunciation’s author was consciously alluding to the events of 1340. 
Ottaviano dei Belforti made himself lord (signor) of Volterra that year. In Giovanni 
Villani’s chronicle, this was followed almost immediately at Florence with an attempted 
coup by the Bardi and Frescobaldi.130 According to Villani, the Florentine magnates also 
mobilized their allies in the contado and beyond: along with the Conti Guidi and Alberti, 
the Belforti da Volterra were, according to Villani, among those who took part in the 
conspiracy.131 This was followed three years later by further strife between magnates and 
popolani in 1343, following the expulsion of the Duke of Athens, Gualtiere di Brienne.132  
The denunciation’s description of Frescobaldi machinations in 1347 echoes that of 
Villani’s description of the events of 1343.  The denouncer’s description (“questo 
fecciono per levare la terra a’romore”) matches that of Giovanni Villani when speaking 
																																																								
128 CdP.53, 6v: “….per guastare il buono e paccificho e tranquillo stato del popolo 
e del comune di Fiorenze e di parte guelfa….” 
129 On Ottaviano’s seizure of power in Volterra and the subsequent fate of the 
Belforti, see the pieces by Lorenzo Fabbri and Claudia Tripodi in Le signorie cittadine in 
Toscana, ed. Andrea Zorzi (Rome, 2013), 231-52, and 253-72, respectively. Villani 
describes Ottaviano’s seizure of power at 12.116. 
130 G. Villani, Cronica, 118. 
131 G. Villani, Cronica, 118. 
132 For these events, see Villani, 12.118, and Amedeo de Vincentiis, “L’ultima 
signoria. Firenze, il duca d’Atene e la fine del consenso angioino” in Le signorie cittadine 
in Toscana, 83-120. 
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of how Florence expelled the Duke: “come la città di Firenze si levò a romore, e cacciò il 
duca d’Atene che n’era signore.”133  
The author also warns the Executor that the Frescobaldi intended to ruin the Parte 
Guelfa, which he equates with the commune itself, referring to a fundamental unit in the 
cultural and political makeup of the Florentine state. Following the vicious schism 
between the Black and White Guelfs, the Guelf Party gradually became a pillar of the 
oligarchical regime that dominated the city for most of the period 1308-1343.134 As noted 
above, the Executor himself was required to be “zealous for the Guelf Party.” By the 
1350s, the Parte Guelfa was able to disqualify its enemies from political office through a 
system of warnings against supposed Ghibellines, the ammonizioni.135 When the 
Ordinances of Justice were incorporated into the commune’s statutes in 1409, the 
Ordinances’ new prologue boasted that they had been compiled “for the honor, triumph, 
and exaltation and strengthening of the sacrosanct, ever-victorious and unconquerable 
Guelf Party….”136 In the twilight of the Florentine republic, the Guelf Party was 
synonymous with the commune itself. Emphasizing the threat the Frescobaldi allegedly 
posed to the commune and political orthodoxy, the denouncer was working within a 
																																																								
133 Villani, 12.17.  
134 Vieri Mazzoni, Accusare e proscrivere il nemico politico: Legislazione 
antighibellina e persecuzione giudiziaria a Firenze (1347-1378) (Pisa, 2010), is a 
thorough analysis of the Guelf Party and its impact on Florentine politics during the 
Trecento. See Mazzoni, 103-05, for the first law of 1358 on ammonizioni. 
135See Mazzoni, 103-05, for the first law of 1358 on ammonizioni. For the broader 
context of Florentine politics and society in the 1350s and ‘60s, see Brucker, Florentine 
politics, 336-51, for what Brucker aptly describes as “the Guelf terror”. 
136 The 1409 prologue is cited in Zorzi & Diacciati, La legislazione, XXXIII: 
“…ad honorem, triumphum et exaltationem et augmentum sacrosancte, victoriosissime, 
et inconvincibilis Parte Guelfe….” Zorzi and Diacciati’s discussion of the relationship 
between the Guelf Party and the magnates that follows is also valuable.  
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venerable associative field with a long history before it in Florentine politics, and with 
roots going back to the Primo Popolo of 1250-1260. 
The most striking part of this screed against the Frescobaldi is, however, its 
conclusion, which is worth quoting at length. In some of the most vivid language I have 
found in the entire run of denunciations to the Executor and Capitano, the author shapes 
the events in piazza Frescobaldi into an existential threat to the commune. What sort of 
response did this require from the Executor?: 
“I write the names [of the witnesses] below in this writing, because we entreat you 
that you may, from this crime and dangerous affair, do justice unto them and carry out a 
great vendetta, because they must not be pardoned for such evils, and this must not 
happen another time, and so that this city shall not be smashed and so that this popolo 
shall not perish and shall not be wrecked by the grandi.”137 
  
The ideology of the popolo reaches its logical extreme here. If the Executor and 
Capitano del Popolo exist to protect the buono e pacificho e tranquillo stato del comune, 
then justice must be done against its enemies. And this justice is nothing other than the 
vendetta. The denunciation’s author envisions the Executor not as a mediator or legal 
administrator, but as the sword of the popolo, closer to Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the 
Cheka, than Mompuccio dei Girolami. The spirit of Giano Della Bella and the radical 
wing of the popular party of the 1290s flickers through in this author’s prose as he 
demands that the crimes of the grandi not be forgiven (tanti mali non si perdoni loro).  
Another case from 1347 indicates, if not how magnates saw the popolo, at least how 
popular discourse constructed elite perceptions of the popolo. Niccolo di Messer Stoldo 
																																																								
137 CdP.53, 6v: “….i quali io scrivo di socto in questa scrita perche vi preghiamo 
che di questa rea e periculosa chosa facciate grande giusstitia [sic] e vendetta di loro 
perche tante male no si perdoni loro e no sia un’altra volta. E che questa citade no si 
guasti e questo popolo non sia more e disfacto pe’grandi.” 
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dei Frescobaldi was denounced in March 1347 for beating up Michele di Piero degli 
Inghilberti in the town of Castelfiorentino in Valdelsa in December 1346.138 Niccolo 
assaulted Michele in the loggia of Castelfiorentino’s castello. He did so, according to the 
denunciation, to spite the Florentine popolo, declaring as he beat Michele,“These 
popolari are shit!”139  The denunciation concludes with an appeal to the Executor to carry 
out his duties, “because [the] popolari of Florence have great hope in you.”140 Again, the 
statutes’ vision of the nature of the Executor’s office diverges sharply from how public 
opinion saw it. This is how the statutes define the duties of the Executor and this is how 
the people thought they were supposed to behave.  
The same person most likely wrote another denunciation a few weeks later, against 
Lotto di Lapo di Gherarducci dei Buondelmonti, for another assault in 
Castelfiorentino.141  Lotto supposedly beat one Covero di Guidino, declaring like Niccolo 
dei Frescobaldi, “popolari di merda sono questi”, and threatening to kill Covero.142 The 
denunciation opens by declaring that the popolani of Florence had the very greatest hope 
in him, arising from the name and reputation of the Executor’s father.143 The Executor for 
this semester was Landuccio di Ser Lando dei Bicchi da Gubbio; his father, Lando dei 
																																																								
138 CdP.53, 14r. 
139 CdP.53, 14r: “E le predicte chose fece in dispecto del popolo di Fiorenze 
dicendo che popolari di merda sono questi.” 
140 CdP.53, 14r: “Piacciave di farne lo ufitio vostro iperoche popolari di Fiorenze 
anno grande isperanza in voi.” 
141 This argument is based on the identical vocabulary and syntax of the two 
denunciations: see the appendix for my transcriptions.  
142 CdP.53, 20r: “….in dispecto del popolo di Fiorenze, dicendo che ‘popolari di 
merda sono questi’ e minacciandolo, ‘io tutoro la persona.’” I read “tutoro” as a 
Tuscanized, future form of the Latin “tutare”: http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/TUTARE 
143 CdP.53, 20r: “Messer lo seguitore sopra gli ordini della Justitia nella cui 
Singnoria I popolani di Fiorenze anno grandissima speranza in voi per piu cosi et 
considerando il nome e fama del vostro padre…” 
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Bicchi, had served as Bargello of Florence in 1316.144 This family of Guelf stalwarts 
furnished several more officials for the Florentine commune. Lando di Lando served as 
Podestà in 1374, and Lazzaro di Lando, this Lando’s son, was Capitano del Popolo in 
1395.145  
The denouncer does not explain the virtues of Lando, but places the two Bicchi in 
contrast to Landuccio’s predecessors. He makes his appeal not only because of Lando’s 
good reputation, but “because your [Landuccio’s] two predecessors have ruined this, your 
office….” The denouncer goes on to implore the Executor to act so that the popolani 
shall not be “so harshly injured by the grandi.”146 This is remarkable evidence for social 
memory at work.147 For whatever reason, the memory of Lando the virtuous Bargello 
remained among the people of Castelfiorentino 31 years after his term of office. This 
memory was deployed to favorably contrast Lando with his son Landuccio’s two 
predecessors as Executor, Montano di Cecco da Pergola and Egidio di Gareggiato dei 
Mecchi da Perugia.148 We again see the Executor’s social base-those lodging the 
denunciations-envisioning, or perhaps demanding, a more active and aggressive role for 
the court than previous officials have played.  Tuscans seem to have kept tabs on 
																																																								
144 Oderigi Lucarelli, Memorie e guida storica di Gubbio (Città di Castello, 1888), 
230. Lucarelli descries the Becchi as “appartennero alla fazione guelfa, e dal 1384 al 
1391 furono tra I più fervidi patrioti eugibini che si opposero alla signoria del conte 
Antonio di Montefeltro.” 
145 Lucarelli, Memorie, 230. The Bargello was another foreign official; the office 
gave its name to the eponymous building. For the duties of the Bargello, see the entry in 
L’Enciclopedia Italiana and TLIO: http://tlio.ovi.cnr.it/TLIO/ .  
146 CdP.53, 20r: “due vostri predecesori anno guasto questo vostro offitio intendisi 
che per voi saraconti si e in tale modo che popolari di Fiorenze no siano cosi fortemente 
ingiuriati da grandi.” 
147 For the idea of social memory, see Chris Wickham and James Fentress, Social 
memory: New perspectives on the past (Oxford, 1992).  
148 See Elenchi Nominativi, 14, for these officials. 
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individual rectors’ aggressiveness, or lack thereof, in pursuing and prosecuting magnate 
violence, and this knowledge could be woven into appeals to the Executor for stronger 
action. 
As noted above, some scholars have perceived a lack of interest on the part of the 
Executor in initiating inquests into crimes reported in the tamburo in the post-plague 
years; others have gone so far as to claim that Tuscan communities had lost interest in 
policing crime.149 It does seem to be the case that the number of tamburagioni leading to 
inquests decreases after 1348 relative to the surviving documentation from the pre-plague 
years (1343-48). While pro forma syndications occupied much of the court’s time, the 
Executor did not abandon the business of hearing tamburagioni against magnates, and 
Tuscans certainly did not lose interest in denouncing the crimes of the grandi. When 
tamburagione-based inquests do appear in registers from the 1350s and 1360s, they are 
similar to those from the pre-plague years. Following the first ban on the use of the 
tamburo in magnate cases (1355-60), a trickle of anti-magnate tamburgioni begins again, 
although by the late 1370s, the notaries had replaced a full transcription of denuncie with 
summary notes of the magnates being denounced and the witnesses against them.150 
One of these was lodged against Messer Neri di messer Jacopo da Certaldo, one of 
the rural magnate lineages.151  The denunciation frames Neri’s activities in the 
established genre of magnate violence against rural people. Sometime before November 
20 1367, Neri, armed and on horseback, attacked Giovanni, called “Rubbish” (vocatur 																																																								
149 For a decline in the reportage of crime, see Manikowska, “ ‘Acurr’uomo,’” 
546-49. 
150 See, for example, EOG.810, for June 1378, for this change in court 
documentation. 
151 Statuti, II.290-92, for the 1322-25 list of magnate families, including the da 
Certaldo. See EOG.514, 20r-20v, for the denunciation against Neri. 
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ciarpa), whose father was a hired hand (manovrare) for the church of San Michele a 
Mogliana, near Montespertoli.152 Neri beat Giovanni several times with his sword and 
threw him to the ground. Neri then used his horse to crush or kick Giovanni, and beat him 
some more. This vicious assault crippled Giovanni, such that he could no longer work his 
plot of land (podere).153 All of this was, the author noted, publica voce e fama in the 
popolo of Sant’Andrea di Montespertoli.154 
Like the outrages of the Gherardini, Frescobaldi, and Buondelmonti, the report of the 
crime embeds it within the categories of popular discourse. From the specific events, the 
author leads into a broader affirmation and appeal to the values and community embodied 
in the Ordinances of Justice. This appeal is also a demand for aggressive action on the 
part of the Executor. The author’s exasperation underlines his (her?) appeals to the state’s 
duties towards its subjects: 
“All these injuries named above are against our statutes and most especially against 
the ordinances of justice, those ordinances which you have sworn [to uphold]….”155 
 
																																																								
152 EOG.514, 24r: “Neri….a cavallo armato di tucte arme da offendare assalio a la 
casa i nela quale abita Giovanni chiamato Ciarpa….” My translation is based on the 
TLIO entry, citing Sacchetti’s fourteenth-century Rime: http://tlio.ovi.cnr.it/TLIO/, entry 
for “ciarpa,”. See Pirillo, Forme.I, 428, for the location of San Michele a Mogliana. 
153 EOG.514, 24r: “Al quale Giovanni il decto Misser Neri si diede piu e piu colpi 
d’una spada sanza spargimento di sangue, egittando el quale dicto Giovanni per terra, 
facendoli scalpitare al cavallo al quale scalpitatura fece spargimento di sangue e ancora 
diede el dicto Messer Neri al dicto Ciarpa piu e piu pugna per la faccia, evetando allo 
dicto Giovanni chiamato ciarpa che non devesse piue lavorare il podere il quale il dicto 
Ciarpa lavora.” Giovanni is described as one of the church’s laboratores and was 
presumably, like his father, a tenant farmer. 
154 EOG.514, 24r: “di questo malefitio comesso e piubicca voce e fama e 
maximamente i nel popolo di Sancto Andrea a Monte spertolo e i nel popolo di Sancto 
Michele a Mogliana.” 
155 EOG.514, 24r: “le quagle tucte ignurie di sopra nominate sonno contra li nostri 
statuti e maximamente contra l’ordini de la giustitia, i quali ordini voi avete giurati….” 
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While it is tempting to read this as a spotaneous outburst of exasperated rage, it is 
also a conscious appeal to the popular regime’s self-image as protector of the people 
agianst the superbia of the grandi. And the Executor is, again, the enforcer of “our 
statutes” and the Ordinances which he had sworn to defend. Juridical discretion is 
entirely absent from this denuncia. Before listing the witnesses, the author entreats the 
Executor to act, again appealing to the venerable image of the superbia dei grandi: “you 
are obliged to rediscover this evil deed, committed by this messer Neri, grande e 
possente, so that he does not remain unpunished through [his] superior power.”156 
 The sense that the Executor not only was obliged to do his duty, but that his duty 
was properly defined by the popolo, not the commune’s Signoria, appears again in the 
author’s coda following his witness list. After noting that many of the witnesses were 
eyewitnesses for Neri’s crimes, he again entreats the Executor. In the name of God, the 
Executor must prosecute the crime “so that the grandi do not kill and injure the men [of 
the popolo] as you see they do.” If Neri is prosecuted, “there shall be great honor and 
praise for you [the Executor] and you will be esteemed by the popolani of this land of 
Florence.”157 The stakes here are not only justice for Giovanni, but the public opinion of 
the Executor and, by implication, the legitimacy of the Florentine courts. Authors of the 
denuncie fashioned the public image of the Executor into something far more proactive 
and ideologically pointed than the court’s actions usually would bear out. The denuncie 
																																																								
156 EOG.514, 24r: “voi debiate ritrovare questo malefitio comesso per questo 
Misser Neri grande e possente e che per magioranza non rimanga inpuntio ed a questo 
malefitio provare si sonno questi testimoni [the witnesses follow].” I read “magioranza” 
as meaning “superior power” or “power”, based on the context. 
157 EOG.514, 24v: “Siche [sic][,] per dio ritrovate questo malefitio, siche i grandi 
huomini non occidano l’uomini e ignurino chome vedete che fanno e questo vi sia grande 
onore e lodo e donorato da popolani di questa terra di Firenze.” 
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envision a partisan of the popolani, not the neutral adminstrator of law envisioned by the 
statutes founding the office of the Executor.  
Conclusion 
I have reviewed here the establishment of the court of the Executor, the official 
network mediating between state and subject, and the establishment of the tamburo 
system. Denunciations to the Executor demonstrate a familiarity with the Florentine 
popolo’s ideology and rhetorical lexicon, which their authors used to structure accounts 
of magnate abuses against popolani. These denunciations were not spontaneous 
expressions of popular feeling towards the magnates. Rather, read collectively, they are 
appeals to the Executor for more aggressive action against the magnates, carefully 
couched in the language of popular solidarity and official obligation of Florentine popular 
discourse. In appealing to the Florentine popolo’s cohesion and unity against to the 
magnates, the vivid language of the denunciations in fact constitutes this unity: in reality, 
popular solidarity was as provisional and negotiable as the distinctions separating 
elements of the popolo grasso from the magnates. The denuncie are not simple reports of 
magnate-popolo relations, but rhetorical texts in which the dramatis personae have 
scripted roles. Like all good ideological instruments, the denuncie simplified and 
polarized the world into a basic and fundamental rupture: in this case, that between 
magnati e popolani.  
This formal simplicity is, however, balanced by the sophisticated maneuvering for 
position evident in the same denunciations. The denuncie envision a more radical role for 
the Executor than that envisioned by the statutes. The statutes require the office to be held 
by a Guelf and popolano-fairly unremarkable qualifications, in the climate of the first 
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decade of the fourteenth century. Yet by the time documentation picks up in 1343, the 
social reality had changed significantly, with many magnate lineages reduced to poverty, 
while others had been stricken from the list of magnates.158  The socio-political climate 
can partially explain the fierce rhetoric of the denuncie from the 1340s: the “magnates’ 
priorate” had just been deposed and a popular regime reinstated when the documentary 
trail begins. This does not, however, explain the survival of this ideologically charged 
rhetoric into the latter part of the century. At work here is the decoupling of ideology 
from social reality that Roman historian Henrik Mouritsen refers to in his study of the 
later Roman Republic’s political culture.159 
This decoupling emerges with startling clarity when one shifts from the denunciations 
to the results of tamburagione-based inquests. The general tendency, identified by all 
previous scholars of the Executor’s court, was for initial denunciations to result either in 
outright dismissal, or to fizzle out after perfunctory inquests that usually did not result in 
testimony against the magnates in question.160 All the denunciations discussed above fit 
with this conclusion. The inquest against Boccaccio dei Gherardini was forwarded to the 
Podestà, but I have not found the case in the relevant atti: perhaps the case never went to 
trial, or Boccaccio settled with his victim out of court. The denunciations against the 
Frescobaldi brothers Sandro and Niccolo, Neri dei Frescobaldi, and Lapo dei Gherardini 
do not seem to have made it past the initial transcription into the Capitano’s registers, as 
																																																								
158 For adjustments to the list of magnates during the early fourteenth century, see 
Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 24-26. 
159 Mouritsen, Plebs and politics in the late roman republic (Cambridge, 2001), 
15: “Ideologies are not mirrors of reality, but may-and often do-have a life of their own, 
independent of the political practices of the time.” 
160On the dismissal of the majority of initial denuncie, see Caduff, “Magnati,” 26-
27. 
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inquests for these do not appear in the Executor’s atti. Giovanni, he of the horse-
trampling, did not receive justice, either: all the witnesses cited against Neri da Certaldo 
claimed that they knew nothing.161  
Another salient feature of these denunciations is the veil of silence surrounding 
motivation: both for the magnates committing a crime, and for whoever wrote the 
denunciation of this crime. As Caduff argued, all parties concerned would most likely 
have understood the context and motivation for the crimes, the writing of a denunciation, 
and, perhaps, who wrote the denunciations.162 Modern historians are, however, usually 
left grasping at hypotheses to resolve this problem. The issue of who wrote these 
denunciations, and why, is even more pressing given that medieval litigation at all stages, 
from an initial suit to peace pacts ending a piece of litigation, often was part of a pre-
existing, extra-judicial continuum of events: this could include disputes or feuds, the 
origins of which are usually absent from the surviving records.163 Likewise, the 
anonymity of the denunciations’ authors usually makes it impossible to know what 
sectors of Tuscan society produced the most tamburagioni, and how these classes may 
have had different understandings of the role of the Executor and the other foreign 
rettori. More information on the authors of these denunciations would allow us to 
understand the social base of the Executor’s court, those sections of Florentine society 
most inclined to use it. For these reasons, I turn now to an exception to all these 
																																																								
161 See EOG.514, 21r-21v, for witness testimony. 
162 Caduff, “Magnati,” 35. 
163 Shona Kelly Wray, “Instruments of concord: Making peace and settling 
disputes through a notary in the city and contado of Bologna,” Journal of Social History 
42:3, 2009, 747. 
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tendencies: the case of the rural notary Andrea di Ser Ugo and his prolonged dispute with 
the Pulci lineage. 
  Appendix 1: Transcriptions of Some Cases Discussed In-Text: 
 
Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Atti dell’Esecutore degli Ordinamenti di Giustizia.21. 82r 
 
Die XXI mensis Februariis 
 
Hec est inquisitio que fit et fieri intenditur per predictos dominum Executorem et iudicis 
ex eorum et cuiusque ipsorum et curie officio vigore ordinamentum iustitie contra et 
adversus: 
 
Bocchaccium domini Rinaldi de Gherardinis de Florentie mangnatem [sic] et potentem et 
de domo magnatum et potentum civitatis Florentie videlicet de domo de Gherardinis. In 
eo de eo et super eo quod fama publica precedente et clamosa insinuatione referente ad 
aures et notitiam ipsius domini Executoris iudicis et curie[,] fama pervenit auditu maxime 
per quadam reperta in tamburo quod residet pro comuni Florentie in palatio residentie 
ipsius domini Executoris cuiusquidem cedule tenor et talis est: 
 
Dinazi atte che se sostengno del popolo di Fiorenze, misericordia per dio, soccorete i 
popolani che non siano quanti robari chome sono tucto di per li Gherardini che anno facti 
piu micidi et malifici che tucte le case di Fiorenze, per dio, soccorrete a queste cose 
sappiate singnore nostro che Bocchacio di Misser Rinaldo Gherardini grande e possente 
chon sua conpagnia cio’e fu Angnolo di Misser Lapo da Cholle e altri fanti I nomi non 
so, il decto Bocchaccio assalio e manomese Nuccio di Giovanni Arrighi del popolo di 
San Quirico da Mortenana del contada di Fiorenze il quale Nuccio ‘e popolano e al decto 
Nuccio si fe diede d’una lancia nel volto si che fece una grade fidita chon effuxione di 
sangue e dicichatrice anche gli  
 
82v: 
 
diche cholla decta lancia due fedite un’e nel fiancho e una nella mano diricta del decto 
Duccio [sic] de quali fedite se crede chel decto Nuccio muoia. Elle decte chose forono del 
presente mese di Febraio anni mille CCC XLIIII e fuorono nella strada piunicha nella 
corte e distrecto di Cholle di Valdelsa, il luoco decto Belvedere, che dal 1 l’erede di 
Nicolo Malavolti, a 2, il commune di Colle la quale fu di Misser Albizzo di Tancredo, a 3 
e 4 Messer Nicola di Francesci overo altri piveri confini. Piacevi per dio, per dio, punire i 
nimici stati sempre del popolo di Fiorenze che sono i Gerardini.  
 
T. [for “Testi”] Corsucio Benicase popolo di San Donato in n’Avena 
Y Nicolaio Corssellini da Poibonizo overo della corte 
Piero di Chello del contada di Fiorenze 
Y Albizo Rigecti da Poiboinzi 
Y Bernardo di Gucio da Siena qui moratur a Staggia 
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Jacopo Buosi di Piano di Francesco 
 
Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Atti del Capitano del Popolo.53, 6r-6v: 
 
Anni Miille CCCXLVII 
 
Notificasi a voi messer la siquitore dil’ordinamenti dela giustitia si chome del mese di 
Febraio passato, Napolione Sandro fratelli e figluoli che fuoreno di Lipaccio dela chasa 
de Freschobaldi grandi e posenti del dicto mese di nocte tenpo gictarono di chasa loro piu 
e piu sassi e mactoni e sactarono uno quadrello conasta con pene de ramo alle guardie del 
chomune di Fiorenze che guardavano in su la piazza dei dicti Freschobaldi e questo 
feccione per levare la terra arromere et  
 
 
6v: 
per guastare il buono e pacceficho e tranquillo stato del popolo e del comune di Fiorenze 
e di parte Guelfa e aveano in chasa in chasa [sic] loro da cinquanta fanti e aveano 
mandati lorro messi Actaviano signore di Volterra loro coginato e molte artire in chasa 
loro e tutte queste chose troverete di vero con testimonii di veduta e di udita i quali io 
scrito di socto in questa scrita perche vi preghiamo che di questa rea e periculosa chosa 
facciate grande giusstitia e vendetta di loro perche tanti mali no si perdoni loro e no sia 
un’altra volta. E che questa citade no si guasti e questo popolo no sia more e diffacto 
pe’grandi 
 
Testimonii sono questi d’udita e de veduta:  
Tucti del popolo di San Jacopo Oltrarno: 
Pagino Choveritii 
Meo Vinatiere 
Jacomo Brunepti 
Arigho Barbiere 
Lappino Piczichaiolo 
Dominico Pianellaio 
Salvino Tani Faisectaio 
Micchele Spitiale 
Jacomo ligniaiolo 
 
Berti du Messer Giovanni Freschobaldi 
Piaccino, albergatore [nel] popolo San Friano [San Frediano] 
Giovanni di Cante de Sisi, popolo di Sa’Michele a Quarantola 
Piero 
Del Chanicello 
Filippo della lagia popolo de San Friano 
 
Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Atti del Capitano del Popolo.53.14r: 
 
Die Veneris XXIII Martii 
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Messer la seguitore sapiate chome Niccholo de Messer Stoldo di Freschobaldi e dela casa 
di grandi prese Niccholo di Piero Inghilberti da Castello Fiorentino per lo pecto et luy 
schosse piu volte e anche glie diede uno pungno nel volto chon sangue. E le predicte 
chose fece in dispecto del popolo di Fiorenze dicendo che “popolari di merda sono 
questi”. E le predicte cose fuoreno chomesse per lo dicto Nicolo nella persona del dicto 
Micchele nella loggia del comune de castello Fiorentino posta nel dicto chasstello dal 
primo, via; dal secondo, la piazza; dal’rezo [sic; read as “terzo”] casso dell’ano presente 
et del mese de Dicembre proximo passato, piacciave di farne lo ufitio vostro in proprio 
che popolari di Fiorenze anno grande isperanza in voi. 
 
Testimoni sono questi: 
Tucti di Chastello Fiorentino: 
Ser Sanna di Morie 
Fiorino Buoni 
Polito Dardonino  
Jacopo di Ciecho Schyche 
Domenicho di Fiorino 
Benedicto di Lanzo 
Giovanni di Varnuccio, chiamato “Morro” 
Ser Donato di Quirino 
Filippo di Jacopo 
Mayestro Francischo di Nocea 
Ser Symone Petri  
 
Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Atti del Capitano del Popolo.53.20r: 
 
Die Veneris XIII Aprilis 
 
Messer la seguitore [sic] sopra gli ordini della Justitia nella cui Singnoria I popolani di 
Fiorenze anno grandissima speranza in voi poer piu cosi considerando il nome e la fama 
del vostro padre et perche due vostri predecesori anno guasto questo vostro oficio[,] 
intendosi che per voi sara conti[,] in tale modo che popolani di Fiorenze non siano cosi 
forzamente ingiuriati da’grandi[,] sapiate come Locto di Lapo di Gherarducci 
de’Bondalmonti [sic] de’grandi et sicome dela casa I grandi, irato animo, percosse piu e 
piu volte Covero Guidini da  Castello Fiorentino cholle piungna dandogli nel viso con 
sangne [sic] et nel pecto et nel reni [sic] in dispecto del popolo di Fiorenze[,] dicendo che 
[“]popolari di merda sono questi[!”] e minacciandolo [“]Io tutoro la persona[“] E le 
predicte cose fuorono comese per lo decto Locto nella persona dell decto cela di Michele 
cardini posta nel chastello fiorentino dalato Covero dell’ano prosimo passato e del mese 
di Maggio prosimo passato nella cella di Michele Cardini posta in Chastello Fiorentino[,] 
dallato a Borgo Nuovo questoro[,] sanno questo facto[,] i nomi dei quali sono questi: 
Moncello di Lato Berti 
Ser Jacobo [di] Ser Ricardi 
Balito da Tinagnano [Tignano] 
Petruccio[,] chiamato ‘Ciecho’ da Pissa [sic] il quale dimora in Castello Fiorentino 
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Daniello di Ser Ricovero 
Petro Charducci 
Giovanni Paganelli 
Peruccio Lapi 
Tingho Ghini 
Jacomo[,] chiamato ‘Campanella’  
Maro di Borgo Vinuccio di Borgo da Lisi 
Giovanni d’Alamanno 
Gaddo di Canaffo 
Giovanni di Ciecho Gherardi 
Francischo di Tuccio Ruborni 
Maestro Francischo di Nocta 
Miechele [sic] di Nucciolino 
Cenne di Gherino 
Jacopa di Lato Minati 
Filippo di Jacopo di  
[20r and 20v are blank.] 
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Ch. 4: “To the damage and injury of the aforesaid….”: Judicial procedure and the 
dynamics of rural social conflict 
 
Abstract: This chapter examines the mechanics of Florentine judicial procedure, how rural people 
used the Executor’s court, and how the court could turn on its users. The chapter poses three 
questions: How did judicial procedure shape the strategies of public justice’s users, and the record 
of these strategies? How did extra-judicial networks and social standing impact disputes in court? 
Answering these questions requires moving beyond the rhetoric and institutions of the Florentine 
popolo, and so the chapter draws extensively on notarial material to reconstruct the documented 
part of a prolonged (1342-1347) dispute between a rural notary and a magnate over land and 
social status in the Mugello, north of Florence. A sophisticated understanding of Florentine 
judicial procedure and mastery of the popular rhetoric did not ensure success in court: popular 
appeals to public justice. Based on a reconstruction of the dispute, the chapter argues that 
important aspect of popular justice during the fourteenth century was the unpredictability of 
outcome facing those who activated it: the procedural mechanisms of Florentine public justice 
could quickly turn on its users. Users also faced opprobrium from their communities for 
disrupting local social peace by pursuing disputes through the popular courts. These factors–
rather than rural peoples’ apathy or active resistance to the Florentine state- explain the 
disengagement and indifference that previous scholars have ascribed to the Florentine popolo by 
the 1340s. 
    
Introduction 
 
 This chapter examines Florentine judicial procedure and the operation of the 
inquisition ex officio.1 Scrutinizing the ex officio trial procedure proceeds directly from 
chapter three. Whereas the previous chapter analyzed the initial stage of the procedure, 
denunciation, this chapter analyzes the procedure beyond this stage; chapter five analyzes 
patterns in witness testimony and communal solidarities when involved in inquisitorial 
proceedings against magnates. Three questions guide my discussion. How did judicial 
procedure affect the users of Florentine public justice? Users included those making 
denunciations, those defending themselves against denunciations, and witnesses cited in 
denunciations. How did the Florentine courts become involved in rural disputes? What 
were some possible results of cases that made it beyond the initial denuncation stage? 
And how did extra-judicial networks and social standing relate to strategies and behavior 																																																								
1 I use “ex officio trial” as shorthand for the inquisitorial ex officio procedure, for 
cases in which the Executor, Capitano, or Podestà initiated an inquest based on either 
accusations or denunciations.  
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in the Executor’s court?  In answering these questions, my methodology is based broadly 
on the processual model of legal anthropology. The anthropologist Max Gluckman and 
his students in the Manchester School first developed the processual model of the trial to 
analyze dispute settlement in sub-Saharan African societies.2 Central to this approach is 
the assumption that trials are not stand-alone units to be analyzed in a vacuum. Rather, 
trials are one stage in relationships with histories that precede and follow the trial itself. 
Trials also may not end a dispute or conflict, which can continue after the judge’s 
decision. 
 Since the late 1980s, medieval social and legal historians have drawn on this 
body of work with important results, in particular for understanding the political-juridical 
logic of the urban communes’ public courts.3 This scholarship has modified an earlier, 
evolutionary and statist interpretation of judicial procedure. It has also changed 
																																																								
2 For the processual model, see in particular: Max Gluckman, Order and rebellion 
in tribal Africa (London, 1963), and “Limitations of the case-method in the study of tribal 
law,” Law and Society Review 7 (1973): 611-14; Sally Falk Moore, Law as process: An 
anthropological approach (London, 1978); and Simon Roberts, Order and conflict: An 
introduction to legal anthropology (New York, 1979). 
3 See in particular: Chris Wickham, Courts and conflict in twelfth-century 
Tuscany (Oxford, 2003) [hereafter “Wickham, courts”]; Thomas J. Kuehn, Law, family, 
and women: toward a legal anthropology of renaissance Italy (Chicago, 1991); Sarah 
Rubin Blanshei, Politics and justice in late medieval Bologna (Leiden, 2010); Massimo 
Vallerani, Medieval public justice, trans. Sara Rubin Blanshei. Washington, D.C., 2012)  
and Andrea Zorzi, L’amministrazione della giustizia penale nella repubblica fiorentina. 
Aspetti e problemi (Florence, 1988) “Controle social, ordre public et répression judiciare 
à Florence à l’époque communale: Eléments et problèmes.” Annales: E.S.C. 45 (1991): 
1169-88; “‘Ius erat in armis’: Faide e conflitti tra pratiche sociali e pratiche di governo,” 
in Origini dello Stato: Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo e età 
moderna, ed. Giorgio Chittolini, et. al. (Bologna, 1994): 609-29, and “La cultura della 
vendetta nel conflitto politico in età comunale,” in Le storie e la memoria: In onore di 
Arnold Esch, eds. R. Delle Donne & A. Zorzi (Florence: Florence UP, 2002), 135-65. 
James B. Given, Inquisition and medieval society (Ithaca, NY., 1997), at 169-190, applies 
convincingly deploys anthropological models of social stress and social strain for 
fourteenth-century Languedoc. 
	 246	
understandings of feud and disputing in medieval Italian judicial systems. Whereas 
earlier scholarship assumed that “archaic” practices such as feud and the vendetta were 
remnants of a stateless past and posed threats to sovereignty, such practices are now seen 
as integral parts of the communes’ judicial matrix.4 
Legal historian Massimo Vallerani, working on trial-based inquisitions in 
Bologna and Perugia, has proposed two parallel paths of research on judicial procedure 
and urban society in medieval Italy.5 One traces litigants’ ability to use the trial: the 
tribunal’s accessibility, and litigants’ attempts to carry forward a trial once it was 
initiated.6 I pursue this line of inquiry in chapter five, addressing the rate of cases going 
beyond the initial stage and the behavior of witnesses in cases that did, through a study of 
case clusters from the period 1347-1350. In this chapter, I pursue Vallerani’s second 
research ambit: how the trial could be interfered with or distorted by what he calls 
“collateral acts”.7 These included negotiations between the opposing parties before and 
during the trial and out-of-court settlements, which the early communes’ judges were 
sworn to uphold.8 
																																																								
4 On this model, see the cogent remarks of Andrea Zorzi in “Le pratiche 
infragiudiziarie,” in La trasformazione di un quadro politico. Ricerche su politica e 
giustizia a Firenze dal comune allo Stato territoriale (Florence, 2008) [hereafter “Zorzi, 
La trasformazione”], 163-65. On feuding and vendetta, see Trevor Dean, “Marriage and 
mutilation. Vendetta in late medieval Italy” Past & Present 157 (1997): 3-36. 
5 Vallerani, Justice, 32-34. 
6 Vallerani, Justice, 32-33: “The first [research perspective] examines the diverse 
typologies of the use of the trial on the part of the litigants, meaning by ‘use’ the capacity 
of the litigants to carry forward and conclude a confrontation that, as far as it was 
regulated, was also costly and difficult.” 
7 Vallerani, Justice, 34. 
8 For public justice and procedural logic in the age of the consuls, see Vallerani, 
Justice, 18-21. 
	 247	
I focus on one dispute between a rural notary, ser Andrea, son of Ugo, and the 
kinsmen Bartolomeo di Lapo and Giovanni di Guelfo de’ Pulci. Their relationship left an 
unusually long documentary trail in two parts, from 1342-44 and 1346-47. Records of the 
conflict’s judicial portion survive in the form of three separate ex officio inquests by the 
Executor’s judges, in 1343-44 and 1347. Documentation of the dispute originated with an 
inquest against Andrea for lodging a false denunciation, yet did not end there: this makes 
it possible to track how Andrea’s legal strategy changed over time. Since the case 
eventually proceeded to the presentation of intentiones (items to be proven in the course 
of a trial),9 it is also possible to reconstruct how the Pulci family’s legal representative 
(procurator) sought to undermine Andrea’s case, and the weight of different forms of 
proof at this stage of the trial. The case illustrates a single conflictual relationship 
wending its way through Florentine public justice, from initial denunciation to the 
presentation of witnesses.  
While other disputes of the same kind may exist and have yet to be identified in 
the popular courts’ records, I have found none with the same contextual and textual 
depth, and chronological scope, as this. Thus, the following analysis is a detailed, but 
episodic, snapshot of how judicial procedure and disputing affected the parties involved, 
and their neighbors and family members. 
 The rural popolo in which the dispute played itself out, S. Maria and S. Niccolo di 
Latera, was a small combined parish in the Mugello, in the larger piviere of San Giovanni 
in Petroio. There is a good run of mid-Trecento documentation for Latera. The area 
produced numerous cases in the courts of the foreign rectors, and notarial documentation 
																																																								
9 For intentiones in the accusatory procedure, see Vallerani, Justice, 93-96. 
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(Notarile Antecosimiano) preserves scattered documents relating to land sales in Latera, 
and mentions of residents of the parish appearing as witnesses. A processual case study, 
informed by the work of Vallerani, Wickham, and Kuehn, is possible for this rural 
community in a way that is difficult, given the state of current research, for most 
settlements in the Florentine contado, especially in the mountainous hinterland north of 
the city. In future work, I intend to develop a more detailed study of Latera and its 
residents in conjunction with other rural parishes. 
I begin with the development of the trial system in the Italian city-states, and the 
inquisitorial ex officio trial system as it functioned in Florence during the mid-fourteenth 
century. I then reconstruct the case of Andrea and the Pulci, following the conflict 
chronologically and procedurally. I focus in particular on the ideological aspects of the 
Executor’s decision-making, the limits of the ex officio system, and the forms of proof 
both parties employed.  
 Judicial Procedure and the Inquisition ex officio 
Compared to its neighbors Pisa and Lucca, Florence developed institutional forms 
of public justice relatively late, and also lagged behind precocious communes like 
Milan.10 There is no trace of public justice in the city between 1122, date of the last old-
style public judicial assembly, the placitum, held by the Marquises of Tuscany, and 1172, 
																																																								
10 Wickham, Courts, 169. For the development of public judicial institutionas at 
Milan, see Wickham, Sleepwalking into a new world: The emergence of Italian city 
communes in the twelfth century (Princeton, NJ., 2015), 21-37; for Pisa, see 
Sleepwalking, 67-118 and  Courts, 110-34. For Lucca, see Wickham, Courts, 16-67. The 
basic descriptive survey of Florence’s judicial system remains Davidsohn, Storia di 
Firenze, vol. 5, 479-639. 
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the first mention of a consular judicial official.11 This does not imply an absence of 
justice and arbitration, however. The most recent scholar of the period, Enrico Faini, has 
rather characterized twelfth-century Florentine justice as hidden and ubiquitous, once one 
moves past the constitutional preoccupations of medieval Florence’s first great 
institutional historian, Pietro Santini.12 Forms of justice included hearings before judges 
and arbitration by respected men of the city.13 
Scholars have significantly revised their view of the role of arbitration and the 
function of the peace accord (pax; instrumentum pacis) in medieval Italian justice.14 The 
Florentine case, as Faini has demonstrated, fits with Vallerani’s argument for the 
relationship between private settlements and consular justice. Rather than public justice 
and private arbitration existing in opposition, the early consuls were open to settlement 
by arbitration.15 At Pistoia, similar in its tweflth-century developments to Florence, the 
consuls swore to uphold not only their own decisions but also any private agreements 
																																																								
11 Faini, Firenze, 279. For the placitum in Tuscany, see Faini, Firenze, 280-91; 
see Wickham, “Justice in the kingdom of Italy in the eleventh century” in La giustizia 
nell’alto medioevo (secoli IX-XI), (Spoleto: Centro di studi sull’alto medioevo,  
1997), 179-250, for placita in the Regnum Italicum as a whole. 
12 Faini, Firenze nell’età romanica (1000-1211): l’espansione urbana, lo sviluppo 
istituzionale, il rapporto con il territorio. Biblioteca storica Toscana, 62 (Florence: Leo 
S. Olschki Editore, 2010) [hereafter “Faini, Firenze”], 297: “Siamo andati alla ricerca di 
una giustizia nascosta e, seguendo la traccia lasciata dai giurisperiti nella 
documentazione, l’abbiamo trovata un po’dovunque, senza fare troppa fatica.” See also 
Faini’s “Alle origini della memoria comunale,” Quellen und Forschungen aus 
italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 68 (2008): 61-81. 
13 Faini, Firenze, 317.  
14 See in particular Andrea Zorzi, “‘Ius erat in armis’: Faide e conflitti tra pratiche 
sociali e pratiche di governo,” in Origini dello Stato: Processi di formazione statale in 
Italia fra medioevo e età moderna, ed. Giorgio Chittolini, et. al., 609-29, and his ““Le 
pratiche infragiudiziarie,” in La trasformazione, 163-79; and Vallerani, “Peace accord 
and trial in the judicial system: The example of Perugia,” 174-227. 
15 Vallerani, Justice, 21-22.	
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made under the protection of the commune.16 This acceptance of arbitration was, indeed, 
a sign of the strength of the commune’s political-technical personnel.17 For Florence, the 
paucity of early consular acts is balanced by evidence for development of a normative 
infrastructure for doing justice. An 1159 entry in the archbishop’s Bulletone speaks of 
ordinamenta “made by the commune and people of Florence,” an early mention of the 
commune.18 A constitutum is mentioned in an 1182 agreement with the rural commune of 
Pogna,19 and there are fragmentary references to Roman law from 1197.20 
The inquisition ex officio grew out of the ecclesiastical context of Innocent III’s 
pontificate,21 and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) is traditionally seen as a turning 
point in the adoption of the inquisition ex officio in Latin Christian Europe.22 The 
																																																								
16 Vallerani, Justice, 22, citing Natale Rauty’s edition of the Pistoiese statutes. For 
the early commune at Pistoia, see David Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia 
(New Haven, 1967), 26-33. 
17 Faini, Firenze, 318-19: “Come ha notato Massimo Vallerani, l’idea che 
l’arbitrato in sede cittadina costituisca un vulnus alla sovranità del Comune è sbagliata: al 
contratrio è la capacità di permeare anche questi istituti meno formalizzati che dimostra 
la forza del personale politico e tecnico del Comune.” 
18 Faini, “Le tradizioni normative delle città toscane. Le origini (secoli XII-metà 
XIII)”,  Archivio storico italiano (2013): 438: “il regesto si riferisce a un documento del 
1159 e parla di ‘ordinamenta facta per comune et populum Florentie’, dizione 
improbabile a quell’altezza cronologica, soprattutto per la menzione del comune.” For the 
purpose and provenance of the archbishop’s Bulletone series, see George W. Dameron, 
Episcopal Power and Florentine Society, 1000-1320 (Cambridge, MA., 1991), 16-21. 
19 Faini, “Le tradizioni,” 438. 
20 Wickham, Courts, 171. 
21 See Vallerani, Justice, 35, for Innocent III’s role in the development of the 
inquisition ex officio. 
22 There is a large bibliography on the Council and its importance for the process. 
See in particular Richard M. Fisher, “IV Lateran’s revolution in criminal procedure: The 
birth of inquisitio, the end of ordeals, and Innocent III’s vision of ecclesiastical politics, 
in Studia in honorem eminentissimi cardinalis Alphonsi M. Stickler, ed. Rosalio Iosepho 
card. Castillo Lara (Rome, 1992), 96-111; the council’s proceedings are published in 
Constitutiones concilii quarti Lateranensis una cum commentariis glossatorum, ed. 
Antonio Garcia y Garcia, Monumenta iuris canonici, series A, Corpus Glossatorum, 2 
(Vatican City, 1981).  
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Council’s Canon VIII, in particular, was a major point of reference for later juridical 
commentators.23 In an effort to maintain order within the Church, Innocent III was 
instrumental in devising the procedure as an alternative to accusations and episcopal 
inquests. These inquests had been proven ineffectual in rooting out suspected heretics in 
Languedoc and the Italian cities, and the inquisition ex officio became the standard 
procedure for ecclesiastical tribunals against heretics.24  
 The development and spread of the inquisition ex officio was an important 
innovation in Latin Europe’s judicial procedure.  Despite the contemporaneous spread of 
Roman law, particularly in Italy, there was a shift in how crime was identified and 
punished.25 According to the Roman-law ordo, without an accuser, there could be no 
trial, yet the absence of an initial accusation is what distinguishes the procedure ex 
officio.26  The accuser’s place was taken, rather, by publica fama.27 Publica fama is a 
vexed concept in the history of late medieval law.28 The important point to note here is 
																																																								
23 Vallerani, Justice, 36. 
24 There is a large literature on the ecclesiastical inquisition and its use against 
heretics and other marginal groups. For the repression of heresy in the Italian towns, see 
Carol Lansing, Power and purity: Cathar heresy in medieval Italy (Oxford, 2001 [1998]), 
135-51 and Florentine magnates, “Umiliana dei Cerchi and disaffection from the 
lineage,” 109-24. For inquisitorial procedures in a wider European context, see R.I. 
Moore, The formation of a persecuting society: Power and deviance in Western Europe, 
950-1250 (Oxford, 2005 [1987]. For the ecclesiastical inquisition and inquisitorial 
culture, see Dyan Elliott, Proving woman: Female spirituality and inquisitorial culture in 
the later Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ., 2004), 119-79. For the operation of the early 
ecclesiastical inquisition in Languedoc, see Mark Gregory Pegg, The corruption of 
angels: The great inquisition of 1245-1246 (Princeton and Oxford, 2001).  
25 These three modes consisted of accusation, denunciation, and notoriety: 
Vallerani, Justice, 37. 
26 Vallerani, Justice, 48. 
27 Vallerani, Justice, 36-38. 
28 On fama, see the pieces by Chris Wickham and Thomas Kuehn in the volume 
Fama. The politics of talk and reputation in medieval Europe, eds. Thelma Daniel Lord 
Smail (Ithaca, NY., 2005) [hereafter “Fama”], 15-26 and 27-46, respectively, and, for the 
	 252	
the substitution of an in-person accusation, written or oral, with an impersonal concept 
standing in for the wronged community. This was in fitting with the nominal purpose of 
the inquisition, to prevent crimes from going unpunished (ne maleficia remaneant 
impunita).29 This formula became the justifying ideological principle of the inquisition ex 
officio when it was added to the theoretical armature of the communes’ legal systems. 
There was a gap between the advent of the ex officio trial in the Italian civic courts 
(1220s-1230s) and Alberto Gandino’s inclusion of it among communal trial models in his 
Tractatus de Maleficiis (1287-1301). 30 It is possible that the lack of an accuser and the 
break with classical Roman law explains this hesitation to normalize the inquisition in the 
normative infrastructure of the civic tribunals.  
By the late thirteenth century, the inquisition ex officio procedure was widespread 
throughout the Italian peninsula.31 Yet the communes’ institutional and statutory 
innovations were often ad hoc and did not clear away pre-existing arrangements: it is a 
question of sedimentary layers of legislation and normative procedures, not successive 
renovations of either. As Mario Ascheri has put it, “different communities continued with 
a statute that was in part obsolete, or not applied: almost through inertia, as if awaiting 																																																																																																																																																																					
concept’s development in the high medieval jurists’ writings, Francesco Migliorino, 
Fama e infamia: Problemi della società medievale nel pensiero giuridico nei secoli XII e 
XIII (Catania, 1985). 
29 On this formula and the ideology of penological public justice, see Vallerani, 
Justice, 65-69. 
30 Vallerani, Justice, 44; the standard edition of the Tractatus is Hermann U. 
Kantorowicz, Albertus Gandinus und das Strafrecht der Scholastik, vol. 2, Die Theorie: 
Kritische Ausgabe des ‘Tractatus de maleficiis’ nebst textkritischer Einleitung (Berlin, 
1926). 
31 The Angevins, however, abolished Frederick II’s inquisition procedure 
(Vallerani, Justice, 43) and granted significant exceptions to the remit of royal justice, a 
process not (partially) reversed until the Aragonese period: Eleni Sakellariou, “Royal 
justice in the Aragonese kingdom of Naples: Theory and the realities of power,” 
Mediterranean Historical Review 26:01, 31-50.  
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better times that often never came.”32 Even with the adoption of a harsher penal regime in 
the later Duecento, penalties meted out by the communes’ foreign rectors were frequently 
cancelled or attenuated.33 Vallerani has argued that this improvisatory, malleable quality 
did not represent a weakness of the early ius comune, but rather constituted its logical 
basis; this recognition is important to keep in mind when considering criminal records.34   
The same applies to procedural models. A single, general procedure for 
inquisitions ex officio never existed; Gandino himself outlined three modes of ex officio 
justice.35 The application of the inquisition varied from city to city, along with the 
responsible personnel. By the mid-fourteenth century, when Florentine judicial 
documentation picks up, most trials in the popular courts were initiated by denunciations. 
These came from anonymous Florentine subjects or from the local officials (rectores, 
sindici) discussed in chapter three. The commune’s town criers, bannitori, were deputed 
by the various foreign rectors to solicit reports of any crimes  (maleficia) in their parishes  
(populi). 
Some procedures could accompany, disrupt, or decide the inquisition ex officio. 
Supplica, petitions to a city’s signor, were not used in Florence because of the survival of 
the republican commune, although they became common elsewhere in Italy during the 																																																								
32 Ascheri, The laws of late medieval Italy (1000-1500): Foundations for a 
European legal system, trans. Anabel Thomas and Sara Elin Roberts (Leiden, 2013), 306-
07.  
33 On this thirteenth-century shift, see Vallerani, Justice, 67-69, and Andrea Zorzi, 
“Battagliole e giochi d’azzardo a Firenze nel tardo Medioevo: due pratiche tra 
disciplinamento e repressione,” in Gioco e giustizia nell’Italia di Comune, ed. Gherardo 
Ortalli (Rome and Treviso, 1993), 71-107. 
34 Vallerani, Justice, 72: “These provisions [for cancelling or attenuating a 
penalty, and of an exceptional nature] often assumed the authority of statutory rubrics, 
marking the structural nature of a compositional system that was based by necessity on a 
continuum of extemporaneous decisions.” 
35 Vallerani, Justice, 49. 
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fourteenth century.36 Despite Gandino’s strenuous efforts to represent the inquisition ex 
officio as superior to arbitration or the accusatory procedure, and his discomfort with 
private settlements, these continued as an important element in the judicial order in 
Bologna and elsewhere.37 The standard form of the peace pact (instrumentum pacis) was 
devised by Gandino’s elder contemporary, Rolandino de’Passaggeri.38 As Shona Kelly 
Wray has demonstrated, Bologna’s first “crypto-signor”, Taddeo dei Pepoli, used peace 
agreements as a political tool in the early Trecento.39 Semi-ritualized peacemaking, 
featuring a scripted reenactment of the original crime, also featured in Trecento Roman 
conflict settlement.40 
Peacemaking and arbitration continued to flourish in Florence, as well. 
Chroniclers and historians have usually focused on elite practices of peacemaking and its 
ritual apparatus, and renowned occasions of peace-making such as the 1279 peace that 
Cardinal Latino imposed on the Florentine Guelfs and Ghibellines. Yet as Andrea Zorzi 
and Katherine L. Jansen have shown, feuding and instruments of peace (pax; 
instrumentum pacis; charta pacis, laudum pro bono pacis) were widespread among the 
																																																								
36 See Vallerani, “The petition to the Signore and the power of mercy,” in Justice, 
306-48, for the early use of supplica at Bologna during the 1320s and 1330s. For the 
French monarchy’s use of royal grace for the condemned, see Claude Gauvard, “De 
grace especial”: crime, état, et société à la fin du Moyen Age, 2 vols. (Paris, 1991). 
37 See Vallerani, Justice, 51, for an insightful reading of Gandino’s treatise in 
conversation with surviving archival material for his behavior when serving as judge in 
Bologna, in 1289. 
38 Rolandino de’Passaggeri, Summa totius artis notariae Rolandini Rodulphini 
Bononiensies, ed. Consiglio nazionale del notariato (Bologna: Forni, 1977). 
39 “Instruments of concord: Making peace and settling disputes through a notary 
in the city and contado of late medieval Bologna.” Journal of Social History 42:3 (Spring 
2009): 733-60; see pp. 737-45 for Taddeo’s use of arbitration and peace-making.  
40 For Roman uses of peace-making and ritual, see James A. Palmer, “Piety and 
social distinction in late medieval Roman peacemaking.”  Speculum 89:4 (October 2014): 
974-1004, which emphasizes the ritualized, pietistic nature of peace-making accords. 
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Florentine popolo, as well.41 Peace pacts and arbitration were not extraneous to 
Florentine public justice and its practices, but important components of these.42 The same 
is true for compromises over less sanguinary affairs than the vendetta. A notarial act from 
1323 demonstrates the ongoing use of arbitrators, in this case concerning a debt that a 
notary, Ser Lippo Benincase, owed to Gino son of Messer Uberto dei Visdomini.43 
Rainerio di Villanuova, described as an arbiter et arbitrator et amicus comuni, ruled that 
Lippo was to pay Gino five hundred gold florins and be released from prison, after the 
initial stages of compromissum and laudum (the selection of arbitrators and the ruling of 
the arbitrator, respectively).44 
																																																								
41 Zorzi, “ ‘Ius erat in armis’” and “Le pratiche infragiudiziarie”; Katherine L. 
Jansen, “Pro bono pacis. Crime and Dispute Resolution in Late Medieval Florence: the 
Evidence of Notarial Peace Contracts,” Speculum 88.2 (April 2013): 427-56, and 
“Florentine Peacemaking: the Oltrarno, 1287-1297,” in Pope, Church and City: Essays in 
Honor of Brenda Bolton (Leiden, 2004), 327-344.  
42 Zorzi, “ ‘Ius erat in armis’” and “Le pratiche infragiudiziarie” in La 
trasformazione. 
43 The settlement and payment are recorded in the register of the notary Ser Rucco 
son of Giovanni de Bondinaia: Notarile Antecosimiano.18338: 2r-2v. 
44 NA.18338.2r: 2r: “Certum est quod dominus Raynerius de Villanuova olim 
arbiter et arbitrator et amicus comuni electus a superscriptiis, a Ghino olim dominum 
Uberti de Vicedominis ex una parte et a Ser Lippo Benincase notario ex alia parte. Ut de 
compromisso in dictum dominum Raynerium facto per dictas partes dicitur plenius 
contineri mano Ser Phylippi Jacobi de Villamagna [sic] laudaverit et arbitratus fuerit inter 
cetera quod dictus Ser Lippus daret et soluerit dicto Ghino Quingentos florenos aureos 
inde ad certum terminum prout de predictis laudo et alio in eo contenti continetur 
publicum instrumentum inde secundum manum Ser Phylippi Conticcini notarii sub dictis 
annis domini MCCCXXIII indictione septa die sexto mensis Ottubris.” The stipulation 
that Lippo be released from the Stinche is found in NA.18338.2v: “Insuper etiam dictus 
Ghinus dedit et concessit licentiam et perabolam micchi Ruccho notario infrascripto 
recpiere pro superstitibus carcerum stincharum comunis Florentie relaxandi dictum Ser 
Lippum a dictis carceribus….” 
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One more element in normative Florentine trial practice is worth mentioning: the 
consilium sapientis iudiciale, consultation of a legal expert.45 Either the judge or the 
parties could seek a consilium iudiciale; if the judge did so, the ruling of the sapiens was 
final.46 The resort to consilia when made by one of the parties could also serve as a way 
to remove the case from the jurisdiction of the communes’ foreign rectors, reflecting a 
broader trend in the late-medieval Italian cities towards curtailing the judge’s discretion, 
as well as trial length.47 The presence of a sapiens in the family could also, as Giuliano 
Milani has shown for late Duecento Bologna, function as a way for elite families 
otherwise banned from politics to exert influence in communal politics.48   
 Inquisitorial procedure and disputing in the Fiorentino 
Chapter two analyzed denunciations as a product of popular rhetoric with a wide 
diffusion among rural people; chapter five will scrutinize in detail how those cited as 
witnesses behaved in court, and offer some hypotheses to explain this behavior. Here the 
focus is on the stages of the judicial iter following the initial denunciation. 
Reconstructing the sequences of a rural dispute and its successive judicial phases 
indicates the complexity of the popular courts’ operation. After introducing the sources 
																																																								
45 The standard work on the consilium is Guido Rossi, Consilium sapientis 
iudiciale: Studi e ricerche per la storia del processo romano-canonico (Milan: A. 
Giuffrè, 1958). Massimo Vallerani, “Consilia iudicialia. Sapienza giuridica e processo 
nelle città comunali italiane,” MEFR: Moyen-Age, Temps modernes 123-1 (2011): 129-
49, is a more recent analysis. 
46 See Thomas J. Kuehn, “The Renaissance consilium as justice,” Renaissance 
Quarterly 59:4 (Winter 2006): 1058-88, at 1072. 
47 The standard reference for this process is now Blanshei, Politics and justice; for 
the widespread use of supplica at Bologna to initiate summary justice, see Vallerani, 
Justice, 306. 
48 Giuliano Milani, “Bologna’s two exclusions and the power of law experts.” 
2002  http://fermi.univr.it/RM/biblioteca/scaffale/m.htm#Giuliano%20Milani. 
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used for reconstructing this dispute and the parties involved, I explore the local society 
that produced it, the rural parish of S. Maria di Latera.  
The 1342-1347 feud between the rural notary ser Andrea and rural members of 
the magnate lineage of the Pulci demonstrates how the inquisition ex officio’s power 
could shape behavior. Yet it also illuminates the limitations of the very same procedure. 
Records of the dispute survive because the Executor’s court reversed its interpretation of 
Andrea’s initial denunciation, and was acting to correct this error: from there, the case 
took several strange twists and turns that can be traced with some detail through 
surviving notarial documentation and the Executor’s acts. Simultaneously, in this case, 
the inquisitorial procedure did not circumscribe the dispute as a legal matter, and 
neutralize its destabilizing impact on Latera. This paradox is not a judgment on the 
“strength” or “weakness” of the procedure, still less a sort of evolutionary barometer 
determining the same qualities of the Florentine state. These limitations contributed to the 
strong disincentives for rural people to comply with the popular courts beyond initial 
denunciations, for reasons to be explored in the next chapter.  
The dispute between the brothers Bartolomeo and Giovanni di Guelfo de’Pulci 
and a rural notary, Ser Andrea son of Ugo, is exceptionally well-attested in the 
Executor’s registers. Andrea’s own notarial registers do not survive, but he appears in a 
series of notarial acta from the period 1329-1349. It is possible to reconstruct Andrea’s 
social network, as well as the dispute itself: who his associates were, and how he fit into 
Latera’s social world. The fact that the Executor carried out three separate trials in this 
case, each with different outcomes, makes it possible to explore how the ex officio 
procedure operated in practice.  
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Some aspects of the case’s documentation bear mention. Due to the hazards of 
documentary survival, the reconstruction of the dispute which follows is necessarily 
incomplete. The surviving documentation constitutes a series of snapshots, as the 
quarreling parties meandered in and out of the Florentine judicial system on the eve of 
the Black Death. Within these limits, the dispute’s record is a remarkable source for 
understanding how and why rural people might utilize the commune’s judicial system-the 
“real” motivations behind the denunciations’ rhetoric of the common good -and how 
trials resonated within the communities whose problems they were supposed to solve.  
The lawsuit Andrea initiated in the dispute’s second stage is one of the longest 
continuous trial records surviving from the Executor’s court: the surviving portion fills 15 
folii in the court’s atti. The record breaks off, however, before reaching the stage of 
witness testimony, and these witnesses do not appear in the relevant registers of 
testimony (libri testium). Nor is there a sentence from the Executor in this case, or from 
the other foreign-staffed courts. Thus, it is impossible to know the outcome of the trial. It 
is possible that the two parties reached an out-of-court settlement, the record of which 
either does not survive. No mention is made, however, of such a settlement in the folii 
concerning the lawsuit. It is also possible that the Executor dismissed the case at some 
point following the witnesses’ testimony. Yet it is worth studying, again, for the amount 
of detail it provides concerning how parties framed their narratives, and the forms of 
proof they deployed. It also reveals the openness of the Executor’s court to non-
inquisitorial procedures, and the manner in which extended disputes were broken up into 
legally actionable segments. 
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A rural community and its inhabitants: Latera in the 1340s 
What was the dispute’s geographical and social context?49 The notary Andrea was 
a native of the rural parish of S. Michele a Monte Cuccoli.50 This rural parish (popolo) 
lies 37 kilometers north of Florence in the Mugello, nestled in the mountainous terrain 
that divides the narrow Val di Bisenzio from the main route between Bologna and 
Florence, the medieval Via Bolognese.51 This mountain hamlet, on the edge of the 
Florentine contado, produced scant documentation during the Trecento. This is probably 
because it was part of the signorial patrimony of the Conti Alberti da Mangona before the 
urban magnate and banking family of the Bardi purchased the contea of Mangona and 
Vernio from them in the 1330s, a development I discuss in the next chapter.52  
By 1343, when documentation for the dispute begins, Andrea and his brothers 
Piero and ser Guido, a fellow notary, were inhabitants of the fortified settlement 
																																																								
49 For the physical landscape and toponyms of Latera and the upper Val di Sieve, 
I refer the reader to this study’s map appendices. 
50 On the Mugello in the later Middle Ages, see George Dameron, “A world of its 
own: Economy, society, and religious life in the Tuscan Mugello at the time of Dante” in 
Beyond Florence, eds. Paula Findlen, et. al. (Stanford, 2003), 45-58. 
51 See William R. Day, Jr., “The early development of the Florentine economy, c. 
1100-1275”, PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2000) 
[hereafter “Day, ‘Early economic development’”], 21-24, for maps of the medieval road 
and bridge network in the Fiorentino. Charles M. De La Roncière, Firenze e le sue 
campagne nel Trecento. Mercanti, produzione, traffici, trans. Isabella Chabot and Paolo 
Pirillo (Florence, 2005) [hereafter “La Roncière, Firenze e le sue campagne, [page #], ch. 
3, “Le strade e la circolazione all’inizio del Trecento”, is the best recent analysis of the 
commune’s efforts to control the road network. 
52 Paolo Pirillo, Forme e strutture del popolamento nel contado fiorentino: I/I**. 
Gli insediamenti nell’organizzazione dei populi (prima metà del XIV secolo) (2 vols.: I, 
I**) and II. Gli insediamenti fortificati (1280-1380) (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2005) 
[hereafter “Pirillo, Forme.I**/II], identifies three mentions of one of S. Michele a 
Montecuccoli’s member populi for the entire fourteenth century. 
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(castello) of Latera, also in the Mugello.53  The castello was 9 kilometers away from 
Monte Cuccoli, along another branch of the Via Bolognese.54 The move from Monte 
Cuccoli to Latera brought Andrea and his brothers to the Val di Sieve, within walking 
distance of the larger settlement of Barberino di Mugello. Andrea would claim in the 
course of his 1340s litigation that he was a resident of the urban Florentine quartiere of 
S. Maria Novella, and hence was an urban popolano. Yet in most surviving 
documentation, he appears firmly rooted in the local society of the Mugello’s upper Val 
di Sieve: his mother was a member of the venerable Magalotti lineage, and his future 
wife, domina Piera, was a member of the da Barberino, a locally-based lineage of rural 
magnates. Andrea’s move from Monte Cuccoli to Latera may have been a result of a 
desire for local social mobility. Local rural society could, then, hold the attention of 
literate professionals such as Andrea and his family, then, in an example of how the 
Mugello was a world apart from Florence.55 
In the fourteenth century, Latera was part of the piviere of S. Giovanni in Petroio. 
Today it is a frazione of the commune of Barberino di Mugello, lying on the 
southwestern shore of the artificial Lago di Bilancino, built following the Arno flood of 
1966.56 The castello, the remains of which are still visible near S. Maria di Latera, 
overlooked the branch of the Via Bolognese passing through Barberino di Mugello. The 
settlement lies in the crook between the castello’s hill (1075 feet above sea level) and a 																																																								
53 On the differences between castelli and other types of fortified rural 
settlements, see Pirillo, Forme.I, 1-5. 
54 See Paolo Pirillo, Forme e strutture del popolamento nel contado fiorentino II: 
Gli insediamenti fortificati (1280-1380) (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2005) [hereafter 
“Pirillo, Forme.II”], 102-03, for the location of the castello, and map 5 for the 
topography of the area. 
55 Dameron, “Life in the Tuscan Mugello,” 49.  
56 See 131-36, for the parish of S. Giovanni in Petroio and its constituent populi.  
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much steeper one, on the right bank of the river Sieve (today drowned by the Lago di 
Bilancino), near Cavallina.57  
This area of the Mugello, the upper Val di Sieve, was under the control of lords 
local and city-based from an early date. The future magnate lineages of the Cattani da 
Barberino and Lambardi held Latera in the eleventh and twelfth centuries for the 
Florentine bishops, in addition to the nearby castello of Barberino di Mugello.58 Latera 
had a market by 1202, which was shifted to the strada publica, perhaps the modern 
strada Latera, in 1345, in order to catch more of the traffic heading to or from Florence 
through the Barberino di Mugello region.59 This route, the via Bolognese, also made the 
area a flashpoint in the increasingly frequent wars between Florence and Visconti-led 
Milan.60 Niccolò da Barberino, castellan of Barberino and Latera, handed the castello 
over to the Milanese army in August 1351, along with the neighboring castelli Villanova 
and Galliano.61  
Most of the people and events discussed below were local to the Latera area. 
Andrea and his family on both sides were locals, while his enemies, the kinsmen 
Bartolomeo di Lapo and Giovanni di Guelfo de’Pulci, appear to have lived in Latera as 
well. The witnesses cited in the relevant registers of the Executor, and most of those 
mentioned in relevant notarial documentation, also were from Latera or other areas of the 
Val di Sieve. The disputed rural properties at the heart of the dispute also all lay in S. 
																																																								
57 Repetti, 657. 
58 See Pirillo, Forme.II: Insediamenti fortificati, 52, for Barberino’s castello. 
59 See La Roncière, Firenze e le sue campagne, 138-40, for the relevant 
documentation and Latera’s location on the via Bolognese. See appendix map 5 for 
current street names in Latera, some of which echo medieval toponyms. 
60 La Roncière, Firenze e le sue campagne, 376-77. 
61 Matteo Villani, Cronica, ed. Giuseppe Porta (Parma, 1995), 2 vols., at 12.2.189. 
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Maria or S. Niccolo di Latera. This was a local affair and those involved would likely 
have known the origins and motivations behind Andrea’s actions and those of the Pulci. 
In what follows, I reconstruct the textually attested segments of the dispute and how 
judicial procedure shaped it. I would like to remind the reader, however, that the recorded 
part of the dispute is almost certainly not the whole story. Like the trials that the Executor 
convened to resolve the dispute, the dispute’s documentation, and hence any 
reconstruction of it, were only part of a constellation of relationships, allegiances, vested 
interests, and tactics which predated this record.  
Stage I: One denunciation, one inquest, and two convictions: 1343-44 
 The record of Andrea’s dispute with members of the magnate lineage of the Pulci 
begins in the first register of the Executor’s surviving atti, for the period 12 December 
1343-25 April 1344. This register consists of inquests, commissions, summonses, and a 
miscellany of procedural notes.62 The Executor, Pauluccio di Lello dei Riguccii da 
Perugia, had been in office since 27 November 1343; the criminal atti for 27 November-
12 December do not survive, along with most of the rest of the archive predating July-
December 1343.  This is because the commune’s archive, the Camera del Comune, 
burned when the Florentines expelled Walter of Brienne, the city’s “lord for life,” earlier 
in 1343.63 
The incipit of each new case before the Executor demonstrates the process of 
abstraction and formalization that Massimo Vallerani ascribes to the ordines iudiciarii of 																																																								
62 EOG.1.1r: “Hec est liber sive quatenus in se continens inquisitiones 
comissiones relationes comparitiones fideiussiones exbannimenta citationes testium 
iuramenta testium publicationes testium et dicta eorum et alias varias multas et diversas 
scripturas….” 
63 Lorenzo Valgimogli in Elenchi nominativi degli Esecutori degli Ordinamenti di 
Giustizia in cara del 1343-1435, ed. Irene Fabii (Florence, 2004), 4. 
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the early communes’ wise men (sapientes). One of the purposes of the trial procedure 
was to remove a conflict or crime from its potentially explosive context, and recraft it as 
a legal claim.64 The Executor’s trials usually originated through written, anonymous 
denunciations (cedulae or tamburagioni), but also from the report of the commune’s local 
officials. This action was then inscribed into the procedural formulae of the Executor’s 
court. Typically, the inquisitio was noted simply as ex officio, that is, originating from the 
rectors’ offices; sometimes the statutory or legislative basis of the inquest was also noted. 
When Andrea was prosecuted for false denunciation, this was done according to the 
Ordinances of Justice.65 At this point, in late 1343, the Ordinances had only recently been 
reinstated following the expulsion of the Duke of Athens and the overthrow of the brief 
magnates’ priorate of August 1343.66 
The Executor’s judge, Giovanni da Parma, opened an inquest against Andrea, son 
of Ser Ugo, on 14 March 1344. After identifying his origins, the notary records the crime 
for which Andrea is being prosecuted: forging a false denunciation, which the Executor 
received in February 1344.67 The internal mechanisms of the inquisition procedure are 
stated; here, the procedure closely follows Gandino’s outline in the Tractatus.68 The 
judge Giovanni initiated the inquest after the crime came to the court’s ears and notice 
(pervenit ad aures et notitiam), with the preceding clamor of publica fama, acting in 
																																																								
64 See Vallerani, Justice, 32, for this process of abstraction and segmentation. 
65 EOG.1.52r: “Die XIIII mensis martii. Hec est inquisitio que fit et fieri 
intenditur per superdictum Executorem et suam curiam secundum Ordinamentum 
Iustitie…”  
66 Caduff, “Magnati,” 23. 
67 See EOG.1.52r, for a copy of the initial denunciation. 
68 See Vallerani, Justice, 48-49, for Gandino’s discussion in the Tractus; he 
himself was directly adopting the canon law of Pope Gregory IX, the Liber extra, the 
locus classicus for the ex officio procedure by this point. 
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place of the accuser here as the report of an event. The report of publica fama came not 
from malevolent people but those worthy of trust (non quidem a malevolis set a 
fidedignis personis), and thus merited ex officio action.69 
A copy of Andrea’s initial denunciation follows the statement of mechanisms 
activating the inquisition. The placement of the copy is noteworthy: the Executor had 
previously been deceived by the denunciation, thus perverting the course of justice. Yet 
the judicial apparatus was now reinscribing this bit of falsity into its procedural 
apparatus, transforming initially successful deception into proof of guilt. The court was 
thereby acting in accordance with the Roman-law definition of iustitia, as stated by 
Ulpian in the Digest and which the Florentine Ordinances of Justice explicitly appealed 
to: the constant and perpetual will to give to each their due.70 Andrea’s deceptive 
narrative, having been recognized as such through the publica fama clamosa et precedens 
reaching the Executor and his court, became a proof-text in the juridically true narrative 
of his crime and punishment.71 According to Gandino’s typology, this false cedula was a 
document containing proof of the crime (that is, the false denunciation, not Bartolomeo 																																																								
69 Andrea’s name is in the accusative case in this clause, which follows the 
“contra et adversus” of the incipit. See EOG.1.52r: “Ser Andream ser Ugonis de Monte 
cuccholi et nunc habitatorem in castello Latere comitatus Florentine falsarium et falsitatis 
perpetratorem in eo de eo et super eo quod fama publica precedente et clamosa 
insinuatione referente non quidem a malivolis set a fidedignis personis ad aures et 
notitiam dicti domini et sue curie pervenit….” 
70 Corpus iuris civilis, ed. T.H. Mommsen, W. Kroll, P. Krueger, and R. Schoell, 
3 vols. (Berlin, 1928-29), 1:24 (1.1.10) [accessed 12 July 2015 via: 
https://ia802609.us.archive.org/20/items/corpusjuriscivil00krueuoft/corpusjuriscivil00kru
euoft.pdf] : “Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuere.” 
Compare this with the opening of the Ordinances of Justice (in Zorzi & Diacciati, La 
legislazione, 74): “Quoniam iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum unicuique 
tribuens ideo infrascripta, que merito iustitie ordinamenta appellantur, pro rei publice 
utilitate edita sunt.”  
71 On the difference between the factual reality of an event and and the truth of the 
fact as reconstructed by law (that is, legal reality), see Vallerani, Justice, 73. 
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de’Pulci’s attack). It thus counted as undoubted evidence, ensuring a conviction.72 The 
content of Andrea’s initial denunciation was copied into the record of his prosecution for 
false denunciation. It is representative of the categories of popular identity and anti-
magnate discourse analyzed above. As a notary and the son of a notary, Andrea would 
most likely have been familiar with the requirements and format of the cedulae as a 
genre, and perhaps also of the Ordinances of Justice.73  
Andrea’s initial cedula, deemed fraudulent by the judge Giovanni da Parma, told 
the following story. In November 1343 Bartolomeo di Lapo dei Pulci attacked Andrea 
and his brothers, Piero and Guido. Bartolomeo beat the brothers with his hands and 
directed his followers Ugone di Durante, Magnotto di Migalotto dei Guineldi, 
Machiocchio di Ciollo, Ugolino di Morentano, with many others (aliis pluribus), to beat 
them as well. Machiocchio hit Andrea’s brother, ser Guido, in the eyelid with a rock, 
with an effusion of blood (cum sanguinis effuxione). The attack caused a great 
disturbance (magnus rumor) in Latera’s castello, and local popolani raised the hue and 
cry with the parish church bells (campane pulsante fuerunt ad sturmum).74 Andrea’s 
denunciation concluded with the location of the attack, in the piazza of S. Niccolò, 
																																																								
72 See Vallerani, Justice, 104-05, for undoubted evidence in Gandino’s Tractatus. 
73 Unfortunately, Andrea’s notarial registers do not survive in the Notarile 
Antecosimiano, although they are referred to in other notarial acts. 
74 Ringing the bells ad sturmum signified an emergency and call to arms: 
http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/STURMA. For a discussion of this and a constellation of 
similar terms for disturbance and disorder in the Italian communes, see Aldo A. Settia, “I 
luoghi e le tecniche dello scontro,” in Magnati e popolani nell’italia communale, ed. 
Vanna Arrighi (Pistoia, 1997), 81-115, at 82-83. 
	 266	
bounded by the church of S. Niccolò, the castello, and two properties: the heirs of Guelfo 
and the heirs of Nuccio respectively.75  
After the initial denunciation, the mechanics of Andrea’s crime are explored. 
Andrea ordered his servant (famula) Brandaglia to deliver the cedula to the Executor’s 
dropbox (the tamburo), “knowing the same [denunciation] to be false and untrue”; for 
this Brandaglia received two soldi.76 Initially, his ploy was successful. The Executor, “on 
account of the same cedula”, condemned Bartolomeo according to the Ordinances of 
Justice.77 The charge emphasizes repeatedly Andrea’s cognizance of the crime and his 
offense against justice and the social order:  
“and [he was] saying, [and] writing thus, that which is contained in the said 
cedula, on behalf of the truth, although it was not true and he knew it not to be true, [and 
he was] causing it to be placed in the tamburo, against the form of the statutes and 
ordinances of the commune of Florence and toward the damage and prejudice and blame 
of the said Bartolomeo, in order that the said Bartolomeo would be punished, against God 
and against justice.”78 
 
The statement of charges concludes with a statement of place and purpose. Andrea, 
cognizant of his own mendacity and the action’s injustice, had done all this in the city of 
Florence, in the house of the Executor, in the court of the same, where justice was handed 
																																																								
75 EOG.1.52r-52v. Given the lack of a patronymic, I assume that this is not Guelfo 
de’Pulci, father of Giovanni and Bartolomeo de’Pulci. See David Herlihy, “Tuscan 
Names, 1200-1530” in Renaissance Quarterly 41:4 (Winter, 1988): 561-82, for late 
medieval Tuscan naming practices. 
76 EOG.1.52v: “Et predictam notificationem seu denuntiationem falsam et non 
veram de dicto Bartholomeo magnate scripsit et fecit dictus Ser Andreas et ipsa scripta 
poni fecit et mandavit dictus Ser Andreas in tanburo posito in dicta curia dolose et false et 
scienter, sciens ipsam falsam et non veram….” The compensation of two soldi is 
mentioned in EOG.5.23v, in Andrea’s condemnation. 
77 EOG.1.52v. 
78 EOG.1.53r: “et sic dicendo scribendo et poni faciendo in tamburo quo in 
superdicta cedula continetur pro veris cum non esset et sciret vera non esse contra 
formam statutorum et ad hoc ut dictus Bartholomeus contra deum et iustitiam puniretur.” 
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out.79 This can be dismissed as technical verbiage, yet this technical apparatus was 
central to the inquisitorial procedure and the juridical order of Florence. It is worth 
stressing the specificity with which the notary concludes the summary of charges. 
Andrea’s crime had offended the commune, in its manifestation as a circumscribed 
physical and metaphorical space: by depositing a false denunciation in the tamburo, his 
servant had profaned the legal and administrative center of Florence with calumny.80 He 
had offended God and justice by ensuring that Bartolomeo received injustice (in grave et 
preiudicium et vituperationem), in the very place where this distributive justice was 
meted out by the Executor and the other foreign rectors.  
 Alberto Gandino would have been pleased with this summary of charges, as it 
exemplifies his procedural philosophy in action. Massimo Vallerani has argued 
persuasively that Gandino formalized the link that canon law had already sketched out 
between truth (veritas) and guilt (culpa).81 This veritas was to be found, via the 
inquisition ex officio procedure, in the body of a person-and this truth was accompanied 
by guilt. Andrea, repeatedly described as knowing the falsity of his claims and the truth 
of the matter (sciret non esse vera), had knowingly impugned himself before God. The 
deception had initially distorted the particular justice of the Florentine courts, yet this 
																																																								
79 EOG.1.53r: “Et predicta omnia et singula comissa et perpetrata fuerunt per 
dictum Ser Andream superdictis anno et mense in civitate Florentie in domo habitationis 
domini Executoris in curia ipsius ubi per ipsum iura redduntur posita in platea 
dominorum priorum.” The emphasis is mine. 
80 See Niall Atkinson, “The republic of sound. Listening to Florence at the 
threshold of the Renaissance,” I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance 16:1/2 (2013) 57-
84, and Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr., “Icons of justice,” Past & Present 89 (Nov., 1980): 23-
38, for the city center’s ideological, architectural, and aural meanings.	
81 Vallerani, justice, 48. 
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secret knowledge remained known to God.82 By this standard, Andrea’s sin and crime 
(vituperatio) had been unjustly meted out to Bartolomeo.83  
In prosecuting Andrea, the Executor was correcting this injustice and offense 
against God. The court would carry out its duty to execute the Ordinances of Justice, 
reveal the truth, redistribute ius, and thus bring Florentine public justice, within its limits, 
back into line with divine justice. The fact that the court notary did not note the process 
by which the Executor had decided that Andrea’s initial denunciation was false is a 
salutary reminder that the atti were not written for modern scholars, and work according 
to their own logic. The absence of this explanation also reinforces the ideological claim, 
implicit throughout the procedure, that truth will eventually be found and that crimes will 
not go unpunished. The lack of information can be read as an implicit assertion of 
Florentine public justice’s epistemological foundations. 
 The judge, Giovanni da Parma, dispatched the court’s messenger to cite Andrea to 
appear and give a defense against the charges. Andrea made the 30-kilometer walk from 
Latera to the Bargello and appeared the next day, 15 March 1344, and the notary read the 
charges to him, in Tuscan volgare. Andrea confessed “freely” (sponte confessus fuit) that 
the entirety of the charges against him were true. He could not produce guarantors 
(fideiussores) to post surety for him, and Andrea was thrown in the commune’s prison, le 
Stinche, with ten days to make a defense.84 
																																																								
82 For the difference between the particular justice of humans and the general 
justice of God, see Kuehn, “Consilium,” 1059-60.  
83 I here read vituperatio according to the medieval Latin definition found in 
DuCange (http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/VITUPERATIO) as a cognate of vitium (crime, 
sin) or defectus (failure). 
84 EOG.1.53v. On the Stinche, see Guy Geltner, “’Isola non isolata.’ Le Stinche in 
the Middle Ages,” Annali di Storia di Firenze III (2011): 7-28. 
	 269	
 Why did Andrea immediately confess? No explanation is given, although this was 
common notarial practice, since the notary, as usual, wrote out the trial procedure in 
summary form. It is likely that Andrea understood the bind he was in, given that the 
judge had already decided on his guilt and the charges were read to him as a fact awaiting 
confirmation. As a notary, he would have had familiarity with the inquisition ex officio 
procedure of the public courts. He may have believed he should not bother with a 
defense. This hypothesis is based on the fact that publica fama had reached the court’s 
attention, and the damning nature of the court’s proof, that is, the cedula itself: undoubted 
proof, accordng to the inquisitorial procedure. It is unlikely that Andrea feared torture; 
mentions of torture (tormentum) are in fact extremely rare in the Executor’s atti.85 As 
Vallerani has argued, this was unexceptional for the public courts of the communes.86 
Bologna’s 1288 statutes explicitly protected members of the popolo from torture, as did 
those of several other Italian communes in the later Duecento.87  
Andrea’s confession may have been a tactical decision to cut his losses and avoid 
giving a defense. The best evidence for this hypothesis is that he was unable to produce 
oath-helpers following his confession (non potuit dare fideiussores). Either he was bereft 
																																																								
85 The only reference I have found to torture (tormentum) among the Executor’s 
records is in EOG.51, 16r, when an anonymous denunciation mentions it in the context of 
witnesses’ recalcitrance to give testimony. A similar denunciation from 11 March 1368 
against Guido di Barna dei Frescobaldi entreats the Executor to torture the witnesses to 
force them to talk, EOG.530.46r: “Se voi stregneti i testimoni, dicono la verita, se gia non 
la ssano [sic] per paura dello ingiurievole huomo Guido.” None of the 11 witnesses cited 
testified when they appeared in court, so the Executor appears not to have heeded the 
writer’s advice. 
86 Vallerani, Justice, 53. 
87 Statuti di Bologna dell’anno 1288, eds. Gina Fasoli and Pietro Sella (Vatican 
City, 1937-39), rubric 17, 184. On the Bolognese restrictions on torture, see Blanshei, 
Medieval Public Justice, 320-37, and Vallerani, Justice, 275-76, for discussion of this 
exception to the ex officio procedure, and 60-62, for other Italian cities.  
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of friends or made a calculated decision to bide his time in prison. He may also have 
thought that the commune’s prison cells were a safer place for him than Latera was: 
Bartolomeo de’Pulci would be seeking vengeance.  
Andrea was given ten days to craft a defense while in prison, but he did not 
reappear before Giovanni da Parma and the court until 11 April 1344, almost a month 
after the initial inquisition.88 After recapitulating the malevolent, knowingly false nature 
of Andrea’s actions, the original denunciation was copied out once again, and probably 
read out in court, reaffirming that his malevolent falsitas had violated justice and its 
physical habitus.89 Giovanni sentenced him to a fine of one hundred lire payable in 
fiorini piccioli, or 1 gold florin, thirty-five minor florins, at the current rate of 65 fiorini 
per one gold florin.90 Andrea was still unable to produce a fideiussor to post surety, and 
was returned to le Stinche until he could pay. I have found no record of Andrea in fact 
paying the fine: it does not appear in the Camera’s Entrate for 1343-44.91 
What does this initial stage of the dispute reveal about the functioning of the 
Florentine courts, and the inquisition ex officio? The charges against Andrea exemplify 
the mechanisms and ideological nature of the inquisition ex officio, first articulated by 
Gandino at the beginning of the Trecento. The procedure, utilizing the fact that publica 
fama….ad aures executoris et sue curie…pervenit, preceded without accusers or a 																																																								
88 Eog.5.23r-24r. 
89 EOG.5.23r. 
90 The lira was a unit of account; Peter Spufford, Wendy Wilkinson and Sarah 
Tolley, Handbook of medieval exchange (London, 1986), 5, peg the April 1344 
conversion rate for the gold florin to fiorini piccioli/denari piccioli conversion rate at 
1:65. 
91 The relevant treasury records are ASF, Camera del Comune.2-4. These record 
payments to the commune for the period in question. It is possible that the payment was 
never made, or that it was reduced through arbitration, documentation of which no longer 
survives. 
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denunciation, as far as we know, of the falsity of Andrea’s initial denunciation. The only 
proof cited after the initial clamor was Andrea’s own cedula, the true nature of which had 
just been revealed. Justice is here equated with Gandino’s famous assertion that “he who 
accuses intends that a maleficium be punished, and the judge, who inquires, likewise, and 
it is common law, in order that crime shall not remain unpunished.”92 The Executor’s 
court had revealed the unpunished maleficium, and Andrea was punished.  
The notary’s knowing attempt to saddle Bartolomeo dei Pulci with the burden (in 
grave) of the guilt and blame of an attack that did not happen was a result of his desire 
that Bartolomeo be punished against God and justice (contra deum et iustitiam).93 The 
Executor’s court, exercising justice in the distributive sense of giving to each his due, was 
correcting this miscarriage of justice by revealing that the truth and guilt (veritas and 
culpa) of the crime lay not in Bartolomeo and his henchmen, but Andrea himself. This 
schema has a resolutely physical sense, too: the city of Florence, the Executor’s court, 
and the piazza della Signoria collectively were wronged by Andrea, and are being 
restored to their natural function in the court of the Executor’s home, “where rights 
(laws) are distributed by the very same [Executor].”94 This phrasing is not exceptional, 
but rather is typical. The placement of the crime within a precise setting, with the 
violation of the Ordinances clearly stated, represents a quotidian manifestation of the 
ideology of the inquisition and the popolo’s sense of iustitia.  																																																								
92 Gandino, Tractatus, 46, cited in Vallerani, Justice, 49: “qui accusat tendit ut 
maleficium puniatur, et iudex, qui inquirit, similiter, et ius comune est, ne maleficia 
remaneant impunita.” 
93 EOG.1.53r. 
94 EOG.1.53r: “Et predicta omnia et singula comissa et perpetrata fuerunt per 
dictum Ser Andream superdictis anno et mense in civitate Florentie in domo habitationis 
domini Executoris in curia ipsius ubi per ipsum iura redduntur, posita in platea 
dominorum priorum cuius domui.” 
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The case discussed here illustrates the normative functioning of the commune’s 
popular courts, and the way in which the inquisition ex officio procedure operated in a 
manner that can be characterized as relatively autonomous from the political context-in 
this case, the recent defeat of the “magnates’ priorate” and the popular revival of the 
years 1343-48, after the Florentines expelled the Duke of Athens, Walter of Brienne. 
Rarely in Florentine history would it have been less likely for a popolano like Andrea to 
be prosecuted for falsely impugning a magnate (and perhaps this was a consideration in 
his timing of the tamburagione) than in the autumn of 1343.95 Despite Bartolomeo’s 
initial punishment, the denunciation had the potential to harm or at least harass not only 
the magnates, but members of the popolo: both the one lodging a supposedly false 
denunciation, and those witnesses who backed up his version of the facts in court.  
There is an obvious problem with this inquest, for historians. How did the 
Executor and his judge, Giovanni da Parma, first determine that Andrea’s denunciation 
was true, and, even more importantly, on what basis did they then reverse their previous 
decision and procede against him for writing a false denunciation? Given the absence of 
the first inquest, against Bartolomeo dei Pulci, it is impossible to answer the first 
question. Only a month or so separated the first, “true” denunciation and whatever 
sentence Giovanni da Parma may have given Bartolomeo from the surviving inquest 
against Andrea. This was the average for most cases that I have read from the Executor’s 
office, and concurs with Claudia Caduff’s findings for 1345-46.96 It is possible that the 
Executor’s court had reversed course in the interim, before Bartolomeo had been 
																																																								
95 For the third popular regime and its harsher antimagnate legislation, see 
Brucker, Florentine politics, 114-16. 
96 Caduff, “Magnati,” 28. 
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sentenced, which would explain the absence of this inquest in the relevant register for this 
semester (12 December 1343-25 April 1344), which is the same one Andrea’s inquest is 
in, but this must remain a hypothesis.  
One possibility is that the initial procedure against Bartolomeo was interrupted or 
cancelled after witness testimony turned the inquisition against Andrea, and no record 
survives of this intervention. This possibility is indirectly supported by the fact that 
Andrea was unable to produce oath-helpers (fideiussores) at any stage in the trial, even 
though neither of his brothers were implicated in his calumny. Perhaps Andrea’s publica 
fama in Latera told against him when he tried to impugn Bartolomeo; it is hard to 
imagine how the Executor’s court would have obtained the detail that Andrea employing 
his servant Brandaglia to drop off the denunciation otherwise. If Brandaglia did testify, 
through a male interlocutor, no record of this survives.  
It is unclear what forms of proof the Executor relied upon in this case, due to the 
summary nature of the surviving inquest and the destruction of the Executor’s prior 
material in 1343. The ambiguous role of torture, aluded to above, is related to this 
indeterminacy of proof. Going by Gandino’s Tractatus, given the theoretically supreme 
power of the judge (arbitrium iudicis), Giovanni da Parma and the Executor would have 
been able to utilize circumstantial evidence in place of legal proofs.97 The court possessed 
publica fama (in its form as the report of a crime), which created the suspicion of guilt. 
The most damning piece of evidence against Andrea, however, would have been his 
initial denunciation, once it was deemed false-again, through a reasoning that is 
documentarily invisible.  
																																																								
97 Vallerani, Justice, 59-60. 
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II: Andrea and the Pulci return to the Executor’s court, 12-18 May 1347 
a. Andrea’s Civil Suit against Bartolomeo de’ Pulci 
The next phase in Andrea’s dispute with Bartolomeo de’ Pulci began in the spring 
of 1347. It began when Andrea filed a civil petition with the Executor, which played out 
in the Executor’s court as a trial on the accusatorial model. The triadic structure of the 
accusation is a strong feature of this lawsuit. Whereas the Executor’s court usually 
conducted itself ex officio through the inquisitorial procedure, here, the Executor and his 
judge acted as referees, supervising both parties’ reconstruction of conflicting versions of 
the truth through several stages.98 Throughout this portion of the dispute, the Pulci were 
represented by their legal representative, ser Stefano di Gino. 
Andrea’s initial action was a civil lawsuit for the unjust seizure of land. As 
Thomas Kuehn has observed, lawsuits were elements in vendettas: they were expensive, 
especially for the losing party.99  It put the Pulci on the defensive and required 
Bartolomeo di Lapo de’ Pulci’s legal representative to counter the narrative contained 
therein, and the specific charge of land usurpation. In response, Stefano simultaneously 
denied the entirety of Andrea’s actio, and motioned for a dismissal of the case. This led 
to Andrea’s presentation of his positiones, legal claims or propositions that he affirmed. 
Here, these consisted of 23 separate claims, to which Stefano would have to provide 
affirmative or negative answers.100 Following Andrea’s presentation of his witnesses to 
																																																								
98 For the triadic structure of the accusatorial procedure, and its division of labor 
in reconstructing an acceptable version of the truth, see Vallerani, Justice, 77-78. 
99 Thomas Kuehn, “Social and legal capital in vendetta: A fifteenth-century 
Florentine feud in and out of Court,” in Sociability and its discontents, eds. N.A. Epstein 
& N. Terpstra (Turnhout, 2009), 51-72, at 58. 
100 For the role of positiones in the ordines iudiciarii and their use in the 
accusatorial procedure, see Vallerani, Justice, 89-92. 
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be cited, Stefano presented his response to Andrea’s positiones in twelve separate 
answers, nine of which he denied.101 The record breaks off following the citation of 
witnesses by both parties, with the outcome unclear. 
What was Andrea doing between 1343 and 1347? There is no way to know what 
Andrea may have been doing since 1347, as he does not appear in notarial acts during 
this period from Latera or its environs. It is unclear when Andrea was released from the 
commune’s prison, le Stinche, yet he had regained his freedom by 1347, when he 
returned to the same court that had imprisoned him. On 12 May 1347, he made an in-
person deposition to the Executor Ser Landuccio di Ser Lando dei Becchi da Gubbio and 
his judge Nino dei Baldelli da Gubbio. The procedure survives in the Executor’s acta 
civilia for the first semester of 1347.102 
 Andrea does not seem to have incurred infamia, in this case fama in its 
manifestation as the ability to do things in law, for his false denunciation and prosecution 
for it in 1343-1344. His 1347 accusation was not dismissed for this or any other reason 
that we have record of, nor did the Pulci legal representative, Ser Stefano di Gino, invoke 
infamia in his responses to Andrea’s charges. It is also unclear whether his sentence for 
fraudulent denunciation would have called into question his reputation, and the validity 
of his acta as a notary, although this seems likely. As his registers do not survive, we 
cannot assess the damage this had on him outside the law courts.103 It seems, however, 
that fraudulent denunciation did not necessarily disbar one from pursuing further cases 																																																								
101 The entire lawsuit is found in EOG.81, 26v-43v, interspersed with occasional 
fragments of other procedures the Executor’s court was conducting simultaneously. 
102 The case is found in EOG.81.26v-53v. 
103 On the legally disabling nature of mala fama, see Thomas J. Kuehn, “Fama as 
a legal status in renaissance Florence,” in Fama, in particular p. 39, on the damage that 
mala fama did to notaries in their professional capacity.  
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with the foreign-staffed courts. It is possible that this was only because Landuccio and his 
judge were unfamiliar with the 1344 inquest, but there is no reason they could not have 
checked the relevant registers in the Camera del Comune. In terms of motivation, perhaps 
Andrea was re-opening the dispute as a legal procedure because he reckoned that a 
straightforward case of property usurpation would produce more witnesses because it was 
a public act, or from a lack of better options for seeking restitution or justice.104 
 At some point between his stint in prison in 1344 and his 1347 accusation, Andrea 
seems to have moved to the urban quartiere of Santa Maria Novella.105 Andrea 
denounced Bartolomeo for having occupied and held, “wrongly and unjustly” (indebite et 
iniuste), his goods and possessions (possessiones et bona ipsi Ser Andree).106 This 
situation had existed, Andrea claimed, for about four years.107 The dating is slightly 
vague (terminum quattuor annorum vel id circa), but Bartolomeo’s theft and usurpation 
of Andrea’s possessions occurred about a year before Andrea’s initial denunciation 
(February 1344) and consignment to le Stinche (April 1344).  
It is possible, working against the findings of the Executor’s court, that the attack 
described in Andrea’s initial cedula had in fact taken place, and that it was related to the 
dispute over Andrea’s possessions (possessiones et bona). An alternative reading, with 
																																																								
104 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Signals from below: Soviet letters of denunciation of the 
1930s,” The Journal of Modern History 68:4, “Practices of Denunciation in Modern 
European History, 1789-1989” (Dec., 1996), 831-66, at 866, concludes that Soviet 
peasants and workers typically resorted to denunciations since they “had so few options 
for action”, an argument which I find convincing for users of the Executor’s court, as 
well. 
105 In the initial accusation (EOG.81.26v), Andrea is described as “Ser Andreas 
Ser Ugonis de Latera comitatus Florentie qui hodie moratur in populo Santa Maria 
Novelle de Florentie et de populo civitatis Florentie”. 
106 EOG.81.26v-27r. 
107 EOG.81.27r: “per tempus et terminum quattuor annorum vel id circa.” 
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less support from the dating, is that Andrea had pre-dated this seizure of his possessions, 
which Bartolomeo may have done while Andrea was imprisoned. The case does 
illuminate an important aspect of the conflict. Although Andrea’s petition denounced a 
different crime than his initial (false) denunciation, these two different crimes were 
almost certainly part of the same extended conflict between the two men.108 
 This approach, denouncing crimes individually instead of as part of an ongoing 
whole, is reflected in Andrea’s appeal, in his 1347 civil suit, regarding judicial procedure. 
Andrea’s statement invokes the Executor’s duties and appeals to Florence’s statutes to 
demand the restitution of his goods. In the last section of the deposition, he requests a 
specific procedural modification. Andrea petitioned the Executor for summary justice, 
“without the procedure and form of judgment”, which the Executor could and should 
carry out “from your good office, according to the statutes of the commune of 
Florence”.109 He was likely referring to the statutes of the Capitano del Popolo of 1325, 
which direct the Capitano and Podestà to procede “breviter and summarie,” the same 
language of Andrea’s petition.110 The petition was a common procedure by which 
members of magnate lineages sought to regain membership within the popolo, but this is 
the only petition for summary justice I have found in the records of the Executor’s court 
for the 1340s.111 Andrea’s petition for summary procedure lacks the rhetoric of poverty 
																																																								
108 See Vallerani, Justice, 130-31, for similar ambiguity in the surviving 
Bolognese accusatorial procedures for the late thirteenth century. 
109 EOG.81.27r: “et in predictis petit procedi breviter et summarie idem Ser 
Andreas sine strepitu et figura iuditii et ex vostro bono officio prout per formam 
statutorum comunis Florentie potestis et debetis, predicta quidem dicit et petit dictus Ser 
Andreas salvo sibi iuramento ad dandum remittendi et etiam corrigendi si opus fuit.” 
110 Statuti II, rubric I. 
111 Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 195-220, is the best account of this 
phenomenon; see also her ““Nobles or pariahs? The exclusion of Florentine magnates 
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characteristic of the Bolognese petitions that Massimo Vallerani has analyzed.112 This 
rhetoric, which appealed to the prince’s duty to safeguard the poor (miserabiles), was, 
however, similar to that of the denunciations analyzed in chapter 2, with the Florentine 
courts in the de facto role of signor. Andrea’s move was, however, based on the same 
logic as the cases Vallerani discusses. He sought the Executor’s intervention to enforce 
the restitution of Bartolomeo’s ill-gotten lands, and likely was impoverished following 
his imprisonment, fine, and the theft of his lands.113 
 The Executor’s judge for this semester of 1347, Nino dei Baldelli da Gubbio, then 
concluded the opening stage of the lawsuit. Bartolomeo de’Pulci’s procurator ser Stefano 
was given until 20 May to defend his client against Andrea. The hearing adjourned after 
Stefano presented a notarial instrumentum testifying to his role as legitimate 
representative of Bartolomeo di Lapo de’Pulci.114 It is unclear whether Bartolomeo and 
his procurator had prior knowledge of the initiation of the lawsuit, but they probably 
																																																																																																																																																																					
from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
39:2 (1997): 215-30, “Ruptures de parenté et changements d’indentité chez le magnats 
florentins du XIVe siècle,” Annales: E.S.C. 43 (1988): 1205-1240, and “Vrais et faux 
magnats. L’application des Ordonnances de Justice au XIV siècle” in Magnati e popolani 
nell’italia communale, 273-93. 
112 Massimo Vallerani, Justice, “The petition to the signore and the power of 
mercy,” 306-47, at 334-37. 
113 Vallerani, Justice, 336: “In other instances restitution of a property is sought 
solely on the basis of the plenitudo potestatis: that is to say, the dominus ought to 
intervene directly to force the adversarial party to restore the contested property.” 
114 EOG.81.27v: “Dictus iudex superdictus assingnavit et statuit terminum Ser 
Stephano Gini procuratori et procurator nomine dicti Bartolomei ad respondendum dictae 
petitioni quicquid vult ad diem hunc, proxime ventum ante vesperas et hic presens Ser 
Andrea et petens. Qui ser Stephanus ad legitimatem sue presentie produxit coram dictis 
domino executore et iudici instrumentum sui mandati public scriptum manu publici 
notarii quid dimisit….” 
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were not caught wrong-footed, given the history of animosity between Andrea and the 
Pulci.115  
Ser Stefano responded on May 17 1347, with an attack on the entirety of Andrea’s 
petition. His legal tactics reflect a dual strategy: denying the grounds of Andrea’s suit and 
undermining its legality, while simultaneously making specific counter-claims regarding 
possession of the lands in question. Stefano claimed that the whole lawsuit was false. He 
then presented a request for peremptory dismissal and postponement, followed by 
questioning the competence of the personnel and judge of the Executor to hear the case. 
And anyway, according to Stefano, none of the narrative in the petition was true. Andrea 
had no rights to the goods mentioned in the petition. Not only that, but Bartolomeo 
himself possessed rights and title to the lands, and had for five years or more. Stefano 
concluded with a protest concerning Andrea’s legal action.116 He then produced proof of 
his procuratorship for Bartolomeo, a copy of which was made for Andrea.117  
																																																								
115 There is no evidence here for the elaborate procedure for citing the accused as 
discussed by Vallerani for thirteenth-century Bolognese accusatorial trials: Vallerani, 
Public Justice, 138-39. 
116 EOG.81.29v: “Ser Stephanus Ghini procurator Bartholomei….pro eo ac 
petitione predicto exibito contra dictum Bartholomeum per Ser Andream ser Ugonis 
predictum et contenta in dicto petitione et ante omnia protestat et obbicit [sic] omnes suos 
et dicti Bartholomei excepta dilatione peremptore et persone et iudicis incompetentei et 
omnes alii sibi et dicto Bartholomeo salvas fore et respondendum dicte petitioni contra 
ipsum Bartholomeum exibiti negavit narratave materia in dicta petitione vera esset et 
petita et petitione fieri debetum et dictum Ser Andream ius vel haec in dictis bonis in 
dicta petitione contenta, dixit tamen et confessus fuit quod bona in dicta petitione 
contenta in ipse Bartholomeus iusta causa et titulo tenet et possidet, et tenuit et possidit 
iam sunt V anni et ultra et ab ipso tempore citato et per ipsum tempus et hodie tenet et 
possidit. Et reconveniendum dictum Ser Andream petitionem expressas causae factum et 
de faciendi protestatur.” 
117 EOG.81.29v: “Qui Ser Stephanus ad legitimationem sue persone produxit 
coram dictis dominis Executoris et iudicis instrumentum sue procuratori mandi quod de 
mandato dictorum dominorum Executoris et iudicis deposuit presenti notarii curie ut Inde 
copam faciat parti adversi si eam velunt.”  
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These motions were commonplace in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century 
Bolognese accusatorial procedures, as Massimo Vallerani has shown.118 Stefano, as 
Bartolomeo’s procurator tasked with defending his client by any possible means, sought 
not only to delegitimize the narrative and claims of Andrea’s case, but to suspend it: form 
and content were attacked simultaneously.119 The Executor’s court, here functioning 
rather like a public tribunal in cases of arbitration, served as the referee between two 
conflicting accounts of land possession. Landuccio’s behavior and that of his judges was 
implicitly segmentary, again reflecting the tendency in the procedure per accusationem to 
break down a conflict into its component parts.  
The land dispute was handled with no reference to Andrea’s previous conviction 
for false denunciation (1344), and Stefano’s response to Andrea consisted of various 
discrete points addressing different parts of his original petition (these concerned: 
jurisdiction and competence; possession of the lands in quesiton; proof of this possession; 
duration of this possession, lasting longer than the period Andrea mentioned in his 
petition). There is no evidence here for structural hatred of an enduring sort between the 
two parties-or rather, it has no legal value at this stage. The procedure is also free of the 
vocabulary of anger and sustained animosity (ira; inimicitia), the latter referring to an 
ongoing status and not an emotional state, which Daniel Lord Smail found for thirteenth- 
and fourteenth-century Marseilles.120 The court addressed itself piecemeal to different 
crimes despite the fact that they were most likely manifestations of the same dispute; this 
																																																								
118 Vallerani, Justice, 151-56, for exceptions and the resort to consilia. 
119 On the duties of a procurator, see Vallerani, Justice, 141-43.  
120 See in particular Smail, “Hatred as a social institution in late-medieval 
society,” Speculum 76:1 (Jan., 2001): 90-126, and his The Consumption of Justice. 
Emotions, publicity, and legal culture in Marseille, 1264-1423 (Ithaca, 2003), 89-132. 
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was a logical result of the attempt to defuse an explosive situation by breaking it down 
into its legally actionable components.121  
On May 17 1347 Ser Stefano di Gino also presented a series of notarial 
documents (instrumenta and iura) demonstrating Bartolomeo’s right to the disputed 
lands, “for proof of the right of Bartolomeo and for the defense of the same 
Bartolomeo”.122 The first of these was a notarial act (publicum instrumentum) containing 
proof of sale for one of the disputed pieces of land. According to this, Pulce di Guelfo 
de’Pulci, acting in the name of Bartolomeo, had purchased the first two pieces of land 
and goods named in Andrea’s petition from Alberto di Piero dei Magalotti, Andrea’s 
brother-in-law through his wife.123 Alberto’s legal representative had handed over 
possession of the goods to Bartolomeo; the sale was final.124 Stefano submitted two 
further instrumenta publica: the first contained a third purchase by Pulce di Guelfo 
de’Pulci, again from the de’Magalotti lineage, this time from the brothers Ugo, Guilelmo 
and Perozzo, sons of Durante.125 The second was an instrumentum proving his 
procuratorship for Bartolomeo. Stefano turned these over to ser Domenico di ser Becto, a 
																																																								
121 On the accusatorial trial’s process of abstraction and delimitation of which 
facts to pursue at law, see Vallerani, Justice, 93-97.  
122 EOG.32r: “Die XVII Maii. Comparuit coram dictis dominis Executore, iudice 
et curia, Ser Stephanus Ghini procurator et procuratore nomine Bartolomeo olim Lapi 
predicti et in causa et questione predicta quam habuit cum Ser Andrea ser Ugonis 
predicto ad probationem iuris dicti Bartholomei et ipsius Bartholome defensionem 
produxit infrascripta instrumenta et iura.” 
123 The presentation of the instrumentum is in EOG.81.32r. 
124 EOG.81.32r. 
125 EOG.81.32r-32v: “Item quoddam alium publicum instrumentum scriptum 
manu publico notarii in quo inter cetera continenta qualiter Pulce quodam Guelfi de 
Pulcis nomine dicti Bartholomei emit inter alia bona in ipso scripto contenta tertium 
petium terre cum domo contenta in petitione dicti Ser Andree ab Ughone [32v] Guilielmo 
et Peroczo filibus quodam Durantis Pieri de Magalottis de Latera.” 
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notary otherwise unattested in this case but who seemed to be acting as a notary for 
Andrea at this stage.126 
The Executor’s notary for the 1347 lawsuit, Giovanni di Curto da Gubbio, does 
not note the dates of these instrumenta, nor does he name the notary who drafted them, 
making their identification in the Notarile Antecosimiano virtually impossible, assuming 
they survived at all; no copies were included with the trial transcripts of the Executor’s 
court. None of the notarial registers containing mentions of the parish of S. Giovanni in 
Petroio or the suffragan populi of Latera and its castello contain them.127 So the real 
ownership rights to these pieces of land remains unknown, although two of the three 
parties in the suit, Andrea and Bartolomeo, would have known the factual reality of the 
matter.128 This factual reality is in specific contrast to the reality of the trial, that is, the 
legally-actionable elements of reality as reconstructed in the process of the trial by the 
three parties: the accuser, the impugned, and the court.129 Perhaps the Executor’s court 
did not deem the instrumenta sufficiently important to transcribe them.  
Following Stefano’s responses to Andrea’s initial charge, the Executor’s court 
and Andrea recognized Stefano as Bartolomeo’s procurator, concluding the initial stage 
																																																								
126 EOG.81.32v: “Que instrumenta et iura deposuit penes Ser Domenichum Ser 
Becti notarii ut inde copiam faciat parti adeverse si eam voluit. Et hinc in termionus sibi 
per dictum iudicem assignato porrecto presente dicto Ser Andrea.” 
127 Pirillo, Forme.I**, 131-36, provides archival references for the parish of S. 
Giovanni in Petroio and its constituent populi for the period 1300-1350; for the castello 
of Latera, see Pirillo, Forme.II, 102-03. 
128 EOG.81.27v. 
129 Vallerani, Justice, “How procedures think,” 73: “[…]the facts that ‘really’ 
happened and the facts judged in the trial are not exactly identical. Even today we ask 
ourselves what actually happens in a trial and to what degree procedural reality conforms 
to or reflects a reality external to the trial.” 
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of the suit.130 The judge then gave Andrea or his legal representative until next Thursday, 
20 May 1347, to submit an actio with modes of proof for “whatsoever he wished”, with 
both parties present and consenting to this next stage of the procedure.131 
 To now, I have focused largely on the sequences of the civil lawsuit, both parties’ 
claims and maneuvers, and the actions of the court. What was at stake in this dispute? 
Andrea’s initial request for summary justice was followed by a list of the possessions 
Bartolomeo had stolen from Andrea. Read with notarial evidence for the area, these can 
be used to reconstruct the politics of land and family that lay behind the dispute. Between 
his move to Latera from Monte Cuccoli and the depredations of the Pulci, Andrea had 
built up a small patchwork of land holdings in the area around Latera’s castello. The 
properties he named in his 1347 suit included two pieces (petiae) of land in the popolo of 
S. Maria di Latera, bounded on three sides by a road and on the fourth by the rivus 
Cassichus, probably a tributary of the river Sieve and now drowned by the Lago di 
Bilancino.  
Andrea also initially sought the return of two more pieces of land, one in S. Maria 
di Latera and the other in S. Niccolò di Latera, on the slopes of the castello.132 
Apparently one piece of arable land remained in his possession: one of the stolen 
properties abutted with another property described as belonging formerly to the “heirs of 																																																								
130 EOG.81.30r: “Die XIIII Maii. Dictus iudex ut supra sedens vis in scripto 
procuratoris dicti Ser Stephani Ghini, procurator dicti Bartholomei, presente dicto Ser 
Andrea et consentiente, pronuptiavit dictum Ser Stephanum esse et fuisse legitime 
procuratorem dicti Bartholomei in dicta causa.” 
131 EOG.81.30r: “Et deinde statuit et prefixit terminum dicto Ser Andree agenti et 
dicto Ser Stephano procuratoris et procuratore nomine dicti Bartholomei presente et 
intelligente, ad probandum per actionem genus probationis hinc ad diem Ivosi proxime 
ventum et peremptorem quicquid voluit in dicta causa. Et hii presentis et consentientibus 
dictis partibus.” 
132 See EOG.81.27r-27v for the locations of the properties in question. 
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Parigi and Malvicino, or the lady Ciaberotta, and today to the said ser Andrea.”133 This 
was a small community: one of the stolen properties abutted that of a follower of 
Bartolomeo de’Pulci, Ugo di Durante dei Magalotti.134 
Some families reappear again and again in the course of the dispute between 
Andrea and the Pulci. The Magalotti family appears in the lawsuit and other archival 
references to Latera: what can be reconstructed of their relationship with the two parties? 
The Magalotti were an old Tuscan family, perhaps from Fiesole but with a branch living 
in Florence by 1020; this branch of the family’s first entrance to the priorate was in 1283, 
a year after the institution’s establishment.135 Those Magalotti appearing in the lawsuit 
were all related to Piero de’Magalotti da Latera, who seems to have been the head of this 
branch of the family in the 1340s (see the reconstruction of this branch at the end of the 
chapter).136  This was a rural branch of the family, which may have been related to the 
rural magnate clan of the da Latera.137 Another member of the Magalotti, Magnotto de’ 
Magalotti, is described in Andrea’s initial denunciation as “Magnotto dei Migalotti of the 																																																								
133 EOG.81.27v: “a IIII, olim heredes Parigi et Malvini sive domina Cieberote et 
hodie dicti Ser Andree.” 
134 See EOG.81.27v for the location of this property; Ugo di Durante is listed as 
one of Bartolomeo’s fanti in Andrea’s initial denunciation (EOG.1.52r). Even if this 
denunciation was false, there is no necessary reason to suppose that this Ugo was not part 
of Bartolomeo’s retinue.	
135 See the Archivio di Stato di Firenze’s Sistema Informatico for a discussion of 
the Magalotti family and their surviving (much later) documentation: 
http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/siasfi/cgi-
bin/RSOLSearchSiasfi.pl?_op=getsprod&id=FIDD000141&_cobj=yes&_language=ita&
_selectbycompilationdate=SI&curwin=secondwindow 
136 No archival references that I have found refer to the generation before Piero 
dei Magalotti, nor are they described as magnates, despite Repetti’s characterization of 
them as “la famiglia magnatizia dei Magalotti”: Repetti, 657. 
137 Repetti, 657: “Dai documenti citati dal Brocchi nella sua descrizione del 
Mugello rilevasi, che da Latera trasse la sua prima origine la famiglia magnatizia dei 
Magalotti, la quale tanti uomini esimii fornì alle lettere, alla spada e alla toga.” The urban 
branch of the Magalotti family, later distinguished in the arts, died out in 1712. 
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house of the Guineldi.”138 In Neri Strinati’s list of rural magnate lineages included in his 
Cronica, one of the families from the sesto Porta del Duomo was given as “figliuoli di 
Guineldo da Barberino, e da Latera, e da Rezzano, ovvero Mortoiano.”139 These lineages 
remained on the list of rural magnates in 1325: the statutes of the Podestà include them 
under the rubric for the sesto Porta Duomo.140 The other rural magnate lineage associated 
with Latera was the Cattani-Lambardi, who originally held the castello of Latera.141 
These families appeared on the list of rural magnates in the 1325 Podestà’s statutes, but 
by 1342, the da Latera had become popolani.142  
In his initial 1343 denunciation, Andrea had named Ugo di Durante as one of 
Bartolomeo’s followers who assisted in the assault on him and his brothers.143 Ugo was 
the son of Durante, himself son of Piero dei Magalotti. Magnotto is described as “de 
																																																								
138 EOG.1.52r: “[the clause is in the dative] Durantis Magnoti de Migalottis de 
domo de Ghuineldis de Latera….” I read “Migalottis” as a variant of “Magalotti.” This 
rather clumsy naming system [filii X, de X] was characteristic of the rural magnates, as 
Christian Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 25, has observed: “….les nobles ruraux n’ont pas 
encore franchi les étapes du processus qui ont porté dès le XIIIe siècle les ligages urbains 
à fixer un nom collectif à partir d’un ancêtre...La plupart des autres nobles ruraux se 
définissent par leur appartenance à une lignée (filii X) et pa leur implantation 
géographique….”     
139 Neri Strinati’s list is reproduced in Lansing, Florentine magnates, appendix I, 
240-42; see 242 for the da Latera and their kin. 
140 Statuti.II, 292: “De Sextu Porte domus comitatus:….filiii Guineldi videlicet de 
Barberino et de Latera et de Reczano vel de Merociano, exceptis Filigno et fratribus filiis 
Pagnii de Latera et eorum filiis.” 
141 Statuti.II, 292, for these lineages. Originally a unitary lineage, by 1325 they 
had splintered into the “Cattani et Lambardi de Sommaia” (whose magnate status was 
cancelled by the Duke of Athens in 1342), and the “Cattani sive Lambardi de la 
Querciola.”  
142 See the table in Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 458. 
143 EOG.1.52r: “[Bartolomeo] mandavit Ughoni Durantis Magnoti de Migalottis 
de domo de Ghuineldis de Latera, Macchiocchio Ciolli et Ugholino Morentani et aliis 
pluribus [52v] pluribus de Latera quatenus percutent dictum Ser Andream Pierum et 
Guidonem ex qua mandato dictus Ugho menavit cum quadam lancia quam habebat suis 
manibus contra dictum ser Andream Pierum et Guidonem.” 
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domo de Guineldis”, which may indicate membership in the lineage noted in Strinati’s 
Cronaca, as well as the Magalotti. While Andrea’s denunciation was deemed false, this 
does not necessarily negate the veracity of some aspects of his narrative. As Chris 
Wickham has said of contemporaneous Pyrenean villagers’ narratives before an 
ecclesiastical inquisition, Andrea believed this was a version of his world that seemed 
credible to an outsider.144 Ugo may have been a member of Bartolomeo’s retinue 
(fanteria; brigata) of young magnates, noblemen, and henchmen of the sort analyzed by 
Carol Lansing for a slightly earlier period in Florentine history, and similar in ethos to 
Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur’s earlier milites pro comuni.145  
Other members of this rural branch of the Magalotti appear in documentation as 
land-holders in the upper Val di Sieve. Their holdings were concentrated in the twin 
populi of S. Maria and S. Niccolò di Latera, with some properties abutting those of 
Andrea.146 Based on their association with the old signorial families of the area, the 
Magalotti may have been allies of the Pulci, who also possessed lands in the area.147 
There is no evidence for this beyond one of the Magalotti’s association with Bartolomeo. 
Some of the Magalotti may, however, have colluded at some point with Bartolomeo or 
his legal representative to influence the outcome of Andrea’s initial trial, or the lawsuit 
that followed, especially since Andrea had impugned Ugo dei Magalotti along with 																																																								
144 Wickham, “Gossip and resistance among the medieval peasantry,” Past & 
Present 160 (1998) [hereafter “Wickham, ‘Gossip,”], 3-24, at 8. 
145 Lansing, Florentine magnates, 184-91; Maire-Vigueur, Cavaliers et citoyens 
(Paris, 2004), in particular 23-90. 
146 Pirillo, Forme.I**, 133, notes the tendency to conflate the two populi in the 
sources. Latera’s castello was in the pieve of S. Maria di Latera: Pirillo, Forme.II, 102-
03.  
147 For references to Pulci landholdings in the area, see NA.195, 110v-111r; 113r; 
141r; and 170v. These references are all locative clauses to Pulci lands for acts unrelated 
to the Pulci themselves. 
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Bartolomeo de’Pulci in his denunciation of 1344. Yet the Magalotti also had connections 
to Andrea of a more civil sort, which I discuss below. These pre-existing relationships, of 
which there are usually only traces in the documentation of the courts, need to be kept in 
mind in understanding the battle of proofs that ensued between Andrea and Bartolomeo 
de’Pulci’s procurator.  
Andrea responded immediately to Stefano’s flat denial of his charges with a series 
of 24 positiones of his own. Andrea presented these to the court on the same day as 
Stefano’s evidence (May 17, 1347), indicating a degree of preparation. The initial claim 
of Andrea’s lawsuit was that Bartolomeo had usurped Andrea’s legally-sanctioned 
property. This claim divides here into 24 separate facts which together reconstitute the 
original fact, now demonstrated through legal proofs, as well as Bartolomeo’s usurpation 
of this property. Most of Andrea’s positiones were based on notarial documents 
(instrumenta publica) that together demonstrated the process by which the lands in 
question passed into his hands. The others were collateral acts establishing the dating of 
this and grounding it in publica vox et fama. I will first review the transactional history of 
Andrea’s land in summary, then address the probative value of positiones in relation to 
the procedural stage the parties were at, before examining Stefano’s responses. 
Andrea’s positiones: Family and Property in Latera 
Andrea’s first positio was a publicum instrumentum containing two land sales for 
properties in S. Maria di Latera.148. The first was Albizzo degli Albizzi’s sale of one 
																																																								
148 EOG.81.33v: “Quodam publicum instrumentum manu publico notarii scriptum 
inter cetera continentem qualiter Albiczus domini Albiczi de Latera vendidit Tanino filio 
Gerini petiam unam terre partem aratoriem et partem vineatam cum domo capanna 
resedio et habituro positam in populo Sancte Marie de Latera in pendicibus castri Latere 
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piece of land to Tanino, son of Geri. Given the identical locative clauses, it was one of 
the pieces of land Andrea had claimed, in the opening of the 1347 lawsuit, that 
Bartolomeo had usurped from him.149 The second piece of land was in the same area, 
near the castello’s moat.150 Andrea’s second positio confirmed Albizzo’s transfer of 
ownership to Tanino and his brothers.151 
Andrea’s subsequent positiones trace the transfer of this land and other pieces of 
land (petiae) from the family of Tanino and Gerino to him. The third item was a proof of 
sale for another piece of land, with Piero de’ Magalotti selling the land to Tanino’s 
brother, Piero.152 His next instrumentum recorded that Piero and Tanino’s father, Gerino, 
and Sinibaldo (their relationship is unclear) had received a dowry to the amount of 140 
fiorini piccioli from Alberto di Sassone di Dante for Sinibaldo’s marriage to Alberto’s 
daughter, Chiarissima. They were now agreeing to return this dowry to Alberto on behalf 
of Chiarissima, although the reason for the dowry’s return is not given, as it was 																																																																																																																																																																					
loco dicto Fracta quibus a I, via publica; a II, heredes Parigii et heredes Malvicini et via; 
a III, ecclesia Sancte Marie predicte; a IIII, dominio Loterii olim domini Odaldi.” 
149 EOG.81.33v: “ Albiczus domini Albiczi de Latera vendidit Tanino filio Gerii 
petiam unam terre partem aratoriem et partem vineatam cum domo capanno resedio et 
habituro posita in populo Sante Marie de Latera in pendicibus castri Latere loco dicto 
Fracta quibus a I, via publica, a II, heredibus Parigii et heredibus Malvicini et via, a III, 
ecclesia Sante Marie predicte, a IIII, domino Loterii olim domino Odaldi.” Compare this 
with EOG.81.27v: “Item alia petia terrae parti <aratoie> in parte vineata cum domo 
capanna et habituro posita in dicto popolo loco dicto Fracta cui a 1 via a 2 olim heredes 
Viniani et hodie Ugonis Durantis a 3 ecclesia Sancte Marie a IIII, olim heredes Parigii et 
Malvicini sive domina Cieberote et hodie dicti Ser Andree.” 
150 EOG.81.33v: “Item petiam unam terre aratorie positam in dicto populo Sancte 
Marie loco dicto colto cui a I et II, via; a III, fossatum et dictos emptores; a IIII, dictorum 
emptorum pro partio in dicto instrumento venditionis contentam.” 
151 EOG.81.33v. 
152 EOG.35r: “Item quoddam aliud publicum instrumentum mano publico notarii 
scripto intercetera continentem qualiter Bectus et Cherichus fratres et filii Pierii de Latera 
fecerunt cartam vendictionis Piero filio Gerini de Latera [brother of Tanino]  de quadam 
petia terre et vineata posita in pendicibus castri Latere cui a 1, vi; a 2, Uberti et Scholaii, 
a 3, Becti Gerini, a 4, dicti emptoris pro partio in ipso instrumento venditionis contento.” 
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irrelevant to Andrea’s lawsuit; perhaps Sinibaldo had died. This position was followed by 
an instrumentum matrimonii, denoting that Sinibaldo and Chiarissima, Alberto’s 
daughter, had wedded.153 Chiarissima then ceded the rights of this dowry to Compiuta, 
the daughter of Piero de’Magalotti.154 Compiuta, in turn, “because of the donation and 
concession,” gave these rights to her son, none other than Andrea. 
This familial connection emerges from a separate notarial act done in her name on 
6 April 1347.155 This act (mundium) granted Andrea legal guardianship (the office of 
mundualdus) over his mother, Compiuta and his own wife Piera, daughter of Michele di 
Dinaccio da Barberino di Mugello.156 Ser Francesco drew up the mundium in S. Maria di 
Latera a little over a month before Andrea’s lawsuit began, by Ser Francesco, exercising 
his ability as a notary to appoint a mundualdus.157 This guardianship was enacted so that 
																																																								
153 EOG.81.34r: “Item quoddam aliud publicum instrumentum dotis manu publico 
scriptum…qualiter Gerinus qd Rinucetti sive Venuti et Sinibaldus vocatur Favaglius 
confessi fuerunt se habuisse in dotem ab Alberto Sassonis Dante quod domina 
Chiarissima filia sua et uxore dicti Sinibaldi LBR centum quadraginta FP quam dotem 
ipsi et quibus ipsorum in solidum ob promisserunt eidem Alberto rec[] pro dicta dominia 
Chiarissima reddere et restituere eidem in omnibus et singulis causibus restituende dotis. 
Et quod dictis observandis obligaverunt se ipsos et eorum heredeum et bona.” The 
instrumentum matrimonii follows: “Item quoddam alium publicum instrumentum 
matrimonii manu publico notarii scripto inter cetera continentem qualiter dictus 
Sinibaldus et dicta domina Chiarissima per verba de presbiterii matrimonii inter se ad 
invicem contraxerunt.” 
154 EOG.81.34r: “Item quoddam alium publicum instrumentum cessionis manu 
publico notarii scriptum inter cetere continentem qualiter dicta domina Chiarissima 
consensu sui mundi cessit iura dicte dotis domine Compiute filie quondam Pieri de Latera 
in quo instrumento continentem instrumentum mundi ipsae domine Chiarissime.” 
155See NA.195, the first volume of imbreviatures by the notary ser Francesco di 
Zanobio di Albizello, at 141r. 
156 On the Florentine institution of the mundualdus, see in particular Thomas 
Kuehn, “ ‘Cum consensu mundualdi’: Legal guardianship of women in Quattrocento 
Florence,” Viator 13 (1982), 309-333, in particular 310-12 (reprinted in Kuehn,  Law, 
family, and women: toward a legal anthropology of renaissance Italy (Chicago, 1999)). 
157 See Kuehn, “‘Cum consensu,’” 311, for notaries’ and judges’ ability to appoint 
guardians. NA.195.141r: “Item eodem anno [1347] et die sexto mensis Aprilis. Actum in 
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Compiuta, working through Andrea, could sell a piece of land (petium terre) to Barone di 
Barone, a Florentine residing in the quartiere of S. Maria Novella-the only urban 
landowner attested as active in this part of the Mugello during the 1340s. Compiuta is 
described in the act of mundium as “once daughter of Piero Magalotti and formerly the 
wife of ser Ugo di Ser Guido”. That Compiuta’s deceased husband, Ugo, was Andrea’s 
father, is confirmed in the next line, where Piera is described as “once the daughter of 
Michele di Dinaccio da Barberino and wife of ser Andrea, son of the said deceased Ser 
Ugo of S. Maria di Latera.”158 This would explain Andrea’s appointment as her guardian. 
This instrumentum mundii also proves that Andrea had not incurred mala fama with legal 
standing from his conviction for the false denunciation of 1344, since he could still serve 
as a guardian.  
The next entry in the same notarial register is the land sale to Barone di Barone, 
supervised by Andrea for Piera and Compiuta, with his brother ser Guido acting as 
procurator.159 Barone, an urban popolano from Santa Maria Maggiore, appears 
frequently in ser Francesco’s atti between 1345-48, usually buying lands in the parish of 
S. Giovanni in Petroio and leasing them out via sharecropping contracts (mezzadrie) to 
																																																																																																																																																																					
popolo Sancte Marie de Latera, presentibus testis Laterino Betti et Francischo Ciali dicti 
populi Sancte Marie de Latera ad hunc vocatur et rogatur secundum domina Compiuta, 
videlicet filia quondam Pieri Magalotti et uxor quondam Ser Ugonis Ser Guidonis.” 
158 NA.195.141r: “domina Compiuta videlicet filia quondam Pieri Magalotti et 
uxor quondam Ser Ugonis Ser Guidonis et domina Piera, filia quondam Michaelis 
Dinaccii de Barberino et uxor Ser Andree filius quondam dicti Ser ugonis ambe populi 
Sancte Marie de Latera.” On the hazards of accurately identifying individuals from 
medieval evidence, especially when dealing with those lacking surnames, see the classic 
piece by Zvi Razi, “The Toronto School’s reconstruction of medieval peasant society: A 
critical view,” Past & Present 141 (1979): 141-57, at 142-43. 
159 The entirety of this sale is found in NA.195.141r-143r; for Guido as 
procurator for Compiuta, Piera, and Andrea, see NA.195.142v. 
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locally-based tenants.160 The land being sold was not involved in Andrea’s dispute with 
Bartolomeo de’Pulci, although its locative clauses indicate their proximity.161 Perhaps 
Andrea was consolidating his holdings, or needed cash to cover expenses before initiating 
his lawsuit against Bartolomeo in May 1347. 
 This dense network reveals the complex familial and associative ties behind 
Andrea’s lawsuit, and his dispute with the Pulci. Andrea had an ongoing involvement 
with Barone di Barone during the mid-1340s. Barone, who appears in the sources as 
“Barone, son of the deceased Barone/of the other Barone, of the deceased Cappello”, is a 
notable example of an urban landowner with extensive properties in the Mugello. In May 
1347, as his lawsuit with Bartolomeo continued, Andrea took out a loan from Barone of 
25 gold florins, perhaps to support legal expenses; evidently his previous land sale had 
not produced enough cash for his current needs.162 Evidently Barone managed to remain 
above the dispute between Andrea and the Pulci. He does not appear in the instrumenta, 
nor is any of his land mentioned, even though he must have been aware of the dispute 
between his associate and the Pulci. On September 26 1347, Andrea received a six-month 
lease for a house in the urban quartiere of S. Maria Novella from one ser Francesco di 
Bencivenne; Piero di Feo di Chiaro, who appears in land sales as Barone’s procurator, 
brokered the deal.163 Perhaps Barone or his legal representative deliberately assisted 
Andrea. Barone, who lived in the urban populus of S. Maria Maggiore, may have found it 
useful, as a patron and creditor, to have one of his clients and debtors in the nearby 																																																								
160 See NA.195.141r-153r, and 202v, for Barone’s land transactions. 
161 NA.195.141v: “Unum petia terre laborata posita in popolo Sancte Marie de 
Latera loco dicto Acchengi, cui a I, via, a II, heredes Nardi, a III, fossatum, a IIII, 
Laterini Betti et heredes Guidi….” 
162 NA.195.153r-153v for the loan, with Andrea as the debtor.  
163 NA.195.178v. 
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quartiere of S. Maria Novella; Andrea had moved there at some point before beginning 
his lawsuit.164   
At an unknown point before 1347, Barone and his unnamed heirs had become 
patrons of the church of S. Maria di Cassi, a church in the parish of S. Giovanni in 
Petroio near Latera. Andrea’s uncle-in-law, Arrigo di Dinaccio da Barberino di Mugello, 
appears as a witness in a census of Barone’s patronage rights drawn up on 14 August 
1347.165 Ugo di Durante dei Magalotti also appeared as a witness for this census.166 Ugo, 
as noted above, was one of the Pulci followers denounced by Andrea in 1344. Given that 
Compiuta di Piero dei Magalotti was Andrea’s mother, and Ugo was the son of Durante, 
Compiuta’s brother, in denouncing Ugo Andrea had denounced his own cousin, who was 
now serving as a witness for his creditor Barone. Late medieval Tuscany’s “excessive 
community” is in full evidence here.167  
This Arrigo was Andrea’s uncle-in-law and he was also a co-recipient with him of 
the rented property in the quartiere S. Maria Novella overseen by Barone’s procurator. 
Arrigo and his family, the da Barberino, were no popolani: in 1346, the year before 
Andrea’s civil suit against Bartolomeo began, Arrigo was denounced as a “magnate of 
the Florentine contado” (comitatum florentie magnas) by Tello di Guerro, a resident of 
the populo of S. Margherita dei Cerchi in Florence. Tello described himself as a “weak 
																																																								
164 For the logic of of lending and debt in maintaining social networks in 
Quattrocento Florence, see Ronald F.E. Weissman, “The importance of being ambiguous: 
Social relations, individualism, and identity in Renaissance Florence,” in Urban life in 
the Renaissance, eds. S. Zimmerman and R. Weissman (Newark, 1989), 269-80. 
165 NA.195.169r-169v. Arrigo was the son of Dinaccio da Barberino; Arrigo’s 
brother, Michele, was the father of domina Piera, Andrea di ser Ugo’s wife. 
166 NA.195.169r for Ugo as one of the witnesses. 
167 Stephen J. Milner, “Partial readings,” 98. Milner was speaking of the excessive 
community discussed by Weissman in the piece cited above. 
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and poor person” (impotens et miserabilis persona) in the denunciation.168  Together with 
Paolo Giunte, a “nobleman of the Florentine contado,” Arrigo had taken Tello’s land in 
S. Niccolò di Latera, and it was currently in the possesion of Paolo Giunte.169 Piero di ser 
Ugo, Andrea’s brother, was listed as a witness for this crime, and was contumacious.170 
Arrigo appeared before the Executor and claimed that he had not seized or occupied the 
lands in question, although there is no further record of the outcome of the case.171 Paolo 
Giunte eventually appeared before the Executor and confessed that he had worked the 
lands in question-but he had done this at the behest of Arrigo’s nephew, Andrea’s 
brother-in-law, Ser Dinaccio di Michele di Dinaccio, and that no seizure or usurpation 
had occurred.172  
Arrigo and ser Dinaccio were members of the rural magnate lineage of the da 
Barberino, who in turn were related to the da Cattani, the original castellans of the rocca 
																																																								
168This appears to have been an in-person denunciation before the Executor. See 
EOG.68, 7r: “Exponit Tellus quondam Gueri olim popolo S. Remigii et hodie populi S. 
Margarite de Florentie popularis de popolo civitatis Florentie et impotens et miserabilis 
persona quod Arrighus Dinacci de Barberino de Mugello comitatus florentie magnas de 
domo de Captanis de Barberino de Mugello”.  
169 EOG.68.7r: “Arrighus Dinacci de Barberino de Mugello comitatus florentie 
magnas de domo de Captanis de Barberino de Mugello invasit per se ipsum et per 
Paulum Iunte de popolo S Nicholai de Latera nobilem comitatum florentie et hominem 
male condictionis et fame contra formam iustitie et statutorum per vim et violentiam 
contra voluntatem dicti Telli infrascripto bono idem et possessionem dicti Telli”. 
170 EOG.68.7r. Although a “y”, signifying the appearance of a witness, is next to 
“Pierus ser Ugonis,” he is not listed among the witnesses who appeared to testify: 
EOG.69.17r-18r. 
171 EOG.68.7v: “Arrighus citatus….responsit quod se non invasisse dicta bona 
nec occupasse nec invasse contenta in dicta inquisitione.” 
172 EOG.68.8v: “Die XIX mensis Iunii. Paulus Iunte dixit et sponte confessus fuit 
se superscripta bona et possessiones in dicta querela seu notificatione contra eum, 
laborasse de licentia et voluntate domini Dinacci Michelis de Barberino et pro ipso 
Dinaccii et ut laborator ipsius alia vero in dicta notificatio et querela negavit vera esse.” 
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di Barberino and the castello di Latera.173 The da Barberino were episcopal vassals, and 
appear in listed in the list of archepiscopal goods known as the Bulletone.174 They 
remained castellans under the commune; Niccolò da Barberino handed the castello over 
to the Milanese army in August 1351, along with those of Villanova, Galliano, and 
Latera.175 In marrying Piera di Michele, Andrea had married into a branch of an old 
magnate family, and was associated through them with the da Cattani, da Barberino, and 
de’ Magalotti. Perhaps he is best seen as a member of the sub-regional elite of the Val di 
Sieve, with the evident ambition to expand or safeguard his landholdings against the 
Pulci.  
 How did these complex interconnections between Andrea’s family and other 
residents of the Mugello, relate to Andrea’s effort to prove ownership of the disputed 
lands? That is, how did social interconnectivity translate into proving one’s claims in 
court? It is significant that in the publica instrumenta displayed before the Executor’s 
court in his series of positiones, only one of them refers to his mother, Compiuta; his 
family and friends are otherwise absent from the lawsuit, and must be reconstructed from 
notarial evidence. Nor are Barone, Arrigo, or any of the other associates discussed above 
cited as witnesses to prove Andrea’s claims; indeed, none of these witnesses are attested 
																																																								
173 These roots were quite old by 1347. A 1072 parchment preserved among the 
Diplomatico of the monastery of Passignano contains an investment for a hospital 
stewardship, made by Uberto and Teuderigo figli di Ugo dei Cattani in their castello at 
Latera: Repetti, 657. For the Cattani and da Barberino, see also Francesco Niccolai, 
Mugello e Val di Sieve. Guida topografica, storico-artistica illustrata (Rome: 
Multigrafica Editrice, 1974 [1914], 310-11. 
174 Enrico Faini, “Il gruppo dirigente fiorentino dell’età consolare,” Archivio 
storico italiano CLXII (2004), 199-231, at 12 in online version, at nt. 88. 
175 M. Villani, Cronica, 12.2. 
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except from Andrea’s positio naming them.176 Because the lawsuit breaks off shortly 
after this stage, we do not know if Andrea called forth his kinsmen as fideiussores at a 
later point in the lawsuit. Here, however, he seems to have deliberately excluded them 
from the list of witnesses proving the veracity of his claims. 
 It is possible that Andrea was employing a similar strategy to that of cfourteenth-
century Marseillais, as analyzed by Daniel Lord Smail: selecting distant acquaintances or 
strangers emphasized their reliability, and was supposed to assure that the plaintiff had 
not suborned the witnesses.177 Or perhaps Andrea did not draw on his local elite 
connections in court for the simple fact that magnates like Arrigo di Dinaccio da 
Barberino were hardly the best witnesses to produce against fellow magnates like 
Bartolomeo de’Pulci. It is just as likely that his magnate kin chose to stay out of the 
dispute. 
 Following proof of his reception of Chiarissima’s dowry from his mother 
Compiuta, Andrea displayed another marital document. This was a dotal act 
(instrumentum dotis) recording the dowry of 195 fiorini piccioli that Gerino, Tanino, 
Germia and Sinibaldo di Gierino received from Aglio son of Mompuccio for his 
daughter, Lapa. Lapa had married Germia, as shown by another instrumentum 
matrimonii, so the dowry was legitimate, but the brothers had then promised to restore it 
																																																								
176 The witnesses are listed in EOG.81.36r: “Testes autem quos idem ser Andrea 
producit ad predicta probandum et ipsorum nomina sunt ista: omnes comunis de Latera. 
Iuntinus Vindi, Cinus Gianius, Borghus ser Telli, Puciante Simonis et Salinbene 
Giannini.” 
177 Daniel Lord Smail,  “Witness programs in late medieval Marseilles,” in Voices 
from the bench227-50, at 240-41.	
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to Lapa.178  Lapa in turn ceded the dowry, with the consent of her guardian (mundualdus), 
to Andrea, following Germia’s death.  
Andrea did not immediately take possession of the dowry, however: Germia and 
his brothers held Lapa’s goods until the time of their deaths.179 Andrea took care 
throughout his positiones to carefully specify the dating of each successive sequence. 
Germia and Sinibaldo had died 24 years ago. Here Andrea appealed for the first time in 
his positiones to publica vox et fama to prove this assertion, and Stefano did not deny it, 
only slightly back-dating their deaths to 30 years ago.180 At some point after Lapa 
formally turned her dowry goods over to Andrea but before the death of her brothers, 
																																																								
178 EOG.81.34v: “Item quoddam aliud publicum instrumentum dotis manu 
publico notarii inter cetera continentem qualiter dictus Gerinus Taninus Germia et 
Sinibaldus fratres et filii dicti Gierini in solidum se ob fuerunt confessi et contenti se 
habuisse et recepisse in dotem ab Angelio quondam Mompi populi Sancti Nicholay de 
Spugnole dantem et soluentem pro domina Lapa filia sua et uxore dicti Germe stipulante 
libros centum nonagintaquinque FP quam dotem ipsi et quilibet ipsorum in totum et in 
solidum ob reddere promisserunt ipsi Aglio recte et stipulati pro dicta domina Lapa in 
actionem causam eventumque reddendi et restituendi dotis et pro dictis obbligaverunt  
Item quoddam aliud publicum matrimonii manu publico notarii scripto inter centera 
continentem qualiter dictus Germia et dicta domina Lapa per verba de praesenti 
matrimonii contraxerunt.” I read “Mompi” as shorthand for “Mompuccio”; the other, 
literal translation would render his name as “Mompo.” On the subject of dowries in late 
medieval and Renaissance Florence, see the classic study by Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, 
“The Griselda complex: Dowry and marriage gifts in the Quattrocento,” in her Women, 
family, and ritual in Renaissance Italy, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago and London, 
1985), 213-40. 
179 EOG.81.35r: “In super idem ser Andreas ad probationem dicte petitionis 
porrectam contra dictum Bartholomeum per dictum Ser Andream exibitam et porrectam 
et probationem iurium ipsius Ser Andree ponit et si negatur probatio, intendit capitula ita 
videlicet, quod Gerinus quondam Rinucetti Sinibaldus vocatur ‘Favaglius’ Taninus et 
Germia fratres et filii dicti Gerini tenuerunt et possiderunt dicta bona super nominata 
usque ad tempus mortis eorum.” 
180 EOG.81.35v: “Item quod dictus Sinibaldus et Germia mortui sunt et 
decesserunt iam sunt XXIIIIor anni et ultra et de predictis fuit et est publica vox et fama.” 
Stefano’s response is in EOG.81.27v: “Item quintem positionem quod incipit ‘Item quod 
dicti Sinibaldus etc.’, dixit quod credit quod decesserunt iam sunt XXX anni et ultra.” 
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Bartolomeo relinquished all rights to the goods Andrea received from Lapa’s dowry.181 
Maddeningly, the registers of the notary whom Andrea entrusted to copy these out for the 
court, ser Piero Banchino di Firenze, do not survive.182 Andrea had possessed the goods 
and petiae terrae he had acquired through the two dowry acquisitions until 1342, “for 
himself and his laborers,” implying he leased out his land to others, perhaps to 
sharecroppers via mezzadria contracts.183 
 Up to this point in the suit, Andrea mainly relied on written documents to prove 
his case. It is remarkable how many separate instrumenta he preserved-perhaps in his 
notarial registers, which do not survive, or in a private archive. When the fact he was 
trying to prove shifted from his possession of the lands in question to the fact of 
Bartolomeo’s usurpation, his forms of proof shifted as well. Andrea appeals to publica 
vox et fama to prove Bartolomeo’s occupation and usurpation of Andrea’s goods; 
Bartolomeo’s magnate status; and that Andrea himself was a member of the urban popolo 
di Firenze, and had been for “thirty years and more.”184  
																																																								
181 EOG.81.35r: “Item quoddam aliud publicum instrumentum manu publico 
notarii scriptum inter cetera continentem qualiter dictus Bartholomeus renuptiavit omnia 
iura quod sibi competebat in ipsis bonis ratione emptionis facte de ipsis bonis que 
instrumenta et iura deponit penes Ser Pierum Banchini notarium ad copiendam aliteri 
parti si voluit.” 
182 Piero’s son, Antonio del fu ser Piero di Banchino di Firenze, is however 
attested in the ASF’s Diplomatico series as early as 1359: 
http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/pergasfi/?op=fetch&type=pergamena&id=953421 
183 EOG.81.36r: “Item quod in Millio CCC XLII dictus Ser Andreas dicta bona et 
petias terrarum suis confinatis habuit, tenuit, et possedit per se et suos laboratores.” 
184 EOG.81.36r: “Item quod dictus Bartholomeus de Pulcis occupavit et exurpavit 
et invaxit dicta bona et petias terrarum dicto Ser Andree et de predictis fuit et est publica 
vox et fama. Item quod dictus Ser Andreas fuit et est popularis et de populo civitatis 
Florentie et ita tenetur et habitatur et tractatur et reputatur et habitatus et reputatus et 
tractatus fuit iam sunt triginta anni et ultra. Item quod dictus Bartholomeus fuit et est 
magnas et potens et de domo mangnatum et potentum dicte civtatis Florentie videlicet de 
domo de Pulcis de Florentia.” 
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This was untrue. The first definite attestation of Andrea in the archival material, a 
notarial act of 19 September 1329, refers to a November 1328 instrumentum written by 
Andrea and describes him as “ser Andrea son of Ugo di Guido, of Latera.”185 In the 
incipit of the Executor’s 1344 inquest against him, he was described as “of Montecuccoli 
and now an inhabitant of the castello of Latera, of the Florentine contado.”186 Stefano, 
Bartolomeo de’ Pulci’s procurator, fastened on this in his tenth positio: Andrea was not a 
city-dweller but a comitatus popularus, a non-elite resident of Florence’s countryside.187 
There was not necessarily a problem here-contadini popolani were not barred from law-
but Andrea’s (deliberate?) mistake is significant. We do not know if Stefano exploited it 
to greater effect later in the trial, given that the record breaks off before the witnesses’ 
testimony.188 Nevertheless, it would have been an obvious point for Stefano to focus on. 
A common form of defense for the accused’s procurator was to question the accuser’s 
publica fama. This consisted in large part of the person’s integration into his community: 
his labor, his family, and work.189 If Andrea claimed he was an urban popolano, how 
could the witnesses he cited, all from Latera, vouch for his publica fama and the fama of 
the events he described? And if he was from Latera, why was he claiming to be a resident 
of Florence?  
																																																								
185 NA.10899, 101v: “publico instrumento scripto per Ser Andream ser Ugonis 
Guidi de Latera notario in Millio Trecento Vigint otto indictione duodecima die 
duodecimo mensis Novembris.” 
186 EOG.1.52r: “Ser Andream ser Ugonis de Monte Cuccholi et nunc habitatorem 
in castello Latere comitatus Florentie….” 
187 EOG.81.38r: “Item decime positio quod incipit ‘Item quod dictus Ser Andreas 
etc.’ dixit quod credit eum esse comitatinum popularem.” 
188 This was a commonplace in the trials of the late medieval communes: 
Vallerani, Justice, 33. For figures on the number of trials featuring witnesses for Perugia 
and Bologna for 1298-1319, see Vallerani, Justice, 165. 
189 Vallerani, Justice, 149. 
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These sorts of ambiguities regarding Andrea’s personal status could be exploited 
by Stefano, and he in fact denied most of the 12 positiones taken up in his response to 
Andrea. Those he did not deny, he modified: Sinibaldo and Germia had died-but around 
thirty years ago, not 24, as Andrea gave it; the only positio he accepted, and thus which 
would not be raised again if the trial proceeded to witness testimony, was that 
Bartolomeo was a magnate.190 Stefano promised to elaborate upon his denials and 
responses once the Executor’s judge had fixed a date for this.191 The last surviving 
records from the trial consist of the judge assigning the two parties six days before the 
next stage of the trial, in order for Stefano to cross examine the witnesses.192 The 
surviving record of the trial breaks off here. It would not be surprising if Andrea and 
Bartolomeo reached some sort of out-of-court settlement, perhaps through a peace pact 
(instrumentum pacis) before the trial entered the stage of witness testimony.  
One of the most significant aspects of the lawsuit is the emphasis on written 
documents’ probative value, the manipulation of them in constructing a narrative, and 
Andrea’s ultimate reliance upon publica fama for proving the fact of Bartolomeo’s 
usurpation. It is unexceptionable that Stefano and Andrea deployed so many instrumenta 
publica; they were after all legal professionals steeped in the culture of the courts.  																																																								
190 Eog.81.38r: “Item XI positio: qua incipit ‘Item quod dictus Bartholomeus etc.’ 
dixit quod credit.” 
191 EOG.81.38r: “Item super ultima positio, respondit quod de confessis confitetur 
et de negatis negat ut superscriptus est, quod responsionem feceret in termino sibi 
assignato in presente dicti iudicis apud dictum bancum dicto Ser Andrea presente.” 
192 EOG.81.43r-43v: “Quibus partibus [Andrea and Stefano] presentibus et 
consentientibus dictus Iudex statuit terminum ad reprobandum dictos testes secundum 
formam statutum seii dierum utlium et peremptorem. Et ego Johannes Curti de Eugubio 
imperiali auctoritate notarius et iudiciarii ordine et nunc notarius et officialis dicti domini 
Executoris et comunis Florentie predictis ominbus et singulis in dicto quateno contentis 
inter fui et ea de mandato dicti domini Executoris rogati scripsi et publice et meum 
singnum apposui.” 
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More revealing is the narrative that these instrumenta collectively constitute. 
Stefano produced the first notarial act of sale, showing Pulce di Guelfo de’Pulci 
purchasing two pieces of land for Bartolomeo from Alberto di Piero dei Magalotti, 
Andrea’s brother-in-law.  The third showed another purchase made by Pulce, this time 
from Alberto’s nephews, Perozzo, Ugho, and Guilielmo. These instrumenta seemed to 
trump Andrea’s version of the claim as given in the initial actio: The lands in question 
were rightfully Bartolomeo’s, and Andrea had no legal title to them.  
These were immediately countered by Andrea’s positiones, which laid out more 
notarial acts and reconstructed the history of the claim in much more detail than Stefano 
had. In his various instrumenta, Andrea traced the history of the pieces of land in 
question back about twenty-five years, to the period preceding the deaths of Sinibaldo 
and Germia. Taken together, the positiones provide a more detailed and deeper 
reconstruction of Andrea’s claim, with substantive proof of his history of association with 
the lands, via his kin and the dowries of Lapa and Compiuta. None of the instrumenta are 
dated, but Andrea’s claim to have possessed the lands “for himself and his laborers”193 
established his ownership prior to Bartolomeo’s instrumenta presented by Stefano di 
Gino. The question remains of how to reconcile the apparent proof of purchase by Pulce 
di Guelfo de’Pulci with Andrea’s a priori possession of the lands in question. Given the 
lack of dates for any of the instrumenta cited by either side, this cannot be answered with 
certainty. There is no reason to discount Bartolomeo’s previous ownership of some or all 
of the disputed lands: Andrea provided a positio claiming that Bartolomeo had 
relinquished all his rights from the purchase made for him, presumably that made by 																																																								
193 EOG.81.36r: “Item quod in Millio CCC XLII dictus Ser Andreas dicta bona et 
petias terrarum suis confinatis habuit, tenuit, et possedit per se et suos laboratores.” 
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Pulce di Guelfo de’Pulci and cited by Stefano.194 Stefano, of course, vigorously denied 
this. 
This ambiguity was probably the central point of the dispute, and the lawsuit. 
Given the overlapping contacts between Andrea and Bartolomeo, it is not impossible that 
the origin of their dispute lay in different interpretations of what rights each party 
possessed to the three pieces of land. This is especially the case given the intermediary 
situation of the Magalotti family: Magnotto and Ugo di Durante de’ Magalotti may have 
been associates of Bartolomeo (according to Andrea’s false cedula), and Andrea’s 
mother, Compiuta, was the sister of the men from whom Pulce di Guelfo de’Pulci 
purchased land. Although not related by blood, Andrea and Bartolomeo may have 
posssesed rights simultaneously to some or all of the petiae terrae. Andrea held another 
piece of land, abutting the third piece of land he claimed in his initial petition, in common 
with the heirs of Lotterio. One of these heirs is identifiable from a notarial act of 26 July 
1329: Odaldo, son of Lotterio, who himself was the son of the deceased Filippo da 
Barberino.195 Andrea was tied to the da Barberino through his wife, Piera. This sort of 
joint-property ownership was a hallmark of the magnate class that we can see Andrea 
associating himself with in the notarial documents.196 Andrea was not a member of the 
Pulci, but was associated with the lineage’s magnate milieu. 
																																																								
194 See EOG.81.35r for this positio. 
195See NA.10899.97v; the instrumentum was done on 26 July 1329  “in castro de 
Latera de Mugello, in the names of “Lotterius quondam domini Phylippi de Barberino et 
Odaldus eius filius”.  
196 For this, see in particular Lansing, Florentine magnates, 46-84, and Klapisch-
Zuber, Retour, 79-108. Both of these scholars focused primarily on the urban magnate 
lineages, but I see no reason to not ascribe this tendency to the rural magnate lineages 
such as the da Latera and da Barberino, especially given the episcopal associations of 
both. 
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It seems reasonable to posit that the original dispute between Andrea and 
Bartolomeo was caused by doubts or confusion regarding what exactly Bartolomeo had 
relinquished when he gave up his rights to the properties in question. An oddity of the 
case concerns the dating of Andrea’s initial acquisition of the land in question: in 
medieval Italy, uncontested possession of land for 30 years was proof of ownership, in 
and of itself.197 Neither of the parties appealed to this custom to support their case or 
damage their enemy’s, at least in the portion of the trial record which survives. Perhaps 
the 30-year limit was an element in the feud: Andrea could have been contesting 
Bartolomeo’s claims towards the end of thirty years of confused or uncontested 
ownership; conversely, perhaps Bartolomeo’s usurpation of the lands was intended to 
publicly demonstrate his claim to the land.198 
Publica fama played an important role in the lawsuit. Although he relied upon 
written documents to prove his ownership of disputed land, Andrea’s claim that 
Bartolomeo had usurped and occupied his lands, and the social status of Bartolomeo and 
himself, depended wholly on publica fama, which his witnesses were, presumably, 
willing to verify.199 Publica fama in the form of the public knowledge of a fact confirmed 
that Bartolomeo had usurped his lands, and fama publica as a legal status, based on one’s 
personal reputation, confirmed Bartolomeo’s magnate status and Andrea’s own status as 
a popolano, of the city (according to him) or of the contado (according to Stefano, and 
																																																								
197 Wickham, “Gossip,” 4. For a similar dispute over urban property, featuring the 
30-year limit on uncontested ownership, that ended with the consilium sapientis of 
Giovanni di Bernardo Bovachiesi da Prato, see Thomas Kuehn, “The Renaissance 
consilium,” 1077-80. 
198 For similar public acts and their probative value in the twelfth century, see 
Wickham, “Fama and the law in twelfth-century Tuscany,” 22-24. 
199 EOG.81.36r. 
	 303	
the surviving documentation). Fama publica as the report of a crime has already been 
discussed, in its role as the stand-in accuser in ex officio inquisitions such as the one 
Giovanni da Parma carried out against Andrea in 1344. Publica fama as common opinion 
regarding one’s status or reputation also had legal standing: It was one of the original 
ways of determining magnate status, in Florence and at Bologna.200 It had an ambiguous 
relationship to publica vox et fama in its extra-judicial, social sense: the common 
knowledge of a given place, of a person or event.201 Stefano was careful to deny that 
publica fama supported Andrea’s claim regarding Bartolomeo’s theft; if the lawsuit had 
continued, Andrea would probably have sought the confirmation of publica fama from 
the witnesses, who were all from Latera.  
The initial inquest against Andrea is one example among many in Florence’s 
foreign-staffed courts of publica fama in its Gandino-esque guise, as an accuser and 
sufficient proof. The lawsuit, however, demonstrates that, even in cases where both 
parties could produce substantive documentation to back their claims and were 
themselves legal experts or notaries, publica fama-the common opinion or local 
knowledge of an event or fact-retained probative value, at least regarding events (land 
usurpation) and peoples’ status (was Bartolomeo a magnate? Was Andrea a rural or urban 
popolano?). On the other hand, the legally-actionable elements of mala fama do not seem 
to have damaged Andrea’s ability to serve as his female kin’s guardian, nor did Stefano 
pursue this avenue of attack, at least as far as I know. Despite its clear legal status at 
Florence and elsewhere as a mechanism for identifying magnates, and its celebration by 
																																																								
200 Klapisch, Retour, 17. 
201 For this, see Wickham, “Fama and the law in twelfth-century Tuscany,” in 
Fama, and “Gossip”. 
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Alberto Gandino as a stand-in for an accuser and a certain proof, it retained its other 
aspect, common talk or repute. In this form it was a crucial element in the Executor’s 
criminal inquisitions.  
Andrea and Bartolomeo do not apppear in the courts’ records after May 1347. 
Their dispute does not seem to have involved their associates. One of the locative clauses 
of another of Barone di Barone’s many land purchases implies that Bartolomeo de’Pulci 
shared ownership of a piece of land in Latera with the heirs of the magnate Lotterio da 
Barberino, almost certainly including the Odaldo da Barberino who appears as Lotterio’s 
son in an actum of 1329.202 Bartolomeo was apparently capable of living in peace with 
this branch of the da Barberino lineage, who were closely tied to Andrea through 
marriage.203 The last mentions of Andrea in the notarile date from later in 1347. One 
records the loan he received from Barone di Barone of 25 florins (25 May 1347); his role 
as a witness for a transaction by one Bernardo di Ceccho da Gangalandi; the other is the 
lease to him on 26 September 1347 of a property in the urban quartiere of S. Maria 
Novella; Andrea disappears from the historical record after this.  
Two notarial acts from February 1350 provide information in passing about 
Latera in the immediate wake of the plague, and tantalizing information on the current 
ownership of one of Andrea’s properties in Latera. The first was done in the castello of 
the da Barberino family and involved members of the da Barberino family, including 
Andrea’s brother-in-law, Dinaccio. He is now described as “dominus Dinaccius filius 
																																																								
202 NA.10899.97v. 
203 For the locative clauses, see NA.195, 173v:  “Item alium petium terre partem 
boscatam et partem laboratam positam in Latera, loco dicto Selva Piana, cui a I, via; a II, 
Bartolomei de Pulcis et heredes Lottieri de Barberino; a III, dicti Baronis; a IIII fossatum 
in predictos confines.” 
	 305	
quondam Michaelis de Barberino”: he may have become the head of the family following 
his father’s death, perhaps of the plague. The second records a sale of property by 
Dinaccio on behalf of his daughter, Lapa, to one Gualtiero di Olivero dei Carboni da 
Firenze. The property’s locative clauses are roughly identical to those of one Andrea 
described in a 1347 positio. It abutted on one side the land of the heirs of Bartolomeo 
de’Pulci; next to this was another piece of land described as “once that of Ser Andrea de 
Latera, and today property of the Florentine commune.”204  
This tantalizing reference does not explain how the commune had come into 
possessiono of the land. Perhaps Andrea forfeited it to the commune at some point in his 
protracted dispute with Bartolomeo. It is also unclear whether Andrea was dead at the 
time of the 1350 transaction. The reference to Bartolomeo de’Pulci’s heirs is equally 
vague, as is a reference to two more pieces of land owned by these same heirs. Were 
these unnamed heirs in possession of the land in 1350 due to Bartolomeo’s death, perhaps 
of the plague? Or was Bartolomeo still alive? I have found no further mentions of the 
dispute, or the two disputants, in the notarial and judicial evidence. This does not mean it 
ended in 1347; the next portion simply was not recorded.  
 
 
																																																								
204 NA.1010.11r-11v. See NA.1010.11v for Dinaccio: “Eodem anno et indictione 
[1350, third indiction] dicto loco [Barberino’s castello] et coram dictis testibus, dictus 
dominus Dinaccius filius quondam Michelis de Barberino iure proprio et in proprio dedit 
vedidit tradidit et concessit supradicto Gualterio quondam Oliverii Carbonis de Florentia 
ibidem emendationem reptum et stipulantem pro supradicta domina Lapa filia sua et 
uxore dicti Stefani et pro eiusdem domine Lape heredibus et pro quibus iure sua concessit 
unam domum cum una petia terre aratorie cum arboribus posita in populo Sancte Marie 
de Latere loco dicto ‘alla Fratta’, quibus a I, via; a II, heredes Bartholomeii Lapi 
Fiorenzani de Pulcis; a III, via; a IIII, olim ser Andrea et hodie comunis Florentie.” 
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Conclusions 
Violent emotion, or emotive language of any sort, is largely absent from the 
record of the dispute. There is no evidence in Andrea and Bartolomeo’s relationship for 
the sort of ongoing, structural malaise Daniel Lord Smail made famous for Marseilles. 
Andrea and Bartolomeo do not seem to have had a history of enmity, given that 
Bartolomeo and his kin seem to have acquiesced in Andrea’s (co-)possession of the lands 
in question until 1342-43. Despite the Executor’s ruling that Andrea’s initial denunciation 
was false, the attack it described could have taken place: it is the sort of raid (cavalcata) 
characteristic of the Tuscan nobility.205 Violent direct action would have served to 
emphasize Bartolomeo’s claims against Andrea.206 Conversely, if the denunciation was 
false, lodging a denunciation against someone was in itself a hostile act, and recognized 
as such in fourteenth-century Tuscany, as in contemporary Italy.207 
Why did Andrea denounce Bartolomeo? The affair can be read as a dispute that 
got out of hand, probably as a pressure tactic to force an out-of-court settlement on his 
foe. Andrea was probably confident that he could game the Executor’s court in his favor. 
This supposition is based on his legal knowledge as a notary, the magnate status of his 
foe, and the uniquely auspicious moment for anti-magnate activity in late 1343 and 1344. 
These were the early days of the third popular regime which had come to power 
following a popular revolt against the “magnates’ priorate” of 1343. But Andrea’s legal 
and discursive strategem backfired badly for him, reflecting the semi-detachment of the 																																																								
205 On this, see Maire-Vigueuer, Cavaliers et citoyannes and Caduff, “Magnati.” 
206 For an analogous situation in the twelfth-century Fiorentino, see Wickham, 
Courts and conflict, 216-22. 
207 On denunciation and sociability in modern Italy, see the valuable discussion of 
Michael Herzfeld in Evicted from eternity. The restructuring of modern Rome (Chicago, 
2009), 219-52. 
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Executor’s court from the Florentine state’s ruling elites: the Executor’s court, whatever 
else its shortcomings, did not go in for vindictive class justice.208 
Inquisitorial procedure mattered here: in the prosecution of Andrea we can clearly 
see many aspects of the ex officio procedure as valorized by Gandino. Andrea’s 
punishment does not seem to have been very drastic: imprisonment and a fine, as 
opposed to losing a hand or his tongue, the statutory penalty for false testimony or 
denunciations.209 Yet what Vallerani has called the “ideology of the penalty” is 
identifiable in the procedure against Andrea: in lodging a false denunciation, he shamed 
and besmirched justice, by doing so in the same place where justice was allotted, the 
Palazzo del Podestà.  
Why did the Executor’s court reverse course in 1344 on its initial ruling against 
Bartolomeo de’ Pulci, and prosecute Andrea? The inquest provides no information on 
this matter, beyond the note that publica fama had notified the court of the falsity of 
Andrea’s denunciation.210 This was a formality, yet given the frustrating ambivalence of 
publica fama, a well-defined legal category and a more fuzzy aspect of the wider social 
habitus, it may contain clues. The inquest was opened against Andrea on March 14, 
1344; the inquest based on his denunciation had happened last month, in February. This 
space of a few weeks would have been crucial in the development of the dispute, and its 
impact on the community of Latera. As Thomas Kuehn has argued regarding a later 
																																																								
208 On the question of ruling elites and state autonomy in preindustrial societies, 
see above all John Haldon’s discussion, drawing on Ottoman and Middle Byzantine case 
studies, in The state and the tributary mode of production (London, 1993), at 140-202. 
209 Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 139, ftnt. 177. 
210 EOG.1.52r: “quod fama publica precedente et clamosa insinuatione referente 
non quidem a malivolis set a fidedignis personis ad aures et notitiam dicti domini 
Executoris et sue curie…..” 
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Florentine feud, the prospect of violence in a feud widened the audience for each party’s 
story, and opened a dialogue about peace and public order.211 Based on the dense 
connectivity between Andrea and the Pulci, and their respective social networks in 
Latera, the dispute must have echoed in local society. In future work, I intend to 
reconstruct in detail how this community handled disputes like this. Further research into 
the region’s notarial documentation is required.  
For the moment, I would propose that publica fama was crucial in the court 
reversing its decision, and prosecuting Andrea for false testimony. The charges against 
Andrea note that his denunciation initially resulted in the Executor condemning 
Bartolomeo for his assault on Andrea. This would imply that some of the 12 witnesses 
named in Andrea’s denunciation testified against Bartolomeo: enough to secure initial 
condemnation by the Executor.212 At some point, however, either these witnesses 
recanted their testimony, or Latera’a publica fama turned against Andrea and his 
narrative of the dispute. Another possibility is that Bartolomeo and his kinsmen 
mobilized their own social network against Andrea. Magnates were, as I will explore in 
the next chapter, ready and eager to enforce silence and non-complicance with urban 
courts on rural people: the threat of (further) violence may have forced some locals to 
denounce Andrea, or otherwise impugn his narrative before the Executor. Again, these 
are working hypotheses I will pursue in further research.  
Given the conflicting claims about the land in dispute (Andrea possessed it in 
1342, according to him; Bartolomeo de’Pulci had possessed the land for five years or 																																																								
211 Thomas J. Kuehn, “Social and legal capital in vendetta: A fifteenth-century 
Florentine feud in and out of court,” in Social capital and its discontents, eds. N. Terpstra 
and N.A. Eckstein (Turnhout, 2009), 51-72, at 72. 212	See EOG.1.52v for the witnesses. 
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more, according to his lawyer’s claims in 1347), it is possible that Bartolomeo took the 
opportunity of Andrea’s 1344 imprisonment to snatch the land from him as revenge. 
Socially, Andrea and Bartolomeo de’Pulci moved in overlapping circles: his wife was a 
scion of the locally significant rural magnate clan of the da Barberino, and less clear 
connections with the da Cattani-da Latera lineages. Such a man may not have moved his 
popolano neighbors to much sympathy when he began quarreling with Bartolomeo 
de’Pulci. Bartolomeo was denounced to the Executor two other times at least, and 
absolved in both cases.213 Nor did Andrea’s social capital, through his association with an 
urban landowner such as Barone, or old magnate families such as the da Barberino, help 
him in court; nor did his legal and notarial expertise. I will try to understand why this was 
the case in future research. 
What does the case reveal about procedure in Florentine public justice? 
Procedure-the elements of factual reality that were legally actionable or relevant-shapes 
and determines, in a primary not incidental way, the surviving documentation. The 
judicial material of the Executor, revealing as it can be in certain ways, was intended to 
create a record of individual proceedings and certify their legitimacy, and are not guides 
to factual reality in any direct way.214 The most obvious example of this concerns how 
Giovanni da Parma deemed that Andrea’s denunciation was false: the summary copy of 
the procedure reveals nothing about this, despite how important this part of the procedure 
would appear to researchers. 
																																																								
213 These cases are found in EOG.6.18r-18v and EOG.71.1r, 21 June 1346. 
214 Gene A. Brucker drew on material from the Executor and Capitano’s courts in 
such a manner in his Florentine politics and society; see, for example, his reading of 
denunciations at 63 and 200. 
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The inquest and lawsuit underline the appeal of urban institutions of public justice 
for rural people. Enrico Faini has traced the gradual process by which the early Florentine 
communal courts attracted a magnetic pull on the countryside from the late twelfth 
century, absorbing, not suppressing, private settlements through arbitration; by the 
fourteenth century, this process was far along.215 The notary Andrea was nothing if not 
stubborn, and in his quarrel with Bartolomeo he consistently turned to the urban courts, 
despite the distance between Latera and Florence, and the attractiveness of local social 
elites to him. No one doubted that the commune’s jurisdiction applied to Latera and 
Barberino di Mugello, not even members of the da Barberino clan and their associates 
when they appeared in the Florentine courts.216 Massimo Vallerani has demonstrated the 
same phenomenon for Bologna’s courts: by the thirteenth century, the public courts were 
swamped with cases, many coming from the countryside.217  
This was due in part to the many forms that judicial procedure could take in 
Florence. The inquests and suits appearing in the Executor’s court should be understood 
as elements within broader wholes that were primarily non-judicial in nature. Few of the 
denunciations to the Executor made it to the witness stage, and still fewer resulted in 
sentences or convictions.218 In this, denunciation-based inquisitions were typical of 
communal justice in general.  Vallerani has shown that between 80-90% of cases initiated 
in Perugia and Bologna during the late Duecento and early Trecento resulted in 
acquitals.219 This was not a system that systematically sought punishment, despite 
																																																								
215 See Faini, Firenze, in particular 318-20. 
216 EOG.68. 
217 Vallerani, Justice, 137. 
218 See the figures cited by Caduff, “Magnati”, 28.  
219 Vallerani, Justice, 33; see also 156-57. 
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Gandino’s lucidly articulated “ideology of the penalty.” Indeed, Vallerani has argued that 
“generalized acquital seems to be a structural datum of communal judicial systems.”220 
Even with a court as ideologically grounded as that of the Executor, the sharp edge of a 
denunciation did not necessarily produce more convictions or a substantial enhancement 
of the commune’s power, in contrast to the in-person accusations by local officials. This 
fuzziness was a source of danger to those using the court, but also made denunciations 
potentially of great value on a tactical level in out-of-court conflicts.  
As a result of its close relationship with the popular commune’s concept of 
iustitia, the inquisitorial procedure acted as a brake on the ideological demands of some 
rural popolani for a harsher, activist public justice closer to the thirteenth-century 
Bolognese model reconstructed by Vallerani and Blanshei.221 Rural Tuscan popolani 
were not protected from the logic of impartial, distributive justice. Despite ongoing 
demands in denunciations to the Executor that he rein in the grandi, Andrea-himself a 
notary and popolano-was prosecuted, imprisoned and fined for the perversion of justice. 
Chapter two focused on the urban popolo’s brief success at usurping the commune’s 
normative infrastructure, institutions, and ideology, and creating what Vallerani, speaking 
of Bologna, has described as “the presumption of guilt for every violent action attributed 
to magnates. ”222 Yet popolani were not protected from prosecution in the very courts 
they had created and continued to appeal to for justice. 
																																																								
220 Vallerani, Justice, 156. 
221 Vallerani, “The inquisitorial trial in the political struggles in Bologna between 
the Duecento and Trecento,” in Justice, 272-305, and Blanshei, “The politicization of 
criminal justice” in Medieval Public Justice, 313-484. 
222 Vallerani, Justice, 68. 
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This did not deter people from using the courts. Initiating suits such as that of 
Andrea allowed disputants to put enemies such as Bartolomeo de’Pulci on the defensive, 
without immediately compromising their strategic flexibility in a dispute. In court, 
litigants utilized a variety of tactics to defend themselves and impugn their enemies. 
These included undermining the opponent’s public reputation and social standing 
(publica fama); sowing doubts about particular elements in his version of a claim; and 
seeking arbitration-in the lawsuit against Bartolomeo de’ Pulci, the Executor and his 
judge acted as arbitrator for the two sides. Peace pacts, petitions for summary justice, and 
consilia sapientium were also part of disputants’ legal toolkit.  
In this chapter, I have focused on procedures, legal tactics, and in-court behavior. 
This has been supplemented with a reconstruction of what is known of the two parties’ 
connections outside of court. Magnates, at least rural magnates such as the da Barberino, 
possessed some influence in their communities, and intermarried with popolani such as 
Andrea; they furthermore accepted communal justice, to the degree that they appeared in 
court (Arrigo di Dinaccio da Barberino; Paolo Giunte) or hired procuratores to represent 
them. Public justice and popular institutions mattered to rural people. Yet their 
significance contained important negative elements for communities as well as 
individuals like Andrea, as the next chapter will explore. 
Appendix 1: Andrea di Ser Ugo’s Family Network 
 
These family clusters are reconstructed from notarial and judicial sources cited in-text. 
Where a patronymic or lineage name is lacking, notarial documents typically denoted a 
person by parish of origin (ex.: Piero da Latera), a practice I follow here. 
Key: 
----  : denotes marriage 
[?] : spouse unknown 
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A. The Magalotti da Latera: 
 
Piero di Latera----[?] 
Attested children: 
Sons:  Durante and Alberto  
Daughter: Compiuta----Ser Ugo di Guido da Monte Cuccoli 
 
Durante----[?] 
Durante’s attested children: 
Pieroczo, Guilielmo, and Ugo (a follower of Bartolomeo de’Pulci, according to the 
denunciation of ser Andrea di Ugo, his maternal cousin) 
 
Attested children of domina Compiuta di Piero di Latera dei Magalotti and Ser Ugo di 
Guido, da Monte Cuccoli: 
Ser Piero 
Guido 
ser Andrea 
 
B. The figli di Dinaccio da Barberino 
 
Note: The figli di Dinaccio refers to the branch of the Da Barberino, a rural magnate 
lineage, that was descended from Dinaccio Da Barberino, living in the first part of the 
fourteenth century, and his children via an unknown spouse. The term does not appear in 
the documents; I use it here for shorthand.  
 
This branch of the Da Barberino lineage’s relationship with the filii Guineldi, videlicet de 
Barberino et de Latera et de Recano, who were included in the 1325 Statutes of the 
Podestà’s list of rural magnate lineages, is unclear. 
 
   Dinaccio da Barberino----[?] 
Attested children: 
Michele and Arrigo 
 
Arrigo (accused in the Executor’s court of seizing a rural popolano’s land at the behest of 
his nephew, ser Dinaccio, son of his brother, Michele) 
 
Michele----[?] 
Michele di Dinaccio da Barberino’s attested offspring with this unknown spouse: 
 
Ser Dinaccio, a landowner in Latera 
 
Piera, wife of Ser Andrea di Ser Ugo 
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Chapter 5: Ambiguous Engagement: Distance, silence, and elite violence in Florentine 
Tuscany 
  
Abstract: This chapter analyzes communal responses to magnate violence, focusing on the 
testimony stage of anti-magnate inquests for the years 1347-1349. These years were selected 
because the relevant documents are complete and relatively undamaged, and because they 
straddle the onset of the Black Death (1348). The records for these years are also continuous with 
those discussed in previous chapters. Reconstructing the behavior of witness communities in the 
Executor’s court demonstrates two patterns: a general tendency to deny all knowledge of magnate 
depredations, and appealing to common knowledge with probative value (publica fama) when 
people did claim to know of a crime. I argue that the habitual silence of witnesses was a response 
to elite violence outside the courtroom, and the procedural snares discussed in the previous 
chapter. Rural disinclination to cooperate with the Florentine courts resulted neither from 
communal institutions’ decadence, as some scholars have claimed, nor from rural communities’ 
refusal to carry out judicial responsibilities. Rural people regularly appeared to testify, but local 
power relations and communal solidarity conditioned their responses. The chapter thus 
emphasizes the ways in which the Florentine popular commune’s courts were constrained by, and 
compromised with, the power relations of Tuscan society.  
 
“Most of the boys around here knew to get stony stupid when the police came down. No 
matter what the knockos did to you, whatever they called you, all you had to do was 
weather it out, because the knockos couldn’t do shit if they couldn’t find nothing, so 
anybody who understood survival out here just hung tight and took the abuse until the 
knockos went away.”-Strike, Clockers 
 
Introduction: Questions and structure 
 
 This chapter’s theme is how rural communities responded to the demands of 
Florentine public justice in the later Middle Ages. By the mid-fourteenth century, 
Florence was the dominant power in northeastern Tuscany, and its territorial expansion 
would dramatically increase later in the century.1 Expanded territorial control was not 
synonymous with pacification: Florence’s rural territories and their residents remained 
targets of magnate violence, who often acted with impunity. This is in contrast to the city 
of Florence. Although factionalism long remained a favored elite Florentine pasttime, 
decades of popular agitation and institutional wrangling had largely pacified the city by 																																																								
1 On Florence’s fourteenth-century expansion, see, out of a vast literature, Lo stato 
territoriale fiorentino (secoli XIV-XV), eds. William Connell and Andrea Zorzi (San Miniato, 
2002); Florence et la Toscane. XIVe-XIXe siècles. Les dynamiques d’un Ètat italien, eds. Jean 
Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon (Rennes, 2004), and Giorgio Chittolini, La formazione 
dello Stato regionale e le istituzioni del contado (Turin, 2005 [1979]). 
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the mid-fourteenth century.2 One of the primary goals of the thirteenth-century popolo 
commerce and civic life could proceed in peace, and the consular-era military elite’s hold 
on the commune had been broken, in part through the creation of judicial institutions like 
the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice. When the old elite tried to violently reassert its 
control over the urban commune, such as in the Bardi family’s attempted coup of 1340 or 
the short-lived “magnates’ priorate” of 1343, they were quickly and vigorously 
suppressed.  
What, then, of the countryside? This chapter explores the myriad factors 
conditioning rural peoples’ engagement with the Florentine state, in the form of public 
justice and its demands. How did rural people interact with an expanded state presence? 
What were their calculations in dealing with Florentine justice, and the power of rural 
lords?  
The first half of the fourteenth century is usually seen as one of crisis for the 
urban Italian communes.3 During this period, city-states across north-central Italy became 
lordships (signorie), as the institutions and regimes thrown up by the thirteenth-century 
popular revolution gradually shed their ideological charge. Scholarship on the decline of 
the communes typically focuses, however, on public life exclusively through the lens of 
formal political participation, particularly election to the commune’s councils and office-
holding. In what follows, I use the more mundane civic activity of witness testimony as a 
frame through which to understand rural (dis)engagement with the Florentine commune. 
Providing testimony in formal judicial proceedings was a requirement of every Florentine 																																																								
2 On Florentine factionalism, see Patrick Lantschner, The logic of political conflict: Cities 
in Italy and the southern Low Countries, c. 1370-1440 (Oxford, 2015) [hereafter “Lantschner, 
Logic”], 138-46. 
3 See Alma Poloni, “Il comune di popolo e le sue istituzioni tra Due e Trecento,” Reti 
Medievali Rivista 13, 1 (2012): 3-27, for a review of recent work on the period. 
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who was not infamous at law-that is, whose personal infamia disbarred them from 
citizenship rights and responsibilities. Thus, studying witness behavior in the court of the 
Executor of the Ordinances of Justice provides a lens for understanding how citizenship 
worked on a mundane level. What people did or did not say when cited to testify against 
magnates could have dire consequences: despite its mundane nature, testifying was a 
loaded action.  
Despite decades of popular agitation and the survival of the popular courts, the 
Florentine commune was unwilling and unable to protect rural people from elite violence. 
The magnates and their targets, rural communties, were aware of this. As a result, rural 
people generally did not cooperate with the Florentine state. Providing minimal 
compliance to the courts’ demand to denounce crime, they rarely followed through with 
testimony against malefactors. I argue that Tuscans regularly resorted to claims of 
ignorance for three reasons. Rural people sought to avoid retribution at the hands of 
Florentine magnates. Fear of the nobles, and the persistent inability of the Florentine 
commune to protect its subjects (or the commune’s indifference to the problem) appears 
in denunciations to the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice, and in witness testimony. 
Denying all knowledge of a crime furthermore protected Tuscans summoned to court 
from prosecution for contumacy or perjury, since it was virtually impossible for the 
Executor’s court to impose punishments on an entire community for obfuscating the 
course of justice, when the court bothered to initiate prosecution at all. 
Arguing for rural non-cooperation with the Executor’s courts may seem perverse. 
Initial denunciations-the legal actions leading to witness testimony-continued to stream 
into the court across the fourteenth century, and the court continued to initiate, if not fully 
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prosecute, anti-magnate inquests. Yet these denunciations rarely led to the conviction and 
punishment of the offending magnates, in large part because of rural peoples’ silence 
when cited as witnesses. In previous chapters, I explored the motivations behind these 
apparently futile denunciations. Here, I do the same with testimony. 
At the center of this analysis is the triadic relationship between the popular courts, 
magnates, and rural communities. I use the term ambiguous engagement to describe how 
rural people and magnates approached the popular courts and, by extension, the 
Florentine state during the 1340s. It encapsulates all three parties in this relationship. 
Despite a de facto indifference to rural oppression, the Florentine commune remained at 
mid-century statutorily committed to the defense of its rural subjects from the violence 
and arrogance of the grandi. This statutory commitment had real consequences for non-
elites. By 1343, the Florentines’ theoretical commitment to the popolo’s rhetoric of pax et 
iustitia had resulted in several courts hearing cases against magnates, and created an 
important channel linking rural subjects to the city-state’s institutions, which featured in 
local disputes and strategies for social mobility. Behind these institutions stood a long 
history of collective struggle against the city’s old military elite. By the mid-fourteenth 
century, these struggles and their textual products had themselves become a structural 
element in social and public life. Yet the malleability of popular rhetoric and institutions 
indicates the ambiguous relationship between the popolo’s legitimizing rhetoric and its 
social function.  
By mid-century, I argue, Florentine institutions such as the Executor’s court had 
become unmoored from the ideological charge that initially produced them in the crucible 
of the 1290s. The narrowly technical strain that Claudia Caduff has identified among 
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rectors of the 1340s reflects that, by this time, the Executor’s court was one among many, 
its officials simple technicians of power.4 The continued existence of these courts was not 
superfluous, however. The survival of the popular courts reflects the inability of the 
thirteenth century’s early popular regimes to discard early communal offices like the 
consulate. Doing so would have provoked a violent reaction from the urban milites, and 
flew against the popolo’s self-perception as conservative revolutionaries.5 Likewise, 
Florence’s fourteenth-century regimes could not simply abolish products of popular 
struggle such as the Executor’s court: doing so would have antagonized non-elites in city 
and countryside.6 The popular courts may seem at best ramshackle and at worst actively 
malicious towards non-elites, yet they served a purpose, on both sides of the exchange 
between denouncers and public officials. The court continued, year after year, to draw 
hundreds of denunciations from rural Tuscans. These people were no one’s fools, as I 
have tried to show in previous chapters: they utilized the denunciation system for a 
variety of reasons. Despite all its limitations, appealing to the Executor’s court remained 
a tactical option for rural non-elites confronting elite terrorism, safer than active self-
defense, and perhaps less shameful for some rural people than joining a magnate’s 
entourage (brigata; fanteria).  
The continued operation of the Executor’s court, in however narrow and 
ineffectual a manner, maintained a link between rulers and ruled, urban center and rural 
communities. Its inquests performed legitimacy for the popular commune, justifying 																																																								
4 See Claudia Caduff, “Magnati e popolani nel contado fiorentino: dinamiche sociali e 
rapporti di potere nel Trecento.” Rivista di storia dell’agricoltura 33:2 (December, 1993): 15-63, 
at 28-29, for fourteenth-century rectors’ technical approach to their case-loads. 	
6 See William Caferro, Mercenary companies and the decline of Siena (Baltimore,  
1998), 27, for exiled Ciompi joining the mercenary Company of St. George and recruiting 
Sienese comrades in 1379. 
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Florentine authority over its communities. Outright abolition of the popular courts was 
something no fourteenth-century regime was strong enough to do, however 
oligarchically-minded it was-and few Florentine regimes were as self-consciously 
oligarchic as the Albizzi-led regime of the late fourteenth century. Only Cosimo di 
Medici, in the 1430s, would be able to obliterate this institutional ghost of the medieval 
popolo, abolishing the office of the Executor in 1435. 
I begin by analyzing the reasons for rural peoples’ compliance with the 
commune’s demand that they denounce, and their disinclination to testify when cited as 
witnesses. This ambiguity indicates the liminal position of rural people in popular 
ideology. Rural peoples’ engagement with the commune’s courts remained ambiguous: 
an inclination to denounce magnate depredations clashed with a disinclination to support 
prosecution of these depredations with testimony. In the following section of the chapter, 
The cases of magnate violence against rural communities discussed below link these local 
crimes directly back to the ideology and language of the Ordinances of Justice. Rural 
people, residents of Florence’s contado and district, were subject to the commune, and 
officially protected by its judicial system. Yet they were also, going by the evidence of 
the popular courts, marginal to the popolo. The (relative) peace the popular movement 
had imposed on the city proved impossible in the countryside, and the popolo could not 
or would not protect rural communities from magnate terrorism. Rural popolani were in, 
but not of, the Florentine popolo.  
The final section of this chapter scrutinizes the logic and broader context for elite 
violence against rural people, using attacks by members of the illustrious Bardi lineage in 
the Upper Valdarno as case studies in how elite terrorism in the countryside could serve 
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as part of wider-ranging familial responses to the crisis period of the 1340s. Ambiguous 
engagement here denotes the tormented relationship between magnate lineages like the 
Bardi or Pulci and the Florentine popular commune’s institutions.7 As Christiane 
Klapisch-Zuber has shown, by the 1340s many magnate families were debilitated 
shadows of their former selves.8 Successive series of anti-magnate legislation and 
decades of popular opprobrium had made their mark. For magnate families engaged in 
commerce or finance, such as the Bardi, Frescobaldi, and Cerchi, these local problems 
were accompanied by the onset of the fourteenth-century crisis. Rural magnate violence 
should be understood in this broader context, as I try to do below. The chapter closes with 
a consideration of the many afflictions-plague, famine, marauding mercenary bands, and 
escalating fiscal demands-facing the Florentine commune and rural Tuscans in the middle 
decades of the fourteenth century. A consideration of these manifold crises helps avoid 
moralizing evaluations regarding the “success” or “failure” of the popular communes. 
Just as the crisis surrounding the Kingdom of Italy’s early twelfth-century collapse 
birthed the communes, the fourteenth-century economic and demographic crisis would 
undermine the economic, demographic, and social underpinnings of those city-states 
which were still independent by mid-century.  
   
 
 
																																																								
7 The phrase “popular commune” is used here as shorthand to denote not a specific 
popular regime (like that of the third popular regime, 1343-1348), but rather the totality of the 
commune following the mid-thirteenth century rise of the popolo as a political force. It is used in 
contrast to the more aristocratic consular-era commune, dominated by the urban milites. 
8 See the statistics on the magnate lineages’ numbers and wealth in Christiane Klapisch-
Zuber, Retour à la cité: Les magnates de Florence, 1340-1440. Paris, 2006), 453-464. 
	 321	
 There is a large literature on transformations in the structure and staffing of the 
Florentine state in the fourteenth century, as the medieval commune transformed into the 
Renaissance-era territorial state.9 This scholarship has primarily focused on a narrow 
range of themes: relations between Florence’s ruling class and provincial elites, changes 
in the administration and staffing of the territorial state, and its physical manifestations, 
such as the commune’s “new towns” (terre nuove).10 These are important topics, and I 
draw widely on this literature below. It largely ignores, however, how rural non-elites, 
Florence’s putative subjects, perceived and responded to Florentine expansion and 
consolidation in its territory.11 Exceptions to this have focused primarily on the 
peasantry’s active rejection of the Florentine state.12 Furthermore, scholars of the 
relationship between the Florentine state and its subjects have rarely used the acts of the 
commune’s criminal courts as a source for understanding how rural non-elites dealth with 
the state. Scholars who have used these records have done so largely to answer 
quantitative questions regarding conviction rates and types of crime. 
																																																								
9 See in general Marvin B. Becker, Florence in transition.II; the conference collection Lo 
stato territoriale fiorentino (secoli XIV-XV), eds. Andrea Zorzi and William J. Connell (Pisa:, 
2001); Paolo Pirillo, Construzione di un contado (Florence, 2001); Zorzi, “Il dominio territoriale: 
formazione e pratiche di governo,” in La trasformazione di un quadro politico (Florence, 2008) 
[hereafter “Zorzi, La trasformazione”], 257-79. For a comparative view of Sienese policy, which 
seems to have been relatively benign, toward its contado, see William Caferro, “City and 
countryside in Siena in the second half of the fourteenth century,” The Journal of Economic 
History 54:1 (1994), 85-103. 
10 See the range of pieces in Lo stato territoriale, and Pirillo, Costruzione. 
11 The most notable exception is C.M.  De La Roncière. See in particular his “L’influence 
des franciscains dans la campagne de Florence au XIVe siècle (1280-1360),” in Mélanges de 
l’Ecole française de Rome. Moyen-Age, temps modernes T.87.1 (1975), 27-103; “De la ville à 
l’Ètat régional: la constitution du territoire (XIVe-XVe siècle).” In Florence et la Toscane, eds. J. 
Boutier, S. Landi, O. Rouchon (Rennes, 2004):15-38; and Firenze e le sue campagne nel 
Trecento, trans. Isabella Chabot and Paolo Pirillo (Florence, 2005). 
12 Samuel Cohn, Jr., Creating the Florentine state (Cambridge, 1999). 
	 322	
This is in spite of the importance of witness testimony for recent medievalist 
scholarship.13 I contribute to scholarship on the late medieval territorial state by using the 
testimony stage of anti-magnate inquests as a lens through which to understand the 
factors shaping rural peoples’ interactions with state institutions. How did rural people 
act when the commune’s messengers cited them to give testimony in anti-magnate 
inquests? I do not attempt a comprehensive answer to this question. Several scholars have 
subjected the Executor’s material to wide-ranging, sample-based stastical analysis, and I 
happily refer the reader to these for a quantitative breakdown of the court’s operations in 
the later fourteenth century.14 I restrict my focus here to the later 1340s, specifically the 
period 1348-1350, just before and in the wake of the Black Death.15 Reading registers of 
denunciation-based, anti-magnate inquests for rural crimes, I reconstruct patterns in 
witness behavior, and contrasts between rural and urban peoples’ actions at the testimony 
stage.  
There are several reasons for focusing on a fairly short period. One of the most 
frustrating problems with the foreign-staffed courts’ records is the manner in which 
different scribes recorded different amounts of information. The notaries of the 1340s and 
early 1350s consistently copied out entire denunciations and witness lists, with copious 																																																								
13 See Enrico Faini’s discussion in “Le memorie del territorio nella dei secoli XII-XII: 
strategie di condizionamento nei dicta testium,” MEFR 123/2 (2011): 487-97, at 487-88, with 
references in the copious footnotes. 
14 For quantitative analyses of the popular courts, see: Samuel Cohn, Jr., “Criminality and 
the State in Renaissance Florence, 1344-1466,” Journal of Social History 14:2 (1980): 211-233 
and The laboring classes of renaissance Florence (New York, 1980), in particular appendices 
H.I-H.3, at 275-80, for statistical breakdowns of crime patterns; A. Zorzi, L’amministrazione 
della giustizia penale nella repubblica fiorentina (Florence, 1988) and, by the same author, “the 
judicial system in Florence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries” in Dean & Lowe, 40-48; and 
Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, table 2, 460-61. 
15 The registers are: EOG.96, EOG.119, a book of inquests and denunciations (liber 
continens tamburationes et investigationes super eisdem), EOG.122, a book of magnate inquests 
(liber inquisitionum magnatum) and EOG.124, a book of testimony (liber continens testium 
attestationes), respectively. 
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procedural information. They typically annotated inquests with notices regarding the 
outcome, and where the relevant witness testimony could be located in the commune’s 
other archival series. Thus, the earliest material is also the easiest to read systematically. 
This begins to change in the 1360s, however, following the reinstitution of the tamburo 
system against magnates after a freeze in the 1350s. I have not yet identified a 
satisfactory explanation for this, but the notaries of the 1360s and 1370s consistently 
provide truncated summaries of each inquest, brief procedural notes, and no annotations 
regarding witness testimony. By the late 1370s, the notaries copied out only the bare facts 
of each denunciation: its date, the magnate lineage denounced, and the crime. Virtually 
no other information is included, such as case outcome. This documentary shift was 
probably due to several factors, such as understaffing in the Executor’s court or changes 
in notarial protocols.16  
Thus, the Executor’s registers of the 1340s provide the most information within 
the archival series on rural peoples’ responses to rural crime, and crucial procedural 
information surrounding each inquest: this enables reconstruction of the logistics and 
considerations governing witness behavior. In turn, the notaries for 1348-1349 usually 
grouped anti-magnate inquests together, with most prosecutions of non-elite Florentines 
and communal officials in separate registers. The notaries’ separation of magnate 
inquests from other kinds for 1348-1349 allows me to focus on rural crimes situated in 
asymmetrical power relationships. In cases where violence was involved, magnates 
																																																								
16 The best study of the Florentine chancellery and the commune’s archives is Francesca 
Klein, Scritture e governo dello stato a Firenze nel Rinascimento (Florence, 2013).   
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almost always attacked, robbed, and terrorized their social inferiors.17 Furthermore, the 
registers for 1348-1349 are mostly complete: the catastrophic flood of the Arno river in 
1966 did not damage them as severely as other sections of the Executor’s registers, and 
the years have not subtracted folii from them. This gives some measure of certainty that 
the surviving denunciations for this period represent the absolute number of 
denunciations leading to inquests by the Executor’s court. This is impossible with the 
fragmentary, patchwork registers for the 1350s and 1360s and becomes impossible with 
the trunctated summaries recorded from the 1370s. A further empirical caveat regards the 
content of denunciations leading to inquests by the Executor’s court. Although non-lethal 
assaults made up a majority of the crimes triggering an inquest, this does not mean that 
assaults were the most common form of magnate crime against rural people. It means 
only that denouncers calculated that denunciations for assault stood a better chance of 
producing an inquest than other crimes, such as theft or rape.   
Judicial caseload and logistical constraints on witnesses 
 The table below shows patterns in the crimes denounced to the Executor’s court, 
and patterns in the court’s handling of these crimes.  
Figure 5: Table 1: Some patterns in criminal inquests by the court of the Executor of the 
Ordinances of Justice for first semester of 1348 and second semester of 1349 
 
1.16.1348-5.12.134818         7.24.-1349-1.14.135019 
 
Total criminal inquests:  52     63 
 
Anti-magnate denunciations: 48 (92.3%)    61 (98.3%) 
 
Ex officio corruption cases: 4     2 																																																								
17 There is one denunciation of intra-elite violence for this period, however, in which 
members of the Pulci lineage ransacked the house of a widow from another branch of the lineage: 
EOG.122.120r-122r. 
18 EOG.96. Testimony for this semester is in register EOG.95. 
19 EOG.122. 
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Rural (contado & distretto)20: 35 (67.3%)    42 (66.67%) 
 
Denunciations of magnate crimes 
in the countryside:  3121      42 
 
Urban (w/in the last wall circuit): 17     18 
 
Non processum/non probatum: 36 (69%)    4722 (77%) 
 
Probatum/remissum potestati:  1123 (21%)    5 (8%)24 
 
Cases where all witnesses  
“se nichil scire dixerunt”: 22 (42% of total )   33 (54% of total) 
 
Rural             17  (77% of total)   25 (75.7% of these) 
 
Urban “”:   5 (22.7% of total)   8  (13% of these) 	
 
The first semester sample comes from the first part of 1348, the second semester 
sample covers July 1349 to early January 1350. The second half of 1348 was dominated 
by the plague: Florence’s courts and other institutions ground to a half during this period. 
The plague arrived in Florence in March 1348 and exploded in April. During the summer 
months, it ravaged the city; the chronicler Marchionne Coppo di Stefani claimed that 
96,000 of the city’s 180,000 inhabitants perished in these months of horror.25 
																																																								
20 This includes cases of official wrong-doing as well as anti-magnate denunciations. 
21 The other four inquests were cases of wrongdoing in the countryside by communal 
officials. 
22 47 cases contained explicit notes that they were “non probatum” or “non processum.” 
This number is probably closer to 54 (or 88.5% of the 61 total anti-magnate denunciations) if one 
includes cases with no specific “Non probatum”/”non processum” notice which also do not 
mention that the case was forwarded to the other foreign rectors. The Executor’s notaries for the 
1340s always noted this act of the process when cases moved beyond witness testimony.  
23 Case 46 (EOG.125r-127r, against Ottaviano di Testo dei Tornaquinci) contains no 
information on the outcome of the case in the register of inquests (EOG.96) or witness testimony 
(EOG.95).  
24 See above for the seven ambiguous cases for this semester. 
25 Stefani, Cronache, rubr. 635. 
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Government and civic life largely came to a halt during August and September.26 
Although the judicial acts do not mention the plague, it undoubtedly affected magnate 
activities in the contado-but in conjunction with other structural factors and individual 
initiatives. 
The Executor’s court carried out a comparable number of inquests during both 
semesters. The majority, over 90% in both cases, of these inquests were against 
magnates. The majority of inquests were in response to complaints coming from the 
countryside, 67% and 66% of the respective totals. The majority of inquests for both 
semesters were dismissed after the judge had heard witness testimony. Of the fifty-two 
inquests from January-May 1348, thirty-six, or 69%, went unproven (non probatum). 
This is matched by the figures for 1349:  47 cases, seventy-seven percent of the total, 
went unproven (non probatum).27 A further seven cases lack the non probatum notice, 
but we can assume that they were also dismissed, as they were not forwarded to the other 
competent courts, those of Florence’s Podestà or Capitano del Popolo.28 In one case from 
1349, the magnate defendant, Simone di Gottifredo dei Tosinghi, successfully petitioned 
the Executor to prove that he had popolano status, and thus was not subject to the 
Executor’s jurisdiction: he successfully evaded prosecution.29  
It was quite rare for an initial inquest lead to further action by the Podestà. 
Between January and May 1348, just eleven inquests, twenty-one percent of the total, 																																																								
26 Piero Gualtieri, “La Peste Nera a Firenze,” in Portale Storia di Firenze Marzo 2014 
(http://www.storiadifirenze.org/?temadelmese=la-peste-nera-a-firenze). 
27 These inquests are: EOG.122.2r, 5r, 8r, 14r, 17r, 19r, 22r, 25r, 28r, 31r, 35r, 37r, 39r, 
41r, 47r, 51r, 56r, 58r, 60r, 62r, 64r, 66r, 68r, 70r, 74r, 78r, 80r, 84r, 86r, 35r, 99r, 101r, 103r, 
105r, 109r, 111r, 113r, 114r, 116r, 117r, 118r, 123r, 125r, 127r, 128r, 138r, and 139r. 
28 EOG.11r, 95r, 107r, 129r, 131r, 133r, and 136r. 
29 The initial denunciation is EOG.122.33r; testimony regarding his status as a popolano 
is found in EOG.122.92r. The Executor’s ruling in favor of Simone’s status is found in 
EOG.122.94r-94v. 
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moved beyond the testimony stage.30 The numbers are worse for 1349: a bare eight 
percent, five inquests, were deemed actionable after hearing witness testimony.31 Four 
out of these five cases concerned crimes committed within Florence’s wall circuit. 42 of 
the inquests from 1349 concerned crimes committed outside the city of Florence, in its 
contado or distretto.32 18 concerned crimes from within the city walls, while one 
denunciation failed to note where the crime had occurred, and was dismissed.33  
These numbers fit the pattern Claudia Caduff and Carol Lansing have identified 
for the pre-plague period. Three-fourths of the 302 cases Caduff reviewed for the period 
1345-46 originated in the contado.34 Similarly, Lansing noted that the most serious 
crimes usually originated in the countryside. All but one of the homicide cases she 
studied were rural, and 17 of the cases she studied concerned armed raids by magnates 
and their followers (fanti) on rural farms or mills.35 Magnates did not possess a monopoly 
on violence, however. In 1351, one Alberto di Jacopo da Brescia was prosecuted for 
leading a raid (cavalcata) with his henchmen against the rural castello of Sant’Andrea di 
Monte Giovi.36 
																																																								
30 These inquests are found in EOG.96, 4r, 10r, 24r, 34r, 43r, 52r, 65r, 68r, 83r, 85r, 109r. 
31 EOG.122.76r, 82r, 90r, 97r, and 120r. 
32 EOG.122.2r, 8r, 11r, 14r, 17r, 19r, 22r, 25r, 28r, 31r, 41r, 47r, 56r, 62r, 64r, 66r, 68r, 
70r, 74r, 76r, 80r, 84r, 86r, 88r, 90r, 95r, 99r, 103r, 105r, 109r, 111r, 113r, 114r, 118r, 125r, 127r, 
128r, 129r, 131r, 133r, 136r, 138r.  
33 EOG.122.5r, 33r, 35r, 37r, 39r, 51r, 53r, 58r, 60r, 78r, 82r, 97r, 101r, 116r, 117r, 120r, 
123r, 139r. The unclear case is EOG.122.107r-108r. Since it was a case of a nobleman, 
Bartolomeo olim Consilio dei Cerchi, beating a member of his famiglia, it most likely occurred 
on a Cerchi estate or in a house belonging to the lineage. 
34 Caduff, “Magnati,” 16. 
35 Lansing, “Magnate violence,” 41. 
36 See EOG.157, 67r-68v, for the inquest and Alberto’s confession. In this case, the court 
succeeded in prosecuting a foreigner for a crime that Florentine magnates usually committed with 
impunity.  
	 328	
 All but eight crimes from 1349 occurred in the same calendar year as the 
denunciation and inquest they produced.37 Inquests that the Executor forwarded to the 
Podestà could take one or two months for a final decision, and a week or two often 
separated the transcription of an initial denunciation and witness testimony.38 For 
example, the court copied out a denunciation against Domenico di Jacopo dei 
Tornaquinci on 24 July 1349.39 According to the denunciation, Domenico had stolen a 
pig from a merchant (mercator), Mozzone, in the Mugello parish of Latera, discussed in 
the previous chapter in relation to Andrea di Ugo’s dispute with the Pulci lineage. The 
theft took place in April 1349; Domenico beat Mozzone when he protested. The 
Executor’s messenger, Francesco di Lapo, was commissioned to cite the witnesses ten 
days later, on August 2 , and reported back the next day. The witnesses were given until 
August 13 before being cited for contumacy, however. The initial stage of the inquest, 
from denunciation to testimony, thus took the better part of a month. All this was for an 
inquest that was dismissed as unproven. A week typically separated a denunciation’s 
transcription and the citation of witnesses, and another week between this citation and the 
announcement that contumacious witnesses were to be treated as such. There was a time-
lapse between the commission of a crime, its denunciation, and the beginning of any 
criminal investigation into the crime. 
 This institutional crawl gave potential witnesses time to plan their strategies when 
in court. People who the Executor’s messengers cited would have been aware of what the 
																																																								
37 The eight exceptions all report crimes committed in 1348: EOG.122.5r, 22r, 35r, 41r, 
88r, 103r, 111r, and 123r. 
38 Caduff, “Magnati,” 28, for the average duration of processes based on the 
tamburagioni, and the relevant statutes governing criminal processes. 
39 EOG.122.8r-8v. Domenico’s full name is given as “Dominichum Iacobi domini 
Roggeri de Tornaquincis.” 
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statutes demanded of them, and the punishments facing those who were contumacious.40 
The 1295 Ordinances of Justice obliged popolani to report magnate crimes: sons of the 
victims were to report the incident if over the age of 14; if not, their guardians.41 The 
report was to be made within three days of the crime if it happened in the city, and within 
ten days if in the contado. If the victim survived, he was to make a denunciation himself 
or be fined 50 lire.42  
The 1325 and 1355 statutes required residents of a parish in which a homicide or 
serious assault had been committed to raise the grida, a semi-formalized hue and cry, 
against the malefactor. Residents were also obliged to sound the bells of the local church, 
and to pursue and capture the malefactors, if possible.43  Denunciations frequently 
mention this process, particularly in cases of attempted rape and abduction, in which the 
grida denoted lack of consent on the victim’s part. When Guido di Geramonte dei 
																																																								
40 For the commune’s official information network, see Statuti della repubblica 
fiorentina, vol. II, Statuto del Podestà dell’anno 1325, ed. Romolo Caggese, rev. ed. eds. 
Giuliano Pinto, Franesco Salvestrini, Andrea Zorzi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1999 [1921])[hereafter 
“Statuti, [volume #], [book number], [rubric number]], 2.I.rubr. XI, de bannitoribus communis 
Florentie et eorum officio.  
41 Ordinamenti, in Zorzi and Diacciati, 28-29: “Item provisum et ordinatum est quod, in 
omnibus et singulis supradictis casibus [of magnate-inflicted injuries], quilibeyt qui offenderetur, 
teneatur et debeat denuntiare domino potestati ea que ad ipsius offitium spectant, et domino 
defensori ea que ad suum offitium pertinent; videlicet, filius vel filii mortui seu occisi, si maior 
vel maiores fuerint XIIII annis; vel si minores essent, eorum tutores, et si tutores non haberent, 
eorum fratres, et si fratres non haberent, eorum propinqui, infra tertiam diem post co(m)missum 
maleficium in civitate Florentie; si vero co(m)missum fuerit in comitatu, infra decem diem dies, 
sub pena librarum centum florenorum parvorum, per dominum potestatem vel capitaneum 
auferenda ei qui contra fecerit.” 
42 Ordinamenti, in Zorzi and Diacciati, 29: “Et si viveret vulneratus vel offensus in 
persona, teneatur denuntiare seu denuntiari facere Potestati iniuriam sibi factam infra tertiam 
diem, si offensus vel vulneratus fuerit in civitate, burgis vel subburgis civitatis Florentie, si vero 
in comitatu infra decem dies, sub pena librarum quinquaginta f.p. eidem per dominum Potestatem 
auferenda et quotiens.” 
43Manikowska, “‘Acorr’uomo’”, 526, citing the volgare version of the 1355 statutes. 
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Frescobaldi assaulted one Tura in January 1348/49 and attempted to rape her, she shouted 
“many, many times ‘acurr’uomo! Acurr’uomo!”, the standard grida.44  
Given these statutory obligations, what factors shaped the decision to appear in court 
and once there, to testify? Appearing before the Executor’s court would have been 
inconvenient and time- consuming. The witnesses cited in a 1349 denunciation against 
two men of the Cavalcanti lineage, denounced for ordering a homicide, would have had 
to walk about 27 kilometers from the Valdipesa and back, most likely staying the night in 
Florence. The distance was even further for those living on the periphery of Florence’s 
contado. For example, 10 of 32 witnesses cited in an inquest against Gero di Gero di 
Guglielmo dei Rossi were from Monte Castelli, deep in the hillcountry of the Florentine 
Chianti.45 These witnesses faced a 41-kilometer, eight-hour walk to Florence and back. 
This would also have meant one or two days of lost labor for rural people. 
More directly, wtnesses who testified were exposed to violent retribution at the 
hands of magnates. Denunciations sometimes report magnate threats or boasts, speaking 
of the Executor’s inability to protect popolani and their own immunity to public justice. 
As the cousins Geri and Niccolo dei Frescobaldi beat the notary Francesco Guiducci da 
Signa outside Prato in the summer of 1349, they taunted him: “we’re not at Florence, 
we’re at Prato, for that reason do we act here, and we’re not scared of the Executor and 
his court.” After they finished beating him, the brothers reminded Francesco that he 
																																																								
44 EOG.122.22r-22v: “E ella [Tura] gridanno piu e piu volte ‘acur’omo! Acurr’omo!’” 
Apparently this succeeded in driving off Guido, since “il detto Guido la detta Tura per forza 
carnalmente non cognoscesse….” See EOG.157.72r-74v, for an inquest into a similar case in 
which the victim raised the grida. 
45 See EOG.122, 131r, for the denunciation and witness list. Pirillo, Forme.II, 594, for the 
location of Monte Castelli.  
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should “know never to do anything against us, [or] we’ll kill you by the sword.”46 The 
short arm of Florentine justice is graphically illustrated by cases like these. Physical 
distance, lost productivity, and the threat of violent retribution all worked as disincentives 
for Tuscans to testify. 
There were further statutory penalties, however, for failure to actively alert one’s 
compatriots to a crime in progress, or to denounce a crime. If a criminal was allowed to 
escape from the scene of the crime, inhabitants of the parish were fined on a sliding scale 
determined by age: those over fifteen were fined 20 soldi.47 Failure to appear when cited 
to give testimony incurred a penalty of 25 lire.48 The commune’s bannitori, the public 
criers, cited witnesses and announced the names of those who had been fined for 
contumacy. These rounds are occasionally mentioned in the Executor’s libri 
bannimentorum, registers containing statutory material the Executor’s bannitori were to 
announce in public.49 Those cited to give testimony would likely have heard these 
bannitori, and were familiar with the penalties they would incur for contumacy. There is 
no good evidence in the commune’s treasury records that contumacious witnesses paid 
the stipulated fines, but the latent threat of punishment inherent in the status of 
contumacy may explain why rural Tuscans would bother to appear before the judge, 
instead of simply ignoring the summonses. 
																																																								
46 EOG.122.60v: “’Noi non siamo a Firenze, anzi siamo a Prato, che faremo la nostra 
ragione qua, e non abbiamo paura del’executor e la corta….sai fare mai nulla contra noi, noi te 
occideremo a gladio.’” The full names of the Frescobaldi cousins are given as “Gerium Johannis 
domini Freschi” and “Nicholaum Bartholli domini Freschi.” 
47 Manikowska, “ ‘Acorr’uomo’”, 526-27. 
48 Lansing, “Magnate violence,” 43. The lira was a unit of account, equivalent to 20 
soldi. Florence’s gold currency, the florin, was equivalent to 64 soldi: Caferro, “Petrarch’s War,” 
155, “note on money.” 
49 See, for example, EOG.82.2v-5v for the items that these bannitori were to announce. 
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There was a further structural constraint on witnesses’ willingness to provide 
information when they did appear in court. The act of testifying carried dangers bound up 
in out-of-court considerations: providing too much information to the Executor’s court 
could expose one to retribution at the hands of fellow witnesse, as well as magnates. 
Witnesses who verified the claims of a denunciation that was later deemed fraudulent 
exposed themselves to fines and imprisonment for perjury. The same applied to witnesses 
whose testimony was itself deemed fraudulent by other witnesses. An inquest from 
January 21, 1345 graphically illustrates this danger. Someone denounced the magnate 
Giovanni di Guelfo de’ Pulci for assaulting Grasso di Guccio in the rural parish of Latera, 
scene of the dispute between the notary Andrea and the Pulci lineage discussed in chapter 
four.50 The assault had happened over a year ago, in October 1343, and took place in the 
parish’s piazza, outside the church of S. Maria di Latera.51According to the denuncia, the 
popolo of Latera responded swiftly. The church’s bells were rung to raise the hue and 
cry, and Grasso raised the grida, shouting, “Acurr’uomo! Acurr’uomo! Viva el 
popolo!”52 Nisto di Barbero, Tico di Bindo, and Ciato di Neri gave detailed testimony 
confirming the assault.53 Nisto and Tico claimed they had witnessed Giovanni assault 
Grasso, while Ciato said that he saw Grasso with a face smeared with blood, and further 
claimed that the events of the inquest were public knowledge (publica vox et fama), 
																																																								
50 EOG.21.37r 
51 EOG.37r-37v: “et queste cose furono comesse per lo dictio Giovanni nel mille trecento 
XLIII nel mese d’ottobre nella piazza di Santa Maria da Latera dal I e dal II la decta chiesa, al 
terzo via al IIII l’erede de Spagnuolo.” For the location of Santa Maria di Latera, see the map 
appendix. See also Pirillo, Forme.I, 133-34. 
52 EOG.21.37r: “El dicto Grasso cade in terra per la quale cosa fo gran romore nello 
castello de Latera e sonarono le capane a stormo el dicto Grasso gridando ‘acurr’humo viva el 
popolo  
53 See EOG.21.38r-38v for their testimony. 
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confirming the denouncer’s claim that the assault created a great disturbance (gran 
romore) in the parish of Latera.54  
Yet the nine other witnesses cited in this case thought otherwise. At this point, the 
inquisitorial machinery turned on the three hapless men in much the same way it turned 
against Ser Andrea di Ugo in the previous chapter. In the summary of their testimony the 
notary transcribed, the witnesses claimed that the denunciation and the three witnesses’ 
testimony had been made malevolently against Giovanni dei Pulci, and specifically “to 
the damage and injury of the witnesses themselves.”55 The alleged victim, Grasso, 
himself testified that none of the events described in the denunciation had occurred.56 
Three days later, Tico, Nisto, and Ciato were prosecuted for giving false testimony. They 
eventually confessed spontaneously (sponte) that the other witnesses were telling the 
truth and that they had knowingly perjured themselves.57 The three hapless men were 
fined one hundred lire, about one and one half florins, and thrown in the commune’s 
prison (Le Stinche) until they could pay up.58 It is impossible at present to determine 
whether the original denunciation was indeed false, or whether the other witnesses acted 
from fear of the Pulci or animosity towards those who spoke, but the case starkly depicts 
the hazards witnesses faced before the bench. An eagerness to talk could be a self-																																																								
54 EOG.21.38r: “Nistus Barberi testes predictus dixit quod loco et tempore in dicta 
inquisitione contentis vidit in persone et fuit qui Johannes Guelfi inquisitus magnas predictus 
percuxit dictum Grassum…cum spada in facie….Tichus di Bindi testes predictus dixit quod ipse 
testes fuit presens et vidit quod dictus Johannes….percuxit dictum Grassum popularem predictum 
in facie cum spada unde cum pomo ipsius spadae….Ciatus Neri testes iuratus et interrogatus dixit 
se tamen scire de contentis in dicta inquisitione quod loco et tempore in dicto inquisitione 
contentus vidit dictum Grassum Gucci popularem predictum cum facie sangui volenta et dixit 
quod est publica vox et fama de contentis in dicta inquisitione contra dictum Johannem magnatem 
inquisitione predictum.” See EOG.21.37r for the gran romore. 
55 EOG.21.38v: “ad dampnum et iniuriam ipsorum testium.” 
56 See EOG.21.38v for his testimony. 
57 See EOG.21.40r-43v for the process against the three. 
58 EOG.27.15r. The conversion is based on Caferro’s figures: Caferro, “Petrarch’s War,” 
155, “note on currency.” 
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imposed prison sentence if a witness did not consult his fellow villagers first on what he 
should (or should not) say in court. 
Thus, there were many good reasons for witnesses to deny all knowledge of a crime. 
Distance, lost productivity, and inconvenience combined with the very real threat of 
retaliation from impugned magnates. Witnesses ran the risk of being imprisoned for false 
testimony if they said the wrong thing. Yet there were also dangers in contumacy. 
Statutory law contained numerous monetary fines for those failing to carry out their 
duties surrounding a crime. Previous chapters demonstrated the appeal of the 
denunciation system, and the ways in which its users could manipulate it tactically. Yet 
an important part of successfully using the inquisitorial system was knowing when to 
disengage with it, or when to avoid it altogether. This ambiguous engagement-in which 
some residents of a parish were willing to denounce magnate crimes, while those 
residents cited as witnesses stayed silent-emerges in more concrete terms through 
examining some cases in detail.  
Those witnesses to a crime who appeared before the Executor took an oath on the 
Gospels. They swore that their testimony would be truthful and free of any influence 
from love, fear, or hatred.59 It is unclear whether this oath was collective, or appears as 
such because the Executor’s notaries grouped the witnesses’ names together in the oath 
formula. The same problem applies to the testimony itself. The Executor’s notaries 
transcribed testimony by individual, but it is unclear whether other witnesses were in the 
Executor’s chambers while waiting their turn. The notaries translated the witnesses’ 																																																								
59 A typical example of the formula for the oath is from EOG.122.110r: “Die octa mensis 
novembris. Constituti personaliter in iudicio coram superdicto iudice ut super sedente ad solitum 
banchum et quilibet ipsorum testes in superdicta inquisitione nominati iuraverunt ad sancta dei 
evangelia corporaliter tacenti scripta dicere et perhibere testimonium veritatis superdicti 
inquisitione et contentis in ea remoti odio amore timore etc.” 
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Tuscan into Latin while transcribing their testimony; the length of an individual’s 
transcribed testimony depended on what he or she said. In cases where the individual 
denied all knowledge, the notary noted that the witness “knows nothing concerning the 
contents of the said inquest.”60 
 How frequently did witnesses profess total ignorance of a crime? Did this 
proclivity towards denial correllate to living in the city or in the countryside? Based on 
the evidence from the late 1340s, witness groups collectively claimed ignorance fairly 
often, and this correlated to rural residency. In 22 of the 52 inquests from January-May 
1348 (42%), all of the witnesses said they knew nothing (se nichil scire dixerunt). 
Seventeen of these twenty-two cases were rural. In thirty-three of the sixty-three cases 
from the second semester of 1349, all of the witnesses cited denied all knowledge of the 
crime in question.61 Of the 33 cases in which all cited knew nothing, eight were from the 
city; 25 concerned crimes committed in the contado or distretto.62 This may reflect the 
diminishing power of the commune as one moved away from Florence, with a heightened 
danger of magnate retaliation.63  
 The rural communities that these witnesses came from were small, and witnesses 
from a given piviere would have known each other personally. Occasionally witnesses 
are noted as being hired hands (lavoratori) of magnates, or other witnesses.64 Family 
																																																								
60 “dixit se nichil scire de contentis in dicta inquisitione.” 
61 These are: EOG.122.17r, 19r, 22r, 28r, 37r, 39r, 51r, 58r, 60r, 64r, 68r, 70r, 74r, 78r, 
80r, 86r, 88r, 95r, 105r, 109r, 111r, 113r, 114r, 116r, 117r, 125r, 127r, 128r, 129r, 131r, 138r, 
139r, and EOG.124.22r. 
62 Cases concerning the city are: EOG.122.37r, 39r, 51r, 58r, 60r, 78r, 116r, 139r. 
63 Caduff, “Magnati,” 34. 
64 For laborers in the witness lists, see: EOG.122.80r; 95r-95v; and 97r-98v. 
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members appear together in witness lists.65 Reliable demographic information for the 
communities concerned does not survive for 1349, but the figures Samuel Cohn, Jr., 
provides for other settlements in the contado can be used to create a comparative picture. 
He has estimated that the commune of Mangona, high in the Florentine Alps, contained 
around two hundred and fifty households in 1356, falling to two hundred or so following 
the second plague cycle of 1363.66 A small parish in the Arno plain such as S. Giusto 
contained as few as seventy-five households in 1356.67 Villagers would have known the 
names and motivations of those making denunciations and their motivations. 
Intimate enemies: The local dynamics of elite violence and popular self-defense 
This local dynamic becomes clearer through analysis of some cases in greater 
detail. At stake in a witness’s decision to speak or remain silent were a variety of 
interests: statutory threats and pragmatic limitations, the threat of magnate vengeance, the 
dilatory nature of state activity, and one’s own standing in a community. The Florentine 
courts were a factor in a haphazard and unpredictable sort of way: unable, probably 
unwilling, to effectively defend rural people juridically or otherwise from elite violence, 
the courts were still able and willing to prosecute rural people for legal infractions great 
and small, from contumacy to perjury and false denunciation; and at least some of the 
																																																								
65 For family members cited together, see: EOG.122.109v: Barthollo di Fede Bonamichi 
and his wife, mona Bartolla, sua moglie; Loreno, Angnollo and Donino, “fratelli e figliolli di 
Lotto” and EOG.122.114r: Gino and Pagollo di Feo; Porreto di Venturello and Jacopo, “suo 
figliolo.” 
66 Cohn, Creating the florentine state: peasants and rebellion, 1348-1434 (Cambridge, 
1999), 86. 
67 Cohn, Creating, 88. For more information on rural demography and society see 
Charles Marie de La Roncière, “L’influence des franciscains dans la campagne de Florence au 
XIVe siècle (1280-1360),” in Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome. Moyen-Age, temps 
modernes T.87.1 (1975), 27-103; La Roncière Tra preghiera e rivolta. Le folle toscane nel XIV 
secolo (Rome: Jouvence, 1993); La Roncière, Firenze e le sue campagne nel Trecento (Florence, 
2005). 
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time, the documentation shows these sanctions working, as in the case of the three 
witnesses prosecuted for perjury discussed above. Magnates prosecuted by the commune 
could evade or temporize with Florentine justice in variety of ways. Their rural neighbors 
and victims were not so fortunate: men like Ciato and Tico would have lacked the 
resources to evade the Exectuor’s officials or bribe them to go away. They also lacked the 
resources effectively defend themselves once hauled into court. 
This produced a situation in which rural people were policed but not protected by 
the Florentine state. The statutory demands that rural people cooperate with the courts, 
and the ideological claims of the Executor’s court in particular, did not translate into 
security for non-elites who testified in court. This absence of protection was of a dual 
nature. Despite Florentine garrisons in rural towns like Figline Valdarno or Scarperia, the 
Florentine state could not hinder magnate crimes against rural people. More profoundly, 
the Executor’s court was failing on its own terms: its purpose had always been to protect 
popolani, rural and urban, from the depredations and arrogance of the great.68 Yet 
engagement with this court could mean fines and imprisonment for rural people, in 
addition to the myriad dangers they faced at the hands of magnates. 
This dual failure meant that members of the magnate families could be fairly sure 
that they could evade punishment for crimes against rural non-elites. This made rural 
communities and individuals easy targets for predatory elite families, who themselves 
were under pressure in the 1340s from all sides. The fourteenth-century crisis was under 
way in Tuscany well before the 1348 arrival of the Black Death. A deepening crisis of the 
commune’s finances and those of its major banking companies contributed to revived 
social conflict between magnates and Florence’s urban popolo (the third popular regime 																																																								
68 See chapter 3, below. 
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of 1343-1348).69 Florentines of all classes also faced such demographic catastrophes as 
Tuscan famine of 1346 and the Black Death of 1348. This concatenation of maladies 
facilitated, as well as  some of the violence reported in cases before the Executor: 
Extorting and despoiling rural people was one way that the Florentine magnates 
responded to the deteriorating socio-economic situation of the 1340s, and the structural 
constraints on Florentine justice made these actions easier. 
The first inquest I will explore in depth began on 2 November 1349. It concerned 
an assault that happened the previous January or February.70 The cousins Lotto and 
Bernardo degli Agli were denounced for assaulting one Viero di Vanno, from the rural 
popolo of Sant’Agata a Mucciano, in the Mugello northeast of Florence.71  Lotto and 
Bernardo attacked Viero with knives, beat him, threw him to the ground, and demanded 
that he “‘proclaim your life to us, or we’ll kill you!’’’72 The Agli were likely demanding 
that Viero become one of their tenants, or perhaps henchmen (fanti). This interpretation is 
borne out by evidence for this branch of the Agli family’s longstanding presence in the 
parish of Sant’Agata a Mucciano. Lotto and Bernardo’s fathers, Bindo and Aglio 
respectively, appear in 1328 as property owners leasing pieces of land (petii terrae) in 
																																																								
69 The best references for this period in Florentine history are Marvin Becker, Florence in 
transition (Baltimore, 1968), vol. 1, and Gene Brucker, Florentine politics and society, 1343-
1378 (Princeton, NJ., 1962). 
70 See EOG.122, 105r, for the denunciation. Lotto and Bernardo are named in full as 
“Lotthum Bindi et Bernardum Agli de Aglis.” 
71 Pirillo, Forme.I, 160. See George W. Dameron, “Life in the Tuscan Mugello at the 
time of Dante.” In Beyond Florence, eds. Paula Findlen, Michelle M. Fontaine, and Duane J. 
Osheim (Stanford, 2003), 44-58, for more information on the Mugello. 
72 EOG.122, 105r: “et eidem dixerunt ‘O tu confessa la vita per noi o noi 
t’uccideremo[!]’” My translation of confessare is based on references in TLIO: 
http://tlio.ovi.cnr.it/TLIO/  
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Sant’Agata.73 In 1342, the Florentine commune authorized Angelo, Lotto and Bernardo’s 
uncle, and Bindo, Bernardo’s father, to fortify another farm (podium) in Mucciano. They 
were explicitly forbidden to include the church of Sant’Agata or other properties in this 
fortification: perhaps the Signoria feared the implications this would have for Agli 
lordship in the area.74  
Members of the lineage had previously been denounced to the Executor’s court. 
Leonino, Bernardo’s brother, was denounced to the Executor Piergiovanni di Montefalco 
on November 21, 1344.75 According to the denunciation, Leonino beat one Diana and 
scattered her chestnuts in a field near the church of Sant’Agata.76 The Executor 
Piergiovanni’s judge forwarded the inquest to the court of the Podestà, but no records of 
the inquest survive. Since the Executor’s notaries usually made a marginal note of 
“proven” (probatum) when a case was successfully prosecuted, it appears that no 
condemnation resulted. Another denunciation from 1344 against two other sons of Aglio, 
Lapo and Bonifacio, was deemed false. The two men whom the judge identified as the 
denunciation’s authors, Tone di Marcuto and Baldesino, were prosecuted for fraud and 
imprisoned, like the witnesses discussed above.77 
 The Agli were an established presence in this part of Florence’s contado, the 
Mugello. They owned land, much of which they rented out to tenant-cultivators. Their 
hegemony in the area was sanctioned by Florence in the fortification decree of 1342. 
																																																								
73 Members of this branch of the Agli, which I have traced back to a grandfather named 
Caro, appear in Notarile Antecosimiano.10899 [hereafter NA.10899].26v (20 September 1328) 
and 36v-37r (10 October 1328).  
74 Missive.7.7v (March 10, 1342).  
75 EOG.21.57r-57v for the denunciation and witness list.  
76 EOG.57v.  
77See EOG.21.153r-156r for the inquest, a copy of the original denunciation, and the 
prison sentence.  
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When they were denounced to the criminal courts, the case either fizzled out at the 
testimony stage or the inquest turned on the denouncers themselves. It is hardly 
surprising that the case against Lotto and Bernardo went unproven. Seven witnesses were 
cited for evidence concerning the assault on Viero, five from Sant’Agata, and one each 
from neighboring populi, also part of the parish of San Giovanni Maggiore di Mugello.78 
Piero Lorenzo, from San Michele, was contumacious; the rest claimed that they knew 
nothing.79  
For the people of Sant’Agata a Mucciano, testifying against the Agli was at best a 
waste of time; at worst, it could lead to prison. There is no evidence for the fate of Viero 
di Vanno, the man Lotto and Bernardo degli Agli targeted in 13448, but his wretched 
story highlights the dangers, even the sheer pointlessness, of testifying against the elite 
for rural Tuscans. The Agli not only were de facto impervious to Florentine public 
justice; their status as a semi-permanent prop to Florentine suzerainty over the area is 
reflected in their official sanction to fortify their property in 1342. In such a situation, it is 
hard to know where the magnate class ended, and Florentine public power began: to what 
extent was the Florentine state, or elements of it, coterminous to rural people with locally 
entrenched magnate families that this very same state claimed to be protecting them 
against? 
This paradoxical situation is underlined by detailed consideration of how the 
commune handled the rural predations of members of the Bardi family How did rural 
violence relate to magnate families’ political life, and what options were available to rural 																																																								
78 See Pirillo, Forme.I, 157-61, for the location of S. Jacopo de Pianezzo and S. Michele 
di Ronta. The witnesses from Sant’Agata were Bonaiuto Benciveni; Urbano Ginozzi; Sarto 
Simone; Giovanni di Pighe; and Baldo Chaleffi. Francesco di Ser Ugolino di Docco was from 
San Iacopo, and Piero di Lorenzo was from San Michele de Ronta: AdE.122.105r-105v. 
79 See EOG.124.68v for witness testimony. Piero di Lorenzo was contumacious. 
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people against magnate attacks? Future work will focus on the deeper history of Bardi 
involvement in the countryside, violent or otherwise. Here, I will focus the family’s 
activity in the northeastern part of the Florentine contado, the lower Val di Sieve and 
upper Valdarno. The response of rural victims to Bardi attacks reveals the capacity of 
rural people for collective self-defense, however circumscribed and enervated in the 
absence of support from the Florentine commune. It also indicates how attacks on rural 
people could fit into broader family strategies in the 1340s, a period of serious crisis for 
Florence, its rural territories, and Europe as a whole.  
The Bardi lineage was one of Florence’s wealthiest and most distinguished 
families. The 1340 collapse of the family’s farflung and overextended banking empire 
did not destroy this prosperity.80 One of the only popular families to gain admission to the 
milites in the thirteenth century, they were branded magnates by their erstwhile popular 
peers in 1293.81 I will return to their relationship with the commune following analysis of 
inquests against them for violence against rural people in 1347-1349.  
The first inquest concerned a crime that took place in August 1349 in the parish of 
S. Cristoforo in Perticaia.82 S. Cristoforo lies in the hills southwest of Rignano Sull’Arno, 
upriver from Florence in the upper Valdarno.83 The denunciation was lodged against 
three members of the Bardi: Gianni, his nephew Bardo, and their kinsman Sandro. They 
attacked Biagio di Cogniano, described as Giano and Bardo’s hired laborer (lavoratore). 
																																																								
80 Armando Sapori, La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi 
(Florence, 1926), is still the Bardi and Peruzzi companies. 
81 Bardi popular status before the Ordinances: Poloni, Potere al popolo, 78.  
82 See EOG.122.70r-73r for the denunciation, witness list, and processual information; 
AdE.124.49r-50v for the witnesses’ testimony.  
83 Pirillo, Forme.II, 535. On the Valdarno di Sopra, see in particular Lontano dalle città. 
Il Valdarno di Sopra nei secoli XII-XIII, eds. Giuliano Pinto and Paolo Pirillo (Rome: Viella, 
2005). 
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The attack took place in a public road (strada publica) near a house belonging to Giano 
and Bardo, in which Biagio was living at the time.84 As the Bardi beat him with their 
sheathed swords, Biagio raised the hue and cry (grida). They then choked him until he 
could no longer shout.85 The closing lines of the denunciation reveal what must have 
been a common feeling among witnesses: 
“If you [the Executor] yourself want, make an inquest, [for] you can learn of it from publica vox 
et fama and from certain men such as those who heard [Biagio] shout ‘acurr’uomo!’,  and you 
yourself may find them [the witnesses] near us, [do so] as secretly as possible so that they [the 
Bardi] may not first blandish you or threaten you, so that they may not deny the truth of the 
crime.” 86 
 
Given the verb form (lasinghati and minacciati), the denouncer assumed that the 
influence of the Bardi extended to the Executor and his famiglia. By threats or bribes, 
they would be able to influence the outcome of the case. For the people of this area, the 
arbitrary power and coercion of the Bardi was more real than the authority of an urban 
court, and this conditioned rural peoples’ perception of the court itself. Fear of the Bardi 
resulted in a veil of silence surrounding this crime. 
  In a similar case from 1 February 1348, Viero di Filippozzo dei Bardi murdered 
another resident of S. Cristoforo, Tingo di Geri.87 The denouncer noted that the witnesses 
listed would not speak, “unless they are forced and compelled by your office, and this [is] 
																																																								
84 EOG.122.70v: “Biagio di Chogniano del popolo de San Cristofano in Perticaia ed el 
lavoratore del dicto Giani e del dicto Bardo asalirlo e percossolo insula strada publica a lato a lato 
a casa del dicto Giani e Bardo nella quale il dicto Biagio di Cogniano istava e sta luogho 
chiamato a la felice[.]” 
85 EOG.122.70r-71v: “E lo dicto Biagio gridando piu e piu e piu volte  ‘acurre homo, 
acurre homo[.] Il sopradicto Bardo el dicto Sandro de la casa di Bardi si chome grande e possenti 
si lo pigliaro e misogli le mani amendu nella golla e tencho i strettamente per tale guisa che non 
potea piu gridare….” 
86 EOG.122.71r-71v: “se viu vorite, farne inquisitione il potrite sapere di piubicha vocie e 
fama[,] e da certi chome audire gridare acure homo, e quisti homeni vi coniurebe avere a po noi il 
piu secretamente chi se potesse si che no fosseno prima lasinghati o minacciati, onde gli no vene 
di negassono la verita di questo maleficio.”  
87 The inquest is EOG.96.61r-64v. 
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for fear of the power and greatness of the abovesaid Bardi.”88 Unsurprisingly, none of the 
sixteen witnesses in this inquest knew anything and the case went unproven (non 
probatum).89 
Knowledge of magnate crimes quickly circulated in the vicinity. Whoever 
denounced the 1349 attack on Biagio explained that “this crime is public knowledge 
(publica fama) throughout the parish,” and that people in neighboring parishes heard 
Biagio’s cries for help.90 According to the denunciation’s author, there were several 
eyewitnesses to the attack and Biagio’s shouting. Three men of nearby S. Quirico Valli 
“saw him [Biagio] shouting.”91 Two men from S. Cristoforo heard the shouting (audillo 
gridare).92 The magnates’ victims were typically members of the communities in which 
the attacks took place. Biagio lived in S. Cristoforo. Viero, attacked by the Agli in 1349, 
lived in Sant’Agata a Mucciano, where the crime took place. Francesco di Riccucio, a 
witness cited in the 1349 case against the Bardi, is described like Biagio, as one of Giano 
dei Bardi’s laborers, a lavoratore. He lived “side by side, less than one hundred fifty 
braccie from where the crime happened.”93 Biagio himself lived in a Bardi-owned house 
(casa).94 Most of the other witnesses were also locals, from the same parish as Biagio 																																																								
88 EOG.96.62r: “E sia manifesto ad voi che gli ‘infrascripti testimoni non dicono il 
predicto maleficio se non sono per lo vostro officio stretti e ifforzati e gravati, e questo sì per 
paura della potenzia e maggioranza de’ sopradetti Bardi.” 
89 See EOG.96.62r for the witnesses, and EOG.9663r for the notice that they all claimed 
to know nothing. 
90 EOG.122.71r: “de questo maleficio e publica voce e fama per lo paese e da aliquanti 
vicini fo sentito gridare ‘accure homo.’” 
91 EOG.122.71v: “Francio duzzo di Bachirelli: vidillo gridare; Latino di Maffeo o del 
piaciete: vidillo gridare; Francesco di Ricuccio…: vidillo gridare.” 
92EOG.122.71v: “Bertho dela Manato: audillo gridare; Ciecho de Latino: udillo gridare.” 
93A braccio was 58.36 centimeters or roughly two feet.  See C.M. De La Roncière, Prix 
et salaires à Florence au XIVe siècle (1280-1380) (Rome, 1982), 30-32. 
94 EOG.122.71v: “Franciescho di Riccucio lavoratore del dicto Giani ista a lato a lato a 
meno de cento cinquanta braccia ove si fu il maleficio e del popolo di Santo Andrea a anticha[,] 
vidillo gridare.” 
	 344	
(San Leolino a Rignano), or within ten kilometers of San Cristoforo.95 Only four were 
from outside the upper Valdarno.96  All of them also claimed that they knew nothing.97 
S. Cristoforo in Perticaia was a favorite target for the Bardi: their deep roots in the 
area is a subject I will pursue in depth in future work. In July 1348, as the Black Death 
raged in Florence, members of the lineage, Andrea, Francesco, Totto, Bindo, and Ceo, 
attacked the church of S. Cristoforo itself. This prompted an inquest on February 61349.98 
The Bardi occupied the church, driving out the local men who had been defending it. As 
they smashed down the doors of the cloister, they boasted: 
“‘Many times already have we smashed the popolo of Florence, and we can safely 
break the popolo of San Cristoforo in Perticaia. And yet another time, if the tamburo is in 
Florence-for [this] reason we’re here in the contado, and in our wisdom we act here. We 
will hang you like robbers over these oak trees, you and whoever disobeys.’”99 
 
The Bardi then began beating one of the church’s defenders, Francesco del Farsata.100 As 
they beat him, they made the same demand that Bernardo and Lotto degli Agli made of 
																																																								
95EOG.122.71v-72r: “Ugato di Feo Althoviti del popolo de Santo Apostole di Firenze, 
Palmieri del Charo Altoviti del dicto popolo, Bandino di Rinieri Valori and Stefano di Rinieri 
Valori: sono del popolo di Santo Stefano a Ponte di Firenze.” 
96 San Niccolo da Olmeto, San Cristoforo in Perticaia, and San Quirico Valli are all in the 
piviere of San Leolino a Rignano (Pirillo, Forme.II, 535, for the list); San Lorenzo Cappiano, in 
the parish of San Vito a Incisa, in about ten kilometers up river on foot from San Cristoforo; San 
Donato in Collina (Pirillo, Forme.II, 571); San Donato Collina (parish of Santa Maria all’Antella: 
Pirillo, Forme.I, 351) is about 5.4 km. downriver from San Cristoforo. I have not been able to 
locate Santa Lucia a Besticcio. Santi Apostoli and Santo Stefano a Ponte are both in the city of 
Florence.  
97 See EOG.124.49v-50v for their testimony. 
98EOG.119.27r-28v for the denunciation and witness list; the case is copied in 
CdP.103.3v-4v.  
99 EOG.119.27r: “Noy abbiamo gia piu volte rotto il popolo di Firenze, ben possiamo 
rompere sicuramente quello di S. Cristophano in Perticaia[.] E ancora a una per una altra volta, e 
se il tanburo e a Firenze, a la ragione e noi siamo in contado e farella a nostro senno e 
impiccharevi commo ladri super queste querce, voi e quique a dissobidira….’” 
100 EOG.119.28r: “i predicti Andrea Francesco Totto Bindo e Ceii colloro raunata e 
congiura di sbanditi e d’altri per forza di balestra e d’altre arme da spezare uscia persono per 
forza il decto Francesscho del Farsata e gittarlo in terra e catuno di loro il percosse piu e piu volte 
dandoli pugni e calci….” 
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Viero: “Acknowledge your life is ours, filthy thief and traitor that you are!”101 When 
Francesco refused, Francesco dei Bardi beat him to death.102 The Bardi occupied the 
church and were still in control of it at the time of the inquest.103 This case did move 
beyond the Executor’s court: the Podestà sentenced two of the Bardi to death by 
decapitation and two more were fined 3,800 lire. Andrea’s son, Giovanni, was also fined 
for their contumacy. All four were, however, absolved in an amnesty of 1352.104  
This was not an isolated case of Bardi immunity from Florentine justice. 
Although Totto and his brothers had participated in an attempted 1340 coup in Florence 
and were exiled, they continued drawing shares from the Bardi bank until its 1343 
collapse, and were still in the area.105 Totto would enjoy a long and presumably 
prosperous line of business in usurping other peoples’ goods. In 1374, Marcionne Coppo 
di Stefani would force him to surrender properties that Totto had quietly stolen from the 
commune, when the chronicler served on a commission appointed for the task.106 
As they attacked the church’s defenders, the Bardi boasted that they had already 
broken (rotto) the Florentine popolo many times-although in fact their attempted coup of 
1340, which Totto and his kinsmen had been banned for, was swiftly crushed by the 
popular militia.107 They saw the countryside as beyond the reach of the tamburo, beyond 
																																																								
101 EOG.119.28r: “dandoli pugni e calci, dicendo ‘riconosci la vita per noi, zozo ladro [e] 
traditore che tu sei!’” 
102 EOG.119.28r: “E allora il decto Francesscho di Filippozzo negendo che costui no 
riconosciena per loro la vita tosto come volemo percosse il decto Francesscho del Farsata nella 
decta chiesa con una spada in sula testa con efuzione di sangue[,] della quale fede e percosse 
predicte il decto Francesco del Farsata e morto e mori.” 
103EOG.119.28r.  
104 See Atti del Podestà [hereafter “AdP”], 404.81r-81v for the condemnations and 
commutations. See AdP.404.90r, for the sentence of Giovanni, son of Andrea. 
105Sapori, La crisi, 129. 
106 Stefani, Cronica Fiorentina, 740. 
107 Brucker, Florentine politics and society (Princeton, NJ., 1962), 6. 
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the city and its institutions. The Bardi were a law unto themselves in the area, and 
flaunted that fact. Revealing in this regard is the dramatically physical language the Bardi 
used. They threaten to hang the disobedient as brigands (ladri) over oak trees. These oak 
trees would have been a constant reminder of this attack and the Bardi menace.  
Francesco del Farsata was a filthy brigand and traitor (zozo ladro [e] traditore) 
for refusing to acknowledge their authority. Why would Francesco be a traitor?  The 
scene is one of domineering lords disciplining wayward subjects tempted by the promise 
of protection from the popular criminal courts. The Bardi saw the land, its tenants, and 
the church as theirs by right. To paraphrase historian Gadi Algazi, they were pruning 
their tenants.108 Magnate violence did not target strangers: victims were their neighbors, 
tenants, and residents of parishes that the magnates themselves sometimes lived in. 
Armed raids by magnates and their followers (fanti) sometimes targeted people and 
places neighboring their own properties, as Claudia Caduff has also found.109 These 
attacks were the calculated use of force to extort rights, payments, or perhaps less 
precisely defined, and hence potentially worse, gifts or customs.  
Most of the witnesses cited to testify regarding the attack on S. Cristoforo came 
from its wider parish of S. Leolino a Rignano, or close to it.110 Like the Agli in 
Mucciano, the Bardi owned properties in the area. The 1348 denunciation notes that the 
Bardi assembled their henchmen on a farm (podere) at S. Silvestro Marciano, in S. 
																																																								
108 Gadi Algazi, “Pruning peasants: private war and maintaining the lords’ peace in late 
medieval Germany,” in Medieval Transformations: texts, power and gifts in context, eds. Esther 
Cohen & Mayke de Jong (Leiden, 2000), 245-274. 
109 See Caduff, “Magnati,” 35-37, for magnate seizures of land belonging to popolani. 
110 EOG.119.28v. Of the twenty-two witnesses listed, ten were from San Cristoforo in 
Perticaia. Six were from the city of Florence.Three were from neighboring parishes, San Donato 
in Collina and Santa Maria di Castiglionchio (see Pirillo, Forme.I.354 for San Donato and Pirillo, 
Forme.II.530 for Santa Maria di Castiglionchio). 
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Leolino a Rignano.111 Andrea, Francesco and Totto, or their brother, Messer Vieri di 
Fillippozzo, owned this estate.112 It was this same Vieri who had murdered Tingo di Geri, 
another popolano of S. Cristoforo, in February 1348. Biagio, the 1349 victim of Giano, 
Bardo, and Sandro dei Bardi, had also lived in a house owned by this branch of the 
family.113  
Like the land that Andrea and the Pulci disputed, it is possible that the Bardi were 
attempting to clarify their rights over the area through brazen public action. Occupation 
was the most direct assertion of these rights possible, and the defenders of S. Cristoforo 
were contesting this claim. The Bardi would eventually succeed at establishing patronal 
rights over the area: in addition to mentions in the Notarile Antecosimiano, S. Cristoforo 
Perticaia appears in the Archivio di Stato’s Diplomatico, in the Pio Istituto dei Bardi 
series.114 
What does the church attack reveal about popular organization in the face of elite 
violence? The attack happened in July 1348, as the plague was devastating Florence and 
its countryside. Rignano lies in the Valdarno just downstream from Figline Valdarno, an 
important sub-regional market town, and an easy walk from Florence. This area would 
likely have been devastated by the plague, more so than the Chianti hillcountry or the 
mountainous northern contado. The denunciation states that the church of S. Cristoforo 
was empty and lacked a rector when the Bardi attacked it: perhaps he had died of plague, 
or fled from it. This would have provided Totto and his brothers with an excellent 
opportunity to (re)assert patronage rights over the church and the area. Based on the 																																																								
111 EOG.119.27v; see Pirillo, Forme.II.536-37, for the location of San Silvestro. 
112 EOG.119.27v. 
113 EOG.122.70v.  
114 Time constraints did not allow me to consult this source for this study. 
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denunciation’s language, this is what the locals were expecting, and they were ready for 
it.  
The popolani gathered in the church were an ad hoc defense group gathered 
specifically to prevent wrongful occupation during the vacancy.115 The church would 
have been the symbolic as well as spiritual center of the vicinity; desecreating it with 
homicidal violence, the Bardi vividly demonstrated their power and arrogance to local 
people. It is impossible to identify the man the Bardi murdered, Francesco del Farsata. It 
seems likely, however, that he was the leader of the church’s defenders. According to the 
denunciation, the attackers singled out Francesco, demanding he acknowledge their 
power over him and calling him a filthy brigand and traitor. When he refused, Francesco 
di Filippozzo dei Bardi “at once” despatched him with a swordstroke to the head.116 The 
Bardi then drove the other defenders from the church, which they continued to occupy at 
the time of the inquest (February 1349). 
This episode reveals that rural people were just as capable of self-defense, and 
spontaneous organization, as their urban brethren. The Florentines expelled the Duke of 
Athens, Walter of Brienne, in 1343 after a brief stint as their “lord for life.” Following his 
expulsion from Florence, a committee of fourteen created by bishop Agnolo degli 
Acciaiuoli abolished the Ordinances of Justice and the office of Standardbearer of 
Justice; the priorate he created was also opened to the magnates for the first time in 
																																																								
115 EOG.119.26v: “la decta chiesa la quale alora vacava e non n’avea rectore e nella quale 
chiesa erano certi huomini del popolo della decta chiesa di Santo Cristofano [sic] in Perticaia a 
guardia et a difesa della decta chiesa, acio che non fosse per alcuna persona indebitamente 
occupata….” 
116 EOG.119.27r: “…il decto Franesscho di Filippozzo negendo che costui [Franesco del 
Farsta] no riconosciena per loro la vita tosto come volemo percosse il decto Francesscho del 
Frsata nella decta chiesa con una spada in sula testa con effuxione di sangue della quale fede et 
percosse predicta il decto Franesscho del farsta e morto e mori il decto Francesscho del farsata 
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decades.117 The response from Florence’s guilds, laborers, and working poor was 
immediate, and decisive: the popolo deposed the “magnates’ priorate” on September 22 
1343. The magnates responded by barricading their urban enclaves, and fighting broke 
out on the September 25 1343 between the magnates’ followers and armed companies of 
the popolo. These companies organized spontaneously, as there was a power vacuum 
following the deposition of the magnates’ priorate.  
The Florentine popolo was more successful in this clash than the men of S. 
Cristoforo, but in both cases the popolo can be seen acting on its own initiative, in a 
moment of emergency when the authority of communal institutions had temporarily 
evaporated: the popolo is visible here as a social group in itself and for itself,  
Occasionally, at least, rural popolani were capable of the sort of collective self-defense 
that lay at the base of popular politics throughout communal Italy, even in the midst of a 
social and demographic catastrophe like the Black Death.   
Rural terrorism and elite family strategy 
  “Behind every great fortune lies a great crime.”-Balzac 
What was the logic of rural crime from the magnates’ point of view? How might 
organized raids in the countryside (cavalcate) relate to the magnate lineages’ other 
activities? I explore these questions in the last section of this chapter, maintaining focus 
on the Bardi and their activities in the Valdarno. While further research is needed, cases 
of Bardi violence can be understood as the sharp edge of the family’s efforts to expand 
and consolidate its rural landholding. These efforts should be understood in terms of an 
elite magnate family of the highest rank reacting to its political marginalization at the 
																																																								
117 For these events, see G. Villani, Nuova Cronica, 13.17-19. 
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hands of the popolo, and a deteriorating economic situation as the fourteenth-century 
crisis descended upon Europe.  
  The Bardi were one of the wealthiest and most illustrious Florentine families. 
Along with the Cerchi, Mozzi, and Spini, they were one of the few popular families who 
were admitted to the urban militia (milites pro comuni) in the first half of the thirteenth 
century.118 At its height in the early fourteenth century, the family’s banking company 
was one of the wonders of the European economy, with agents scattered from London to 
Naples. With the Peruzzi, the Bardi were the main Florentine creditors of the English 
crown before Edward III’s “default” of 1339 and the Bardi collapse of 1346. They had 
been involved in papal banking since the 1260s, and were stalwarts of Florence’s Guelf 
Party.119  
The Bardi were also key players in the south Italian grain trade, profiting from the 
longstanding alliance between Florence and the Angevin Regno.120 This dazzling range 
of international connections allowed them to accomplish impressive logistical feats. One 
of them demonstrates the level at which the Bardi moved internationally. On April 3 
1336, pope Benedict XII earmarked 10,000 florins for the purchase of Pugliese grain and 
its delivery to Cilician Armenia, whose king the papacy was attempting to win over to the 
papal obedience.121 The papacy turned to the Bardi company, which rapidly procured the 
requisite grain through their southern factors in Naples, Bari, and Manfredonia, the main 
																																																								
118 Poloni, Potere al popolo, 78. 
119 On Florence’s late thirteenth-century Guelf elite, see Massimo Tarassi, “Il regime 
guelfo,” in Raveggi et. al., 73-164.  
120 On Tuscan mercantile activity in the Italian south, see Giuseppe Petralia, “I Toscani 
nel Mezzogiorno medievale: note sulla genesi e l’evoluzione trecentesca di una relazione di lungo 
periodo,” in La Toscana nel secolo XIV, ed. S. Gensini (Pisa, 1988), at 287-336. 
121 Yves Renouard, “Una spedizione di cereali dalla Puglia in Armenia sequita dai Bardi 
per conto di Benedetto XII” Studi Salentini 18 (Dec., 1964): 242-78, at 245. 
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center for the Adriatic grain trade; the grain was on its way to Lusignan Cyprus by the 
end of April.122  
The lineage’s size and wealth enabled them to weather the vicissitudes of magnate 
status and economic catastrophe better than many of their elite peers. Even after the 
family’s banking company defaulted, they remained one of the city’s richest and most 
numerous families. Counting 138 male members in 1343 and 150 on the eve of the 
plague in 1348, the Bardi were also among the magnate lineages most often denounced to 
the Executor in the 1340s.123  They were denounced 14 times in the biennial 1345-46 
alone.124 Claudia Caduff noted that, whereas only a few members of each magnate 
lineage typically appeared in denuncie, 11 different members of the Bardi are denounced 
in 1345-46. This indicates that more than individual irascibility was at stake in rural 
Bardi violence.  
Perhaps some of the violence against rural people should be understood in the 
context of elite family responses to the dual crises of political marginalization due to 
magnate status, and a deteriorating economic situation. The Bardi were behaving much 
like their Sienese peers were. Sienese families such as the Malavolti had preceded the 
Bardi and other Florentine Guelfs as papal bankers of choice in the thirteenth century. 
These families then invested their banking profits in land and accompanying feudal 
																																																								
122 Renouard, 267. On Tuscan activity in the Mediterranean, see the paired pieces of 
Laura Balletto and Sandra Origone, “I Toscani nel Mediterraneo: l’Occidente, l’Africa, Cipro” 
and “I Toscani nel Mediterraneo: l’area bizantina, il Mar Nero,” in La Toscana nel secolo XIV, 
ed. (Pisa, 1988), at 251-270 and 271-286, respectively.  
123 See Klapisch-Zuber, Retour, 464, for the number of magnates taking oaths before the 
podestà. Although reduced to 59 males by 1434, this still made the Bardi the most numerous of 
the magnate lineages when Cosimo de’Medici abolished the status. See Caduff, “magnati,” 34, 
for the Bardi and other frequently-denounced families. 
124 Caduff, “magnati,” 52. 
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rights, as they eagerly climbed into the ranks of Tuscany’s feudal nobility.125 As Andrea 
Giorgi has shown, an important theme of the conflict between Siena’s magnates and 
popular regimes was these families’ establishment of rural lordships (neo-signorie), in 
imitation of Tuscany’s old feudal elite, and founded on landed estates and their 
privileges.126 Between the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, families that had 
formed part of Siena’s twelfth-century, consular-era urban elite (Giuseppi, Malavolti, 
Rossi) and prosperous urban mercantile lineages such as the Piccolomini began investing 
in small castles and signorial powers in Sienese territory, particuarly in the Val di Chiana 
and Val d’Orcia.127 Paradoxically, this occurred just as the region’s first-level elite was 
being incorporated into the Sienese commune’s jurisdiction. Old feudal families like the 
Berardenghi and Ardengheschi, which had never participated in the commune’s affairs, 
were the Sienese equivalent of the Conti Guidi or Conti Alberti.  
Bardi activity in the Florentine contado parallels the behavior of Siena’s magnate 
families. Even before the banking company’s collapse, the family pursued investments in 
rural territories and their associated rights in part as a response to political-economic 
problems in the city.128 The Bardi family purchased the strategically located fortified 
settlements (castelli) of Mangona, Vernio, and Pozzo in the 1330s, with their associated 
																																																								
125 Richard Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore, 2009), 29, 
observes that this became a classic pattern in Europe: a three-generational cycle of social mobility 
from merchant to noble. 
126 See Andrea Giorgi, “Il conflitto magnati/popolani nelle campagne: il caso senese,” in 
Magnati e popolani nell’Italia comunale (Pistoia,1997): 137-411, with a valuable map of feudal 
holdings in the Senese between 1316-20, at 141. See also Giorgio Chittolini, “Signorie rurali e 
feudi alla fine del Medioevo” in Storia d’Italia, ed. G. Galasso, vol. IV (Turin, 1981), 589-676. 
127 Giorgi, “Il conflitto,” 154; see in particular the reveakung map of fourteenth-century 
signorial possessions at p. 141. 
128 See Najemy, A history of Florence, at 139-144, for the Bardi banking company’s 
collapse and the complex chain reaction this started in communal government and the city’s 
economy. 
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rights of lordship. The complicated status of Mangona and Vernio in the mid-fourteenth 
century reveals the area’s importance to the Florentines, rural lords, and the Bardi. 
Mangona was originally a major seat of the chief branch of the Conti Alberti; its county 
included Vernio as well, before the Bardi purchase.129 Mangona’s lord, Conte Napoleone 
degli Conti Alberti, had pledged Vernio and Mangona to the Florentines following a 1273 
siege. In April 1328, however, Duke Charles of Calabria, currently serving as lord 
(signor), forced the Florentines to yield it to the Sienese magnate Benuccio de’ 
Salimbeni, following his marriage to Contessa Margherita degli Conti Alberti da 
Vernio.130 In 1332, Contessa Margherita sold the signoria di Vernio for 1200 gold florins 
to Palla di Jacopo Strozzi and Chiavello di Boninsegna Machiavelli, acting as middlemen 
for Andrea di Gualtiero dei Bardi, perhaps to avoid the interference of the Florentine 
priorate in this high-stakes transaction between two lineages with a long and fractious 
history of dealings with the commune. Andrea di Gualtiero dei Bardi received the 
signoria from Palla and Chiavello in 1335.131 Around the same time, the Bardi purchased 
the fortified settlement (castello) and lordship (contea) of Pozzo from the Conti da 
Porciano, a branch of the Conti Guidi.132  
These rural activities evidently caused the Florentines some anxiety. In a decree 
of March 14 1337, the commune banned all citizens from purchasing castelli on the 
borders of the Florentine distretto.133 The commune did this, the chronicler Giovanni 
Villani says, in direct response to the Bardi purchases. The popolo had cause for alarm. 																																																								
129 On Mangona and the Conti Alberti, see M. Abantantuono, Michelangelo & L. 
Righetti, I conti Alberti, secoli XI-XIV (Bologna, 2000), with a profile of the rocca di Vernio at 
363-71. 
130 G. Villani, Cronica, 11.84.  
131 G. Villani, Cronica, 12.74. 
132 G. Villani, Cronica, 12.74. 
133 G. Villani, Cronica, 12.74. 
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These settlements’ old owners had waged intermittent warfare against the Florentine 
commune since the twelfth century. This process would not be completed until 1440, 
when the last Guidi stronghold in Tuscany, at Poppi, final refuge of the Conti Guidi da 
Modigliana, fell to a Florentine army.134  
The settlements the Bardi were accumulating in the 1330s were situated 
strategically. Vernio lies in the Val di Bisenzio, along one of the routes connecting Prato 
to Bologna. Mangona lies six kilometers away on the opposite slope of the spur 
separating the upper Val di Sieve from the Val di Bisenzio. Together, these strongholds 
could interdict traffic and communications between Florence and the Romagna. The  
castello of Pozzo, an old holding of the da Porciano branch of the Conti Guidi, lay in 
present-day Dicomano, at the opposite end of the Val di Sieve. Dicomano lies 17 
kilometers upstream from the meeting point of the Sieve and Arno rivers, Pontassieve, 
and 10 kilometers downstream from the Guidi strongholds of S. Godenzo and S. Bavello.  
Taken together, these three strategic holdings allowed the Bardi to close off 
important sectors of the contado to Florence, while providing steady incomes to the 
family through feudal dues and levies on merchants. Such behavior would have been 
entirely in line with the signorial identity the Bardi embraced with such alacrity. Rural 
lords such as the Ubaldini and Guidi had long used their hilltop rocche to intercept 
traffic, especially grain shipments bound for Florence. Strategic rural strongholds also 
provided shelters for elite families in times of danger. 
																																																								
134 On the history of Poppi and the region during the early modern period, see Giovanna 
Benadusi, A provincial elite in early modern Tuscany. Family and power in  
the creation of the state (Baltimore and London, 1996). 	
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Further evidence of the Bardi family’s move towards becoming a major signorial 
presence in the countryside comes from Giovanni Villani’s account of the Bardi family’s 
1340 conspiracy against the commune. The destruction of the commune’s records before 
1343 makes it impossible to confirm his version of the story, but there is no reason to 
discount it. Villani says that the Bardi organized a conspiracy against the priorate 
following Piero de’ Bardi’s conviction and fine of six thousand lire by the commune’s 
capitano della guardia, Iacopo di Gabrielle da Gubbio, and the commune’s confiscation 
of the property of Mangona.135 What was Piero de’ Bardi convicted for? Beating a vassal 
(fedele) on his estate of Vernio. Villani notes that, because he was a vassal and not a 
resident of the Florentine distretto (distrettuale), the man was tortured.136 This sort of 
violence against rural people is comparable to how the Agli treated their would-be vassal 
Vieri, and the Bardi the men of S. Cristoforo in Perticaia. Disciplining disobedient 
vassals was simply what lords did. 
The Bardi response to these judicial and financial sanctions reveals the strength 
and influence of the family on the eve of the banking firm’s collapse. It also reveals the 
dense network of allies the family could activate among the rural lords of Tuscany, as 
well as fellow urban magnate lineages such as the Frescobaldi and Rossi. According to 
Villani, the Frescobaldi joined the conspiracy out of anger at the condemnation of Messer 
Bardo by the same official, the capitano della guerra Jacopo di Gabrielle, who 
condemned Piero de’ Bardi. The list of Bardi allies from the countryside is a veritable 
who’s who of northeastern Tuscany’s rural lords: Count Marcovaldo dei Guidi, the 																																																								
135 G. Villani, Nuova Cronica, 12.118. 
136 G. Villani, 12.118: “In que’ tempi fu condannato per lo detto mesere Iacopo messere 
Piero de’ Bardi in libre VI mille, perch’avea offeso un suo fedele da Vernia, non istrettuale di 
Firenze, onde gli parve ricevere torto.” 
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powerful Tarlati family of Arezzo, the Pazzi del Valdarno, the Ubertini, Ubaldini, the 
Guazalotti da Prato, and the signor of Volterra, Ottaviano dei Belforti.137 Despite their 
centrality to the Florentine economy and their status, even as magnates, among the city’s 
greatest families, the Bardi were willing to gamble everything on an old-fashioned 
attempt to, in Villani’s words, levare il romore e correre la città and “remake the city 
anew, that is to destroy the popolo.”138  
This conspiracy might have succeeded, but for Iacopo degli Alberti del Giudice’s 
warning to the priorate. The Bardi were acting here again very much like their Sienese 
magnate counterparts. The Tolomei attempted a coup in 1346, and would go to war with 
the Sienese commune in 1372 and 1385.139 They even sided with the Florentines in 1390, 
and Bertoccio dei Tolomei would lead destructive raids in the Senese as a captain in the 
Florentine army.140 Just as the Conti Guidi sided with the Bardi in their planned coup of 
1340, the Conti Aldobrandeschi da Santa Fiore, Siena’s equivalents, went to war with 
Siena in 1369 following the Emperor Charles IV’s Roman expedition. Exclusion from 
political power was hardly a deathknell to the wealthiest magnates’ power; it could 
function as a spur to active war with the popular communes. 
Numerous Bardi men were exiled and faced confiscations following the 
suppression of the 1340 conspiracy. Among these were some who would occupy S. 
Cristoforo in 1349: Andrea and Gualtierotto (“Totto”) di Filippozzo, their cousin 
Francesco, and Bindo di Andrea. Totto’s branch of the Bardi appears to have held Pozzo 
																																																								
137 Villani, 12.118.  
138 Villani, 12.118: “ella mattina vegnente, come le genti fossero allo esequio de’ morti, 
levare il romore e correre la città, e uccidere mesere Iacopo Gabrielli e’ caporali de’ reggenti, e 
abattere l’uficio di priori e rifare in Firenze nuovo stato, ecchi disse disfare il popolo.” 
139 Caferro, Mercenary companies, 25. 
140 Caferro, Mercenary companies, 25. 
	 357	
and its privileges. When the commune purchased Pozzo from the family in 1375, the 
Bardi men party to the deal included Totto’s sons Bartolomeo and Lorenzo, and one of 
the castello di Pozzo’s towers was known as the “torre Brestaglie de Mugello olim Totti 
Filippozzi” even after the Florentines took control of it.141 It was Bindo’s father, Andrea, 
who had purchased the county of Mangona from the Conti Alberti. He would be forced to 
buy it back from the commune of Florence in 1341, along with the county of Vernio, for 
the sum of 7750 gold florins. The commune had confiscated these properties from the 
family for Andrea’s role in the 1340 conspiracy. This was 6550 florins more than what 
Andrea had paid to Contessa Margherita degli Alberti. It is unclear whether the Bardi 
actually paid this massive sum, but the price demanded reflects the value of the holding 
to both parties. If Andrea did pay, this is evidence for the lineage’s continued prosperity 
despite the failed coup, popular rage against the magnates, and looming troubles with the 
banking firm.  
In addition to organized raids (cavalcate) like that on S. Cristoforo, individual 
members of the Bardi were often denounced for assaults on popolani in the stretch of the 
Valdarno between Rosano and Figline-Incisa Valdarno.142 The family originated in the 
area around Bagno a Ripoli, just upstream from Florence. As noted above, the Bardi were 
able to call on leading feudal families of the area for aid in the 1340 conspiracy, lineages 
like the Pazzi, Conti Guidi, and Ubertini. The Bardi were also an established presence 
around the market towns of Figline-Incisa Valdarno and Rignano sull’Arno. The 
Florentine commander of Incisa Valdarno’s garrion expelled Bardi men and other 
magnate families from the settlement on October 2 1340, in response to the family’s 																																																								
141 Pirillo, Insediamenti, II, 58. 
142 EOG.21.54r; EOG.51.5r; EOG.96.10r; 21r; 52r; 61r; EOG.22.70r. 
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abortive coup; they were probably seen as a security risk.143 The Bardi were entwined 
with Tuscany’s feudal elite in punishment as in conspiracy. Following the Florentine 
army’s seizure of Mangona in 1340, it turned on the Conti Guidi da Porciano, enemies of 
Florence and supporters of the 1340 coup.144 The Florentine army took Count Guido 
Alberto’s rocca of San Bavello, in the Florentine Alps east of Florence and upstream 
from the Bardi holding of Dicomano.145 Bardi power overlapped with that of their rural 
allies in the area around which Bardi attacks on rural people clustered. 
I have emphasized how the Bardi grew closer to first-level elite families such as 
the Conti Guidi and Conti Alberti as they established a signorial presence in the contado. 
It is possible to overstate this, however: the Bardi differed from these older lineages in 
important ways. Most obviously, the Bardi had made their wealth in banking and 
international finance; these activities led to land- and castle-holding, whereas a family 
such as the Conti Guidi never went into commerce. More significantly, the Bardi 
maintained a capacity for united action across family branches that the comital families 
conspicuously lacked. Dante immortalized the fratricidal nature of the Conti Alberti; 
likewise, from the thirteenth century on a major cause of the collapse of Guidi power in 
Tuscany was the incessant squabbling between the lineage’s branches.  
Perhaps the most important difference between the Bardi and their paragons, 
however, is in relations with the Florentine commune. The Bardi, even as magnates and 
even as they feudalized, remained important supporters of the commune. The banking 
company would play an important role in propping up Florentine finances in the late 
1330s and early 1340s. Bardi men also continued to serve the commune as emissaries and 																																																								
143 ASF.Responsive.1.15. 
144 Villani, Cronica, 12.125. 
145 Villani, Cronica, 12.125. 
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castellans, in a clear example of Christiane Klapisch-Zuber’s retour à la citè. This was 
true even in the wake of memorable clashes between the family and the popolo. In the 
fall of 1342, the Duke of Athens, at that point still Florence’s signor for life, sent 
Geronzio “Gozzo” dei Bardi as his emissary to the Bolognese mercenary and exile Ettore 
da Panico, besieged in the small castello of Laterino, on the borders of the Aretino.146 In 
1359, Bindo dei Bardi, lord of the contea di Pozzo, headed local Florentine troops in the 
upper Valdarno, and was charged with improving Incisa Valdarno’s fortifications.147 
Even in the crisis period of the 1340s and after decades of exclusion from the priorate, 
the family remained deeply entwined with Florentine state power in the countryside. The 
nature of these ties are important: low-level offices such as castellan may have had less 
prestige than the commune’s councils and priorate. Yet their quotidian nature ensured 
that Bardi men holding these offices were embedded in communities like Incisa in an 
official capacity. This was so even as their cousins and kinsmen were attacking locals. 
Despite the tormented relationship between the Bardi and the Florentine popolo, 
the lineage still, in an example of ambiguous engagement, was happy to serve the 
commune when it was convenient. Viewed through the prism of family politics, serving 
as a Florentine castellan was a tactic, just as trying to seize control of the commune 
through a coup was: either way, the goal would have been the continued survival and 
prosperity of the linege, and the Bardi achieved both. The family would enjoy a long 
tenure in the Mugello and upper Valdarno. The county of Vernio would not be formally 
incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Tuscany until the 1815 Congress of Vienna 
definitively abolished feudalism. The family archive of the Bardi di Vernio contains a run 																																																								
146 Ciucciovino, Cronica Italiana Trecentesca, 816, citing the Chronicon Estense. 
147 ASF.Missive.12.97v. 
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of documents pertaining to the church of San Cristoforo in Perticaia from 1883 to 
1905.148 It seems that in the medieval Valdarno as in Risorgimento-era Sicily, things had 
to change a lot in order to remain the same. 
Some provisional conclusions  
 More research is needed on the efforts of magnate families like the Bardi to shift 
resources and activity to the contado in the face of economic difficulties. It is currently 
difficult to know whether the sort of violence the Bardi deployed in the Valdarno 
increased as the century wore on. Nevertheless, a few noteworthy points emerge from a 
focus on the Bardi and rural communities.  
In scholarship on Florence’s medieval expansion, there is a major emphasis on 
military conquest. Besieging and taking rural castelli, fighting off the occasional 
aggressive adventurer such as Mastino della Scala or the Visconti of Milan, or 
establishing fortified settlements (terre nuove) were undoubtedly important activities of 
the commune, and chroniclers devoted much space to these events. Yet the duration and 
intensity of these conquests seems doubtful. High medievalists generally see the early 
thirteenth century as the turning point in Florence’s “conquest of the contado”, while 
those working on the Trecento and later see the post-1348 period in similar terms, as the 
commune expanded beyond its old contado. 
What was the value of this conquest? Reading Giovanni Villani’s chronicles, one 
is struck by the frequency with which the Florentines had to besiege and destroy the same 
rural strongholds. Ubaldini castelli in the Mugello (Montegufoni; Montegufoni), Guidi 
possessions such as Stia or S. Godenzo, Mangona and Vernio: the Florentines could take 																																																								
148 See Gli archivi Bardi di Vernio: Inventario del fondo Bardi Serzelli, ed. Ilaria 
Marcelli (Vernio: Centro Bardi, 2006), 62, for a list of the relevant documents. 
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these places, but apparently could not hold them. Rural feudal families sometimes did not 
even need to retake their castelli-as with Mangona, the commune was not above selling 
these places back to the same families it had won them from. It is unquestionable that, 
over the broad period between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, the balance of power 
in Tuscany swung gradually but irrevocably to Florence, and away from rival communes 
and rural lords. Less clear is the importance of warfare and fortifications in this process, 
especially when Florence entrusted magnate families such as the Da Barberino and Bardi 
with these fortifications. 
It is important also to remember that magnate violence such as I have discussed 
here was not isolated brutality in an otherwise peaceful countryside. It existed, rather, on 
a spectum of violence that accompanied famine, recurrent disease cycles, and ongoing 
political instability to make the 1340s a remarkably catastrophic decade for Florence and 
much of Europe. This spectrum of violence included imperial expeditions such as Henry 
VII’s descent in 1312 or Charles IV’s in 1368; warfare between the Florentines and 
external foes like Castruccio Castracani; elite brigandage such as the Ubaldini practiced 
on merchants and travelers in the Florentine Alps; raids like that of the Bardi; and the 
depredations of foreign mercenary companies such as that of Walter von Urslingen, self-
described enemy of God, pity, and mercy. 
 Rural Tuscans, especially in isolated mountain settlements like Mangona, were 
regularly exposed to the threat of extreme physical violence in this period. This threat 
came from their lords, mercantile, feudal, or otherwise; mercenaries and foreign troops; 
and from the Florentine commune itself, for giving “false” testimony. This universe of 
violence did offer opportunities of a certain sort for rural people willing to join a passing 
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mercenary company, a nobleman’s entourage, or go brigand.149 Elite-imposed violence, 
whether in the form of magnate raids or at the hands of mercenaries employed by 
Florence,  was a significant force shaping the lives of residents of Florence’s rural 
territories in the later Middle Ages. 
This leads to a second point regarding the nature of Florentine power in the 
countryside. Even in places where Florentine sovereignty was unquestioned, as in 
Rignano sull’Arno, the commune was unable and probably uninterested in keeping the 
social peace there. Rural people faced magnate raids and the imposition of signorial 
powers alone. This could lead to some interesting expedients, such as the self-defense 
group of S. Cristoforo, which demonstrate the resiliency and resourcefulness of rural 
communities threatened with elite thugs and killers like Totto dei Bardi. This was not 
enough, however, to hold off determined magnate encroachments on rural properties and 
their dues, especially in a crisis period such as 1348-1349. This failure made a mockery 
of the Florentine popolo’s claims to serve as guardians of residents of the contado and 
distretto, and the countryside’s ecclesiastical entities there.150 Indeed, in its continued use 
of local magnates as castellans and local representatives, the commune was effectively 
providing a cover for these families to consolidate and legitimzie their power in places 
such as Mucciano and Incisa, legally or otherwise.151 
																																																								
149 On brigandage, see: Claudia Caduff, “I publici latrones nella città e nel contado di 
Firenze a metà Trecento,” in Istituzioni giudiziarie e aspetti della criminalità nella Firenze 
tardomedievale, ed. Andrea Zorzi, monograph number of Ricerche Storiche  
XVIII (1988): 497-521; Giovanni Cherubini, “Appunti sul brigantaggio in Italia alla fine del 
Medioevo,” in Signori, contadini, borghesi (Florence, 1974), 103-33. 
150 See, for example, EOG.96.10r, for an inquest against Andrea di Barduccio dei Bardi 
for assaulting Domenico di Duccio, abbot of the unidentified abbey of “Tagliafine”, probably 
near Dicomano. 
151 See ASF.Missive.7.7v for the commune’s decree of March 10 1342 authorizing 
Angelo and Bindo di Caro degli Agli to fortify Mucciano, in Sant’Agata in the Mugello. 
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Magnate violence played a key role in asserting elite claims over rural lands and 
people, whether or not the Florentine courts were involved. Like purchasing castles and 
fighting the commune, abusing one’s (would-be) vassals was part of what made Tuscan 
lords such. Less prosaically, the violence Totto and his kinsmen deployed against the 
men of S. Cristoforo needs to be understood on several levels. Most broadly, it was one 
incident in an ongoing effort by the Bardi to expand their access to rural properties and 
signorial rights. The power vacuum left by the Black Death provided the family with an 
opportunity to do so with functional impunity.  
 This sort of magnate entrepeneurialism was functionally supported by the 
operation of Florence’s public courts. These Florentine courts could demand compliance 
from rural people, but rarely secured convictions against violent members of the elite. 
When they did, the convictions and sentences were later overturned. Threatened with 
violence for defying nobles for other reasons (such as refusing to become a tenant), 
witnesses also faced the danger of violent retribution for testifying. Elite families could 
usually make life more miserable for rural Tuscans than the Florentine state. This resulted 
in a veil of knowing silence surrounding elite crimes in the countryside.  
 I have focused here on those who did not provide information, but many Tuscans 
did testify. These people were, perversely, exposed to fines or imprisonment as well. The 
courts fined those whose testimony or denunciations were deemed false. The institutional 
logic of the Executor’s court produced a situation in which the potential for harm far 
outweighed any potential benefits from giving testimony. This was a major disincentive 
for rural Tuscans to comply with the law and testify in court. Every time the Executor 
dismissed a denunciation for lack of proof, every time a magnate was allowed to murder 
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a tenant and intimidate witnesses, Florence’s criminal courts were colluding in magnate 
oppression of the rural popolo.152 From the perspective of rural people the Ordinances of 
Justice, the foundational text for the Executor’s court and the authority of the Florentine 
court system, must have been a mockery of the very idea of justice. 
 Places such as Mucciano and San Cristoforo were unquestionably in Florentine 
territory; the only reason we know about the attacks I have discussed is because the 
Florentine courts exercised jurisdiction over them. This jurisdiction was not theoretical, 
either: despite everything, people continued to write denunciations and walk to Florence 
to lodge them. The Executor’s court continued to initiate inquests into these 
denunciations, however desultorily. Elite families such as the Agli and Bardi were deeply 
enmeshed in communal politics, even when Francesco dei Bardi and his kinsmen boasted 
of having broken the Florentine popolo. Even cases of open rebellion such as 1340 and 
1343 can be interpreted as evidence for the fundamental stability of the communal 
regime. The Bardi goal in 1340 was hijacking the institutions of the commune in order to 
secure their economic resources, not to destroy them.153    
 Yet the commune’s rural presence was distinctly ghostly, and its power to coerce 
rural elites was often as frail as that of a specter. The Executor could fine and ban 
magnates when it bothered to prosecute an inquest. It could summon witnesses. It could 
ensnare the unfortunate and unwary in what Thomas Kuehn has described as the law’s 
																																																								
152 I echo here Chris Wickham, Courts and conflict in twelfth-century Tuscany, 216-217: 
“When weaker third parties were the principal victims of violence….its neutral reception by 
arbiters meant then-as it does now-collusion in oppression.” 
153 See Chris Wickham’s remarks about the nature of noble coups in the early medieval 
Lombard Regnum Italicum; he in turn was echoing Max Gluckman’s arguments for the 19th-
century Zulu kingdom: Wickham, Early medieval Italy: Central power and local society (Ann 
Arbor, 1981), 37-38. 
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“labyrinthine and mystical ways.”154 It could fine and ban contumacious witnesses. It 
could amass a staggering amount of documentation, much of it numbingly repetitive, 
almost ritualistic. Yet it rarely did much of anything with this documentation. The 
commune was unable to protect its subjects from rural lords, and this impotence extended 
to those subjects who complied with what the statutes demanded. This undermines 
previous work emphasizing the significance of the system of anonymous denunciations 
as a technology of power: technologies of power, like all technologies, are embedded in 
specific socio-economic and legal contexts which shape and can sometimes blunt their 
effectiveness. 
Fourteenth-century Tuscans were faced with a phantasmic state that produced 
much documentation but little protection, or anything identifiable as justice. This was 
despite decades of popular government and the progressive expansion of Florentine 
military control over the contado and distretto. For most rural people, the state mostly 
meant itinerant court messengers, grasping taxmen, and officials who were quite happy to 
shakedown peasants for a few soldi, but who were never around when serious violence 
happened.155 They also had to contend with a local nobility who possessed solid power 
bases in the countryside, numerous armed followers, and the willingness to exert public, 
humiliating violence that reinforced their claims to property and obedience.156 Inflicting 
this sort of violence was an important part of elite Tuscan culture, despite the commune’s 
																																																								
154 Thomas Kuehn, Law, family & Women. Towards a legal anthropology of renaissance 
Italy (Chicago, 1991), 80. 
155 See, for example, EOG.122.133r-135r, for an extended inquest against Filippo di Lapo 
dei Cuffarelli, a Florentine serving as captain of the League of Chianti, charged with extortion 
and dereliction of duty. 
156 Lansing, “Magnate violence,” 40. 
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ongoing attempts to tame what our documents vividly describe as the potentes.157 This 
situation explains the paradox between the mass of initial denunciations, and the 
frequency with which rural witnesses claimed ignorance: studied evasion was the only 
option available to many people. This was a performance, in the thespian sense, of the 
legal duties Florence required of its subjects.158 The act of denunciation, risky though it 
was, was far less risky than the act of giving testimony as a witness. 
In his provocative study of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, the anthropologist James 
C. Scott remarks that “the job of peasants, you might say, is to stay out of the 
archives.”159 Tuscans were adept at this, hiding in plain sight, so to speak. Rural 
communities such as Rignano sull’Arno faced numerous, overlapping threats in the 
fourteenth century, from plague and famine to a ramshackle criminal court system and 
elite predation. Their coping mechanisms were typically silence and evasion, and very 
rarely, acts of desperate courage like those of Francesco del Farsata and his comrades in 
1349. Calculation and cunning were needed to survive in this world, dominated by men 
like Totto dei Bardi: in the words of a Calabrian proverb, “he who behaves honestly, dies 
miserably” (chi ara diritto, muoia disperato).
																																																								
157 For the culture of the milites see Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, Cavaliers et citoyens: 
Guerre, conflits et sociéte dans l’Italie communale XIIe-XIIIe siècles (Paris, 2004) and Lansing, 
The Florentine Magnates, 164-91. 
158 See Luke Roberts’s comments on Tokugawa-era Japan, Performing the great peace, 3. 
159 Scott, The art of not being governed. An anarchist history of upland southeast Asia 
(New Haven, 2009), 34.	
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Conclusion: A popolo rotto?: The eclipse of the Florentine popular commune and the dual crisis 
of the fourteenth century 
 
This study ends in 1350, with Tuscany still reeling in the fallout of the Black 
Death, which arrived in Florence in March 1348.1  There is a large and ever-expanding 
literature on the plague, its pathogenic identity, and its impact on western Eurasia’s 
population. This is a vast topic, regarding which I happily refer the reader to other 
studies.2 In terms of sheer loss of life, the plague was an absolute catastrophe. This was 
especially true for Tuscany, one of the most densely urbanized areas in Europe in 1347. 
Around half the population of Florence is estimated to have died in the first plague 
summer. Public institutions, including the popular courts, ceased operation during June-
August 1348, crippled by the fact and trauma of mass death. The city would never fully 
recover its pre-plague prosperity, economically or demographically. Not until the 
eighteenth century would Florence’s population overspill its final medieval wall circuit, 
completed just before the plague.  
The medium-term significance of the plague on the Florentine state’s expansion is 
unquestioned.3 Scholars such as Andrea Zorzi have convincingly argued that recurrent 
plague cycles were an important factor in Florence’s late-medieval emergence as 
																																																								
1 Piero Gualtieri, “La Peste Nera a Firenze,” in Portale Storia di Firenze, Marzo 2014 
(http://www.storiadifirenze.org/?temadelmese=la-peste-nera-a-firenze). 
2 See in particular Ole J. Benedictow, The Black Death 1346-1353: The complete history 
(London: Boydell Press, 2012); George Huppert, After the Black Death (Bloomington, IN.,1998); 
David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West. Cambridge, MA., 1998);   
Boris V. Schmid, Ulf Büntgen, W. Ryan Easterday, Christian Ginzler, Lars Walløe, Barbara 
Bramanti, and Nils Chr. Stenseth “Climate-driven introduction of the Black Death and successive 
plague reintroductions into Europe,” PNAS 112 (2005): 3020-3025; Elina Gertsman, “Visualizing 
Death: Medieval Plagues and the Macabre,” in Piety and Plague: From Byzantium to the 
Baroque, ed. Franco Mormando and Thomas Worcester (Kirksville, MO., 2007), 64-89. 
3 On this, see Andrea Zorzi, “L’organizzazione del contado e del distretto,” in La 
trasformazione di un quadro politico (Florence, 2008) [hereafter “Zorzi, La trasformazione”], 
209-256 and “Il dominio territoriale: formazione e pratiche di governo,” 257-279. 
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Tuscany’s dominant power.4  Already more populous than local competitors before the 
Black Death, Florence would weather subsequent revisitations of plague better than 
Siena, Pistoia, or Lucca.5 This combined with ongoing warfare, periodic famines, and 
terminal political instability steadily reduced Florence’s competitors in the jungle warfare 
of Tuscan city-state rivalry. After miraculously surviving the final and most dangerous of 
its wars with Visconti-ruled Milan in 1402, Florence was the dominant power in 
Florence; its brutal siege and subjugation of Pisa in 1406 can be taken as the culmination 
of a process with roots in the consular age. 
It is important to remember, however, that the Black Death struck a society that 
was already in crisis. Europe by the 1340s was already in the grip of the Little Ice Age, 
and had been subject to periodic waves of famine since the famous one of 1315.6 Tuscany 
was the scene of frequent warfare between Florence and all its neighbors. Wars with 
strongmen like Mastino della Scala of Verona or Castruccio Castracani of Lucca were 
only larger-scale examples of ongoing strife. Giovanni Villani, himself a victim of the 
1348 plague, famously depicted 1338 as a capstone for Florentine power and prosperity. 
Following him, Florence’s first great modern historian, Robert Davidsohn, ended his 
exhaustive history of medieval Florence in that year. The political strife discussed in 
chapter 5 should, then, be understood as a process in which the general, structural crisis 
																																																								4	See	Zorzi,	“il	dominio	territoriale,”	in	La	trasformazione	di	un	quadro	
politico	(Florence,	2008),	at	257-260,	for	Tuscan	population	at	mid-century.	5	On	Lucca	and	its	rural	territory	during	this	period,	see	Franca	Leverotti,	“La	crisi	demografica	nella	Toscana	del	Trecento:	l’esempio	delle	Sei	Miglia	lucchesi,”	in	
La Toscana nel Trecento, S. Gensini, ed. (Pisa, 1988), at 67-150. 
6 See William Chester Jordan, The Great Famine (Princeton, NJ., 1998), for the 
history of the Great Famine of 1315-1322.	
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of later medieval Europe worked its way through the particular social relations and 
institutions of Florence and its rural territories. 
 The anno caldo of 1343 demonstrates how strained Florentine society had 
become under the pressure of incessant warfare, falling indirect tax (gabelle) receipts, 
periodic famines, and above all, the collapse of the city’s great banking companies, above 
all the Bardi and Peruzzi.7 As historians since Marvin Becker have shown, the crippling 
costs of warfare, the public debt, and the collapse of the banking companies played a 
fundamental role in transforming the medieval commune into a harsher, more 
authoritarian and more narrowly oligarchic “work of art”, Jacob Burckhardt’s famous 
Renaissance state. The critical months of late 1343 surrounding the expulsion of the Duke 
of Athens demonstrate how high the stakes had become for all parties in Florentine 
politics.  
Faced with a post-expulsion priorate composed by the bishop and a coalition of 
magnate and non-magnate elite families, the urban popolo reacted swiftly. The magnates 
barricaded their urban enclaves on September 22 1343, and fighting began three days 
later. In urban warfare not seen the civil war between Black and White Guelfs of the first 
decade of the century, the popolo’s self-organized militia overwhelmed the magnates. 
The Oltrarno was the magnates’ stronghold in this last old-style war with the popolo. 
Villani claims that the grandi had solicited the aid of a rogue’s gallery of popular 
enemies: “the counts [Guidi and Alberti], the Ubaldini, the Pisans, and some of the 
tyrants of Lombardy and the Romagna”.8 Following their victorious descent on the Bardi 
																																																								
7 On the events of 1343, see G. Villani, Cronica, 13.16-28. 
8 G. Villani, Cronica, 13.21: “Stando tutta la città inn arme e gelosia, i grandi del 
popolo e ‘l popolo de’ grandi, comè detto, dicendosi molte e varie novelle per la terra, e 
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Oltrarno enclaves from the hill of S. Giorgio, the Florentine popolo destroyed 22 of the 
family’s palaces and homes, and reinforced the Ordinances of Justice.  
This was only one of many crises the commune faced in the 1340s. The Peruzzi 
had defaulted in 1343, and the Bardi would in 1346, the same year as a major famine; the 
plague arrived in 1348. The third popular regime, which had seized power following the 
September fighting of 1343, would be undermined by this sequence of catastrophes. It 
was the tragedy of Italy’s popular regimes that they were the product of the economic 
boom period lasting from the later eleventh to the early fourteenth century.9 When the 
economy lurched into crisis, as it did throughout Eurasia following the disintegration of 
the pax Mongolica, the social relations and political institutions thrown up by the boom 
period could not weather the challenge.  
Thus, it seems fitting to end this study in 1350. The 1350s and 1360s were 
difficult times for Florence, as for most places in Europe. The War of the Eight Saints 
(1375-1378) would precipitate the next great political-institutional crisis in the 
commune’s history. Any study of the state and social conflict in late medieval Florence 
must address the Ciompi Revolt (1378), and this study does so by deliberately avoiding 
it. The event of the Ciompi occupies a special place in Florentine history, and is 
																																																																																																																																																																					
come i grandi arebbono grande aiuto da’ conti e Ubaldini e Pisani e d’altri tiranni di 
Lombardia e di Romagna, e che dovieno afforzarsi Oltrarno, ch’avieno la signoria di tutti 
i ponti, e di qua fare cominciare l’assalto giovedì XXV di settembre…..” 
9 On the Italian late medieval crisis, see above all the works of Giorgio Cherubini: 
Una comunità dell’Appennino dal XIII al XV secolo (Florence, 1972); Signori, contadini, 
borghesi. (Florence, 1974). On Cherubini’s work on the late medieval crisis, see Franco 
Franceschi, “Giovanni Cherubini e la crisis tardo-medievale,” in Uomini, Paesaggi, 
Storie, eds. D. Balestracci, et. al. (Florence, 2012), 1131-1149. 
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consequently the subject of a large body of scholarship.10 Yet the bright light of 1378 
should not obscure the longer-term developments that lay behind the group and event of 
the Ciompi. Throughout this study, I have tried to keep in mind historian Alma Poloni’s 
argument that the medieval popolo saw itself as conservatives, not revolutionaries: even 
as it challenged the milites for political power in the thirteenth century and drastically 
reconfigured the communes, the popolo saw itself as defending the traditions of the early 
communes, not subverting them.11 I would argue that, in the same way, the language, 
symbols, and actions of the 1378 rebels hearkened back to those of the radicals of the 
1290s, as much as they evoked any future themes of class struggle. 
This study began with the late eleventh-century crisis and collapse of the 
Kingdom of Italy, following the civil wars between emperor Henry IV and pope Gregory 
VII. In the first chapter, I sketched the geographical and political background to the 
emergence of Florence as a commune, and its sense of civic identity. The multifaceted 
eleventh-century crisis of the Kingdom was balanced by an underlying economic 
dynamism in many of its constituent parts, especially the seaports (Genoa, Pisa) and the 
traditional mercantile and royal centers (Milan; Pavia; Lucca). When the structure of the 
state buckled and collapsed in the early twelfth century, the urban society which had 
always undergirded it in north-central Italy were buoyed along in their ad hoc 
improvisations by a baseline prosperity that would last until the late thirteenth and early 																																																								
10 See most recently: Ernesto Screpanti, L’angelo della liberazione nel tumulto dei 
Ciompi (Siena, 2008) and “La politica dei Ciompi: petizioni, riforme e progetti dei 
rivoluzionari fiorentini del 1378,” ASI XLCV (2007): 3-56; Patrick Lantschner, “The 
‘Ciompi Revolution’ constructed: Modern historians and the nineteenth-century paradigm 
of revolution,” Annali di Storia di Firenze 4 (2009): 277-97; and A. Stella, La Révolte des 
Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le travail (Paris, 1993) 11	See	Alma	Poloni,	Potere	al	poplo,	31-36,	for	the	popolo’s	self-perception	as	restorationists.	
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fourteenth centuries. Florence’s first popular regime (1250-1260) exemplifies this: led by 
the city’s popular elite, it embarked on an ambitious program of urban public works and 
aggressive expansion in Tuscany. 
In my analysis of the Ordinances of Justice and their social context, I argued that 
their various redactions expressed, and were shaped by, the balance of power between 
magnates and popolo, but also between the popolo minuto and the popolo grasso, 
particularly its leading group of judicial experts and elite merchants. This ruling group 
initially drafted the Ordinances as a defensive reaction to the violence and arrogance of 
the grandi. Yet the grassi quickly lost control of the situation. In the period 1293-1295, 
Giano Della Bella’s faction of the popolo attempted to reconfigure the commune into a 
tool of class struggle against the magnates. Their goal was to permanently eliminate the 
grandi from civic life. They were frustrated in this for numerous reasons. I have 
emphasized the structural limitations on popular action, compared to the tactical and 
strategic position of the popolo grasso and the magnates.  
 Remigio dei Girolami’s sermons to the priorate encapsulate the tension in the city 
during the 1290s, and the popular elite’s desire for social peace at any price. These 
sermons legitimized the ceto dirigente’s deposition and exile of Giano Della Bella, and 
Remigio would later play a role in protecting the magnates from popular vengeance 
following their abortive revolt of July 5 1295. This intervention led directly to the 
renewed factional strife of the first decade of the 1300s. Defeated and humiliated, but not 
destroyed, by the popular coalition of the 1290s, Florence’s elite would launch the city on 
one more bout of pyrrhic civil war, which would end in 1308. Such destructive, outright 
warfare would not explode again in medieval Florence, with the exception of 1343. 
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In the third chapter, my focus shifted from the development of popular politics 
and social developments to the functioning of popular institutions. Although Florence’s 
popular courts regularly heard cases from the contado, and rural complaints in fact 
dominated the Executor’s caseload, little work has been done on the mechanics of how 
knowledge of these institutions percolated among rural people. Evidence from the 
commune’s statutes and rural denunciations indicates that the lowest strata of communal 
officials, the locally-appointed rettori, as well as the courts’ messengers, were the crucial 
middlemen standing between the urban courts and rural people. 
 Knowledge of the denunciation and inquisitorial systems was widespread in the 
Florentine contado. Denunciations to the Executor’s court followed a fairly sophisticated 
rhetorical and lexical format, situating particular crimes within a broader popular 
discourse based on popular solidarity against the magnates, and the value of social peace. 
This popular discourse had its roots in the sociopolitical struggles of the thirteenth 
century, and had become a fundamental part of Florentine political culture by the 1340s. 
This legal knowledge was essential for users of the inquisitorial system, such as the rural 
notary Andrea di Ugo profiled in chapter 4. Following a discussion of the inquisitorial 
procedure in a Florentine context, I explored there the intersections of judicial procedure, 
social networks, popular discourse, and the politics of land through a case study of the 
dispute between the notary Andrea and members of the magnate Pulci lineage. This 
revealed the tactics available to rural people when pursuing disputes through the popular 
courts, and the manner in which the inquisitorial process could turn on its users. The case 
study also indicates how individual popolani could try to use the courts to pursue their 
own goals, and the importance of social networks for their success or failure. 
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The final chapter of this study focused on the limitations of Florentine justice for 
rural people. These were manifold: overloaded and technically-minded public courts 
were rarely aggressive in pursuing magnate criminals, and the commune’s power to 
enforce its verdicts was limited in the countryside. These limitations, and the violence 
rural people were exposed to, served as a brake on rural peoples’ willingness to cooperate 
in anti-magnate inquests. This is in spite of an ongoing stream of denunciations. This 
apparent paradox can be explained in two ways. Denunciations were not lodged simply to 
end magnate oppression of rural people. As the case of Ser Andrea shows, they could 
also serve as tactical tools for those knowledgeable and daring enough to use the courts 
against their enemies. Thus, successful condemnation of those being denounced was not 
necessarily the goal of denouncers. Furthermore, those cited as witnesses often had little 
incentive to cooperate, for the same reasons. The chapter concluded with a discussion of 
the logic of magnate violence, from the perspective of familial strategies for surviving a 
period of economic recession and political uncertainty. 
   Closing remarks 
The popolo as an organized entity for political action originated as a defensive 
reaction, to the military elite’s monopolization of political power and offices in the 
thirteenth-century communes. During the thirteenth century, this popular movement-itself 
never homogeneous- succeeded in dramatically expanding the number of citizens 
involved in public affairs, and curtailing the violence and urban power bases of the 
grandi. Buoyed by the thirteenth-century economic boom, which stimulated Florence’s 
unprecedented economic growth and political expansion, the Florentine popolo was 
occasionally strong enough to tame, if not entirely defeat, the military elite. At Florence, 
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popular initiatives lay behind important aspects of state formation. These included the 
popular militia, publicly-funded building programs, numerous public institutions, and the 
Ordinances of Justice. These initiatives played an important role in the emergence of 
Florence as a major Italian power, and helped to reshape Florentine society and political 
culture.  
The late medieval popolo, as a political group which sometimes succeeded in 
occupying and reconfiguring the machinery of government (above all at Bologna, 
Florence, Perugia, and Siena), faced a problem that had undermined the podestarial and 
consular-era communal regimes, and many other states in European history. How to 
prevent the usurpation and patrimonialization of public offices, finances, and resources? 
And how to govern or at least pacify and develop a prosperous urban core capable of 
protecting Florentine merchants and surpluses in the contado, in the face of competition 
from aggressive neighbors and unruly feudal lords?  
It is notorious that popular government in Italy was often followed by the sort of 
private lordship (signoria) that the popular movements of the thirteenth century 
organized to prevent.12 At Milan, aristocratic reaction to the popolo produced the 
Visconti signoria, and Ottone Visconti would later mobilize the popolo to neutralize his 
enemies among the nobles. At Florence, the last and most dramatic outburst of popular 
politics, the Ciompi revolt and its aftermath, played a major part in forming the medium-
term conjuncture that resulted in the Medici coup of 1434.  
																																																								
12 The best recent studies of the late medieval signorie are Andrea Zorzi, Le 
signorie cittadine in Italia (secoli XIII-XV) (Milan, 2010), and Riccardo Rao, Signori di 
Popolo. Signoria cittadina e società comunale nell’Italia nord-occidentale, 1275-1350. 
Milan, 2012). 
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I would like to stress here that it seems facile to evaluate the “success” or 
“failure” of the Florentine popolo, much as historian William Caferro argued regarding 
its Sienese peers. Evaluating the popular regimes of medieval Italy as successes or 
failures implies some sort of privileged position of judgment that historians today are ill-
equipped to take. Moving beyond this requires trying to get a sense of what dilemmas the 
Italian cities shared with other premodern polities, north of the Alps and in the 
Mediterranean world they helped shape. I hope that this study has contributed towards 
putting the fascinating, idiosyncratic, but not entirely unique, experience of late medieval 
Italians into dialogue with that of their rough contemporaries in western Eurasia.13 
There is a paradox at the heart of this study, and it derives from the sources I have 
relied upon. On an empirical level, one of the most typical documents of a regime and 
institution intended to protect non-elites from elite violence, and secure the countryside 
against this, are the volumes of denunciations, largely from rural people, against the 
violence and abuses of the elite, against which Florence’s popular offices remained 
helpless, or indifferent (probably both). One result of this development was the creation 
of a careful, diligent record by state officials of the limitations, self-imposed or otherwise, 
on their own power, despite over a century of Florentine public power’s expansion in 
everything from monumental building (the Palazzo del Podestà; the Palazzo della 
Signoria) to judicial techniques and practices (adoption of a mixed inquisitorial 
procedure; the use of anonymous denunciation). One of the most ambitious goals of 
Florence’s second popular regime, the protection of the poor and powerless from the 
																																																								
13 See Patrick Lantschner, “Fragmented cities in the later Middle Ages: Italy and 
the Near East compared,” English Historical Review 130: 544 (2015): 547-582, for an 
interesting essay in this direction. 
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arrogance and violence of the great, allows scholars to uncover something of the gap 
between intention and result in a society that, even at Florence’s early fourteenth-century 
height, was severely constrained by every aspect of its world, from epidemic disease to 
debt default in a capital-short economy.  
In my analysis of Florence’s popular regimes and the horizons of rural people, I 
have emphasized their contemporary social context and the immediate past. Surely these 
emphases are as valid as uncovering what the communes share with us moderns, whether 
this is, as one wishes, civic humanism, participatory politics, cultural achievements, or 
the economic activities of their greatest families.14 Philip Jones famously said that the 
thirteenth-century popular governments raised, but failed to solve, the question of 
government. The implication was that the early modern principalities, such as the Medici, 
Visconti, Sforza, or post-Avignon papacy, successfully solved the problem of 
government for the Italian cities. I would respond by repeating Lenin’s question, 
who/whom: Solved by whom, for whom, at whose expense, and as a result of whose 
defeats?  
																																																								
14 On civic humanism see above all Hans Baron, The crisis of the early Italian 
renaissance (Princeton, NJ, 1966 [1955]), and James Hankins, “The ‘Baron Thesis’ after 
forty years and some recent studies of Leonardo Bruni,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
56 (1995): 309-38; Ronald G. Witt, ‘In the footsteps of the ancients.” The origins of 
humanism from Lovato to Bruni (Boston, 2000). On republicanism and the Renaissance, 
see: Frederick C. Lane, “At the roots of republicanism,” AHR 71 (1966): 403-274; 
Anthony Molho, “The Italian renaissance, made in the U.S.A.,” in Imagined histories, 
eds. A. Molho & G. Wood (Princeton, NJ, 1998), 263-94; Edward Muir, “Was there 
republicanism in the renaissance republics? Venice after Agnadello,” in Venice 
reconsidered, eds. J. Martin & D. Romano (Baltimore, 2000), 137-67.	
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 Figure 6: Via dei martiri del popolo, Florence. Photograph by the author, March 2015. 
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Map Appendices: Medieval Florence and its Environs 
All maps by the author, using ©GoogleEarth imaging 
1. The	Contemporary	Province	of	Florence	and	Central	Italy	
2. Central	Florence	as	it	appears	today,	with	some	significant	medieval	
buildings	marked	
3. Northeastern	Tuscany	and	the	Tuscan-Romagnole	Appennines	
4. The	North-Central	FIorentino	
5. The	Mugello	and	the	Upper	Val	di	Sieve:	The	Modern	Landscape	
6. The	Upper	Arno	Valley	(Valdarno	di	Sopra)	
7. The	Upper	Val	di	Sieve:	Barberino	di	Mugello	and	Latera	
8. Latera	and	its	environs,	with	contemporary	toponyms	
9. The	Val	di	Sieve	with	Bardi	holdings,	ca.	1343	
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Map	Figure	1:	The	Modern	Province	of	Florence	within	the	regione	of	
Tuscany,	and	the	Appennine	core	of	north-central	Italy		
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Map Figure 2: Central Florence as it appears today. Ognissanti was founded in  
1251, S. Maria Novella in 1279 
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Map Figure 3: Northeastern Tuscany and the Tuscan-Romagnole Appennines 
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Map Figure 4: The North-Central FIorentino 
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Map Figure 5: The Mugello and the Upper Val di Sieve: The Modern Landscape (Lago di 
Bilancino is a twentieth-century creation) 
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Map Figure 6: Detail of the modern Val di Sieve, with Barberino di Mugello and Latera and 
the modern road network 
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Map Figure 7: The Upper Arno Valley (Valdarno di Sopra) 
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Map Figure 8: Latera and its environs with local toponyms 
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Map Figure 9: Bardi holdings in the area of the Val di Sieve and the area of Pontassieve: 
Vernio, Mangona, Dicomano (Pozzo), and the Rignano Sull’Arno area
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